THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 OCTOBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993551
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 3, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
3 October 1972
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Top Secret
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 5 WI ).(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 October 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
China's National Day was celebrated in low key on
Sunday, but in contrast to last year, a major edi-
torial was published. (Page 1)
After a tour of southern Lebanon, the
that the army is generally enforc-
ing restrictions on the fedayeen. (Page 3)
Another US air base was attacked in Thailand this
morning. (Page 5)
At Annex, we discuss the motives of Philippine Pres-
ident Marcos for declaring martial law, and assess
his prospects for success.
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CHINA
For the second year in a row there were no
speeches, parade, or mammoth fireworks displays on
National Day, 1 October. All of the active members
of the ruling politburo normally residing in Peking
turned out for the occasion, except for party chair-
man Mao Tse-tung.
It has now been over eight months since
Mao publicly presided over an important
domestic gathering, although his recently
televised meeting with Japanese Prime Min-
ister Tanaka clearly demonstrated that the
aging party leader is mentally alert and
reasonably healthy.
In contrast to 1971, this year a major edito-
rial was published. It did not forecast an early
resolution of China's domestic political problems
nor did it provide ?any significant treatment of the
sensitive issue of civil-military relations. It
reaffirmed that the denunciation of Lin Piao is the
primary task facing the nation, and repeatedly
called on party cadre to intensify the examination
of their own political attitudes in the light of
Lin's perfidy.
Since early this year, cadre throughout
China have been studying documents out-
lining Lin's unsuccessful coup attempt in
September 1971. Greeted at first with
shock and disbelief, the continuing anti-
Lin campaign and the accompanying "recti-
fication" movement have given rise to con-
siderable anxiety and unrest in the prov-
inces. Local political leaders?most of
whom are military professionals?fear that
they will be implicated.
Indeed, a number of military province
chiefs have dropped out of sight in recent
months, although no charges against them
have been made public. To date no replace-
ments have been named for the missing mil-
itary provincial leaders, and it is pos-
sible that at least some of them will re-
surface in good standing. Given the army's
dominant political role in the provinces,
a centrally directed purge of province
chiefs, even on a selective basis, runs a
serious risk of undermining the relative
order achieved in the three years since
the tumultuous Cultural Revolution.
(continued)
1
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The primary theme of the foreign policy portion
of the National Day editorial was that Soviet efforts
to encircle and isolate China are being effectively
countered by China's flexible approach in foreign
affairs. Both the US and the USSR were criticized
for increasing international tension through their
continuing rivalry, but the primary target of the
editorial was clearly the Soviet Union.
China's tough editorial line.appears to mirror
its stand in the Sino-Soviet border talks. A TASS
report on a reception on 29 September at the Chinese
Embassy in Moscow indicated that both chief Soviet
negotiator Ilichev and Soviet Ambassador to China
Tolstikov are at present back in Moscow.
2
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LEBANON -FEDAYEEN
The army is generally enforcing government re-
strictions against fedayeen activity in southern
Lebanon. After a recent tour of the villages attacked
last month by Israeli forces, the US defense attache
reported that Lebanese Army checkpoints and security
posts in the area were markedly improved as compared
to a year ago. Lebanese officials claimed that no
fedayeen groups are located south of the ?Litani
River, and the activity
in the areas he visited. His tour, however, did
not include the Arqub sector of southern Lebanon,
where in the past there has also been considerable
fedayeen activity.
Despite its controls on the location of the
fedayeen, the army seems to be relaxing some other
restrictions in order to avoid a confrontation.
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PHILIPPINES
President Marcos' actions since his declaration of
martial law on 23 September have been directed more
at restoring his popular political backing than at
rooting out the Communist security threat. Marcos
wants to continue as chief executive after his
present--and constitutionally his last?term expires
in December 1973, but without popular support he
could not rule effectively, even with military as-
sistance. He hopes that the "New Society" reforms,
announced with great fanfare last week, will cap-
ture the favor of the disaffected rural masses and
quiet his critics among the urban middle class.
At Annex we examine Marcos' actions and his pros-
pects in greater detail.
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NOTES
Thailand: Another US air base was the target
of a small-scale attack early' this morning. Prelim-
inary reports indicate that a force of eight to 12
sappers attempted to penetrate Udorn air base in
northeastern Thailand. One sapper was killed and
one captured; two American servicemen were wounded
slightly. Satchel charges and grenades were ex-
ploded during the fray but there was no damage to
facilities or aircraft. Yesterday, Ubon air base
took 35 mortar rounds which damaged some communica-
tions equipment. This morning's prisoner may shed
some light on the origin of the attackers and about
the Communists' plans for future action against US
bases in Thailand.
Yemen (Sana) - Yemen (Aden): Adeni forces with-
drew on 2 October from the Yemen (Sana) border town
of Qatabah. The withdrawal may help to defuse a
situation that seemed to threaten heavy border fight-
?
ing between the two Yemens.
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West Germany - East Germany: The latest round
of negotiations on a basic political treaty made no
progress toward solving the key political issues.
Each side apparently is taking a tough stand in an
effort to extract maximum concessions from the other.
Nevertheless, we believe that Bonn--and also Pankow
to some extent--wants to conclude an agreement prior
to West Germany's Bundestag elections next month.
The talks will continue on 10 October.
Denmark: Voters overwhelmingly approved Danish
membership in the European Communities yesterday.
The pro-Communities forces were aided by a record
turnout of nearly 90 percent of the eligible voters,
63.5 percent of whom cast ballots in favor of entry.
