THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 JANUARY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992409
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 7, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
7 January 1971
47
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
7 January 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
There are some signs that the Communists plan a new
round of attacks in South Vietnam in the middle of
this month, especially in the northern provinces.
(Page 1)
In Laos, government irregulars have ended their har-
assing operation against Ban Ban. (Page 2)
The Soviets appear to have started only one SA-5
complex during 1970. (Page 3)
At Annex, we appraise the attitude of the Egyptian
military as it affects the Sadat regime's approach
to the Jarring talks.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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104
,106 108
NORTH
VIETNA
110
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550787 1-71
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
There are signs that the Communists plan a new
round of attacks in mid-January, especially in the
northern half of the country. Intercepts show that
several North Vietnamese infantry and artillery units
in the eastern DMZ area and in the northern provinces
of Thua Thien and Quang Nam are either combat-ready
or are preparing for tactical operations.
The projected attacks, while of greater
scope than those of the past several
months, will probably be for the most
part the familiar mixture of shellings,
small-scale ground attacks, and terrorism.
In the southern part of the country, the
contemplated enemy offensive seems to be
on a much more restricted scale than in
the north, presumably because operations
in Cambodia have forced the Communists
to curtail their efforts around Saigon
and in the delta.
1
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LAOS: Plaine des Jarres
j
Na or
Khan-'
\
N
Bouam )
Long. { Govern ent forces
with rawing
6
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ang Vieng
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10
20 Miffs
2.0 Kilometers
MuongNA:Z?Clik
, ? 'Government-held location
? \Connmunist-held location?) i
(
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LAOS
Government irregulars have terminated their
six-week harassing operation against Ban Ban and
have withdrawn from the immediate area. The four
?battalions south of Ban Ban will undertake other
harassing missions, while the three to the north
are now returning to the vicinity of Bouam Long.
The operation was beset by bad weather,
lackluster leadership, and unavoidable
delays which resulted in the loss of sur-
prise. It failed to achieve a primary
objective--penetrating the Ban Ban Valley
to harass enemy logistic operations there--
but did destroy small stockpiles nearby.
The cost in casualties was relatively
light.
The operation, which forced the Communists
to divert a North Vietnamese battalion
from the western Plaine des Jarres to the
defense of Ban Ban, did help to keep the
North Vietnamese away from the irregular
bases on the Plaine 's western edge. The
Communists were unable to mount any sub-
stantial offensive toward Long Tieng even
though they were clearly aware of the op-
portunities afforded by the depletion of
government strength in the region.
The longer term consequences of the Ban
Ban operation are less clear. Its prin-
cipal effect may have been to delay an
anticipated enemy push toward Long Tieng.
The withdrawal from the Plaine last sum-
mer of the North Vietnamese 312th Division
and the opening of preliminary talks be-
tween the Lao Communists and the govern-
ment may have meant that Hanoi preferred
to defer a major offensive in north Laos
this year. There are indications, however,
that the 312th may now be returning, pos-
sibly even in reaction to the Ban Ban op-
eration. Its return would increase the
possibility of a repetition of last year's
Communist offensive against Long Tieng.
2
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USSR
Satellite photography of most of the areas where
additional SA-5 (long-range surface-to-air missile
at one time known as the "Tallinn system") site con-
struction had been expected shows only one new com-
plex started during 1970.
3
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EGYPT AND THE JARRING TALKS
The reactivation of the mission of UN negotiator
Jarring provides another breathing space in the dead-
locked situation in the Middle East but does not sig-
nificantly ameliorate the immediate problems con-
fronting the Egyptian regime. In facing these prob-
lems, the Sadat regime will be influenced to a great
degree by the attitudes of the military, since the
military virtually alone possess the means to. force
change in the country's leadership.
A precise reading of the attitudes of the various
segments of Egyptian society toward the struggle
with Israel and the cease-fire is difficult. The
problem is compounded when attempting to assess the
mood of the armed forces because of the isolation
of military personnel from Western observerg.
Thus,
ss s e y a gyptsan po icy over the next few
months will be influenced by the more militant atti-
tudes within the armed forces, or at least by anxiety
among Sadat and his immediate advisers that elements
Al,
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in the military might use any "blunder" in the nego-
tiations to undercut the regime. Additionally,
Sadat may feel compelled to prove he is as militant
as Nasir was in opposition to Israel. This will
tend to make Egyptian policy less than forthcoming
and add to the already formidable problems facing
Jarring.
To arm itself psychologically on both the diplomatic
and the domestic fronts, the Sadat regime is devoting
a large volume of rhetoric to the "battle" with Is-
rael. Echoing some of Nasir's pronouncements, Sadat
recently has been stressing the need for militaru
and civilian preparedness.
Sadat has also attempted privately to convince us
that he is serious when he declares publicly that
Egypt will not agree to extend the cease-fire unless
"there is a definite timetable for withdrawal" of
Israeli forces.
There is, nonetheless, little sign at this point
that Sadat and company are becoming prisoners of
their own posturing in the way that Nasir did before
the 1967 war. At the moment, the sound and fury
amounts largely to pressure tactics. Without some-
thing it can sell as "progress," however, the Egyp-
tian leadership is still capable of trapping itself
into a situation where any action, regardless of
how obviously disastrous its ultimate result might
be, would seem preferable to impotent passivity in
the face of an unyielding Israel.
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