THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 JULY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993865
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 3, 1973

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
The President's Daily Brief
3 July 1973
Fr-
o ret 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
Declassified in Pad- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E.O. 11652
exemption category 51111/.(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T009-36A011600010079-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 July 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Cambodi
(Page 1)
Poor morale and confusion over North Vietnam's line
on the war following the cease-fire prompted Hanoi
to dispatch a ranking Central Committee member to
the South in April. (Page 2)
A variety of "assistance" agreements signed between
the Lao Communists and North Vietnam may cloak a
diminished North Vietnamese presence in Laos, per-
haps including some military personnel. (Page 3)
President Allende's decision to revamp his cabinet
may be part of his effort to obtain congressional
approval of a state of siege in Chile. (Page 4)
Notes on the international monetary situation, a
possible expansion of trade between East Germany
and the US, and an interim solution for dividing
foreign debts between Pakistan and Bangladesh ap-
pear on Page 5.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00636A011600010079-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBOD IA
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
Morale problems caused by confusion over Hanoi's
line on the war and on party affairs apparently de-
veloped among southern cadre following the cease-fire,
causing the dispatch of a ranking Central Committee
member to the South in April.
A major issue appears to have been Hanoi's un-
willingness to support renewed major military opera-
tions in the South.
the
head of the Central Committee's Propaganda and Train-
ing Section, To Huu, told assembled COSVN cadres in
Tay Ninh Province that because of the "international
situation" and a "weakening of the war-making poten-
tial" on the Communist side, a large-scale military
offensive could not be attempted for three to five
years.
To assuage cadre concerns that this policy
amounted to abandonment of the revolution in the
South, Huu claimed that North Vietnam could now con-
centrate on consolidating its economy, to serve as a
"large rear base area for the South"--a traditional
Hanoi cliche. He went on to make some overblown
claims about North Vietnam's intent to concentrate
"all of its economic resources" in support of the
Communists in the South, and said that "three mil-
lion" North Vietnamese will be resettled in "liber-
ated areas" by mid-1974.
Huu was also sent to deal with the repercus-
sions of an article by party First Secretary Le Duan
early in the year, which suggested that some party
cadre were ineffective and would have to be weeded
out. Huu tried to offset the effects of Duan's
statement on party morale by claiming that it had
been intended to improve cadre skills, spirit, and
health.
Huu origin-
ally intended to visit only Quang Tri
Province, but decided to go on to COSVN
after arriving in South Vietnam, This
suggests that he found more serious "mis-
understandings" over Hanoi's current pol-
icy on both the war and on party matters
than he anticipated. Given the apparent
extent of cadre concern, To Huu's over-
stated claims probably had only a limited
palliative effect.
2
25X1
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T009-36A011600010079-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Late last week a Lao Communist delegation signed
an agreement with the North Vietnamese Government for
"medical cooperation," according to the Vietnam News
Agency. During the past two months other delegations
have signed agreements on road construction and food
production.
These "assistance" agreements may be de-
signed in part to provide a cloak of legit-
imacy for a diminished North Vietnamese
presence in Laos--possibly including some
military personnel. Intercepts have indi-
cated that some North Vietnamese units
have been instructed to disguise themselves
as "civilian" technicians or Pathet Lao
troops.
Hanoi may use these arrangements to retain
advisers, small military units in the
hinterlands, and troops to maintain the
road and trail network. It probably would
not use them, however, as cover for major
main force units in.Laos.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
President Allende intends to revamp his "cabi-
net, possibly in a continued effort to secure a
congressional declaration of a state of siege.
Allende still holds the initiative in the wake of
last Friday's abortive revolt, but he remains wary
of the possibility of another move against him.
The disheartening effect of that day's events
on the opposition may have been a factor helping
Allende settle the 74-day-old El Teniente copper
strike. In addition, at least five members of the
extreme rightist Fatherland and Freedom group, in-
cluding its leader, have sought asylum in the
Ecuadorean Embassy. The governing Popular Unity
coalition continues to claim that the country is
in its most serious situation since the civil war
of 1891, however, and Allende has asked the opposi-
tion-controlled Congress to help him "crush fascism"
by declaring a state of siege.
Yesterday the lower house rejected this request.
The opposition National and Christian Democratic
parties maintain that the state of emergency and
curfew presently in effect give the executive branch
sufficient power to deal with the alleged threat to
constitutional order and that any further curtail-
ment of civil liberties is unwarranted.
The Christian Democrats may, however,
agree to give Allende state of siege
powers for three months in return for a
responsible military role in the new
cabinet.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
International Monetary Developments: The dol-
lar again hit new lows in European currency markets.
Austria has now followed Germany in revaluing its
currency; the schilling has been raised by 4.8 per-
cent as a result of Austria's close trade ties with
Germany and its high domestic rate of inflation.
The other major countries have indicated their in-
tention not to follow suit, however.
East Germany - US: The Union Bank of California
has agreed to extend East Germany a $17-million line
of credit. The credit was requested by the East
Germans to facilitate an expansion of trade with the
US, which has been relatively low--some $25 million
in 1972. They are particularly interested in in-
creasing their imports of US computers and grain.
Pakistan: The Bhutto government will accept an
interim solution to the issue of responsibility for
the $1.2 billion in foreign debts incurred on be-
half of Pakistan's former East wing. Pakistan now
will continue servicing the entire debt owed to the
members of the aid-Pakistan consortium until next
June, when it will be relieved of that portion re-
lated to what is now Bangladesh. This allows an-
other year to decide on a final division of all
liabilities--a prerequisite for new long-term aid
arrangements.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
Declassified in Pak - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010079-2