THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 NOVEMBER 1972

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005993616
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Publication Date: 
November 9, 1972
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- Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 The President's Daily Brief 9 November 1972 45 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 513(1),(2).(3) declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T60936A0-11300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 NOvember 197 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS 25X1 Hanoi appears to be sending a fresh armor regiment and two field artillery regiments into northern South Vietnam. (Page 1) Pakistan is taking a number of diplomatic moves favor- able to Asian Communist regimes. These steps may re- flect President Bhutto's dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his relations with the US. (Page 3) The Argentine Government appears to be preparing for the return of former dictator Juan Peron. (Page 4) Uganda's deadline for the departure of non-citizen Asians passed yesterday without major incidents, and most of those required to leave havebeen evacuated. (Page 5) At Annex, we examine the confusing domestic political scene that has prevailed in China since the purge of Lin Piao one year ago. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T0-0936A0-11300080001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY VIETNAM Hanoi appears to be sending a fresh armor regi- ment and two field artillery regiments into northern South Vietnam. Recent North Vietnamese messages, as well as aerial photography and US pilot sightings, have disclosed large numbers of tanks, tracked ve- hicles, and convoys of artillery moving through the panhandle toward the Demilitarized Zone. One inter- cept disclosed that 92 tanks had moved through the Vinh area, and other units farther south have re- ported the passage of three groups of tanks that could be an armor regiment. A message of 5 November from the major enemy logistics authority in northern Quang Tri Province noted that "two ground artillery regiments..." equipped with tracked vehicles and 120 trucks were to move along Route 9 in Quang Tri Prov- ince. 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CHINA It has been a year since the purge of Lin Piao. The ruling politburo has still not been reconstituted by replacement of those military members who went down with Lin. Leadership turnouts and authorita- tive policy pronouncements have been rare. Despite the outward appearance of order in China, tensions clearly persist among the surviving leaders. This is evidently recognized by many low- and middle-level party members in China. Moreover, the protracted campaign through- out the country to repudiate Lin Piao and the absence from view of an increas- ing number of provincial military leaders suggest that military powerholders in the provinces are under pressure. This in- volves real_ risks for domestic political order. At Annex we examine the confusing domes- tic political scene in greater detail.' 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY PAKISTAN - The Bhutto government is taking a number of diplomatic moves favorable to Asian Communist re- gimes. Yesterday, Islamabad began its formal with- drawal from SEATO. On Tuesday, it recognized Hanoi, and it intends to recognize Pyongyang today. More- over, Islamabad's next step may be early recogni- tion of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union." There appear to be several factors behind these moves. Bhutto wants to increase Pakistan's contacts with other Asian nations, he wishes to ingratiate himself further with Peking, and he needs to coun- ter criticism by leftists at home that his policy is too pro-American. A growing dissatisfaction with US policy could also be involved. 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part-- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T06936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY ARGENTINA On Tuesday Hector Campora, Peron's personal representative in Argentina, announced that the 77- year-old former dictator would return to his home- land on 17 November. Within a few hours President Lanusse told the nation that the armed forces would guarantee Peron's personal safety and deal with any threats to domestic peace by either Peronists or their opponents. Peron has said before that he would re- turn, and this announcement may be only another attempt to throw the opposition off balance and to pressure Lanusse into agreeing to his demands on Peronist par- ticipation in political activity. It seems more likely, however, that this time Peron recognizes that he must return or face a serious loss of prestige. If Peron does return he may well stay for only a few days, long enough to endorse an electoral accord with the military. The short lead time on Campora's announce- ment and the tenor of Lanusse's speech suggest that the Peronists and the gov- ernment are close to an agreement on the conduct of the national elections next March and on the orientation of the gov- ernment that will take office in May. 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP76T00936?A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTE Uganda: President Amin's deadline for the de- parture of non-citizen Asians passed yesterday with- out major incidents, and most of those required to leave have been evacuated. Some 1,500 stateless Asians remain, however, along with a few thousand Asians with Ugandan citizenship and those exempted because of their much-needed technical skills. The UN has set up departure centers in Kampala for the remaining stateless Asians and will try to move them to facilities in Europe and elsewhere by the end of the week. 