THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 SEPTEMBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993503
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 5, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
5 September 1972
T
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5111(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LATE ITEM
Early this morning Arab guerrillas entered the
quarters of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich,
killed at least one occupant, and are holding as
many as 20 Israeli athletes hostage within the build-
ing. Press reports indicate the guerrillas are de-
manding the release of Arab prisoners in Israeli
jails in return for the lives of their hostages.
Prime Minister Golda Meir is holding an emergency
meeting of her cabinet to discuss Israel's response.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
5 September 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In,a speech on North Vietnam's National Day, Premier
Pham Van Dong Seemed to hint at possible shifts in
the Communists' negotiating position., (Page 1)
The Communists' Central Office for South Vietnam has
ordered an upsurge of military action and terrorism
during October in order to influence the US elec-
tions. (Page 3)
The situation of General Vang Pao's task forces
around the Plaine des Jarres in Laos is discussed
on Page 5.
Now that National Assembly elections are over, Cam-
bodia's chief,. Lon Nol, is planning to make some
changesin his cabinet. (Page 6)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM
A major speech by premier-Pham Van Dong on 2
September, North Vietnam's National Day, constitutes
one of the most comprehensive statements of the Com-
munists' negotiating position since the Paris talks'
resumed.: The premier repeated his government's de-
mands for completeAJS withdrawal from South Vietnam,
an end to US support Of the Saigon government, and
a guarantee of US "respect for the South Vietnamese
people's right to self-determination," but his elab-
oration of these points was unusual..
On the first and second of these demands, Pham
Van Dong was more specific than Communist negotia-
tors.have been in recent statements. He indicated
that the US would have to end its air, naval, and
other military activities in both the North and
South, in addition to withdrawing all its ground
forces from South Vietnam, He made no mention, how-
ever, of the US military presence elsewhere in Indo-
china. The premier also implied that Hanoi would
not insist on an end to all US support for the pai-
gon,regime, but only-a .halt to "all its military
commitment."'
In discussing the meaning of US respect for
"self.7determination.," Dong omitted. two subjects
that are usually broached in this context Nowhere
did he mention the long-standing demand for Presi-
dent Thieu's resignation,,nor did he.refer to the
call for elections which the communists have always
insisted.should be held: under a coalition "govern-
ment of national concord.": He repeated' thedemand
for formation of such a coalition, but of its func-
tionshe:said only that its members would "together
share the enormous, imperativei.and complex tasks
towhich the people of various strata are urging a
solution." This vague treatment-of,a critical iS
sue is another hint that the Communists might ,be
flexible on the details of a coalition in Saigon,
once the principle is agreed.
There is at least a hint in Dong's speech, as
there has been in other recent North Vietnamese
Statements, that-a.preliminary? settlementAnight be
reached-on the basis of US endorsement,in principle
of Hanoi's demands., In one passage (which Radio
Hanoi's international service repeated for emphasis),
Dong said that "a fundamental and stable solution
1
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,FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
of the Vietnam issue must affirm" the principles he
enumerated. This phrasing might mean that the US
could achieve a preliminary agreement with the Com-
munists by signifying acceptance of Dong's broadened
principles.
This analysis, based as it is on one public
statement, must be considered tentative.
It imputes a high degree of precision to
a speech which clearly includes consider-
able holiday boilerplate. Moreover, there
were many other themes in Dong's address,
including strong doses of fighting rheto-
ric, that were anything but conciliatory.
In one respect Dong's speech is unambiguous.
In the section dealing with the support Hanoi has
received from the Communist world he went about as
far as etiquette permits on such a formal occasion
in signaling his dissatisfaction with Hanoi's Com-
munist allies, particularly Moscow and Peking. In
his rendering of Hanoi's customary statement of
gratitude, he took a decidedly pro-forma line, lump-
ing the Communist governments together with "all
the world's people." Although he expressed "greet-
ings" to the Soviet Union and China, he did not
single them out for special thanks. Dong informed
Hanoi's patrons that, given the contributions of
the Vietnamese Communists to the proletarian revolu-
tion, Hanpi is "all the more entitled" to ask its
allies to "fulfill their international duty."