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THE PHILIPPINES--THE POLITICS OF MARTIAL LAW
President
Marcos had been considering martial law for some time
as a tool for prolonging his hold on political power,/
/It is quite possible that the Luzon floods
of July and August, with the attendant economic chaos
and the prospect of resulting popular unrest, accel-
erated his timetable. At any rate, his actions since
the imposition of martial law indicate that he is
following a carefully thought out plan.
Martial Law
In the first few days under martial law, the
Philippine constabulary, in a series of well-coor-
dinated sweeps based on detailed arrest lists, seized
Marcos' major critics--including politicians of both
parties, proponents of social reform, activist priests
(both Filipinos and foreigners), students, journal-
ists, publishers and some elected officials. All
mass media were immediately closed, and those subse-
quently allowed to reopen have been subjected to
stringent censorship. After the initial series of
political arrests, the constabulary began picking up
notorious criminals and well-known political war-
lords and also began the difficult task of disarming
the various private armies that abound in the Phil-
ippines. The president has said that military courts
are being established to try the cases of those de-
tained, but he has not spelled out the charges or
punishments which will be sought.
None of this has really impinged on the daily
affairs of the average citizen. Nor has the mili-
tary presence been obvious or oppressive. The long-
suffering man-in-the-street in Manila has, in fact,
been gratified by improved conditions of law and
order.
Marcos has been careful to stress the legality
of his actions under the constitution and to empha-
size that the country is still under civilian, not
military, rule. The military is being used to as-
sure law and order and to carry out specific tasks
on behalf of the president, but otherwise most daily
activities of the civil administration and the judi-
ciary continue unaffected. To underscore his con-
tention that martial law is a temporary solution,
Marcos has directed the constitutional convention
to speed its deliberations on a new draft. The next
constitution will replace the presidential system
Al
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with a parliamentary form of government--a change
that could allow Marcos to maintain power indefi-
nitely as prime minister.
Marcos as the Man of Destiny
The reform program announced under the rubric
of the "New Society" is long overdue in the Philip-
pines. There is, however, ample reason to question
Marcos' credentials as a reformer as well as his
ability to make significant headway against powerful
political and economic interests defending the status
quo. Although the tactics have changed, the presi-
dent's current strategy is similar to the one he used
in 1969 to overcome public disenchantment and win
election to an unprecedented second term--dramatic
calls for reform, charges that bureaucratic inept-
ness and entrenched interests were thwarting his pro-
grams, and some showcase public works projects. The
rural countryside today is still crisscrossed by un-
finished sections of concrete roads and half-built
bridges begun during the 1969 campaign and abandoned
soon after. The 1969 wave of "reform" brought the
country to the point of bankruptcy but did nothing
to alleviate endemic corruption, warlordism, and
social injustice.
) Early signs suggest that Marcos will not go much
further this time in actually implementing basic re-
form. The highly touted land reform decree issued
last week, when examined closely, seems to call only
for implementation of the 1963 land reform code--a
moderate reform which, even so, would be prohibi-
tively expensive to carry out and which would require
more government pressure on the landlord class than
Marcos may be willing or able to employ. Marcos'
past behavior makes us skeptical, too, that the
purging of the civil service will do more than re-
place one set of inept and venal bureaucrats with
another. The arms thus far confiscated are insig-
nificant in number compared with total civilian weap-
ons.
The public is generally skeptical that Marcos
is willing or able to do what he says he will. None-
theless, most Filipinos seem ready to give him the
benefit of the doubt in the hope that he will carry
out at least some of the reforms he has promised.
Because Marcos now tightly controls the press, the
public will find it hard to determine the actual
progress of reform.
The Future
The president's tactics have so f.T.r kept the
various anti-Marcos groups in disarray. Many oppo-
sition leaders are in jail or in hiding. The most
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likely sources of open opposition to Marcos in the
near future are the left-wing student organizations,
which are already discussing how best to challenge
martial law. The rural Maoist New People's Army,
already becoming a haven for many radicals on the
arrest list, will doubtless try to step up its in-
surgent effort, especially now that security forces
are partially tied down administering martial law.
Some minor skirmishes have already taken place--on
Luzon with the Communist insurgents and on Mindanao
with Muslim rebels--but thus far these have not dif-
fered in form or size from the past insurgent prac-
tice of harassing the constabulary as opportunity
arises. In the new situation, however, certain mem-
bers of the anti-Marcos establishment might now be
willing to support extremist challenges to the presi-
dent.
Over the short term, it seems more likely that
Marcos, by making some surface reforms in Philippine
society and maintaining public harassment of corrupt
entrenched interests, will be able to improve his
public image, retain the crucial loyalty of the mil-
itary, and overcome any opposition that might de-
velop. Under these circumstances, Marcos could rea-
sonably expect to end martial law in a fairly short
time--perhaps six months to a year--and return to
constitutional government claiming a broad popular
mandate.
Even assuming such smooth sailing, however, the
imposition of martial law has permanently changed the
political equation. Marcos apparently now sees him-
self as an indefinite strongman--whether as presi-
dent, prime minister, or commander in chief--and in
the future he will always be tempted to fall back on
martial law again whenever his political control
seems threatened. At the same time, Marcos' chal-
lengers--both within and outside the Filipino estab-
lishment--may be pushed to the conclusion that con-
spiracy and violence are the only means to achieve
power. Communists and other extremists have long
been advocating this line, and their credibility
will now be enhanced.
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