THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 AUGUST 1971

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005992829
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 28, 1971
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 The President's Daily Brief 28 August 1971 6 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 August 1971 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS Satellite photography shows two additional ICBM silos of the smaller type and five of the larger type at Soviet operational complexes. (Page 1) In Cambodia, new strains on government unity will require Sink Matak's immediate attention when he returns to Phnom Penh this weekend. (Page 2) On Page 3[ 50X1 \Havana has sharply re- duced its aid to insurgents in Latin America. International economic developments are reported on Page 4. The Soviets are preparing another unmanned lunar landing mission. (Page 5) Satellite photography does not show any Soviet mil- itary activity that could be construed as an immi- nent threat to Romania. (Page 5) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 50X1 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY USSR Preliminary analysis of photography confirms two additional new ICBM silos of the smaller type and five of the larger type at operational complexes. There are now 66 of the smaller type and 25 of the large type un- der construction in the USSR. None were detected at complexes where they had not been identified earlier. The smaller silos are at Derazhnya where the SS-11 is deployed with the SS-4 MRBM, and at Pervo- maysk where the SS-11 is deployed with the SS-5 IRBM. The larger silos have been identified at five of the six SS-9 complexes.. Each of the five SS-9 complexes now has five of the large silos; Derazhnya and Pervomaysk each have 33 of the smaller silos. Construction continues at a Tyuratam test-facil- itT which is believed to be involved in the develop- ment of a. missile for at least one of the new type of silos. The latest photography of the facility-- where all. versions of the SS-9 were initially tested-- showed what appear to be missile transporters some 80 feet in.length. This is about 20 feet shorter than transporters seen.there previously. The differ- ent size suggests a new missile, rather than another. version-of the SS-9, will be involved. Analysis of. the photography is continuing and further details may become available. 1 50X1 50X1 50X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CAMBODIA A rift between Lon Nol and Chief of State Cheng Heng is putting a new strain on government unity. Lon Nol thinks Cheng Heng is the leader of a "third force" seeking to compromise with Hanoi and Peking. For his part, Cheng Heng is upset, as are a number of other officials, over the arbitrary manner in which Lon Nol has conducted governmental affairs in Sink Matak's absence. Matak will have to devote immediate attention, too, to the dispute between the National Assembly and? the government? over the regime's lackluster economic polities:. Lon Nol is trying to avert a possible no confidence vote by the Assembly against Finance Minister Sok Chhong or perhaps the entire government. If the Assembly should call for Sok Chhong's resignation, the.rest of the cabinet would probably favor resigning also. Matak's influence.would be needed to dissuade the cabinet from such a course. 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CUBA Havana has sharply reduced its aid to guer- rilla-oriented revolutionary movements in Latin America. The defector's reliability has not been established and he remains under study. training in guerrilla warfare and other paramilitary subjects is now given only to small, select groups. Logistical support still con- tinues to be given to some rebel groups but it is restricted to very small amounts of arms, ammunition, and communications equipment. According to the of- ficial, the turning point in Cuban support to guer- rillas occurred in early 1968 after Cuban-assisted rebel groups suffered several reverses. The govern- ment, thereafter drastically reduced its aid to national liberation movements and concentrated on Cuba's pressing domestic problems. Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Bo- livia, and Guatemala?in that order--as the most im- portant Latin American countries to Havana's foreign policy. Fidel Castro has issued in- structions to maintain complete cooperation with Chile at all costs. In Peru no operations are to be undertaken for fear of upsetting the favorable trend of events. Cuba considers subversive groups in Nicaragua, Colombia, and Venezuela too disorgan- ized, undisciplined, and untrustworthy to merit more than token support. Except for Mexico, all other Latin American countries are considered unworthy of Cuban attention. Mexico is a special case because it has always been a base for Cuban operations against other countries; Castro has prohibited operations against the Mexican Government and assistance to any Mexican subversive group. [Castro reassessed his policy of supporting rebel groups in early 1968, following the Che Guevara fiasco in Bolivia the previous year, and chose to adopt a more realistic foreign policy. Castro's speeches over the past two years show clearly that he has empha- sized the building of special ties with Chile, Peru, and Bolivia (before the re- cent coup), and that he is currently more interested in ending Cuba's isolation than in "exporting revolution." 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS First reports from the Japanese exchange market this morning indicate the newly floated yen appreci- ated by 5.2 percent. The governor of the Bank of Japan told the press that the bank would support the dollar if the yen appreciated too much. He did not? indicate at what point the bank would intervene but private Japanese bankers are predicting that the yen will be allowed to appreciate by 6 percent. Japa- nese official reserves now stand at about $12.5 bil- lion after purchases of $1.8 billion on Thursday and Friday. Large gold sales by speculators in European markets yesterday drove the free market price down to $41.12 per ounce. This represents a decline of $1.87 in the past two weeks. Speculators apparently are beginning to conclude that there is little like- lihood of an early increase in the official price of gold. Moreover, the floating of many major curren- cies favors the chances for a permanent, general re- alignment of foreign currencies, and this reduces pressure for an increase in the official dollar price of gold. 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTES USSR: Preparations are under way for a Soviet unmanned lunar landing mission using the SL-12 booster; the launch from Tyuratam appears to be planned for the first week in September. This will be the first Soviet lunar probe this year. The mission, like earlier ones, could involve the re- turn of soil samples or the landing of a sensor- equipped lunar rover vehicle. Newer and more ad- vanced scientific experiments are also possible. Warsaw Pact: Satellite photography through strengthens the conclusion that there is no military activity in western USSR that could be construed as an imminent threat to Romania. The photography shows no signs of troop concentra- tions or, alerts. At military installations, there was no massing of civilian trucks indicative of.. mobilization, nor were there any concentrations Of military transport aircraft similar to those pho- tographed prior to the Czech invasion of 1968. Photography showed preparations then under way for the exercises now taking place in 'Bulgaria, but there was nothing unusual near the Bulgarian-Romanian border, and military activity appeared normal elsewhere in Eastern Europe, in- cluding Romania. 5 50X1 50X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3