THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 AUGUST 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993890
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
1 August 1973
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
1 August 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
China's exchange program with the US is having some
impact on a growing controversy in Peking over re-
turning to the approach to education and science that
prevailed before the Cultural Revolution. (Page 1)
We have further evidence that Sihanouk and the Khmer
Communists will maintain their tough stance on a
cease-fire and negotiations. (Page 2)
The Soviet leadership is walking a thin line between
extolling detente and urging the communist movement
to remain vigilant against ideological subversion.
(Page 3)
Notes the departure of
Soviet ships from the Persian Gulf, and Indian grain
purchases appear on Page 5.
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CHINA
There is a growing controversy in China over
returning to traditional trends in education and
science that may be related to politicking before
the 10th Party Congress. The exchange program with
the US is also having some impact on this issue.
Much of the debate over education reflects a
split between those who favor a return to a more
traditional university system and those who argue
for retention of the heavily politicized system in-
troduced during the Cultural Revolution. Authori-
ties in Liaoning Province, for example, have pub-
licly criticized the reinstatement of college en-
trance examinations, charging they are designed to
screen out the children of workers and to turn aca-
demic institutions into training grounds for "in-
tellectual aristocrats."
Reports by some Chinese delegations that have
toured the US have also drawn criticism. In one
case, a group of doctors was accused of being overly
enthusiastic about things American./
The heart of these controversies is the
conflict of politically motivated activ-
ists versus experts that has plagued
China for nearly two decades. The pres-
ent trend in favor of the experts was al-
most certain to be opposed by Madame Mao
and the militants. Others may have joined
the debate for tactical reasons in prepa-
ration for the Party Congress.
Although the exchange program with the US
has figured in these domestic disputes,
the general policy of improving relations
with Washington does not seem to be at is-
sue.
no major reversal of current trends is in
prospect.
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CAMBODIA
Further evidence has appeared that Sihanouk and
the Khmer Communists will maintain their hard line
on a cease-fire and negotiations. I
Sihanouk indicated his "government's" negotiating
policy and tactics would depend on the military sit-
uation in Cambodia.
Sihanouk claimed he and members of his politi-
cal front group (FUNK) in Peking--in collusion with
in-country insurgent leaders--had agreed some months
ago that if a military stalemate should evolve in
Cambodia, they would negotiate. If, on the other
hand, it appeared that the Lon Nol regime would col-
lapse under military pressure, FUNK would see no
need for talks. Sihanouk said this second option
is now governing FUNK's policy.
Sihanouk reaffirmed his position that FUNK would
not discuss the mechanics of its "take-over" with
any Phnom Penh group that included or represented
members of the High Political Council. He added
that the FUNK Central Committee would determine his
own role in any talks.
Sihanouk noted that it was no longer possible
for Washington to arrange discussions between the
two Cambodian parties, nor would FUNK agree to talk
with the US or other foreign powers about internal
Cambodian affairs. He indicated, however, that he
would be willing to meet Senator Mansfield because
he is a personal friend and is a "good friend of
Cambodia."
Although these comments are dated, they
are generally consistent with Sihanouk's
most recent public statements. More im-
portant, however, the current Khmer Com-
munist offensive in the Phnom Penh area
underscores the insurgents' determination
to try the military option that Sihanouk
described. Insurgent intercepts continue
to call for a "military victory."
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USSR
The Soviet leadership is trying to walk a
thin line between extolling detente and
convincing the population and fraternal
parties of the need to remain vigilant
against ideological subversion. Several
leaders have spoken on these subjects
since Brezhnev's return from his trips to
Bonn, Washington, and Paris. None has ex-
pressed any reservations about detente,
nor is there any evidence of important in-
stitutional opposition to that policy.
Even the Soviet military--Zed by Marshal
Grechko--have strongly supported current
policies.
Brezhnev hinted at the existence of reservations
about detente in the USSR and among its allies when
he observed, in his Lenin Peace Prize speech on July
11, that moving from confrontation to peace is not
easy. He offered implicit reassurance that Soviet
leaders would remain vigilant, but reaffirmed his
commitment to detente and said that the USSR must
also be ready to head off any attempt to resume the
cold war.
Two days later Brezhnev, addressing Communists
at home and abroad, said that the USSR's foreign
policy ensures better relations among Communist
states and promotes unity among the Communist par-
ties of the world. He ended by noting that imple-
mentation of the "Soviet peace program" is likely
to diminish the danger of a new war.
Brezhnev's words could very well be aimed
at critics who suspect that detente may
weaken the socialist bloc and the world
movement.
Suslov, the party's ideologue, speaking on the
same occasion--the 70th anniversary of Lenin's Bol-
shevik Party--reminded his audience of Lenin's bit-
ter quarrels with other leftist leaders over the
need for a highly centralized and disciplined organ-
ization. He endorsed detente, but pointed out
that the Soviet party, just last April, had called
for vigilance against "imperialist" schemes and hos-
tile ideology.
(continued)
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Since then, many Soviet commentators have dis-
cussed detente and the questions that it has raised.
They have defended it as a long-term phenomenon rep-
resenting the USSR's best interests--as well as
those of the other socialist countries, the inter-
national communist movement, and all mankind--from
which benefits have already begun to flow. They
have also reassured critics that the leadership will
not be "too trusting" vis-a-vis the "capitalists,"
that Soviet military strength will be preserved,
and that trade with capitalists will not open the
door to "penetration" or "exploitation" of the Soviet
economy.
Commentators have also said that the USSR will
not' desert its socialist allies and will continue to
support aspirations of "national liberation" m6ve-
ments. Such commentators warn that the recent re-
laxation of international tension does not mean for
anyone in the communist movement that it is time
for peaceful coexistence on the ideological front.
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NOTES
USSR-Iraq: Three Soviet naval ships have ended
a month's stay in the Persian Gulf. A naval repair
ship remains behind, probably in support of Iraqi
naval port and coastal defense construction near
Umm Qasr.
India: Since mid-June New Delhi has purchased
about 1.5 million tons of wheat and coarse grains,
mainly from the US)
This is still far short of
the 4.5 million tons that the Indians hope to obtain
before the harvest begins in late October. Mean-
while, India is experiencing another erratic monsoon,
but it is still too early to forecast its impact on
the fall harvest.
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