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO (Elected April 1969) STANDING COMMITTEE Mao Tse-tung (78) Chairman, Central Committee WIVES Chiang Ch'ing (56) Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group Lin Piao (64) Yeh Ch'un (44) no - efens Chou En-lai (73) Premier Ch'en Po-ta (66) entral Com- ter K'ang Sheng (72) Adviser, Cu volution , nternal Security Chief PROVINCIAL LEADERS Chi Teng-k'uei (40)* Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial Revolutionary Committee ttee Ch'en Hsi-lien (60) Commander, Shen-yang Military Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Committee Li Hsueh-feng (64)* an, ion rovincial mmittee Chang Chun-ch'iao (59) Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Second Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group Li Te-sheng (61)* Commander, Anhwei Military District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial Revolutionary Committee Hsu Shih-yu (64) Vice Minister of Defense; Commander, Nanking Military Region; Chairman, Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee Yao Wen-yuan (36) Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Member, Cultural Revolution Group *Alternate Members Inactive ilitary Affairs MILITARY LEADERS Huang Yung-sheng (62) St itary Af- ommi Ch'iu Hui-tso (56) , ? ics C fairs Committee Li Tso-p'eng (60) uty Chief of S ; Po- litical sar, Navy; ary Affairs o ittee taff; Army ary Af- Wu Fa-hsien (58) uty Chief o ; Corn- man rce; Military airs Committee Yeh Chien-ying (72) Vice Chairman, Military Af- fairs Committee GOVERNMENT LEADERS Hsieh Fu-chih (69) lic Security er; Chairman, al Revolutionary Corn- ittee; Vice Premie Li Hsien-nien (66) Finance Minister Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown)* Public Security Vice Minister; Direc- tor, General Office, Party Central Committee HONORARY ELDERS Chu Te (85) , Chairman ess eople's Liu Po-ch'eng (79) Vice Chairm eople's ess; Military Affairs Committee Tung Pi-wu (85) Vice Chair epublic na Purged or dead Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79-T00936A011300080001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY DOMESTIC POLITICS, CHINESE STYLE The events of last autumn drastically altered the political edifice in Peking, but the surviving leaders have, at least up to now, managed the crisis well. Basic social order has been maintained. The military has remained stable while being urged by the regime to be subordinate to civilian party con- trol. The trend toward moderation in domestic poli- cies--a trend evident since 1969, and one that has wide popular support--has been even more pronounced since Lin's departure from the scene. In the con- duct of foreign affairs, Peking has scored a succes- sion of triumphs in 1972, the fruition of its deci- sion several years ago to adopt a more pragmatic and outgoing foreign policy. Nevertheless, the domestic political difficul- ties faced by Peking are major ones, and the leader- ship has thus far reacted with extreme caution. Pe- king's problems are most evident within the polit- buro itself; only 16 of the original 25'members named in 1969 are still being mentioned in the offi- cial press by name, and of these only a dozen appear to be participating in the affairs of state in a meaningful way. The delay in reconstituting the politburo is doubtless associated with the question of the military's future representation on that body. While the regime wrestles with this problem, the armed forces are without a designated leader. Mar- shal Yeh Chien-ying has been serving as de facto de- fense minister but has not been formally appointed to the position. The Issues Because Lin was officially designated Mao's successor, Peking also faces a major task of working out anew formula for succession. For several years, Peking has delayed convening the National People's Congress, the state forum for legitimizing institu- tional and personnel changes. Presumably this delay has stemmed from disputes within the leadership, and among these issues has been the wisdom and utility of many of the changes wrought by the Cultural Revo- lution. The idea of a post-Mao "collective leader- ship" has persistently surfaced in the past year; it is likely that it is the mix of this collective, rather than the principle itself, that is now at is- sue. The regime's handling of the Lin affair has made it appear that the central issue in Peking is one of civilian versus military control. In fact, the issue is much more complex. Evidence--some of it antedating Lin's demise--indicates the institu- tional problem is a real one. Nevertheless, the Al FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Declassified in Part: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY leadership is deeply divided on a much wider range of policy and personnel questions. Moreover, devel- opments during the Cultural Revolution clearly cre- ated and intensified antipathies between leaders who were identified with its excesses and those of a more moderate persuasion. It is hard to believe these antipathies have now vanished, or that they no longer cut across institutions and interest groups, including the armed forces. Some Anomalies The actual facts surrounding the demise of Lin Piao?in September 1971 may never be known. Most of those at politburo level who were purged with Lin had long been associated with him and were clearly identified with the excesses of the Cultural Revo- lution. In fact, however, the affair claimed high- level military victims at both ends of the politi- cal spectrum. Moreover, a campaign against ultra- leftists--which began in late 1969, evidently under the direction of Chou En-lai--has been muted if not terminated altogether, even though it has not reached all of its potential victims. Chiang Ching, deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group which directed Mao's purge of the old party apparatus, Seemingly should have been the next target, but as Mao's wife she apparently is immune. Two other prominent leftists, Shanghai party leaders Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, also continue to ap- pear frequently in Peking. In contrast to these inconsistencies in person- nel matters, China appears at present to be travel- ing on a single policy track. Rationality and prag- matism seem to be the order of the day, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic areas dear to Mao's heart, such as education. There are no con- vincing signs that this approach is being opposed or debated at the moment. One element that almost certainly is raising political temperatures is the protracted effort to repudiate Lin Piao. The notion that Lin, the de- fense minister and Mao's designated successor, could turn against his mentor has sharply eroded confidence in the country's leadership, not only among party officials but among the populace at large. Since early this year, cadres have been studying a succes- sion of documents purporting to spell out the details of Lin's coup plot. The key item in this series, the