THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 APRIL 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993234
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 7, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
7 April 1972
46
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
7 April 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The current military situation in South Vietnam is
reported on Page 1.
A Soviet official of the UN Secretariat claims that
Moscow is concerned that the North Vietnamese offen-
sive could adversely affect President Nixon's trip.
(Page 2)
India is awaiting a Pakistani response to its pro-
posed scenario for talks. (Page 3)
Egypt's announcement that it is breaking diplomatic
ties with Jordan is another move to assert Cairo's
primacy as spokesman of Arab nationalism. (Page 4)
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At Annex we discuss the status of Soviet military
activity in the Indian Ocean.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Communist activity in northernmost Quang Tri
Province consisted principally of light artillery
attacks yesterday, but enemy forces also probed
the positions of a South Vietnamese tank battalion
and a marine battalion located southwest of Dong
Ha, guarding the approach to Quang Tri city. Com-
munist units in the province appear to be regroup-
ing for further ground action and strengthening
their defenses against intensified allied air
strikes. In neighboring Thua Thien Province, a
South Vietnamese armored unit continued to fight a
stubborn enemy force on Route 547 west of Hue for
the third straight day.
No significant combat has been reported in the
central highlands, but communications intelligence
now confirms prisoner and defector reports that the
North Vietnamese 28th Regiment is located only
eight miles north of Kontum city. The North Viet-
namese 2nd Division Headquarters and its 1st Regi-
ment have been located in the central part of Kon-
tum Province.
Nearer to Saigon in Military Region 3, the Com-
munists this morning renewed their attack on the
district town of Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long
Province. The enemy infantry troops were reported
to be attacking in waves, supported by up to ten
tanks. A government fire base a few miles south of
Loc Ninh was abandoned under Communist pressure.
Additional Communist units--the headquarters of
the 5th Division and the 7th Division's 165th Regi-
ment--apparently have moved into Binh Long from
across the Cambodian border. The Communists now
have the equivalent of a full division in the prov-
ince, including the 6th, 272nd, and 165th Regiments
and the headquarters component.
There are other indications that the Communists
plan expanded combat in the border provinces north
of Saigon. The headquarters of their Artillery
Command now appears to be located in northeastern
Tay Ninh Province and its subordinate artillery
regiments may also have crossed into South Vietnam
from Cambodia. Another headquarters that controls
Communist local units in the provinces of Binh Long,
Phuoc Long and Quang Duc has also moved back into
South Vietnam for the first time in several years.
The Communists have also launched a series of
shelling and ground attacks in the delta provinces
of Military Region 4. US air observers have spotted
a large enemy force, estimated at 1,000 men, about
30 nm southwest of Saigon.
1
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USSR-VIETNAM-US
A senior Soviet official in the UN Secretariat
told a former US diplomat on 4 April that the timing
of the North Vietnamese offensive was "most unfortu-
nate" and expressed the hope that it would not in-
terfere with President Nixon's trip. The Soviet
stressed that Moscow was in no way involved in the
planning of the attack.
Such an approach, while clearly self-
serving and through an unofficial channel,
may reflect a genuine worry that the of-
fensive might disturb the atmosphere of
the summit. Moscow's press coverage of
the attack seems slanted out of similar
considerations. Thus far, Soviet media
have not stressed the role of Soviet-
supplied weapons.
Moscow, may be unenthusiastic about the
offensive because it fears it may be
called on in some way to pick up the
pieces if Hanoi finds itself overextended.
The Soviet press has sought to convey the
impression that Washington is on the verge
of taking "dangerous" counteraction. The
USSR has been chagrined and embarrassed
throughout the Vietnam conflict by its
inability to prevent the US from bombing,
with relative impunity, a "fraternal So-
cialist state," and the Soviets naturally
do not want a return to damaging air at-
tacks inside North Vietnam.
a North
Vietnamese diplomat in Paris says that Moscow has
invited party boss Le Duan to visit the USSR prior
to the President's arrival.
