THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 JUNE 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993855
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 21, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
21 June 1973
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Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1).(214.32
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
21 June 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Yugoslavia, the party is tightening its control
over the military and security services in order
to head off problems during the post-Tito period.
(Page 1)
As the September 1 deadline for the Egypt-Libya
merger draws closer, differences between Cairo and
Tripoli are sharpening. (Page 2)
Hanoi continues to move large numbers of civilians
into the DMZ and Communist-controlled portions of
northern South Vietnam. (Page 3)
Italian prime minister - designate Mariano Rumor
faces hard bargaining as he tries to bring the So-
cialist Party back into the government after a year
in the opposition. (Page 4)
The EC foreign ministers are planning to discuss a
joint response to the US initiative on Atlantic
relations at the EC Council session next month.
(Page 5)
The shooting that disrupted Juan'Peron's return to
Argentina yesterday is likely to accentuate the
strains between the former dictator and President
Campora. (Page 6)
Chilean President Allende has less room to maneuver
now that the Communists have joined the Socialists
to force a harder government line against the op-
position. (Page 7)
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YUGOSLAVIA
The party is tightening its control over the mili-
tary, apparently to head off problems during the
post-Tito era. Since the first of the year, party
journals have warned the generals to stay out of
politics
Military influence has been strong in recent years,
largely because of its exceptional unity, and on
occasion Tito has had to depend on the military for
decisive support against troublesome party factions.
Now that Tito's drive for party unity has had some
success, the party evidently feels strong enough to
move to prevent the military from becoming a rival
for political power.
The party is also moving to gain control of the se-
curity apparatus.
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LIBYA-EGYPT
Differences between Cairo and Tripoli are sharp-
ening as September 1, the deadline for union, draws
closer. The Egyptians are worried about and disdain-
ful of Qadhafi's "cultural revolution," and their
references to him and his country are taking on an
obliquely critical tone. In an interview in Tripoli
last week, Sadat wished Qadhafi's "experiment" suc-
cess in Libya, but noted that only time will tell
whether it is suitable for other Arabs. He made lit-
tle reference to union.
Cairo press treatment also has become more caus-
tic. Yesterday an influential columnist criticized
"bombshell measures" that have a temporary popular
impact, but do not take into account the "greater
realities"--the most severe public chiding Qadhafi
has received from Cairo.
Sadat and Qadhafi have made little progress in
working out the details of the proposed union. Ac-
cording to one projected timetable, the formal proc-
lamation will be followed by the appointment of a
nominal cabinet and the ratification of a new con-
stitution.
Qadhafi's position in the new
the most immediate problem.
Qadhafi is slated to assume the vice-
presidency, but he apparently is reluctant to accept
a position which might constrain his freedom of ac-
tion. Although Qadhafi has frequently stated that
Sadat must accept the presidency, he reportedly en-
visages the merger as a means of eventually dominat-
ing Sadat.
state presents
The Libyan leader will probably angle for
a role that will give him direct access to
the military and freedom to direct his cul-
tural revolution. He may believe he can
establish control over a mass political
movement throughout the merged state and
thereby secure strong leverage over Sadat.
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VIETNAM
Hanoi continues to move large numbers of civil-
ians, together with their belongings and livestock,
into the DMZ and the Communist-controlled portions
of South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province.
A recent intercept indicates that as of May 28
some 19,500 civilians had been transferred to these
areas and that transportation had been arranged to
move an additional 5,500 south by June 10--the tar-
get date for completing the "resettlement." Many
of those moved into Quang Tri were identified as
families returning to homes that they had fled
during the war.
The Communists have recently established
a provincial government in Quang Tri, and
North Vietnamese engineers have been build-
ing new storage areas, roads, and housing
throughout the part of the province they
control. Hanoi may hope that by returning
politically reliable southerners they can
use the area as both a showplace and as
a means of attracting some of the refugees
from Quang Tri who now live in government-
controlled territory in northern South
Vietnam.