so-called "571 document," contains Lin's purported operations plan. The plan lists not only those forces that Lin allegedly could count on for support-- primarily the air force--but also a number of other military units he supposedly was attempting to en- list in the plot. The implication is that there A2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 CHINA: Missing Provincial Military Leaders SINKIANG Lung Shu-chin TIBET 553765, 11-72 TSINGHAI INNER Kang Chien-min MONGOLIA KANSU PEKING HOFEH LIAONING TI ENTSIN ? SHANTU G SHENSI . S. Liang Hsing-chu SZECHWAN YUNNAN KIAN Sun- i-cha HUPEH ANHWE SHANGHAI Cheng ih-chi g KIANGSy WEICHOW FUKIEN n 1-nung CHEKIA Nan P* KWANGSI KWANGTUNG _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Ce Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY still are elements within the armed forces whose loyalty is questionable. The most ominous sign in this connection is the latest available document in the anti-Lin series, issued in early July, which sug- gests that the central authorities will not in the future need written evidence of complicity in the Lin "conspiracy" in order to move against given in- dividuals. Problems in the Provinces Some members of the leadership may in fact be exploiting the Lin affair in order to move against military powerholders in the provinces. This im- pression has been reinforced in recent weeks by the failure of an increasing number of these leaders to make public appearances A move against provincial military leaders, . even-on a selective basis, risks jeopardizing domes- tic political order. The Cultural Revolution de- stroyed the leadership of the old party and govern- ment bureaucracies, leaving the military as the only effective instrument of control.. Some efforts have been made to re-establish the civilian party struc- ture and reassert its traditional leading role in the Chinese polity. It is clear, however, that mil- itary leaders still hold the balance of power in the party apparatus. outside of Peking. Thus a move against these military leaders, particularly if it is widespread, could cause a breakdown in control, with no alternative mechanism available to fill the void. The continuing denunciation of Lin and the ac- companying "rectification" movement within the party and the army seem to have Mao's consent. Mao may see the campaign as an opportunity to settle personal scores with a number of provincial military leaders, primarily those whose opposition to the Red Guard movement led him to close out the Cultural Revolution before he felt he had accomplished all of his objectives. On the other hand, Mao must recognize that his close personal identification with Lin renders him vulnerable in certain important ways. The 571 docu- ment contains some unusually harsh words about Mao's leadership. In effect, it accuses Mao of the ex- cesses of the Cultural Revolution, characterizing him as aY'cruel tyrant." This attack.on the Chair- man is. attributed to Lin, and it has been circulated A3 25X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY with Mao's explicit approval, but the effect has been to give wide publicity to a list of grievances against Mao with which most of the populace can readily identify. Mao and Chou During 1972, Mao and Chou have seemed to work very closely on most matters. Chou has constantly been at Mao's side during the Chairman's meetings with visiting state leaders, and in the course of the detailed negotiations with foreign powers, Chou has made it clear that he always defers to Mao on broad policy matters. Similarly, Mao has on several occasions publicly acknowledged his confidence in Chou. Provincial leaders_are not now faced, either collectively or individually, with the massive pub-- lic attacks and orchestrated violence that were so provocative in the 1967-68 period. In the absence of such a direct challenge--and Peking has gone to some lengths to indicate that such a challenge is not forthcoming--it is unlikely that they could or would unite to defy the authority of the Chairman - directly. This seems,particularly to be the case in the absence of a strong and authoritative leader for such a move'. It is difficult to cast Chou in such a role. His concern for the loyalty of the armed forces to the political system is surely as great as his con- cern for the cohesion of the military establishment, and on both. grounds he is-likely to attempt\to "limit the damage" rather than place himself at the head of a, group determined to end the selective purge of the military by open defiance of Mao. To- day Chou seems to have the endorsement of the Chair- man for much of his domestic program as well as for his foreign policy, and this is an asset he will not castaway lightly. .Thus, a Mao,-Chou split seems. highly improbable now... Mao's motives in the present situation are equally complicated. Certainly vindictiveness and a desire to settle old scores play a major part in the current moves against the provincial military. But the explicit attempts. to reassure the military A4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 .? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY that it is not about to suffer a thoroughgoing "rec- tification," coupled with continued emphasis on rel- atively conservative and pragmatic policies at home as well as abroad, seem to indicate that the Chair- man's offensive is at this point a limited one. Like Chou, he seems intent for the moment to limit the damage. His objective could well be to estab- lish abetter balance between competing leftist and conservative forces--and hence further increase his own freedom of maneuver--by whittling away at the predominantly conservative military leaders in the ?provinces through a process of linking them, however tenuously, to the Lin "plot." To create this better balance, Mao may eventu- ally do more than merely whittle away. Most recent appointments have involved relatively conservative persons who were under attack during the Cultural Revolution, but two others do not fall into this category. These latter appointments suggest at least the possibility of a leftward swing in the political pendulum. Whatever the case, it is clear that further changes are in prospect and that ten- sions will persist for some time within the leader- ship. A5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 ea 4 Declassified in Part.- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300080001-3