THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 FEBRUARY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993731
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 1, 1973

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010027-0
The President's Daily Brief
1 February 1973
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010027-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010027-0
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(I),(2).13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
February 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
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In Vietnam, fighting remains heavy in Quang Tri
Province, but continues at a reduced level else-
where in the country.
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(Page 1)
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(Page 3) 25X1
The Lao Communists may be abandoning their five-
week siege of the government outpost at Bouam Long.
(Page 4)
The Soviets are hinting that they may be interested
in participating in joint East-West aid for Vietnam.
(Page 5)
Cambodia's former deputy prime minister In Tam has
received some highly favorable initial reaction in
Phnom Penh to his proposals for ending the war in
Cambodia. (Page 6)
South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak recently pro-
vided US officials in Seoul with a sober assessmen
of the North-South talks that disclosed a toughen-
ing of Seoul's attitude toward the negotiations.
(Page 7)
A recent flurry of Soviet diplomatic activity sug-
gests that Moscow is preparing to play a role in
discussions on a Middle East settlement. (Page 8)
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President Marcos has announced that his government
plans a thorough review of Philippine-US relations--
with special emphasis on US base rights. (Page 9)
Japan.
(Page 10)
Prime Minister Mintoff is again threatening to evict
the British forces from Malta. (Page 10)
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frNOR71
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554071 2-73 CIA
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VIETNAM
Fighting remains heavy in Quang Tri Province
following the government's loss of a foothold on
the Cua Viet River. Elsewhere in the country,
fighting continues at a reduced level, but in the
central provinces there are tenuous indications
that a new increase in combat may be in the offing.
Intercepted messages disclose that subsequent to
the cease-fire an element of the North Vietnamese
711th Division has moved into a position from which
it could launch attacks on South Vietnamese units
defending Fire Support Base Ross, a key government
post overlooking the disputed Que Son Valley in
Quang Nam Province. Enemy units are still blocking
some of the major roads in the central provinces.
One of the mdst significant interdiction points is
in southern Quang Ngai Province where the Communists
control nearly six miles of Route 1.
Local Viet Cong administrations apparently
are working hard to consolidate control over areas
long occupied by the Communists as well as those
recently overrun.
There are also fresh indications that
the Viet Cong will bolster their administrative
ranks with civilian experts from North Vietnam.
In some areas, the Viet Cong are said to have begun
setting up "peace committees," to take the lead
in overt agitation against the government.
(continued)
1
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On the government side, President Thieu is
again attempting to improve his standing with the
country's religious and political groups. Thieu
took a conciliatory line in a recent meeting with
major religious and political leaders in which he
briefed them on the cease-fire agreement. He as-
serted that in any future elections in which the
Viet Cong participate, the non-Communist side must
win regardless of whether it is represented by
pro-government or opposition candidates. Thieu
indicated his willingness to discuss the grievances
of some in his audience, such as the restrictive
political parties decree, and he also stressed
his desire to take effective action against corrup-
tion to prevent the Communists from exploiting the
issue.
Maritime activity has increased near Haiphong.
vessels
towing minesweeping equipment through the main
harbor channel, and other small craft were active
in the area. This follows the recent departure
from Haiphong of the North Vietnamese cargo ship
Viet Bao, the largest ship to leave the harbor
since the mining last spring.
lightering
of foreign merchant ships along the northern coast
since the minin
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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LAOS
uang Prabang
4/13
Sala Phou Khoun
13
4/7
Government u its
link up
ong Kaisy
Ban Son
yang Vieng
uong
Soui
ong
Tieng
tit
Vientiane
THAILAND
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Longo
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-"Pha Dong
13
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--`????\
61
ts shift south
an Ban --
ieng Khouan ville
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THAILAND
0 Government-held location
0 Communist-held location
STATUTE MILES
o
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KILOMETERS
13
NORTH
VIETNAM
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CHINA
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THAILAND
CAMBODIA
OUJN
?
554069 2-73 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Government and Pathet Lao negotiators held
their first private session yesterday at the home
of the acting head of the government delegation.
The Communists dropped their previous in-
sistence that these sessions be held at
their residence--another sign of Pathet
Lao eagerness to get substantive talks
under way.
Meanwhile, the Communists may be abandoning
their five-week siege of the government outpost at
Bouam Long. The Communists have not shelled the
base in the past two days, and its defenders have
begun long-range patrolling for the first time in
over a month. Sustained heavy bombing apparently
has forced some Communist units to withdraw. Com-
munications intelligence indicates that command
elements of two North Vietnamese infantry regiments
that moved into the area late last year have now
moved south toward the Plaine des Jarres.
West of the Plaine, the retreat of almost all
Pathet Lao and dissident neutralist units from along
Route 13 enabled Lao Army forces on 30 January to
push up the road and join the irregular troops hold-
#ig the Sala Phou Khoun road junction. Some small
Communist units are still resisting government ef-
forts to clear, Route 13 to the north.
4
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-VIETNAM
At a dinner on 30 January honoring visiting
North Vietnamese dignitaries, General Secretary
Brezhnev declared that postwar aid to Vietnam "can
and must be an act of solidarity of peoples and
states regardless of their social systems"--the
first time any Soviet leader has commented on the
possibility of joint East-West aid.
