THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JANUARY 1974
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0006007648
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 16, 1974
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The President's Daily Brief
January 16, 1974
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declassified only on approval of
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
January 16, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Israel, Mrs. Meir's government has come under in-
creasing attack for what domestic critics fear is its
readiness to make unilateral concessions in the dis-
engagement talks with Egypt. (Page 1)
There are more signs that Tunisian President Bourguiba
has had second thoughts about union with Libya. Yes-
terday, the Tunisians took steps apparently aimed at
putting it off indefinitely. (Page 2)
After agreeing at yesterday's Council meeting to a
community representation at next month's conference
of oil-consuming countries, the EC foreign ministers
will now attempt to work out a common position.
(Page 3)
General Secretary Brezhnev's forthcoming visit to
Cuba will provide an occasion for revolutionary
rhetoric, but his private comments will probably be
low on anti-imperialist fervor and high on the bene-
fits of peaceful coexistence. This will not sit well
with Castro, who sees dangers for his regime in Soviet-
US detente. (Page 4)
Security officials in Jakarta imposed a dusk-to-dawn
curfew following yesterday's anti-Japanese rioting by
students. More troops are being brought into Jakarta
to help restore order, and Prime Minister Tanaka has
modified his schedule in order to avoid direct con-
frontation with the protesters. (Page 5)
The Cambodian Government's conscription campaign to
expand the army's general reserve has faltered. Al-
though by the end of November some 12,000 new trainees
had entered the army, inductions have slowed to a
trickle since then. (Page 6)
The Kuwaiti minister of defense has acknowledged that
his country is negotiating with Moscow for arms.
(Page 7)
In Turkey, President Koruturk has named Bulent Ecevit
prime minister-designate, paving the way for a coali-
tion of Ecevit's left-of-center party with the right-
wing National Salvation Party. No major departure
from Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy is likely.
(Page 8)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ISRAEL
Mrs. Meir's government is under increasing at-
tack for what domestic critics fear is its readiness
to make unilateral concessions in the disengagement
negotiations with Egypt. The rightist Likud bloc,
which scored significant gains in the recent parli-
amentary elections, charges the government with con-
ducting the negotiations with Cairo through Secre-
tary Kissinger as if it had no choice but to "sur-
render in stages." Likud spokesmen claim that the
talks are leading to a unilateral withdrawal that
would endanger the state. Yesterday, Likud demanded
that approval of the government's proposals for an
agreement with Cairo be the first item of business
when the newly elected Knesset opens next Monday.
The Israeli press also is expressing misgivings.
Even US security guarantees, in the view of some
papers, would not be enough to compensate Tel Aviv
for giving up its demand that Egyptian forces on the
east bank of the Suez Canal be thinned in return for
an Israeli withdrawal. The daily with the largest
circulation in the country has called such an ar-
rangement a trap for Israel, arguing that Washington
would be unable to fulfill its commitment when the
chips are down.
Perhaps partly in response to criticism that it
is not tough enough with Cairo, the government yes-
terday halted the daily supply convoys to Suez and
the encircled Egyptian Third Army. Defense Minister
Dayan had warned publicly on January 14 that Israel
might take this action if cease-fire violations con-
tinued. At least 18 Israelis reportedly have been
killed and 88 wounded in fighting on the Egyptian
and Syrian fronts since the cease-fire.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TUNISIA-LIBYA
Evidence continues to mount that President
Bourguiba has had second thoughts about union with
Libya. Yesterday the Tunisians moved to put it off
indefinitely. Prime Minister Nouira announced that
the constitution would have to be revised before a
referendum on the merger could be held. Amending
the constitution would cause, at the least, consid-
erable delay, and could help to kill the project
altogether. The procedure requires two readings,
at least three months apart, in the National Assem-
bly, and then a two-thirds majority for approval.
Nouira, who has long opposed closer ties with
Libya, also threw new doubt on the terms of the
declaration on the merger. He stated flatly that
there would be further negotiations "to determine
the concept of the union and the stages of its im-
plementation."
President Bourguiba's bizarre handling of the
proposed merger will weaken his prestige and lead
to political maneuvering by presidential hopefuls
around him. This can be expected to increase as
preparations continue for a congress of Bourguiba's
party next October, which will be followed by na-
tional elections in November.
President Qadhafi has not yet reacted to Tu-
nisia's delaying tactics; the Libyan radio continues
to hail the union as if the merger plans were still
on the track.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
The EC foreign ministers having agreed at yes-
terday's Council meeting to a community representa-
'tion at next month's conference of oil-consuming
countries, will now attempt to reach a common posi-
tion? French Foreign Minister Jobert supported the
consensus. that Commission President Ortoli and Ger-
man Foreign Minister Scheel, in his role as Council
president, would represent the community in Washing-
ton. Although Jobert said Paris still had reserva-
tions about attending, the other EC foreign minis-
ters now expect to be present.
In leaving its own attendance in doubt, France
presumably hopes to win support among its community
partners for a position that would minimize the US
role in European energy arrangements made after
the conference. The French therefore want to move
EC energy consultations with other countries to the
OECD forum--or even the UN--as quickly as possible
and keep such talks focused on long-term goals.
The Commission has already madesuggestions for
a community position that attempt to answer the
French concern that any energy action group not ap-
.pear to set the consuming countries against the
producers. The Commission stresses that priority
should be given to a dialogue withthe oil producers,
that the EC's position should be communicated to
OPEC, and that consideration must be given to the
non-producers among the developing countries.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CUBA
General Secretary Brezhnev is due shortly in
Havana on his first visit there. Plans for the
visit had been announced unusually far in advance,
not long after Brezhnev returned from the US; a
sign that he saw the trip as a way to demonstrate
that he is not neglecting his Communist allies.