Any such visit--either public or private--
would probably be used to reassure Le
Duan that Moscow stands by the public com-
mitment made by Brezhnev on 20 March not
to sell out the interests of its allies.
Such a trip would also enable the Soviets
to compare notes with Hanoi on the war
shortly before the summit in May.
2
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SOUTH ASIA
The Pakistani foreign secretary yesterday ac-
knowledged India's written offer for a summit meet-
ing, received earlier this week via the Swiss. He
claimed President Bhutto's reply would be sent
shortly. The Indian proposal calls for a preliminary
meeting of emissaries before the top leaders convene.
Indian Foreign Minister Singh returned yester-
day from Moscow, where he was able to persuade the
Soviets to avoid any mediatory role. 25X1
Soviet officials have been urging 25X1
New Delhi to be more conciliatory toward Pakistan,
particularly on the Kashmir issue./
] Although the In-
dians may be trying to improve the climate
for negotiations, there is no indication
that New Delhi has softened its basic po-
sitions in response to Soviet advice.
The Indians presumably are in no hurry
for formal peace negotiations, largely
because they remain skeptical about
Bhutto 's ability to stay in power. While
Bhutto is probably willing to engage in
preliminary talks, he is likely to get
little progress on the issue of greatest
importance to him--repatriation of 94,000
POWs--until he recognizes Bangladesh.
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EGYPT-JORDAN
Cairo's severing of diplomatic relations
with Jordan is another move to maintain
Egypt's primacy as spokesman of the Arab
nationalist cause. Egypt has had no am-
bassador in Jordan since mid-1971, and
relations have been cool for some time,
with King Husayn's clampdown on fedayeen
activity in Jordan and the assassination
in Cairo of Jordanian Prime Minister
Wasfi Tal adding to the strains. Libya,
which broke relations with Jordan last
year, may have pressed Cairo to take this
step as a way of underlining the rejec-
tion of Husayn's West Bank proposal. A
report in Cairo's semi-official paper
Al-Ahram this morning suggests that Egypt
may add an economic sting to Sadat's an-
nouncement by closing its air space to
Jordanian planes.
4
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JORDAN-SYRIA
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JORDAN -FEDAYEEN
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NOTE
Chile: The resignation of the moderate faction
of the Radical Party from President Allende's gov-
ernment is a serious blow to his personal strategy.
Allende had hoped to use the faction as the core of
a non-Marxist political grouping that would make
his administration seem more broadly based and
strengthen his own position within his Popular Unity
coalition. Allende may now have to face up to the
major cabinet reorganization that he promised in
March, but he is likely to find it more difficult
than ever to overcome the internal divisions that
have hamstrung so much of his administration.
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POLAND
Moscow.
II
Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean
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SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
In a conversation during the SALT talks at Hel-
sinki last week, Vice Admiral Sinetsky discussed So-
viet policy in the Indian Ocean. He said that be-
cause the Indian Ocean is in the Eastern Hemisphere
and "much closer to the USSR than the US," the So-
viet Navy will maintain a presence there at least
equal to, if not greater than, that of the US Navy.
Sinetsky noted that the present Soviet objective in
these waters is to maintain a force adequate to
counter moves such as that made by the US Navy dur-
ing the Indo-Pakistani war.
Sinetsky's broad outline accords well with the
pattern of Soviet naval activities in and around
the Indian Ocean over the past year or so. We do
not believe that Moscow has yet signed an agreement
with any of the littoral states for the routine use
of naval facilities)
/It is clear,
/ that the Soviet Navy intends to maintain
a permanent force in the Indian Ocean.
At the onset of the Indo-Pakistani war last
December, the Soviet Navy had three surface combat-
ants and one submarine in the Indian Ocean--the
average force level of the past several years. (In
addition, the Soviets had two space-related ships
in the area--also the usual number.) Other ships
were soon dispatched from distant Pacific ports to
raise the Indian Ocean contingent to 11 combatants
plus as many support ships.
Jit ap-
pears that the Soviets may have decided on a force
level of four surface combatant ships and two sub-
marines on regular patrol, at least for the next
few months.