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
Recently, the Central Office for South Vietnam
(COSVN) outlined to its subordinates Communist ob-
jectives. in South Vietnam during September and Oc-
tober. the COSVN
instructions specify October as t e ?ecisive month
of the 1972 offensive, during which the Communist
main forces are to lead a surge of military activity.
The attacks are intended to force the US and South
Vietnamese governments to grant concessions at Paris
prior to the US presidential elections, and to move
the "revolution" in South Vietnam into a political
phase by the end of the year.
The COSVN's main forces have been directed to
use their artillery and sapper units to attack
South Vietnamese defenses protecting Saigon as well
as large US and government bases. The object of
these attacks would be to tie down South Vietnamese
forces and prevent them from launching counterattacks
into "liberated" areas. Viet Cong local forces have
been tasked with assassinating government officials
in order to weaken South Vietnam's administration at
the lowest levels. The instruction also directed
Viet Cong cadre to recruit new members and to em-
place themselves in positions from which they could
manipulate the populace following a cease-fire.
The instructions emphasize that American pris-
oners are the most valuable commodity the Communists
hold because through the prisoners, the US can even-
tually be forced to accept a political settlement of
the war. In this regard, the COSVN specified that
it is better to capture one American than to kill 30.
Communist cadre and troops are cautioned to guard
all US prisoners closely to prevent their escape
or death.
(continued)
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DEMILITARIZED ZONE
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553546 9-72
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Government troops have made some small progress
in their counteroffensives since yesterday. In the
Que Son Valley, South Vietnamese troops have re-
gained control of Que Son district town, but have
not completed clearing several pockets of resistance
from it. South Vietnamese forces also report that
they have moved still closer to Fire Support Base
?Ross, but it remains in enemy hands. In a move ap-
parently designed to affect the fighting in the Que
Son area, Communist troops just to the south attacked
Tien Phuoc district town and a number of government
outposts in Quang Tin Province. The enemy was pushed
back, but several battalions of government troops
were pulled out of the Que Son area and sent into
Quang Tin Province to reinforce South Vietnamese
positions.
In Quang Tri Province, ground action has tem-
porarily eased, but the Communists continued to
pound South Vietnamese positions in and around Quang
Tri City with heavy mortar and artillery fire.
In Binh Long Province, the government's drive
north from An Loc is making little progress and
there have been several sharp clashes near Quan Loi.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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LAOS:PLAINE DES JARRES AREA
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0 Communist-held location
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553545 9-72 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Government irregulars from the task force north
of the Plaine des Jarres. that was dispersed by ai
series of strong'North Vietnamese attacks late last
week are continuing to filter back to friendly posi-
tions just west of the Plaine. Almost all of.the
stragglers apparently will require some medical
treatment. There has been no change in the status
of the other; government task ?force in the north,
whose movement from Bouam Long. toward Nong Pet was
halted by. Communist resistance on 1' September...
South of the Plaine, the Communists are taking
a-stronger stand.against.the two irregular task
forces in-that area. Elements of the North Vietnam-
ese 148th?and 174th regiments have launched ground
attacks and conducted sporadic shellings against the
task force in the Tha Tam Bleung sector, but the ir-
regulars have held their grOund. Units assigned to
the other southern task force, which is operating
in, the vicinity of Phou Houang, had several clashes
with the Communists on Sunday. Two battalions were
pUshed out of their positions and withdrew a short
distance to the south to regroup.
The weather continues to have a crucial effect
on the course of Vang.Pao's current offensive., Bad
weather preventedany, extensive air support for the
northern.task force and has also hindered
resupply missions. Weather conditions have gradu-
ally been improving, however, and 105 air strikes
were carried out on Sunday in support.of irregular
units around the Plaine.
5
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
The Lon Nol government apparently mustered a
substantial military vote against token opposition
in Sunday's election for the National Assembly.
The civilian turnout was light despite the fact that
harassment by the Communists was less than expected.
Lon Nol now plans to make some cabinet changes.
Shortly before the election, he indicated that he
plans to have Information Minister Long Boret take
over the foreign ministry from Son Ngoc Thanh.
Thanh's reputation as a rightist has complicated
Phnom Penh's efforts to project a neutralist image.
Boret is regarded as competent and has considerable
experience in handling diplomatic assignments.
Lon Nol is also still trying to persuade oppo-
sition leaders In Tam and Sink Matak to accept key
positions in his government in order to restore some
semblance of political unity.
6
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