The occasion will call for revolutionary rhet-
oric, but Brezhnev's private comments to the Cubans
will probably be low, on anti-imperialist fervor and
high on the benefits of peaceful coexistence. This
will not sit well with Castro, who sees dangers for
his regime in Soviet-US detente.
The Cuban leader continues to believe he ,can
ill afford to ease his own anti-US stance. Castro
still points to the "threat" of US aggression, in
order to mobilize Cubans in support of regime poli-
cies, and he has used the economic "blockade" to
explain away many of his own failures.
Despite this, Brezhnev may take the line that
Cuba would profit from a less intransigent attitude
toward the US. The USSR, which still underwrites
the Cuban economy to the tune of more than $1 mil-
lion a day, would also expect to benefit from any
shift in Cuban political attitudes that brought an
improvement in Cuba's economic position. Brezhnev's
general approach is not likely to overcome Castro's
misgivings, however, and Brezhnev is not likely to
press strongly enough to alienate the Cuban leader.
The Soviets will be eager to obtain Castro's
support for the organizational steps they want to
take toward another world Communist conference.
Preparations are already under way for a series of
regional meetings of Communist parties, and there
are reports that representatives of several Latin
American parties will meet in Havana during Brezh-
nev's visit. The Soviets will need Castro's coop-
eration to get their'campaign off to .a propitious
start.
Economic and military aid will certainly be
discussed during Brezhnev's visit. Moscow's exten-
sive use of Cuban military facilities could give
Castro leverage in seeking more Soviet arms, but
there has been no sign that major new agreements
will be made.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INDONESIA
Security officials in Jakarta imposed a dusk-
to-dawn curfew following yesterday's anti-Japanese
rioting by students. Vandalism and burning continued
well into the night and at midnight police were still
trying to disperse 1,500 students gathered near the
Japanese Embassy and several Japanese businesses.
Additional troops are being brought into Jakarta t
help restore order, and Prime Minister Tanaka's
schedule has been modified to avoid direct encount-
ers with the protesters.
Indonesian officials, hoping to avoid a major
army-student confrontation, have ordered troops to
withhold fire except in self-defense. Even so, at
least four persons have been killed and several seri-
ously wounded.
Dissident students have long been planning to
protest Tanaka's visit-with demonstrations against
Japanese economic domination of Indonesia and al-
leged collusion among government officials, Japa-
nese, and local Chinese businessmen. Much of the
vandalism has occurred in Chinese commercial dis-
tricts, and security officials fear that serious
anti-Chinese rioting may develop and spread to other
parts of the country.
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CAMBODIA
The government's conscription campaign to expand
the army's general reserve, launched in mid-October
with a goal of obtaining 25,000 new troops, has fal-
tered. Although by the end of November some 12,000
new trainees had entered the army, inductions have
slowed to a trickle since then.
A fundamental problem is that the manpower" pool
on which the government can draw is drying up. Cer-
tain provincial cities have large numbers of males
eligible for the draft, but provincial officials have
not yet shown much inclination to implement the con-
scription law. In addition, the National Police have
had little success in rounding up draft evaders. Gov-
ernment officials involved with the draft met recently
to plan corrective measures; they told local draft
officials to "get tough," and asked for the appoint-
ment of an assistant to the defense minister to over-
see the program.
At present, Cambodian Army combat strength stands
at between 110,000 and 130,000 troops out of an over-
all strength of almost 210,000. The 37,000-man gen-
eral reserve has borne the brunt of the heavy fight-
ing in the Phnom Penh region during the past year.
Total Khmer Communist combat strength is estimated
at 50,000 to 60,000 troops, of which 12,000 to 15,000
are estimated to be committed to operations near
Phnom Penh.
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KUWAIT-USSR
The Kuwaiti minister, of defense acknowledged on
January 13 that his country is negotiating with Mos-
cow for arms
This is the first time Kuwait
has expressed interest in Soviet weapons. With the
exception of a $1-million contract for antiaircraft
guns ordered from Yugoslavia in 1970, all arms pur-
chases have been from the West.
After border skirmishes with Iraq last March,
the Kuwaiti Parliament in early July approved a re-
quest for $1.4 billion to strengthen the country's
military capability. Negotiations with the US for
a wide range of military equipment, including jet
fighters, air-to-surface and antitank missile systems,
and tanks, have been under way since April 1973, but
have thus far resulted in only one small contract for
trucks.
The Kuwaitis are close to con-
cluding a deal with France for Mirage interceptors,
and have also shown interest in surface-to-air and
antitank missiles made by the French and West Germans.
Kuwait's interest in Soviet arms could be a pressure
tactic to encourage Washington, Paris, and Bonn to
be more forthcoming.
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TURKEY
President Koruturk yesterday named Bulent Ecevit
prime minister-designate, paving the way for a coali-
tion of Ecevit's left-of-center party with the right-
wing National Salvation Party. The two parties have
already agreed on coalition terms and will probably
announce a cabinet soon.
The military would have preferred a coalition in
which the Islam-oriented National Salvation Party did.
not.play an important role; moreover, senior officers
have shown concern over what they consider Ecevit's
leftist tendencies. They will closely monitor the
government's activities but seem willing for the pres-
ent to give it a chance.
The new coalition has a precarious majority of
only eight seats in the National Assembly, and there
is an.ideological gulf between the two parties.. Ece-
vit has little experience in foreign affairs, and
will probably concentrate first on domestic problems.
No major departure from Turkey's pro-Western foreign
policy is likely. Ecevit's party does advocate, how-
ever, more assertive behavior in NATO, reconsideration
of the ban on opium poppy cultivation, and nationaliza-
tion of petroleum resources These are all issues
on Which its coalition partner can agree.
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