THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 AUGUST 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993447
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 4, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
4 August 1972
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2).(3/
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
4 August 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Vietnam, the government campaign to capture the
Quang Tri citadel continues to meet heavy resistance.
Recent photography shows the continued expansion of
the petroleum System from China into North Vietnam.
(Pa gel)
West German shadow foreign minister Gerhard Schroeder
says the Chinese are ready to establish-diplomatic
relations. (Page 2)
In an effort to improve relations with Peking, Thai-
land will let a ping-pong team go to China. (Page 3)
Chilean President Allende has rebuffed Congress by
naming an impeached cabinet minister to another
cabinet post (Page 4)
The latest satellite photography shows another i launch
complex for China's CSS-1 ballistic missile. (Page 5)
At Annex, we review current evidence indicating that
the Communistmain force units may try to initiate
a major offensive in several areas of South Vietnam,
perhaps within the next few weeks.
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North Vietnam: Petroleum Pipeline Construction
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VIETNAM
The government campaign to capture the Quang
Tri citadel continues to meet heavy resistance.
Communist shellings and ground attacks have slowed
the South Vietnamese Marine operation launched yes-
terday against the citadel, and sharp fighting is
reported again along the northern edge of Quang Tri
City. A few miles to the southwest, South Vietnam-
ese airborne forces repulsed a strong enemy tank
attack with the help of heavy air strikes.
A review of evidence pointing to a possible
new coordinated Communist offensive in several areas
of South Vietnam appears at Annex.
The petroleum pipeline system from China into
North Vietnam continues to be expanded. Photography
indicates that the system will consist of three
single pipelines between the Chinese border and
Kep and a combination of a dual and single line be-
tween Kep and Hai Duong, where it will connect with
the extensive pipeline network running down into
South Vietnam and southern Laos. We believe the
capacity of the new system, when completed, will
exceed Hanoi's petroleum import requirement.
The rainy season is nearing its midpoint and
we have no evidence of serious flooding in North
Vietnam. Intercepted river stage reports indicate
that the major rivers are at normal seasonal levels,
and there have been no unusually long, heavy rains
during July like those that preceded last year's
disastrous floods. Photographic coverage of almost
the entire delta area Oisclosed
no breaches in any primary dikes and only normal
accumulations of water in some low areas between
them.
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WEST GERMANY - CHINA
Pressure seems to be building up in Bonn to
establish diplomatic relations soon with Peking.
West Germany's opposition Christian Democrats, who
have been openly promoting this step as a way to
counter what they argue is Chancellor Brandt's too
narrow focus on the USSR and Eastern Europe, re-
cently sent their shadow foreign minister Gerhard
Schroeder, on a fact-finding mission to Peking. Ac-
cording to Schroeder, the Chinese said they are
ready to establish diplomatic relations "immediately"
after a "brief" contact with a Chinese embassy in
some European capital. He added that the Chinese
set forth no preconditions.
Although Schroeder may be overstating the
speed with which China would like to move,
his report places the Brandt government
under some pressure. The Christian Demo-
crats hope to exploit Bonn's relative
neglect of China in the pending election
campaign; recent opinion polls show that
almost 80 percent of West Germans approve
immediate action on this question. Brandt
prefers delaying a bid to Peking in order
to avoid antagonizing the Soviets, partic-
ularly until the negotiations on a basic
political treaty with East Germany--which
Moscow presumably' could influence?are
concluded.
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THAILAND CHINA
General Praphat, the de facto policy maker of
the ruling military body, has reversed himself and
announced that a Thai ping-pong team will be per-
mitted to go to China. He has included in the
sports delegation one of his close associates,
Prasit Kanchanawat, a senior economic official.
The Bangkok press reports that Prasit will discuss
the possibility of opening commercial relations
between the two countries and will meet with Premier
Chou En-lai.
The erratic nature of Bangkok's slow move-
ment toward better relations with Peking
results partly from differences within
the leadership. It also reflects the
Thais' difficulty in reconciling their
perceived need to establish contacts
with China with their long-standing
fears about China's intentions toward
Thailand and the impact which contacts
will have on the large Chinese commu-
nity in Thailand.
