THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 18 OCTOBER 1961

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005991993
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 18, 1961
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PDF icon DOC_0005991993.pdf125.83 KB
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iME3 1:M! EM3 EEM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04: CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 L'? THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 18 OCT 1961 "T-CP-5E-GREI_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 r-,r-ir 7E ir 7[ 7 - -11.? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 1. Congo situation 2. Violence in Algeria a) UN authorities in Leopoldville and New York are said to be dis- concerted over terms of the Katanga cease-fire and Adoula regards it as a damaging blow to prospects 50X1 for reintegration. They are troubled by the provision that Tshombe is free to defend himself if Katanga is invaded by the central government; b) although Tshombe has indicated his readiness to begin negotiations with the central government, his "victory" over the UN is not likely to make him more tractable; c) Gizenga, who is virtually AWOL from his post in Leopoldville, is attempting to put together a new "Lumumbist" coalition in Stanley- vile 50X1 50X11 Moslems have so far been fairly restrained in the face of the European mob attacks of the last few days--probably inspired by the Secret Army Organization. The 50X1 likelihood of a worsening in the situation is strong, however, particularly in view of the nation- wide Moslem demonstrations schedulqam for 1 November which will probably provoke widespread clashes. 50X1 Fnt- Tho PracidAni? ()nix/ Trw, Sprrad- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 :=1 ? 1 I" IL---1 I 1 r 1 LJ L-1LJ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 3. Brazilian financial difficult' s 4. South Vietnamese assess- ment of Viet Cong rural strength Faced by a deteriorating short- term financial position, the govern- ment would like to get a speed-up 50X1 in the flow of US aid under commit- ments made to the Quadros government. Goulart is quoted as saying that President Kennedy thought he might be ?a Cohmunist but this wasn't so and he would prove it, by changes in his government if necessary. Pro-American Finance Minister Salles; on Goulart's urging, may come to Washington to outline Brazil's position and problems. 50X1 OUAI 50X1 the Viet Cong 50X1 fully controls 10 percent of the country's 2700 villages; 30 percent of the villages back the DiQM regime; and the remaining 60 percent, 50X1 though generally anti-Communist, are susceptible to economic, political and propaganda pressures from the ...VietCong. We have no comprehensive check on this estimate, but feel the figures 50X1 are probably fairly close to the mark. 50X1 Fnr Thp Prpciripnt nnlv?Tnn SPerPt Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 1-1 L- I lf If lf Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 NOTES A. The South Vietnamese government today declared a state of emergency, in effect until further notice. B. Our UN delegation believes that .a. Security Council meeting on Outer Mongolia can be postponed until next Monday or Tuesday. The Chinese Nationalist delegate has indicated that such a schedule is suitable to him. D. Soviet nuclear test t Semipalatinsk yesterday 50X1 50X1 cnyi 50X1 E. Anti-Castro elements in Argentina have lost ground in their 50X1 efforts to force a break with Havana. Frondizi's case has beer50xi strengthened by the refusal of Cuban exiles to allow the Argentine government to examine the documents which they claim prove Castro-directed subversion. F. Neither Moscow nor Kabul has announced a figure for the credit agreement which they signed on. Monday, but we expect the Afghans to receive at least $300 million spread over the 5-year term of their economic plan. 50X1 Fru- Tk Proeirionf nnlv?Tnn cprrpf Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8 50X1