THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 NOVEMBER 1970

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005977808
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RIPPUB
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T
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14
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Publication Date: 
November 20, 1970
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i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 The President's Daily Brief 20 November 1970 48 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 0. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 November 1970 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS Monday's private meeting in Paris shows that Hanoi still regards bilateral discussions with the US as the ?way to get the talks moving. (Page 1) On Page 3 we summarize the positions taken by the Soviet delegation in yesterday's SALT talks. Egon Bahr has provided a report of his latest meet- ing with Soviet officials in West Berlin. (Page 4) On Page Chil Latin America Egypt/ //(Page 6) Saigon's cabinet has vetoed recent trade agreements with Cambodia. (Page 7) We report on the current military situation in north- ern Laos on Page 8, and on Page 9 note the increas- ing activity of Chinese Communist antiaircraft units against US aircraft in the roadbuilding area. The Soviet submarine tender left Cienfuegos yester- day. (Page 9) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY VIETNAM The one thing that emerges clearly from the private meeting in Paris on 16 Novem- ber is that Hanoi still views bilateral discussions with the US as the way to get the talks off dead center. This was ap- parent when Xuan Thuy, in response to Am- bassador Bruce's statement that the US will not negotiate the political future of South Vietnam without the full participation of the Saigon government, asked whether Bruce could "discuss anything about political problems." The North Vietnamese are likely to hold to this view, at least until they get a better reading of US/GVN terms for a political settlement. If they see any room for negotiations on terms they might find acceptable, we would expect them to bear down even harder on specific issues, as Xuan Thuy did when he asked for US views on how general elections should be organ- ized in South Vietnam. In our view, such issues, and not the Com- munists' insistence on changes in the lead- ership in Saigon, are at the heart of Hanoi's intransigence in Paris. Although there is no doubt about the seriousness of their de- mand for the ouster of Thieu and Ky or of their long-term goal of achieving full po- litical power in South Vietnam, their basic demand regarding a negotiated political settlement is that there be a new govern- ment in the South in which they have a share of power. Therefore, there is at least a possibility that Hanoi's refusal to deal with the present government is a tactic and not a bedrock policy position. (continued) 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Of interest in this connection is a recent broadcast by the Viet Cong!s:Liberation Radio, which touchedon some of the trou- bles Communists and Communist sympathizers in South Vietnam might have following a' ceasefire if American forces were still on the scene and the present government were still in power. The most arresting passage in the broadcast concerned what would happen if, in such circumstances, "our people should temporarily recognize the Thieu-KyKhiem administration as a legal administration." A number of spe- cific questions posed'were similar to those we might expect the Communists to surface somewhere down the line in the event of any serious negotiations. The broadcast also recalled-how anti-Com- munist campaigns were launched by the Diem regime after the 1954 Geneva Agreements,. asserting that "resistance fighters could expect even,worse treatment if they would lay down their arms under present circUm- stances." It called on' President.Nixon to provide some "appropriate'answers" to these questions iAllegedly a commentary on President Nixon's five-point peace plan, this broadcast could merely be:try- ing,to make a more persuasive case against the President's proposals and to undercut the appeal they may have in South Vietnam. Even so, it leaves-the impression that ac- ceptable answers' to these questions might have an impact on Communist'attitudes to- ward a settlement and even on' Communist . willingness to deal with the Thieu govern- ment. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 50X1 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SALT Soviet delegation chief Semenov devoted yester- day's,meeting to a discussion of verification, ad- vancing for the most part positions that coincide with the US proposal of 4 August. Endorsing reli- ance on "national means" of verification, he agreed to several supplementary features that Washington had already suggested. These include an agreement to exchange--on a voluntary basis--information re- lating to the fulfillment of mutual obligations, and undertaking not to hinder national means of verifi- cation, either by interfering with their operation or by employing special means of concealment. He also accepted the creation of a standing consulta- tive commission to examine future ?questions concern- ing compliance with and modification of the agree- ment. Not all was sweetness and light, however. Sem- enov did not mention, for example, "selective direct observation," a concept the US had proposed as a, possible verification measure. (After the meeting, Soviet delegate Grinevsky stated that the USSR was not prepared to consider such a measure.) Moreover, Semenov continued to insist that mobile ICBMs not be banned as the US proposes. He labeled "artificial" the US argument that if these were permitted, na- tional means could not verify that allowed weapons totals were being honored. In addition, during private conversations the Soviets continued to in- sist that US forward-based systems be discussed at SALT. