THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 JULY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993881
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 21, 1973

Declassified in 'Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936-A011700010008-9
The President's Daily Brief
21 July 1973
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
21 July 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Egypt appears to have halted the Libyan march, and
a Libyan delegation has flown to Cairo to meet Sadat.
(Pagel)
Bangkok wants to begin negotiations toward reducing
US forces in Thailand. (Page 3)
In Chile, workers are demanding that the government
take over all seized industries. (Page 4)
The Chinese evidently have begun deploying a coastal
defense cruise missile of their own design. (Page 5)
At Annex, we discuss Egypt's campaign to improve its
relations with other Arab states.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LIBYA-EGYPT
Colonel Qadhafi replied yesterday to President
Sadat's protests about the "march on Cairo" by claim-
ing that he had resigned as president of Libya on
July 11 and learned of the march only from radio re-
ports.
Qadhafi's resignation and his decision to
make it public are further indications
that he fully intends to place his pres-
tige and leadership behind his own concept
of the merger with Egypt. During his three-
week stay in Cairo he showed no willingness
to yield to Egyptian officials who proposed
gradual implementation of a federal union.
Nor, since his return to Libya last week,
has there been any clear sign that he has
settled differences with fellow members of
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)
over the union.
None of the RCC members has moved to fill the
leadership vacuum created by Qadhafi's prolonged ab-
sence from Tripoli. On the contrary, council members
have refused his resignation and some of them are
participating in the "march on Cairo."
No matter how determined Qadhafi may be,
however, Sadat is unlikely to give in to
Libyan demands for full and immediate
union. The general Libyan performance--
from the march to Qadhafi's dramatics--
could, if anything, intensify Sadat's nega-
tivism on the entire union project.
The Egyptians published what is probably their
minimum position on merger two days ago when the
march began. It involves a formula that has the out-
ward trappings of full unity but allows a year's
grace period for preparations and consultations be-
fore the project is completed, and it refers to a
plebiscite in September 1974. It is doubtful that
Sadat would go much further to satisfy Qadhafi.
Egypt is currently confronted with the more im-
mediate problem of holding back the Libyan march.
By late yesterday afternoon, approximately 1,500
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Libyan vehicles had bypassed Egyptian roadblocks at
Mersa Matruh and had reached Fukah, approximately
50 miles farther east. Egyptian Army units, called
in near Fukah, have blown up portions of the road
to the east and have established an apparently suc-
cessful roadblock in the vicinity. Beyond some mi-
nor rock-throwing incidents, no direct confrontation
has yet been reported.
The tougher Egyptian measures may be having
some effect. Last night, five of the marchers who
had remained at Mersa Matruh, including a member of
the RCC, flew to Cairo to meet Sadat and present
their views on unity.
With a meaningful merger with Libya now so un-
likely, Egypt has recently been improving its rela-
tions with other Arab states. This campaign and
reasons for it are discussed at Annex.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THAILAND
Bangkok, currently reviewing its policy toward
the US, has requested information from Washington on
three matters of "highest importance":
--US intentions regarding Cambodia after Au-
gust 15,
--US intentions regarding future use of the air
bases in Thailand, and,
--US plans for equipping the Thai armed forces.
It is clear, from remarks of Prime Minister
Thanom and Deputy Foreign Minister Chartchai
that Bangkok wants to begin negotiations
to reduce US forces in Thailand. Thai lead-
ers believe that unless some progress is
achieved on this issue, the government will
become increasingly vulnerable to public
criticism. Such criticism could lead to
large-scale student demonstrations.
Most important, the Thai leadership hopes
its demarche will lead to a new US military
assistance package. Alarmed over the dete-
riorating situation in Cambodia and unhappy
over recent cuts in US military assistance,
Bangkok wants to test Washington's commit-
ment to Thai security. Should Thai leaders
be dissatisfied with the reply, they may
consider new steps to signal their dis-
pleasure, such as a demand for a reduction
in the number of US facilities, over and
above the air bases, permitted to operate
in Thailand.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
Workers in Santiago's industrial districts
clashed with police two days ago after barricading
streets near the factories they have seized and held
since June 29. Apparently led by the extreme leftist
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the workers
are demanding that the government take over all
seized industries. President Allende's position is
that each case will be studied individually and that
only "monopolistic" or "strategic" firms will be
taken over by the state.