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ITALY
Hard bargaining on the terms for a new govern-
ment will begin now that President Leone has named
Mariano Rumor as prime minister - designate. Rumor,
a moderate Christian Democrat, was interior minis-
ter in Andreotti's government and had been prime
minister in center-left governments in 1968 and 1970.
Rumor will face the difficult task of try-
ing to bring the Socialist Party back into
the government after a year of opposition.
In approaching the negotiations, his party
and other potential coalition members will
seek assurances that the Socialists will
not gravitate toward the Communists. In
addition, Rumor apparently intends to in-
sist that his new government be based on
advance agreement on specific economic
and social reforms.
Should Rumor succeed in bringing the
Socialists into the coalition, the ?new
government would be composed of the same
parties that governed the country for the
nine years preceding 1972. Such a lineup
would give a more comfortable parliamen-
tary majority, in contrast to the paper-
thin margin which hampered Andreotti's
centrist coalition.
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EC-US
The EC foreign ministers are planning to dis-
cuss a response to the US initiative on Atlantic
relations at the EC Council session on July 23.
The French are reluctantly cooperating in the prepa-
rations. Some member countries oppose focusing on
substance at the outset, however. Belgian Foreign
Office Political Director Davignon, for example,
believes that such a tack would only lead to a con-
frontation with the French, and that Paris must be
brought along step-by-step. This strategy is
threatened, Davignon believes, by the US tendency
to "reward" France for its obstructionism by making
bilateral approaches. Davignon therefore hopes that
Dr. Kissinger will delay a trip to Europe until
after the July meeting.
Last week's NATO ministerial also endorsed a
study of Atlantic relations, although most EC mem-
bers were reluctant to imply that NATO objectives
or strategies should be changed. Non-EC members,
however, pushed for such a study out of concern
that "bilateralism" between the US and the EC--as
the Canadians put it--could erode the NATO consul-
tative process.
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ARGENTINA
The shooting that disrupted Juan Peron's homecoming
yesterday, taking the lives of at least 20 persons
and injuring several hundred more, is likely to ac-
centuate the strains between the former dictator and
President Campora. Peron had already been upset with
Campora's inept handling of the terrorist problem and
internal Peronist divisions.
Peron decided that
he would force Campora to resign and have himself ap-
pointed president by the Peronist-dominated congress.
The shooting may provide him the opportunity to sound
out top military officers and political leaders be-
fore making any move.
Peron has promised to clarify his plans in an address
to the nation tonight. His age and desire to spend
much of his time on foreign affairs may lead Peron
to decide against taking the presidency. In any
event, he will play the decisive role in the govern-
ment. In the coming weeks, Peron will seek to sta-
bilize Argentina's political situation, which now
borders on anarchy.
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CHILE
Communist leaders have joined the Socialists
to force on President Allende a harder line against
the opposition. Last weekend, the two joined to
give Allende an unprecedented public rebuke for
meeting with striking copper workers, and thereby
stalled his efforts to negotiate an end to the
costly walk-out.
The rare agreement between the rival Com-
munists and Socialists reduces Allende's
room to maneuver. Particularly notewor-
thy is the marked shift by the Communists--
the most pragmatic and cautious members
of the Marxist coalition?away from their
usual support for Allende's strategy of
compromise. Their new hard line includes
support for the use of violence.
Meanwhile, Allende continues to press for
inclusion of the armed services and na-
tional police in his cabinet, although he
is having trouble finding terms acceptable
to both military and coalition leaders.
The Socialists, perhaps reassured by the
effectiveness of the army and police crack-
down on the opposition, may be softening
their opposition to these efforts, however.
The security forces themselves continue
to earn their pay handling almost constant
pro- and anti-government demonstrations.
Leaders of Allende's coalition have
scheduled for today a number of new demon-
strations throughout Chile to upstage re-
cent anti-government rallies and to show
military leaders that the government re-
tains widespread public support.
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NOTE
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Top Secret
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