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CHILE
President Allende has rebuffed Congress by
naming impeached Interior Minister Del Canto to
another cabinet post, minister secretary-general of
government. The incumbent, Jaime Suarez, has been
switched to the Interior portfolio. Since both are
Socialists, Allende has maintained the political
balance in the cabinet and avoided infighting within
his governing coalition.
At the same time, the continuing friction be-
tween the President and Congress has been extended
to include the Supreme Court. In an address Tuesday
night Carlos Altamirano, the chief of the Socialist
Party, charged that the court concerns itself more
with protecting property rights than prosecuting
white-collar crime.
The courts, like the military, tradition-
ally have been immune to partisan attack,
but recent decisions favoring the conserv-
ative side of politically sensitive issues
have made them vulnerable to leftist crit-
icism. A new draft constitution promised
for next month presumably will call for re-
ducing the powers of Congress and the
courts and might provide Allende 's coa-
lition with a popular platform for fight-
ing the congressional elections next
March.
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CHINA
The latest satellite photography shows another
deployed launch complex for the 600-mile CSS-1 bal-
listic missile, this one in east-central China.
The complex is at Lien-keng-wang, about 135
miles south-southwest of Nanking. It extends some
20 miles and contains three or four launch sites
and a support area. No missiles ? are visible, but
CSS-1 ground support equipment?missile transporter-
erectors, propellant vehicles., A-frame.cranes, and
launch stands--can be identified, Numerous build-
ings and caves throughout the complex could be used
to store missiles.
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NOTE
Syria?USSR:
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Demilitarized Zone
ng Tri
Duc Duc
MR 1
Que Son
KIEN
pK,ToNNG TUONG
R3
Capital Special Zone
Tho
Gulf of
Thailand
104
MR 4
icr
1q8
AM
AMM
110
MR 2
South
China
Sea
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
110
16--
14-
12-
10--
55341 5 8-72
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VIETNAM: A NEW ENEMY OFFENSIVE SHAPING UP
A review of current evidence indicates that Com-
munist main force units may try to initiate a sub-
stantial and coordinated offensive in several ?areas
of South Vietnam, perhaps within the next few weeks.
Although the attacks may not be on the scale of the
Communist thrusts in early spring, Hanoi will be
hoping to secure battlefield gains that will influ-
ence domestic politics in the US and strengthen its
bargaining hand at Paris.
the enemy's top southern command, '
COSVN, had ordered another strong round of attacks
to try to force a settlement of the war on Communist
terms, and that August and September would be impor-
tant months because US election fervor would be
rising. The recent movement of almost two additional
enemy infantry divisions from North Vietnam into
northern Military Region 1 and the additional de-
ployment of enemy units into the northern delta sug-
gest that these two areas will be the focal points
for the campaign. Renewed assaults around An Loc
and in the provinces northwest of Saigon also appear
in prospect, along with a substantial increase in
enemy operations in sectors of the central coast.
In the western highlands, however, where the Commu-
nists laid siege to Kontum this spring, there are
few signs of enemy planning for substantial new at-
tacks.
The Quang Tri - Hue Front
The movement of elements of two additional
North Vietnamese divisions--the 312th and 325th--
into northern South Vietnam to augment four enemy
divisions already there began in mid-July, shortly
after the South Vietnamese counteroffensive into
Quang Tri Province. There had been earlier indi-
cations that the North Vietnamese were planning to
commit at least elements of these two divisions to
the northern front. The South Vietnamese counter-
offensive appears to have forced Hanoi's hand. The
current locations of the additional divisional ele-
ments suggest that the North Vietnamese could use
them in a vigorous counterpunch at the South Viet-
namese units strung out along Route 1 to Quang Tri
City, hoping to cut off and defeat these troops,
perhaps the best of Saigon's forces.
The North Vietnamese may be moving additional
tanks into the area from North Vietnam to support
the new assaults. A column of 20 to 30 armored ve-
hicles moving through the southern panhandle was
only 15 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone. by 1
August. Intercepts suggest that the vehicles will
enter South Vietnam through the eastern part of the
DMZ. _
(continued)
Al
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The new enemy operations may not involve all
of the forces now deployed in the province. In mid-
July, after a five-month hiatus, the 308th Division
resumed communications with the military high com-
mand in Hanoi, a measure which normally precedes a
major move. This development suggests that the 308th
may be preparing to return to North Vietnam, although
it remains in position to take part in any renewed
fighting.
