THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992586
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 14, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
14 April 1971
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009400130001-9
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
14 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The situation in East Pakistan is discussed on Page 1.
The Russians, apparently in an effort to defuse the
Pakistani crisis, have been making private d4marches
to both the Pakistanis and the Indians. (Page 2)
The Egyptians are becoming increasingly convinced
that at least limited military action against the Is-
raelis may eventually be necessary to break the dip-
lomatic stalemate. (Page 3)
In Ceylon,. Mrs.,Bandaranaike appears to be seeking
ways to. reduce Communist influence as the security
situation aggravates her country's economic problem.
(Page 4)
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BURMA
551309 4-71
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PAKISTAN
A member
of the US Consulate General traveled to the Mymen-
singh area on 12 April, observed conditions that may
typify much of East Pakistan. The Western army had
occupied the town of Tangail, but poorly armed, cas-
ually led, and ill-organized troops of the Bengali
"Liberation Army" were about ten miles to the north.
These Bengalis were prepared to defend the road to
Mymensingh, but at the wrong place tactically. They
had made no plans to break up into guerrilla bands
that wauld be much more effective than attempting
to stand and fight against a better equipped and
trained foe. The Bengalis said they believed it
was their fate to die for the cause of an eventual
Bengali victory0
in areas
controlled by or accessible to the army, the popu-
lation seems to have disappeared, and many villages
have been burned. Of the scores of factories in
Tungi, none seems to be operating, and several have
been completely gutted. Missionaries near Mymen-
singh told the Americans that food supplies would
last only a month or two. They also said that In-
dia was providing rifles and ammunition to the Ben-
galis, and that they had seen a few Hindi-speaking
Indian troops in civilian clothes.
Meanwhile, oncoming rains will make it diffi-
cult for Western ground units to move through the
countryside. Rainfall during May normally ranges
from seven, to twelve inches throughout the Eastern
provinces, and in June it exceeds 20 inches in some
places. Heavy pre-monsoon rains have already begun..
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USSR-PAKISTAN
? Soviet President Podgorny's appeal of 3 April
to Pakistani President Yahya has been accompanied
by a number of private d4marches both to the Indians
and the Pakistanis urging caution and restraint.
The Soviets have intervened at least three times
with Yahya to urge him to use moderation in his deal-
ing with the East Pakistanis and are reported also
to have pressed him to seek .a cease-fire.
The Soviets have also been talking regularly
with the Indians, counseling against precipitate
reaction to Pakistani developments./
The Soviets no doubt are concerned that
increased tension on the subcontinent can
only work to the USSR's disadvantage.
They probably fear that the Pakistanis
and Indians might become embroiled in
fighting as serious as that over Kashmir
in 1965, a crisis which the Soviets heZped
to resolve. Moscow is likely also to fear
that prolonged strife will reinforce ex-
treme, radical groups in East Pakistan,
and perhaps redound to Peking's benefit
over the longer run.
Though the Soviets would prefer to see
Pakistan remain united, Podgorny's strong
criticism of Yahya's resort to force sug-
gests that Moscow shares to some extent
New Delhi's assessment that Pakistani
unity has been damaged beyond repair. The
Soviets have been careful, however, not to
commit themselves publicly on the issue of
East Pakistan's independence.
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EGYPT-ISRAEL
Although
most Egyptian military leaders appear to
have a realistic appreciation'of their
armed forces' inability seriously to chal-
lenge Israelis hold on the Sinai, they are
becoming increasingly frustrated with "no
war - no peace." Some lower ranking offi-
cers have been pressing for a renewal of
hostilities regardless of the outcome. The
rhetoric in Cairo about the need to prepare
for battle with Israel continues, and civil
defense measures have recently been inten-
sified. President Sadat has called April
the "decisive" month in the Arab effort to
resolve the conflict, and other officials
have alleged that Egypt was prepared for
"total war." Officials of Egypt's sole
legal political organization, the Arab So-
cialist Union, also have shown a surpris-
ingly hawkish attitude in public, perhaps
indicating that criticism of Sadat's dip-
lomatic efforts has sharpened behind the
scenes.
The effect of all this on Sadat is diffi-
cult to gauge, but it seems clear that he
cannot afford to ignore these factors in-
definitely. Sadat may eventually conclude
that his position can best be preserved and
the diplomatic process advanced by resort-
ing to limited military action against the
Israelis in the Sinai. The recent intro-
duction of even more sophisticated Soviet
military hardware into Egypt may further
embolden the country's military and its
political leaders. The provision of this
equipment, however, gives the Sovietsoa
continuing strong voice in counseling re-
straint.
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CEYLON
Prime Minister Bandaranaike has followed up her
decision to expel the entire North Korean Embassy
staff (they have been given until Friday) with other
steps designed to restrict Communist influence in
her country. Yesterday she canceled a trip by Fi-
nance Minister Perera, leader of the Trotskyite
party in the united front government, who had planned
to depart today to attend economic meetings in Singa-
pore and Manila before proceeding to Peking. The
?prime minister also ordered the arrest of the leader
of the Peking-oriented wing of the Ceylon Communist
Party and is considering proscribing the wing./
In trying to move against leftist elements,
Mrs. Bandaranaike must take into account
the strong opposition within her cabinet
Ito any steps which might jeopardize eco-
nomic ties with the Chinese. One factor,
apparently, is the important rubber-rice
deal with China which has been negotiated
annually since 1952. Last year, for ex-
ample, Ceylon supplied China about 40,000
tons of rubber in exchange for 200,000
tons of rice.
The US Embassy reports that, with security still
touch and go in several areas, food shortages' and
rising prices are beginning to pose. serious problems
in Colombo, Port operations virtually have stopped,
and the country's already poor foreign exchange po-
sition is expected to grow worse as a result.
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Top Secret
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