THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 OCTOBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992942
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 28, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79-100936A010000250001-8
The President's Daily Brief
28 October 1971
Top Secret
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
28 October 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS.
There is new evidence of Hanoi's concern over the
impact of big-power summitry on its relations with
Peking and Moscow. (Page 2)
Egyptian President Sadat is watering down his as-
sertion that 1971 is "the year of decision" in the
battle with Israel. (Page 3)
In her foreign tour, Prime Minister Gandhi is warn-
ing world leaders that war in the subcontinent is a
distinct possibility unless they use their influence
to help resolve the refugee problem. (Page 4)
Some Eastern European leaders are said to be-con-
cerned over Gierek's reforms in Poland. (Page 5)
The plane incident in New Orleans appears to be a
deliberate Cuban attempt to embarrass the US.
(Page 6)
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NORTH VIETNAM
There are additional indications that the North
Vietnamese are concerned over their ability to
steer an independent course in a period of negotia-
tions between their major Communist patrons and the
US. Foreign Minister Trinh has published an article
in the October issue of Hanoi's theoretical journal
Hoc Tap designed to pass the current foreign policy
line to key cadre. On the whole its message is
bleak. Trinh reflects the concern over big-power
summitry that gave rise to Hanoi's anti-Chinese po-
lemics last summer. In doing so, he clearly implies
that the Vietnamese have not been fully reassured by
Moscow's and Peking's continued protestations of
support nor by the visits to Hanoi of President
Podgorny and Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien.
Trinh condemns US "tricks" aimed at sowing discord
between Hanoi and brotherly socialist countries.
Trinh seems particularly concerned over the possi-
bility of a future reduction in Soviet and Chinese
military aid. Although lavish in his praise of the
economic assistance from Peking and Moscow, he con-
spicuousZy omits expressions of satisfaction with
military support. (For our part, we have seen no
evidence that Hanoi has reason to be unhappy with
the current level of military support.) Trinh
seems to be echoing the uneasiness apparent in
party chief Le Duan's remarks to Japanese Commu-
nists last month when he told them that Hanoi "could
not continue to fight without the aid" supplied by
Peking and Moscow. Le Duan said he would like to
be more critical of both allies, but that he feared
jeopardizing the "vital" aid each supplied.
Trinh also displays sensitivity over Hanoi's loss
of initiative in its negotiations with the US, and
promises to "step up" Hanoi's diplomatic activities
in support of its war effort. He goes so far as to
describe diplomacy as a "front of strategic impor-
tance...with its own positive role." Hanoi has
never before ascribed such significance to diplo-
matic action. Although Trinh does not go into what
specific action Hanoi would take on the diplomatic
front, this could presage some reformulation or
change in Hanoi's terms for a war settlement. There
is nothing in the text of the article, however,
which clearly indicates that this is in offing.
(continued)
1
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Trinh's article in effect lays it on the line to the
cadre that Hanoi must in the future rely more heavily
on diplomatic and political efforts to achieve its
objectives in Indochina. Although Trinh mentions
the importance of military action and pledges a con-
tinuation of protracted warfare, he does not cite
the importance of military action in reinforcing
diplomacy. This suggests that Hanoi believes the
conflict is entering a new phase involving greater
political maneuvering on both sides.
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT
? President Sadat is watering down his assertion in
July that 1971 is "the year of decision" vis-a-vis Is-
rael and that Egypt would not allow 1971 to pass with-
out the battle being "decided." His recent speeches
have played down this suggestion that Egypt may be
planning to renew hostilities this year./
Chances are slim that Egypt might alone
be able to take and hold the Sinai, and
this too no doubt has influenced Sadat.
Although there are hawks in Cairo, re-
sponsible military leaders are said to
believe that such a venture would be sui-
cidal. f
3
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INDIA
Prime Minister Gandhi is embarking on her for-
eign tour to warn world leaders that war in the sub-
continent is a distinct possibility unless they use
their influence with Pakistan, to bring about a return
of the refugees. Outlining these plans to President
Tito last week, she stressed that a decision to go
to war was hers alone to make. Tito is reported to
have warned Mrs. Gandhi that if India initiated hos-
tilities, the world--including Yugoslavia--would not
understand or support the action.
Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to bring interna-
tional pressures to bear on the Pakistani
Government to negotiate a settlement with
the East Pakistanis may be complicated by
the intransigence of the Bangla Desk lead-
ers. Although the Indians continue to sup-
port the East Pakistani guerrillas, New
Delhi is attempting--so far unsuccessfully--
to moderate Bengali demands for independ-
ence. BangZa Desh representatives continue
to take a firm public position against any
compromise with the West Pakistanis. Ear-
lier this month the BangZa Desh acting
president took strong exception to the sug-
gestion by Indian Foreign Minister Singh
that a solution involving less than full
independence for East Pakistan might be
possible.
4
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
POLAND
Some of party leader Gierek's counterparts in
Eastern Europe have expressed concern that his re-
form programs are drifting away from orthodox Com-
munism.
German party boss Erich Honecker is also said to
have called Poland's uncollectivized agricultural
system a contradiction of Communist ideology when
he visited Poland last month.
5
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NOTE
Cuba: Havana's dispatch of a delegation to a
privately sponsored international conference in Baton
Rouge without.proper clearances appears to be'a.de7-
liberate attempt to embarrass the US The pilot is
a,former chief of Cuba's Civil Aeronautics:Institute,
was once Castro's private pilot, and has headed Cuban
delegations to air safety conferences. His assign-
mentto the New Orleans flight indicates that Havana
expected an imbroglio and wanted a trustworthy spokes--
man on hand to make the most of an opportunity for
anti-US propaganda,
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,.
Top Secret
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