The Communist and Socialist leaders apparently
oppose the President's desire to return some indus-
tries to their owners. Communist trade union lead-
ers, on the other hand, are pressing for some form
of workers' action considerably short of seizure.
The Communists, Socialists, and the MIR
may hold Allende personally responsible
for the use of force against workers. The
incident will hurt the President's effort
to persuade Popular Unity parties to sup-
port a dialogue with the opposition Chris-
tian Democrats.
The Christian Democrats, for their part,
are reportedly considering bringing im-
peachment charges against the entire cabi-
net. If successful, this would embarrass
the government, but not bring it down.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
China: the
Chinese have begun to deploy a coastal defense cruise
missile of their own design. The weapon seems to
be a lengthened version of the Styx missile that the
Soviets supplied in the late fifties.
Spain: The new Foreign Minister, Lopez Rodo,
has already begun to define Madrid's terms for re-
newal of the agreement which permits the US to use
several military bases on Spanish soil. Although
the agreement does not come up for renewal until
1975, Lopez Rodo wants to start discussions when he
comes to the UN in October. In a new linkage, he
has told Ambassador Rivero that the US could stay
at the Rota naval base only if the question of Brit-
ish hegemony over Gibraltar is settled, because
there is no justification for two NATO bases in the
area. The Foreign Minister urged the US to get the
British to moderate their intransigent stand against
returning Gibraltar to Spain.
USSR-Cuba: The Soviet Union apparently is
sending another group of ships to visit Cuba. A
guided-missile cruiser, a destroyer, and a tanker
now near the Canary Islands are headed west and
could arrive in Cuba in seven or eight days.
If the visit
takes place, it will be the tenth such port call to
Cuba since the visits began in 1969.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT - ARAB STATES
Egypt has recently made several moves aimed at
bettering its ties with other Arab states.
--During a visit to Khartoum last week, Cairo's
war minister, General Ahmad Ismail Ali, report-
edly reached final agreement on plans to return
a token Sudanese force to the Suez Canal and to
reopen the Egyptian military academy in Khartoum.
Presidents Sadat and Numayri decided in princi-
ple on these moves in late May.
--Egyptian leaders have been in increasing con-
tact with Saudi Arabia since King Faysal visited
Cairo in mid-May. The Saudis since have report-
edly granted Egypt loans of $65 million for food
purchases and $50 million for the purchase of
British helicopters.
--Kuwait has tentatively agreed to finance the
construction of a major oil pipeline from Suez
to the Mediterranean in return for a large
share of the equity.
Arab solidarity is always a goal--however elu-
sive--of Arab leaders, and this objective took on
added urgency earlier this year when President Sadat
put renewed emphasis on his preparations for mili-
tary action against Israel. Reintroduction of the
Sudanese troops provides a symbol of this solidarity.
Cooperation with Saudi Arabia could provide more
than a symbol; Sadat hopes for enough leverage to
induce the Saudis, and probably also the Kuwaitis,
to use their oil resources as a political weapon
against the US if and when he decides to intensify
his campaign to force Israeli concessions on the
settlement issue.
Egypt will use any aid it may receive from
Jidda to purchase Western, principally European,
military equipment. This would allow Cairo to
claim that it needs time to absorb the new equip-
ment before it could undertake war. This arrange-
ment would also lessen Egypt's dependence on Soviet
equipment--an objective that Cairo now feels neces-
sary because of Soviet attitudes toward detente
with the US, and that Saudi Arabia views as emi-
nently desirable.
(continued)
Al
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Sadat has more immediate concerns as well.
Egypt desperately needs economic assistance, and
the oil-rich states have it to give in abundance.
In this connection, the diminishing prospects for
a meaningful merger with Libya, whose own wealth
was the primary inducement for Cairo's participa-
tion in the union project, have accelerated Egypt's
efforts to better its ties with its wealthy neigh-
bors. Sadat's closer ties with the other Arab
states--with Sudan in a purely political sense and
with Saudi Arabia in both a political and an eco-
nomic sense--are an insurance policy against the
failure of the merger plans.
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