THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 MAY 1972
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005993293
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 11, 1972
File:
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Body:
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The President's Daily Brief
11 May 1972
47
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LATE ITEM
USSR:
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
11 May 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet leaderships' attempt to formulate a re-
sponse to President Nixon's speech is discussed on
- Page 1.
The USSR apparently has made no firm decision on the
disposition of its ships in North Vietnamese ports.
Peking's first authoritative comment on the US mili-
tary measures is relatively low-keyed; Hanoi, mean-
while, is emphasizing the need for more support from
its allies and stressing the threat to their ships
and facilities. Communist forces continue to pre-
pare for further offensive operations in South Viet-
nam. (Page 2)
In the past few days Communist forces have improved
their position in southeastern Cambodia. (Page 5)
West German government and opposition leaders have
agreed to postpone the debate and vote on the East-
ern treaties until 17 May. (Page 6)
Soviet
Iran
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Iraq. (Page 7) 25X1
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USSR
There has so far been no authoritative public re-
sponse by the Soviets to the President's speech of
Monday night, but their reaction time in the past
to important developments affecting their vital in-
terests has been slow.
In addition to developing a response to the Presi-
dent, the Soviet leaders must deal with another mat-
ter of great importance to them, the West German
Bundestag debate on treaty ratification. Indeed,
the contradictory positions reportedly taken by So-
viet Ambassador Falin yesterday in Bonn suggest
high-level debate and indecision in Moscow. Under
the circumstances, we suspect that the problems of
US relations and West German relations have become
entangled in Soviet deliberations. If so, yester-
day's delay of the ratification vote in Bonn can
only have complicated the Politburo's problem.
Because of Brezhnev's role ?in both these issues it
is altogether possible that his leadership has be-
come linked with the policy, questions at stake and,
although there is no direct evidence to support the
speculation, that a larger struggle for political
power has been touched off.
1
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VIETNAM
Soviet and Chinese military activities in the
Indochina area continue to appear normal.
In their first authoritative comment on Presi-
dent Nixon's speech, the Chinese in an 11 May "Com-
mentator" article in the People's Daily condemned
the US military measures but refrained from portray-
ing them as a threat or a "challenge" to China. The
article describes the US actions in relatively low-
keyed terms and neither called for their cessation
nor committed Peking to any definite course of ac-
tion. Moreover, the article did not contain any
personal attacks on President Nixon, and attributed
the US actions to the US Government instead. The
commentary did not discuss the President's proposals
for a cease-fire and subsequent withdrawal of US
troops, although it contained the standard demand
that the US pull out of Vietnam and cease supporting
the South Vietnamese Government.
The North Vietnamese Government devoted almost
as much of its first official pronouncement on Pres-
ident Nixon's speech to the need for continued sup-
port from its own allies as to the US action itself.
The government communique, issued yesterday, in-
cludes two long passages exhorting fraternal social-
ist countries "to check in good time the bloody hands
of the US aggressors" and expressing "confidence"
that Hanoi's allies will not fail to measure up to
their responsibilities. It also reiterated most of
the caustic language Hanoi's propagandists have been
using to condemn the US action, including allegations
that the US is escalating the war and violating in-
ternational law.
(continued)
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The statement is only the latest indication of
North Vietnamese concern over the current level of
Soviet and Chinese support. Less authoritative media
have carried a similar line, heavily emphasizing the
danger the US actions pose to Soviet lives and ship-
ping. They have also publicized alleged damage to
the Vietnam - Soviet Friendship Hospital and to the
offices of the Chinese economic mission in Hanoi.
Hanoi's two top negotiatiors have reacted
sharply to Dr. Kissinger's contention that the Com-
munists offered nothing new in the latest round of
secret talks. Chief negotiator Xuan Thuy, as he
prepared to leave Paris for "consultations" at home,
told newsmen at the airport that it was Washington
and not Hanoi that had proved intransigent in the
private discussions. He insisted that Dr. Kissinger
had simply repeated the old US position of "aggres-
sion and colonialism" which the Communist side had
consistently rejected. Politburo member Le Duc Tho,
who saw off Thuy at the airport, maintained that Dr.
