THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 DECEMBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977865
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 23, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
23 December 1970
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
23 December 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The situation in Poland is discussed on Page 1, and
Chinese depiction of that situation as a crisis over
Soviet "revisionist imperialism" is discussed on
Page 2.
North Vietnamese infiltration, although still at a
relatively high rate, has slackened somewhat this
month. (Page 3)
Debate over China policy is intensifying in Tokyo.
(Page 4)
the Soviets may
have ottered the Sudan increased military aid to
combat its rebels in the south. (Page 5)
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POLAND
Wide publicity is being given to Gierek's meet-
ings with delegations of loyal factory workers..
Nevertheless, many workers in Szczecin, as well as
some in the tri-city area, have not: returned to
work'. Szczecin authorities have:referred a lonTlist-
of worker demands to Warsaw for decision.* Prices
and wages are first on the list.
The central press has begun a withering criti-
cism of the old regime's economic policies. Gomulka
is not mentioned by name, but the articles implic-
itly accuse him of ruling autocratically, ignoring
reality, and being out of touch with the people.
For the new regime to attack past "economic reme-
dies," which often meant more austerity for the
workers, will be a welcome development fot' most
Poles. We have no evidence yet, however, on future
policies or the timing of changes in the govern-
ment's leadership.
Labor dissatisfaction will continue de-
spite the facade of Zabor support pre-
sented in the press. Now that communica-
tions have been restored, the severity, of
last week's violence is becoming more
widely known. This is likely to compli-
cate Gierek's efforts to restore calm and
move ahead with rhis program.
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COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR POLAND
An article in China's authoritative People's
Daily yesterday portrayed the Polish riots as a mani-
festation of the crisis in Eastern Europe over "So-
viet revisionist imperialism." It applauded the
fall of the Gomulka regime but charged his successors
with the same revisionist sins. The article claimed
Moscow "began deploying troops" but stopped short of
accusing the Soviets of actually intervening in Po-
land.
This diatribe is a rare break in China's
year-long stand-down of polemics against
the USSR. While crude and unconvincing,
Peking's commentary has the value of keep-
ing alive the specter of Soviet interven-
tion in other areas of Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, it writes off any
chance of establishing a better rapport
with the new Polish leadership.
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North Vietnam: Infiltration Starts
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
- 1968 SVN, Total-240,800
1969 SVN, Total 84,600
1970 SVN, Cambodia, and Southern Laos
1970 total: 105,500 to 21 December
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
-JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1968 SVN
21,000
18,900
32,600
38,900
32,800
23,500
21,800
11,000
2,200
2,800
5,200
30,100
1969 SVN
19,200
25,000
17,100
2,300
1,100
100
100
600
600
4,500
7,800
6,200
1970 SVN, Cambodia,
and Southern Laos
14,200
11,700
10,600
, 3,100
3,800
2,100
4,100
4,400
11,000
15,200
. 17,300
8,000 '
Southern Laos
600
-
700
700
900
700
. 3,300
10,200
3,400
2,600
2,600*
550734 12-70 CIA
Totals for 1968 and 1969 include troops bound for South Vietnam only;;
those for 1970 include troops bound for South Vietnam, Southern Laos,
and Cambodia.
*to date .
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NORTH VIETNAM
So far in December, some 8,000 troops have been
detected entering the infiltration system. Around
3,300 are heading for northern South Vietnam, 2,600
for southern Laos, and only 2,100 for COSVN which
controls Communist activities? in Cambodia and south-
ern South Vietnam. The infiltration pace has slack-
ened somewhat this month, and unless departures in-
crease rapidly in the next week, the total will.be
substantially less than the 17,000 registered in
November.
Nevertheless, there has been a relatively
high rate of infiltration since September,
which we believe is related to North Viet-
nam's drive to enlarge its armed forces.
In The President's Dail' Brief of 2 Novem-
ber we discussed North Vietnamese press
statements which called for additional
mobilization and recruitment.