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 ' FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY WEST GERMANY - USSR In the latest of Egon Bahr's meetings with So- viet officials in West Berlin on 13 November, the Soviets urged Bonn to abandon its position that it would ratify the West German- Soviet treaty only after a satisfactory Berlin agreement is reached. On the question of resuming East -West German talks, Bahr claimed that he had some impact in arguing that the Germans can negotiate arrangements on access to Berlin only under a four-power agreement, and that any results must be covered by a four-power under- standing. This is Bahr's first direct report to the Allies of his conversations2 and he did not men-- tion his earlier meetings. The series started in early June after the draft West German - Soviet treaty had run into heavy flak in Bonn, and may initially have con- cerned revisions the West Germans wanted before signing it. After Bahr conducted intensive talks in. mid-October, the West Germans proposed to the Allies a form of Berlin agreement that in some ways resembled the Soviet position, and the East Germans offered to negotiate access directly. The Russians likely judge their contacts with Bahr as having already been useful in their effort to shift the focus of talks on Berlin to an East - West German forum. Presumably, Moscow's satisfaction at Bonn's response to the East German in- itiative on 29 October weighs heavily in Soviet attempts to avoid any substantive concession at the four-power talks. The Soviets doubtless feel that inter-German talks on Berlin are more likely to create the kind of pressures on the Allies that could lead to some kind of agreement favor- able to Soviet interests. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY LATIN AMERICA In the wake of Chile's resumption of diplomatic relations with Havana last week, Uruguayan Foreign Minister Peirano Facio is worried that other Latin American countries may also recognize Cuba unless an OAS majority reaffirms the 1964 resolution that resulted in the isolation of Cuba, by member-states. He expressed the opinion that Chile's action threatens the "credibility of all inter-American obligations." Colombian Foreign Minister Velasquez has also sug- gested that the OAS review its resolution. Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores, on the other hand, is pleased with Chile's move, and has implied that his Country would vote to seat Cuba in the OAS if the matter comes up. Mexico is the only country that refused to comply with the 1964 resOlution. Unless Havana publicly renounces its role as an "exporter of revolution," a majority of OAS members would uphold the 1964 reso- lution if it ever came to a vote. A num- ber of countries, however, prefer to avoid a public re-examination of Cuba's revolu- tionary role, fearing it would aggravate divisions within the organization. Cuba has indicated a willingness to con- sider bilateral relations with those coun- tries that publicly disavow the OAS sanc- tions, but has vehemently rejected resump- tion of participation in the OAS as long as the US retains membership, 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY EGYPT FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 6 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY VIETNAM-CAMBODIA The South Vietnamese cabinet has withheld ap- proval of trade agreements reached in recent talks with Cambodia because the negotiators had failed to adopt an acceptable piaster-riel exchange rate. It approved agreements on other matters, such as land routes and the delineation of the border for customs purposes. Saigon's hard-nosed economic bargaining will not sit well with the Cambodians, some of whom are already hypercritical of their South Vietnamese allies. How- ever, another effort probably will be made to find a compromise solution to the tougher issues if the two countries proceed with :a previously planned, but still unscheduled, second round of talks. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 LAOS: Plaine des Jarres ,_/-( \ \ / -\ t --"\--1_ I / ry Na 6r--- \ Kha 7-'-"\--\ \ AREA OF MAIM MAP Vie bane Nern Khan Bouam Lon!. P AINE iIa Kou Khoun khou Xieng Khouangville ang Vieng 10 20 M 550573 11-70 CIA 2b Kilometers , ) 50X1 Government-held location.- Communist-held location Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY LAOS Elements of the North Vietnamese 148th Regiment have abandoned an important hilltop position two miles north of Ban Na that has changed hands several times during the cast week. At Muong Soui, the action has been character- ized by light skirmishing and occasional mortar and ? rocket attacks. On 17 November the neutralist gar- rison of about 1,200 there was reinforced with two 75-mm. guns. The North Vietnamese have become concerned that Vientiane may be about to launch a major offensive of its own in the near future. One intercept re- ported that five government battalions from the Long Tieng area would be used to attack enemy supply lines in the vicinity of Xieng Khouang. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 CHINA AREA OF MAP BURMA pri NORTH VIETNAM THAILAND CAMBODIA SO. VIE NA Northern Laos: Communist Chinese AAA Activity CHINi i u Tay./ ../ --... (? 1--------- I I L , , I' 1 Phong Salyrs ? ..........j 7 's. i BURMA ? J ' Muong Sing 1 AD alikt '1 1 - iz. '/ 14 I , Bate , / ,...e." r ,_ I r"-?"" / - 1. --\-1\:-.= -I kra-- , Namrha ( j''` I ..., ..1" uong La /3"...' ,..-/ ) ( ) I/ ....1 MOong, -/-;_........vi i Sai , ? THAILAND NORTH VIETNAM 19 Sop Koo Air defense.s bolstered Nam. Bac Bac _p LAOS ? Muong 0 Ben No Muong Houn Pak Ben ?!//;' # ?Pi ' ang bang , ? Statute Miles 550567 11-70 CIA/ , ? ?102 -22- Die Bie -20- r7Communist controlled area Contested territory Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTES Communist China - Laos: Chinese Communist-an- tiaircraft units in northern Laos have been increas- ingly active against US aircraft in the last few months as Chinese road construction has pushed into an area of US air operations. Construction north- eastward from Muong Sai has reached Route 19 in the Sop Kai area, and intercepts say that Chinese units east of Sop Kai are suffering casualties from air strikes. The Chinese are augmenting their antiair- craft units in the area? At the other end of the road to the southwest, there has been no extension of the road south of Muong Houn, South Vietnam/ USSR-Cuba: The Soviet submarine tender that arrived in Cuba in early September left Cienfuegos at noon yesterday and is heading to the east. A rescue tug, which had accompanied the tender in its cruise around Cuba last month, remained in port. 9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008900190001-9