THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 29 OCTOBER 1962

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005996009
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 29, 1962

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
29 OCTOBER 1962
TOriEGREL
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1, USSR
2. Cuba
a. We see Khrushchev's Cuban
missile misadventure as a major set-
back for him personally.
b. The decision to put the
missiles in Cuba, as well as the
decision to pull them out, was
almost certainly his alone. We did
not, however, see any signs of high-
level opposition to the missile
deployment, as we have in the case
of some of Khrushchev's other pet
schemes,
c. There are no scapegoats
for this one and he will be blamed
by just about everyone. Many whom
he has bullied are probably secretly
pleaed.
d. The top leadership put in
a mass appearance at a theater
performance last night, we suspect,
to show their ranks are undivided.
a. Castro faces a serious set-
back to his prestige.
b. Obviously not consulted
beforehand on Khrushchev's exchanges
with the President, he is trying
hard to get Moscow to back his
demands for major concessions from
us before pulling the missiles out.
So far the only endorsement he has
gotten has come from Peiping.
(Cont'd)
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3. Cuba-USSR
c. Special editions of two of
Havana's leading newspapers were
issued yesterday making much of
Castro's conditions, and they have
been given heavy play on the Cuban
radio.
a. We do not believe the. Soviets.
will attempt to delay implementation
of their promise to dismantle the
missile sites.
b. Nor do we believe Khru-
shchev's expressed "wish" that we
discontinue reconnaissance to be
intended to provide a pretext for
procrastination.
c. We think the USSR would go
along if we were to insist that
Initial steps be taken immediately
(next day or two) to get inspection
in Cuban organized and under way.
d. Soviet First Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov arrived in New
York last night saying the USSR in-
tends to resolve outstanding inter-
national problems through negotiation.
e. Neither he, nor Khrushchev,
nor Soviet media have mentioned
Berlin in connection with the most recent
moves on the Cuba problem, suggesting
that Moscow will continue to play the
German problem in low key for the
time being.
(Cont'd)
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f. In initial responses Bloc
media are claiming that Khrushchev's
latest "blow for freedom" proves the
USSR's peaceful intentions. The
attempt is to salvage some prestige
from the shambles by showing that
the move averted unilateral US
action.
East Germany - a. The opinion is gaining
Berlin ground among officials at the medium
level in the East German party and
government,that our strong stand on
Cuba will cause Moscow to postpone
action on Berlin and a peace treaty.
5. Communist
China - USSR
b. Western businessmen who
visited East Berlin late last week
at the height of the crisis say
they found a "business as usual"
atmosphere and heard no mention of
a blockade of West Berlin in retalia-
tion for the Cuban quarantine.
a. Communist China's leaders
have recently stepped up their
criticism of Soviet foreigi policy
and appear determined to undermine
confidence in Soviet leadership.
We have not gotten a reaction yet to
Moscow's latest moves in the Cuban
crisis, but it will be bitter.
(Cont'd)
r. TL?- T-
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d. Peiping's latest note
charges the Soviets with betrayal
for allowing international communism
to fall behind in the nuclear arms
race by not sharing technical
information with China since 1959.
e. China also accuses Moscow
of betraying the international
communist movement on another front--
the India border dispute. Peiping
says it is absurd to think of
Moscow playing a pacifying role in
this issue: "Communists must draw
a clear-cut line between themselves
and their adversaries."
f. The Chinese, it seems, choose
to ignore Moscow's recent shift frOm
neutrality to a position of cautious
supoort for them on 7is issue.
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For The President Only Top Secret
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COMMUNIST CHINA-INDIA BORDER AREA,
J ,
L, JAmmik
AND
/ KASHMIR.
(Straus in dispute)
........
1
I
WEST
PAKISTAN
inagar
NEW DELHI
Road construction by
Chinese in 1957
rem
\
L.etk
???"
Chushul
Simla
MILES 200
emchhog
Gartok
Boundary shown on Indian maps .
Boundary shown on recent
, Chinese Communist maps ?
Motorable road
Motorable road
? under construction
? Minor road or trail
Rounchries ore net nesessortly those
tecopntzed by the U.S. Government.
Areas in dispute
LOCATION OF
rog CURRENT FIGHTING ?
TIB E
CHINA
.?
. ?
USSR
Vag-
3.1
n n
Lhasa. 'n Luhit
' -- rsi, 1 alon
c . .
-7? Long' ?