Cumulative analysis of internal North
Vietnamese messages suggests that the
military call-up got under way soon after
the fall of Sihanouk last March. An in-
crease since then in the number of mes-
sages dealing with induction problems sug-
gests that twice as many men will be
drafted in 1970 as were called up in 1969.
There is no sign, however, that the call-
up is as massive as in 1967, when Hanoi
was preparing for the offensives of 1968.
Nor is there any indication so far of a
substantial build-up of Communist combat
forces in either South Vietnam or Cambodia.
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JAPAN - COMMUNIST CHINA
Domestic pressures are mounting on. the 'Japanese
Government to take a_stand more independent of the
US on the China issue, a theme which is getting heavy
'emphasis from opposition groups-and from the media.
? Some dissident Diet members within Prime Minister
Sato's own party are seeking to expedite the.restora-
tion of relations with mainland China.
Officials in the Foreign Office are actively
debating a number of proposed policy changes Some
prefer to await the outcome of next year's UN debate
on Chinese representation, while others :insist? that.
the international current is running against Taiwan,
and that the Sato government-will be ata serious
political disadvantage if it waits too lOng to change
its present policy. Sato,. however, is not- prepared-
to act hastily and believes that consultation with
Washington should precede any decision.
? Although Tokyo continues publicly to- em-
brace a "China-is-one" approach, there is
also considerable sentiment in government
and business circles for pursuing more
openly its de facto "two-China" policy,
partly because of Japan's large economic
stake in.TaiWan.
For this reason, as well as China's atti-
tude toward the present Japanese leader-
ship, Tokyo is not sanguine over the pros-
pects for normalizing relations with Peking
in the near future. With Upper House elec-
tions approaching in June, however, Sato
may wish to make some well-publicized over-
ture to Peking regardless of its chances
of acceptance.
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USSR-SUDAN
Moscow may have decided
to provide additional equipment to the
Sudanese to use against rebels in south-
ern Sudan. The Soviets have already pro-
vided considerable equipment suitable for
counterinsurgency operations, and the
number of Soviet advisers in the Sudan
increased during 1970 from 200 to an es-
timated 400.
Khartoum also has received more sophisti-
cated weapons from the Soviet Union. Un-
der the terms of an arms agreement ini-
tialed in 1968 and renegotiated after the
coup in May 1969, Moscow agreed to estab-
lish an air defense system around Port
Sudan. This included MIG-21 jet inter-
ceptors, of which 24 were delivered al-
most a,year ago, and an SA-2 system.
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?32
28
Mediterranean Sea
Two IL-18s
Four BE-12s
MersaS
Matruh
Alexandria
Al Alamayn.
28 .
1
Baltim
Damietta
32
Port Said
LEBAN N *Damascus
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv-Yafo
SUEZ
CANAL
I
I
Cairo
SuezSINAI \ I
(Israeli-occupied) \
UNITED ARAB
(EG PT)
REPUL C V
312
SYRIA
*Amman
JORDAN
Dead
Sea
SAUDI
36 ARABIA
32?
? Wing span ..
Length..
Radius
Cruising speed . .
.123 ft
132 ft
1;700 nm
320 kts
98 ft
99 ft
1,150 'nm
270 kts
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NOTES
USSR-Egypt: The Soviets deployed two IL-18
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft to Mersa Matruh
airfield in Egypt on 19 December. The only other
Soviet land-based ASW aircraft in the Mediterranean
are four BE-12 amphibians at Mersa Matruh. The IL-18
has greater range, can stay on station longer and is
equipped with more ASW sensors than the BE-12.
South Vietnam: The Communists' self-proclaimed
three-day Christmas cease-fire begins at noon today,
Washington time, and the allied 24-hour stand-down
goes into, effect tomorrow morning. Enemy intercepts
indicate that the Communists-will try as usual to
take advantage of the cease-fires to resupply and
reposition as well as to recruit and propagandize
among government troops returning to their villages
on leave. Scattered violations and firefights are
likely throughout. the period. There are also indi-
cations that the Communists plan intensified shell-
ing and harassment,during the period between the
Christmas and New Year holidays.
USSR:
Nigeria:
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JAPAN
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(continued)
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