THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 AUGUST 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993906
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 18, 1973

,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
The President's Daily Brief
18 August 1973
45
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director or Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
18 August 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Soviet disarmament officials recently outlined
Moscow's thinking on the
formal force reduction negotiations which are
scheduled to begin on October 30. (Page 1)
The ruling Israeli Labor Party is trying to satisfy
Defense Minister Dayan's demands for a more activist
Israeli development program in the occupied Arab
territories. (Page 2)
Saudi Arabia's King Faysal is prepared to increase
his financial commitment to Egypt in an effort to
provide Cairo with alternatives to military de-
pendence on the Soviet Union and to wean President
Sadat away from Libya. (Page 3)
Egypt reportedly is willing to sell major items of
Soviet military equipment from its inventories to
Saudi Arabia for delivery to Yemen (Sana). (Page 4)
Kabul--concerned over Islamabad's recent arrest of
opposition leaders in Pakistan's Baluchistan Prov-
ince--has appealed to the US, the USSR, and Iran for
help in preventing trouble in Afghanistan's relations
with Pakistan. (Page 5)
Notes on Syria-Lebanon,
appear on Page 6.
25X1
25X1
and South Asia 25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-MBFR
Soviet disarmament officials
outlined
Moscow's thinking on the formal force reduction ne-
gotiations which are scheduled to begin on October 30.
Their views do not reflect any changes on
major substantive issues.
the Soviets
think force reductions will be easier to achieve
than "constraints" such as limiting troop movements
and reinforcements.
Many Western countries have placed strong
emphasis on constraints, particularly a
prohibition on reintroducing troops which
have been withdrawn.
there must
be a "flexible linkage" between reductions in na-
tional and stationed (foreign) forces. They are
worried that reductions in US and Soviet forces
would leave the West Germans disproportionately
strong.
The Soviets have never stated their posi-
tion on the relationship between national
and stationed forces in detail.
Moscow's continued
concern over multi-national verification' measures.
The Soviets insist that national means of verifica-
tion are sufficient and are concerned over American
insistence on discussing "effective verification."
On procedural matters, the Soviets foresee the
initial phase of the talks being conducted at a high
level, to be followed by negotiations at the working
group level. The Soviets want the negotiations to
be in stages, moving from "agreement to agreement,"
with recesses for consultation between stages. Mos-
cow thinks the need for frequent consultation argues
against establishing permanent missions in Vienna;
Moscow also fears that permanent missions might
breed familiarity between Soviet and Western dele-
gates which the USSR wants to avoid.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
25X1
LOA!
'z-25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ISRAEL
The ruling Israeli Labor Party is trying to
satisfy Defense Minister Dayan's demands for a more
activist Israeli development program in the occupied
Arab territories. Dayan has said he might not be
able to run on the Labor Party ticket unless such
a program is approved.
Dayan and Minister without Portfolio Galili,
a member of Prime Minister Meir's "kitchen cabinet,"
have worked out .a four-year draft program which,
if adopted by the party, would become a policy
guideline for the next government. The draft calls
for:
--an expanded program of Jewish settlements
(there are now about 50);
--government acquisition of more Arab land for
settlement and development purposes;
--allowing private Jewish purchase of Arab
lands under government controls;
--government incentives for Israeli businessmen
in the Arab territories; and
--greater social and economic benefits and
services to the Arabs in the territories.
Some Labor Party leaders, particularly
Finance Minister Sapir, and leaders of
the allied MAPAM oppose such a program
for economic, demographic, and diplomatic
reasons, and criticize Dayan's proposals
as "creeping annexation." Sapir holds
the whip on party and government finances
and thus can block Dayan's initiatives.
At the same time, however, Sapir and his
allies recognize the need to keep the pop-
ular Defense Minister on the party list
and are willing to ?pay a price to keep
him there. Labor Party leaders also
realize that Israeli voters have grown
more conservative about the Arab terri-
tories and that unless the party adopts
a program to satisfy them, it will suffer
political reverses. A more active program
in the occupied territories will also please
the Labor Party's traditional coalition
partner, the National Religious Party, and
will undercut the out-and-out annexationist
policy of the right-wing opposition GAHAL
bloc.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SAUDI ARABIA - EGYPT
King Faysal is prepared to increase his finan-
cial commitment to Egypt in an effort to provide
Cairo with alternatives to military dependence on
the Soviet Union and to wean President Sadat away
from Libya.