So far, there has been little evidence that the
Communists are augmenting their infantry force to
the west of Hue--an action the enemy presumably
would consider necessary if a full-scale push on
the city were planned for the near future. The Com-
munists have recently stepped up their attacks against
government positions in Thua Thien west of Hue, where
two government fire support bases have changed hands
several times within the past month. Enemy gunners
? are within artillery range of the old imperial cap-
ital, and it appears that the Communists would like
to?push back the defending South Vietnamese 1st Di-
? vision in the hope of undercutting and weakening the
government drive into Quang Tri.
Similar enemy strategy appears to be involved
in Quang Nam Province to the south, where another
division-size enemy force--the so-called 711th Di-
vision--is pressing from the west against government
outposts and district strongpoints in Que Son and Duc
Duc districts. We believe that the Communists intend
to try to keep Saigon's units there from reinforcing
the northern battlefront should the fighting begin to
turn against the government there. In the spring of-
fensive, the Communists employed a similar strategy
in this province to back their operations to the
north.
The Delta and the Saigon Area
The Communists have massed the largest concen-
tration of main force units ever seen in the northern
delta. At least five infantry regiments and elements
of an artillery regiment already have infiltrated,
and we believe that two more infantry regiments are
on the way. Most of the infiltrating units, includ-
ing the enemy's 5th Division, have been heading for
a base camp in the northwestern triborder area of
Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, and Kien Phong provinces.
During the past few weeks, clandestine sources have
reported that heavier enemy action is being planned
for August and September in the northern delta.
The Communists appear to have several objectives
in mind in this area. It is a long-time Communist
stronghold which, in the past, has provided rela-
tively good protection and good access by waterway
to resupply from Cambodia. The area lies close to
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Route 4, the government's main road link to the
delta, and to a variety of canals over which food
is moved to Saigon. If the Communists could regu-
larly interdict the road and water routes through
the area, they would seriously disrupt the govern-
ment's ability to support its forces in the southern
delta provinces, and thus facilitate gains by their
own units farther south. The base area also pro-
vides a favorable position for attacks around and
on My Tho, a strategic provincial capital.
Despite reports that increased attacks are
being planned for the provinces to the northwest
of Saigon, particularly in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia,
? there are few indications that the Communists are
moving additional main force units into these prov-
inces. They would need more manpower to mount a
telling offensive there. Most enemy forces involved
in the heavy fighting earlier in MR 3 have recently
seen only limited action. Most of the units from
the Communists' 7th and 9th divisions probably are
still in the An Loc area. It seems likely that these
units would again be used in Binh Long or Binh Duong
provinces in the hope of deterring Saigon from di-
verting its forces north to MR 1 or reinforcing
threatened units elsewhere.
Central Vietnam
We do not expect that enemy combat activity
in the western highlands will.increase substantially
in the coming weeks. Many of the units previously
engaged in the fighting in Kontum and Pleiku prov-
inces have moved out. On the coast, however, gov-
ernment efforts to recapture areas in northern Binh
Dinh Province suggest that fairly hard fighting lies
ahead. Prisoners claim that
the Communists foresee stronger action along the
heavily populated central coast in August and Septem-
ber.
Prospects
The next Communist offensive is likely to be
smaller and more selective than the thrusts last
April and May. With heavy rains and flooding in
some areas, resupply difficulties may limit the
Communists' ability to sustain a heavy pace of fight-
ing. This spring's combat also reduced the strength
and fighting ability of many enemy units. The newly
trained troops that Hanoi sent south may have offset
losses, but even after refitting, the performance of
these units will suffer from the loss of experienced
leadership cadre and specialists.
(continued)
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Despite such limitations, the Communists appar-
ently believe that heavy action in the coming weeks
offers a possibility of at least limited tactical
gains as well as significant political impact. Some
evidence of the scope of enemy plans is appearing
in current North Vietnamese propaganda on the war.
Hanoi's Defense Minister Giap recently claimed that
"favorable opportunities" now exist in the south
? to push forward on the battlefields, and radio and
press commentaries are emphasizing both Quang Tri
and the delta as theaters of operation.
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