To maintain their combatant ships on station
in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets rely mainly upon
the makeshift logistic techniques they developed
in the Mediterranean. These include a roughly one-
to-one ratio of logistic ships to combatant ships
and extensive use of anchorages in international
Al
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waters for replenishment of supplies. The Soviets
have found more ports willing to welcome them for
short visits in the Indian Ocean than in the Mediter-
ranean, but they have no Indian Ocean analogue to
Alexandria, Port Said, and Mersa Matruh for routine
and emergency support.
The Soviets could increase the average size of
the force on station by gaining permission to sta-
tion a repair ship or tender in any suitable port.
A shore support structure would not be necessary,
but access to an airport with civil or military
transport links to the USSR would be desirable for
quick replacement of spare parts. Their leisurely
schedule of activity in the Indian Ocean has helped
the Soviets to avoid major breakdowns, but naval
planners probably see a need for nearby emergency
repair facilities to support any heightened activity
in the future.
Mauritius, Ceylon, and Singapore have signifi-
cant naval support capabilities, but all have care-
fully limited Soviet naval access.
--Mauritius, which offers routine support to
both Soviet fishing and space support fleets,
was recently persuaded by the British to pur-
chase refueling facilities being developed by
a local firm for Soviet use./
--Ceylon has obtained military and economic
aid from several sources, including the US, UK,
USSR, and China, but has neither accepted aid
from anyone to revitalize decaying naval facil-
ities nor provided support to any warships.
The Bandaranaike government is currently sus-
picious of Soviet intentions in the area and
opposes any increased Soviet presence.
--Singapore's government-owned shipyard con-
tracted last December to overhaul three Soviet
whalers. This was the Soviets' first ship re-
pair contract with Singapore. The first So-
viet warship visited Singapore only last July.
Singapore's proclaimed even-handed foreign
policy might lead it to consider some form of
support for Soviet naval ships, but the objec-
tions of the US and Singapore's Commonwealth
partners, which use Singapore's extensive naval
repair facilities, would constitute a major in-
hibition.
(continued)
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India has been expanding its own navy and naval
support capabilities on the basis of extensive Soviet
assistance. Soviet naval ships, however, have been
accorded no more support than required for limited
flag-showing visits. Moscow might acquire some
leverage over the new and needy state of Bangladesh,
but the Indians would almost certainly veto any spe-
cial privileges for the Soviet Navy, in the new na-
tion's ports.
The Soviets frequently use Aden's long-estab-
lished naval and air facilities for civil and mili-
tary transport, although Moscow does not appear to
have acquired naval privileges there. Nor have the
Soviets continued their interest in the remote and
inhospitable island of Socotra, where they appar-
ently did some work in 1970 on an airfield abandoned
by the British in 1947. In Yemen (Sana) to the
north, the Soviets have not for over a year used air
and sea ports they built, probably for fear of be-
coming embroiled in the volatile relations between
the two Yemens.
This situation may add to the Soviets' reasons
for continuing assistance to Somali air and sea port
development on the Gulf of Aden.
a recent agreement with Somalia
allow the Soviets to use the air and
naval port improvements they have agreed to build,
as well as to enjoy extended access to existing fa-
cilities. A possible major addition would be the
use of the Somali airfield at Berbera by Soviet
naval reconnaissance planes based in Egypt. Soviet
warships have often visited Somali ports, especially
during 1970 when the government feared Ethiopian
incursions. Even the extended stay in 1970, how-
ever, did not result in a formal agreement for So-
viet naval ships routinely or automatically to use
Somali port facilities.
The Soviets are proceeding cautiously in de-
veloping their military position in the Persian
Gulf. They are assisting Iraq in the expansion of
port facilities/
/ Soviet
.naval ships occasionally make port calls at Basrah,
Iraq,. but no pattern of visits has been established.
Any step-up in Soviet naval activities in the Gulf
would strain Moscow's improving relations with Te-
hran, and so the Soviets are unlikely to press for
an agreement for regular naval support.
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