On the same day a Soviet official at the UN
told a US counterpart that each country would have
its own bilateral aid program but would also con-
tribute to an international program in which he ex-
pected the UN to play an important role. The offi-
cial said he would welcome talking to someone from
Washington about the subject before returning to
Moscow on 9 February.
In the past, Moscow has been unwilling
to participate in any cooperative aid
ventures with the West Zest the impact
of its own assistance be diluted. Sev-
eral factors might nevertheless induce
the Soviets to reverse their stand in re-
spect to Vietnam, even if they take part
in a limited way. Moscow might hope to
win points with Washington. Moscow might
also believe that Soviet-US involvement
in a joint enterprise throughout Vietnam
would help encourage both Washington and
Saigon to comply fully with their polit-
ical commitments. In addition, the So-
viets might hope the multilateral, aid
projects would lessen North Vietnam's de-
pendence on China.
5
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CAMBODIA
Former deputy prime minister In Tam has re-
ceived some highly favorable initial reaction in
Phnom Penh to his recent suggestion that a small
government-insurgent commission be set up to ar-
range a cease-fire, revise the constitution, and
organize free elections.
Lon Nol would object to some aspects of
In Tam's plan, though at least he would
have no quarrel with its suggestion that
Sihanouk be excluded from any role in
Cambodia's future.
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SOUTH KOREA - NORTH KOREA
' South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak recently
provided US officials in Seoul'with a? sober assess-_
ment of the North-South talks that disclosed a
toughening of Seoul's attitude' toward the negotia-
tions. In sharp contrast to his optimistic dis-
cussion of exchanges and unification late last
year, the CIA director now spoke only of .coexist-
ence with Pyongyang and implied that little prog-
ress in the negotiations should be anticipated.
In this, Yi was taking his lead from
President Pak Chong-hui's tough New Year's
statement, which emphasized the difficul-
ties facing the South in the talks and
urged caution in dealing with Pyongyang.
Pak's attitude reflects a.deliberate,at-
tempt to dampen popular expectations'
raised by the dramatic breakthroughs. of
last year. The early euphoria served
Pak's purposes well, enabling him to use
the prospect of progress in the talkp
as the rationale for a government reor-
ganization that further centralized power
in his hands. Ntnd that these reforms,are
almost complete, he has ,apparently de-
cided to give the negotiations lower
priority.
Yi also stressed the negative attitude of the
North toward the negotiations. He pointed to the
tough stand taken by Pyongyang's representatives
in recent Working-level sessions and the North
Koreans' refusal to set a date for the next high-
level meeting. He also expressed concern about
increasingly harsh North Korean propaganda. Yi
had no ready explanation for the changed North
Korean attitude.
Recent North Korean statements suggest
that Pyongyang may be disappointed with
the limited political returns the talks
have provided thus far.
Despite the negative attitude of the two
sides, neither gives any indication that
it wants to end the dialogue, and some
non-political agreements may be concluded
in the months ahead.
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USSR - MIDDLE EAST
A recent flurry of Soviet diplomatic ac-
tivity suggests that Moscow is getting
ready to play a role in discussions on a
Middle East settlement. It clearly ex-
pects an early revival of international
efforts to this end and does not want to
be left out of the action.
Since latelast week, the Soviet ambassadors in
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq have called-on the presidents
of those countries.' In the Egyptian case, this was
the first time President Sadat has: received the SO-
viet: ambassador since the Soviet military expulsion
last July. The brief press releases on'these.con-
tacts give no hint of the topics discussed. More,-
over, Sadat's national security adviser is.going-to
Moscow soon to discuss what can be done to break
the Middle East deadlock.
Meanwhile, Mikhail Sytenko, the director of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East department,
was in Rome last weekend briefing the Italians on
how the So s beli v a settlement should be a -
proached.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PHILIPPINES-US
President Marcos yesterday brought the US
base issue out in the open by announcing that his
government will thoroughly review Philippine-US
relations, with particular regard to the base rights.
Marcos often turns the heat on the US
when it seems politically expedient. Dur-
ing a domestic crisis last summer, for
example, he publicly demanded a better
deal for the Philippines, but dropped
the subject when the crisis blew over.
Nevertheless, although technical discus-
sions on a new agreement were completed
a year ago, Manila has not yet shown any
inclination to proceed with the high-level
talks needed to conclude the process.
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NOTES
Japan - North Korea:
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UK-Malta: Prime Minister Mintoff is again
threatening to evict the British forces--this time
on 31 March--unless London agrees to discuss com-
pensation for Malta's losses caused by the ster-
ling float. This follows Prime Minister Heath's
rejection of Mintoff's suggestion last week that
a mediator be brought into the dispute and Heath's
insistence on settling only the bilateral issues.
Mintoff's next move may be to seek a meeting with
Heath, for which he has been angling for some
time. Meanwhile, he apparently is proceeding as
though the base agreement will continue. The
draft of Malta's seven-year development plan ap-
pears to assume that base rental payments will
continue and Mintoff has announced a new set of
incentives to attract foreign investment--which
would have little chance of success should the
British be forced out.
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Top Secret
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