From 1967 until this year, Saudi assistance to
Egypt has consisted of an annual subsidy of approxi-
mately $100 million. During the last few months
Faysal has in addition purchased at least $50 mil-
lion in arms for Egypt and offered to guarantee some
$65 million in commercial credits. He reportedly
has offered to pick up Libya's $59-million annual
subsidy to Egypt if merger plans and Libyan aid are
terminated.
Faysal
of military
substantial
Saudis have
SUMED (Suez
large-scale
is actively seeking non-Soviet sources
hardware for Sadat and plans to authorize
Saudi direct investment in Egypt. The
expressed considerable interest in the
to Mediterranean) pipeline and in various
tourist projects.
Beyond any grants of arms aid, Sadat needs
at least $200 million annually in untied
cash loans or grants to help reverse the
rapid decline in Egypt's living standards.
So far there is no evidence of further
cash transfers from Saudi Arabia or of a
firm Saudi commitment to support fully the
Egyptian balance of payments. Until such
a commitment is clearly forthcoming from
Faysal, Sadat will still be forced to shop
for funds from other sources.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT - SAUDI ARABIA - YEMEN (SANA)
Egypt reportedly is willing to sell major items
of Soviet military equipment from its inventories to
Saudi Arabia for delivery to Yemen (Sana). The equip-
ment includes as many as 16 MIG-17 fighters with
associated radar and ground support equipment, 50
T-54 and T-34 tanks, artillery, ammunition, and spare
parts. Egypt may also provide the more advanced
swing-wing SU-17 fighter, even though it only has
about 20 of these. Training in the operation and
maintenance of the aircraft will be provided by
Cairo at no cost.
Sana's military forces are already largely
Soviet-equipped, but in recent years the
Soviets have been reluctant to provide ad-
ditional equipment.
The Saudis supplied Sana with about $3 mil-
lion worth of military supplies from their
own stocks in 1972-73, but Sana has de-
scribed this as "dribbles and dabs of old
junk." If the Saudis can get the Egyptian
arms into Sana's hands relatively quickly,
Sana's growing sense of vulnerability vis-
a-vis the regime in Yemen (Aden) can be
alleviated. The balance of power between
the two Yemens will not be radically altered
by the new equipment, however.
The Egyptians would probably not have de-
cided to aid Sana without strong Saudi
prodding. Cairo's willingness to go
ahead stems directly from Egypt's desire
for greater financial assistance from Saudi
Arabia.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Pakistan
Baluchi tribes
Afghanistan
aa
Baluchistan
Kabul
North-
Wes
PrortIe
\-;Resh
Gilgit
A ency
Ja mu /? 1--Lhe of control
?1 ashmir
1, *Srinagar
"Azad Kashmir
c).State"
Indian held
Kashmir
Lahore'
Pun jab
Gulf of
Oman
Sind
Karachi
554531 8-73
Province boundary
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN
Kabul has appealed to the US, the Soviet Union,
and Iran for help in preventing serious trouble in
Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan. In a state-
ment given to the US ambassador yesterday, the
Afghans expressed deep regret over the recent ar-
rest of opposition leaders in Pakistan's Baluchistan
Province and charged that Islamabad is trying to
suppress the people of the area.
Bhutto locked up the opposition leaders
partly to forestall the installation of
an opposition government, which seemed
likely under the new constitution that
came into effect this week. He had also
received exaggerated reports that the
opposition, with encouragement from
Moscow and Kabul, was plotting secession.
The former governor of Baluchistan un-
doubtedly fueled Bhutto's suspicions
when he charged publicly, just before
his arrest, that Islamabad was deliber-
ately forcing the people of Baluchistan
to seek outside support. Two of those
arrested are chiefs of major tribes, and
an increase in violence in the province--
which borders on Afghanistan and Iran--
seems likely.
Kabul's strong reaction is not surprising,
and the Afghans may not limit themselves
to words. They may be tempted to assist
tribal rebels across the Pakistani border,
which in turn could bring a violent re-
sponse from Islamabad.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Syria-Lebanon: The Syrian-Lebanese border was
officially opened yesterday. A Damascus broadcast
stated that Syria had decided to open the border
after it noted "sincere attempts by the Lebanese to
better relations with the Palestinian resistance
in Lebanon."
South Asia: The second round of talks between
India and Pakistan is scheduled to open today in
New Delhi. The outcome hinges largely on Bangladesh
Prime Minister Rahman's stand on war crimes trials
of 195 Pakistani prisoners of war. Chief Indian
negotiator P. N. Haksar visited Dacca this week
presumably to work out a compromise to present to
the Pakistanis.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030002-3