THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 15 JULY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992753
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 15, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
15 July 1971
48.
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
15 July 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
We now have good evidence that the Chinese Communists
rejected as inadequate a Soviet proposal in March for
a pact renouncing use of force in the border area
pending a final frontier settlement. (Page 1)
In Laos, the Communists have sharply rejected Prime
Minister Souvanna's proposal of 5 July for a cease-
fire on the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 2)
North Vietnam apparently has received pledges of in-
creased military aid from various Communist capitals.
(Page 3)
The Jordanian Army drive against fedayeen strong-
holds in the north has entered its third day. (Page 4)
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COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR
Chou En-lai told
that China had re-
jected a Moscow proposal, made just before the So-
viet party congress in March, for a pact renouncing
the use of force in the border dispute for a three-
year period during which a frontier settlement would
be negotiated. The premier stated that Peking con-
sidered the offer a plot and that Moscow's real in-
tention was to create an impression of Communist
unity in its dealings with the US while in fact
putting off the entry into force of such an agree-
ment.
The Chinese demand, as a precondition for
discussion of border demarcation, that
there be a preliminary protocol regarding
conduct along the border, and that the
protocol include a nonaggression clause.
Moscow's position had been that a nonag-
gression pact is best concluded simultane-
ously with a boundary agreement. The new
Soviet "flexibility" presumably is de-
signed to blunt charges by China that it
is being forced to negotiate under mili-
tary pressure. Although Moscow has no
illusions about the likelihood of reach-
ing a border settlement, it may 'hope that
satisfaction of China's demand for a "pre-
liminary protocol" can be used to obscure
continuing Sino-Soviet difficulties. Pe-
king, however, seems to feel that border
tension has lessened and state relations
have improved so that there is no need to
reach agreement in the near future.
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LAOS
In a tough and unyielding letter to Souvanna on 11
July, Lao Communist leader Souphanouvong stated that
Souvanna's proposal of 5 July for a cease-fire on
the Plaine des Jarres was in effect a rejection of
the Communist proposal for a countrywide cease-fire.
Souphanouvong argued that imposing a countrywide
cease-fire was within the power of the Laotian par-
ties, and that in rejecting it Souvanna was serving
US interests. This is an allusion to the fact that
a countrywide cease-fire would affect the US bombing
program in the infiltration corridor.
The letter comes down hard on yang Pao 's current of-
fensive on the Plaine, which it describes as an "ex-
tremely serious" act. It ties Souvanna's proposal
of 5 July to the offensive and implies that it is
evidence that Vientiane is not genuinely interested
in reaching a settlement. The letter makes no ref-
erence to withdrawing the "special emissary" who is
in Vientiane or to breaking contacts with the gov-
ernment. The Communists may still hope that they
can convince Souvanna that it is in the government's
interest to be more accommodating to their demands
for talks.
The tone of the letter, however, suggests that the
Communists doubt there will be progress toward nego-
tiations until the military situation on the Plaine
turns again to their advantage.
The Souphanouvong letter may take the edge off the
high spirits now enjoyed by the leaders in Vientiane,
but it is not likely to change orders to Vang Pao to
take as much territory as he can. It would be both
politically and psychologically difficult for Sou-
vanna to rein in his troops when they have the upper
hand; furthermore, he believes that gains on the
ground will strengthen his future bargaining posi-
tion. Souvanna evidently has little expectation
that the Communists are interested in a partial stand-
down in north Laos, and the chances for early mean-
ingful negotiations are therefore slim. In its in-
sistence on a nationwide cease-fire, the latest
Souphanouvong letter will only reinforce the view
that there is nothing to negotiate about at this
juncture.
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NORTH VIETNAM
A military delegation headed by a North Viet-
namese vice minister of defense returned to Hanoi
early this month after a month-long trip to Peking
and undisclosed European Communist capitals. The
delegation apparently sought and received commit-
ments for increased military aid.
The North Vietnamese press--which has been ret-
icent about the trip--has noted only that a new sup-
plementary military aid agreement has been concluded
with the Chinese.
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JORDAN
?:The army's drive against fedayeen strongholds
in northernJordan is now in its third day. King
Husayn has committed a significant force, including
tanks and infantry, to the fight, and the tide ap-
parently is going against the fedayeen. Government
troops appear to be in control of the Gaza refugee
camp and surrounding areas but are still trying to
dislodge fedayeen who are dug into the neighboring
heights.
Arab reaction to the government's latest
offensive against the fedayeen has been
relatively muted. Egypt felt it necessary
to postpone King Husayn's visit scheduled
for 23 July but ascribed the delay to pre-
occupation with a political conference.
An official spokesman expressed hope that
Amman would respond to Egyptian-Saudi ef-
forts to mediate the conflict with the
fedayeen. Syrian statements perfunctorily
deplored the fighting. The Syrians, who
are worried about fedayeen on their own
soil, are said to have promised the Jor-
danians to prevent any commandos from
firing across the border into Jordan.
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NOTES
Malta: Mintoff's action yesterday in termi-
nating current arrangements for NATO facilities and
forces in Malta makes the uncertain UK-Malta nego-
tiations even more important if the West is to re-
tain a base on the island. Although Mintoff wants
to retain a British presence there, he obviously
wants to get as good a deal as he can. He continues
to play it tough with London. Yesterday afternoon
he said he did not want the British negotiating mis-
sion- under present circumstances, and this caused
LOndon to recall Defense Secretary Lord Carrington's
.plane from the runway as it was about to leave for
Malta. ? The British representative to NATO, on in-
structions from London, has asked the other Allies
if they would be willing to help pay the amount re-
quired to come to terms with MintOff on the base is-
sue.
' Morocco: Security officials claim that of the
1,500 insurgents involved in Saturday's coup attempt,
168 were killed, 650 have been captured, and 500 or
so have fled; about 100 apparently rallied to the
King, but their fate remains uncertain.
Bolivia:
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Top Secret
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