Kissinger had also misled newsmen about the kind of
government the Communists wanted in Saigon. Tho
asserted that his side was pressing only for a gen-
uine coalition government, not a Communist regime.
He also accused the presidential adviser of having
violated agreements between the two sides not to
disclose the substance of the secret talks.
The Communists clearly were stung by Dr.
Kissinger's news briefing and may well
feel that it has put them temporarily on
the defensive. Once in Hanoi, Thuy prob-
ably will participate in formulating
North Vietnam's position on future nego-
tiations and the new developments in the
war. Thuy will stop in MOBCOW and Peking
en route home. He did not reveal how long
his consultations in Hanoi will last. The
Communists announced, however, that Tho
plans to stay in Paris for the time being.
Communist forces in South Vietnam continue prep-
arations for further offensive operations. In north-
ern South Vietnam, enemy supply movements have in-
creased sharply in the Khe Sanh area. Intercepts
reveal that elements of the Communists' 324B Divi-
sion have been ordered to monitor closely South Viet-
namese positions around Camp Evans, the northernmost
government strongpoint.
(continued)
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In the central highlands, Communist attackers
were pushed out of the Ben Het Ranger camp on 9 May
after they had seized about one third of the base,
and government forces there are thus far holdin
their positions.
In the southern half of the country, Communist
forces early today launched heavy attacks on An Loc
from all sides.
4
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CAMBODIA
In the past few days Communist troops have
gained control over a 35-mile length of Route 16 in
Kampot Province north of Kompong Trach and are in a
good position to put pressure on several key govern-
ment positions in Takeo Province. Enemy elements
are reported to be within striking distance of the
lightly defended town of Angtassom, on Route 3, and
there is also evidence of increasing Communist ac-
tivity around the nearby city of Takeo.
The Communist advances represent the most
significant enemy activity in Kampot and
Takeo provinces since the early days of
the Cambodian war. The Communists' ob-
jective in this region probably is to
eliminate any effective government pres-
ence between the cities of Kampot--which
is already isolated--and Takeo, thereby
facilitating the movement of troops and
supplies into the delta area of South
Vietnam.
The same objective lay behind the Commu-
nists' campaign in Svay Rieng and Prey
Veng provinces last month, which has
given them control of all of Route 1 east
of the Mekong, with the exception of the
now isolated city of Svay Rieng. Phnom
Penh's efforts to reopen the highway have
faltered, and there are no signs that the
government has any serious plans to mount
new operations to clear the hiahwau.
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WEST GERMANY
Government and opposition leaders decided in
the midst of yesterday's Bundestag session to post-
pone the debate and vote on the Eastern treaties
until 17 May. In the interval, a commission drawn
from both government and opposition ranks will at-
tempt to resolve the outstanding disagreement on
the transmittal of the all-Bundestag resolution on
the treaties to the Soviets. Further meetings be-
tween Chancellor Brandt and opposition leader Barzel
are also likely.
Barzel had met with Soviet Ambassador Falin be-
fore the debate began, but the two were unable to
resolve a disagreement about the modalities of the
Soviet response to the joint resolution. As a re-
sult, Barzel threatened during the Bundestag session
that the Christian Democrats would unanimously veto
the treaties if the government insisted on further
debate without granting more time to resolve the
prevailing confusion. Brandt's desire to gain broad
bipartisan support for the treaties was probably in-
strumental in his decision to yield for the time
being.
If the commission can reach agreement dur-
ing the coming week, there is a good chance
that Barzel can swing the bulk of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party behind the treaties.
The resolution itself will present no prob-
lem for the commission, but the Christian
Democrats' desire to raise the legal sta-
tus of the Soviet response could cause
problems and further test Moscow's patience.
6
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NOTES
Israel -E t:
Chile: The removal of two top officials this
week reflects the continuing strains within the Al-
lende government. The resignation of Labor Minister
Oyarce, a Communist, probably resulted from recurrent
labor unrest, including a costly strike of copper
workers. The Communists will press Allende to re-
place Oyarce with another Communist in order to keep
the former political balance. The president of the
financially troubled national airline has been ousted,
both from his job and from the Socialist Party. His
prospective successor, Rodolfo Ortega, is President
Allende's former private pilot and bodyguard.
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Top Secret
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