THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 FEBRUARY 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007668
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 7, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
February 7, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
February 7, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
(Page 1)
The EC Council has approved a position paper which
will allow the community to adopt a cooperative
stance at the energy conference in Washington next
week. (Page 2)
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(Page 3) 25X1
Brezhnev's week-long visit to Cuba did not result
in any major new agreements but brought Cuba more
firmly into the Soviet orbit. (Page 4)
Canadian Energy Minister MacDonald is to visit the
Middle East later this month to improve and expand
Ottawa's relations with Arab states. (Page 5)
King Husayn appears willing to grant pay raises to
rebellious enlisted men, but seems to be balking
about replacing unpopular leaders. (Page 6)
An exchange of statements by Peking and Saigon has
increased tension over Vietnamese troop landings
in the Spratly Islands. (Page 7)
Hanoi's campaign to expand recognition of the Viet
Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government has so
far been unsuccessful. (Page 8)
(Page 9)
A note on the OECD economic forecast appears on
Page 10.
A review of the situation in Greece after the first
ten weeks of rule by the new regime is at Annex.
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USSR - MIDDLE EAST
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EC
The EC Council on February 5 approved a posi-
tion paper designed to permit a cooperative stance
by the community at the Washington energy conference
next week, despite basic reservations about the con-
ference and differences among the EC members.
The principal points of the paper, which was
released to the press in order to strengthen the
EC's bargaining position, are:
--the need to avoid a confrontation between
oil importing and producing countries;
--the desirability of including all oil import-
ing and producing nations in future international
discussions, with a view toward starting these
broader talks before April 1; and
--the necessity of preventing the Washington
conference--"especially in its present composi-
tion"--from being transformed into a permanent
organization.
Commission President Ortoli and Council Presi-
dent Scheel, the EC's delegates to the Washington
conference, told US officials in Brussels yesterday
that the community is going to insist on these
points, but they stressed the EC's willingness to
discuss fully every item on the conference agenda.
This professed flexibility with regard to the
agenda is probably intended in part to take the edge
off the communique's highlighting of positions that
run counter to US aims. It is also evidence of the
lack of complete agreement among the Nine about what
should be discussed in Washington and may reflect
uncertainty in the EC over what the US position will
be on sharing responsibilities in the areas of fi-
nance and energy supply.
The conference has helped to delay formation
of a common EC position on a new relationship with
the Arab world. Nevertheless, some EC members--
particularly the French--are counting on some an-
nouncement after the EC foreign ministers' meeting
on February 14 that the Nine are ready to begin
talks with the Arabs on economic cooperation.
In Washington, the EC will be cooperative in
certain specific areas, such as the development of
alternative energy resources. The EC believes that
such cooperation should take place within existing
organizations like the OECD, but it has not ruled
out the establishment of "short-term working groups"
to examine other possibilities.
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USSR
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USSR-CUBA
Brezhnev's week-long visit to Cuba brought no
major new agreements and no evidence that Cuba would
be any less a drain on the Kremlin's treasury. The
visit tied Cuba more firmly to the Soviet orbit,
however, and Brezhnev is probably more confident
that Castro can be brought to accept, however grudg-
ingly, the Soviet view of the benefits of detente.
The joint declaration signed by Brezhnev and
Castro called for improved bilateral cooperation
and the integration of the Cuban economy into CEMA.
The Soviets clearly intend to maintain close super-
vision of the Cuban economy. There was no mention
of future military assistance, but Brezhnev prob-
ably agreed to consider Cuban requests for more
modern weaponry. Cuban Armed 'Forces Minister Raul
Castro flew to Moscow the day after Brezhnev arrived
home.
Castro's remarks on Brezhnev's efforts toward
detente are his warmest to date, and he seems to
have been satisfied that Cuba's interests will not
be compromised in Moscow's bilateral dealings with
the US. The declaration calls for the termination
of both the "blockade" of Cuba and the US presence
at the Guantanamo naval base.
Castro endorsed Moscow's Asian security pro-
posal and implicitly criticized Peking. The declara-
tion did not, however, mention a world Communist
conference. Neither was there any indication that
a meeting of Latin American Communist leaders took
place in Cuba during Brezhnev's visit.
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CANADA - MIDDLE EAST
Energy Minister MacDonald's planned trip to
the Middle East later this month will be important
in Ottawa's efforts to improve and expand relations
with the Arab world. MacDonald will try to convince
the Arabs of Canada's neutrality on Middle East
matters and will seek assurances of continued Arab
oil exports to Canada.
Before the October war, Ottawa attached a low
priority to relations with Arab countries. Canada
has only four small missions in the Middle East--
in Beirut, Cairo, Tehran, and Tel Aviv. Ottawa is
now scrambling to make up for lost time. Last week,
Canada established nonresident diplomatic relations
with several Persian Gulf sheikhdoms and is seeking
Saudi approval to open an embassy in Jidda.
This activity does not presage any dramatic
shift in Canada's relations with Israel. Domestic
support for Israel remains strong and, although
there is obvious concern about oil shortages, the
Trudeau government has publicly stated that it will
not respond to Arab blackmail.
MacDonald will probably also visit Iran which
supplies 16 percent of Canadian oil imports.
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JORDAN
King Husayn began negotiating yesterday with
rebellious enlisted men from the 40th Armored
Brigade. Their mutiny has created Jordan's worst
domestic crisis since the King's showdown with the
fedayeen in September 1970. Husayn appears willing
to grant pay raises but apparently intends to nego-
tiate other demands, such as removal of the army
chief of staff and the Prime Minister.
The five-day-old mutiny is still nonviolent.
Dissident leaders, however, have threatened to march
on Amman from their base at Zarga if their demands
are not met.
News of the mutiny has spread, despite govern-
ment efforts to suppress publicity, and fedayeen
propaganda will soon add to Husayn's problems. The
public appears sympathetic to the enlisted men's
protests, but there have been no reports of support-
ive civilian demonstrations.
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
HONG KONG
(U.K.)
PRATAS
ISLAND.)
R .PUBUIC
OF
CHIN
AIWAN?
Kao-hsiung
PARACEL
ISLANDS
Spratly Islands ?
e
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CHINA - SOUTH VIETNAM
Peking has called the landings by Vietnamese
troops in the Spratly Islands a "new military
provocation" and declared that it will not tolerate
such an infringement on its territory. Although
Saigon's reply was decidedly defensive, it has dis-
patched two more warships to the area.
China has no forces in the Spratlys and has
not patrolled the area. While Peking may bring
force to bear, there are no signs of preparations
for such an action. The islands are beyond the
range of China's fighters and at the extreme range
of medium bombers based on Hai-nan. A military
move would create diplomatic as well as logistical
problems for Peking since Taiwan and Manila also
claim the islands and have troops on several of
them.
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VIETNAM
Hanoi's campaign for expanded recognition of the
Viet Cong's "Provisional Revolutionary Government"
(PRG) has so far been unsuccessful. North Vietnam
has pressed hard on the issue in negotiations with
the UK, several European countries, .and Japan.
North Vietnam's stiffening demands on recognition
of the PRG seem related to a decision last fall to
stress political action and diplomacy and for the
time being to forgo heavy military operations in the
South.
As a result of this decision, Hanoi asked the
British late last year not to send their ambassador,
even though the North Vietnamese had earlier given
aarement and the ambassador was already en route.
Its justification is that London
has not recognized the PRG.
Dutch and Belgian ambassadors accredited to Hanoi
are still waiting in Peking because the North Vietnam-
ese have refused to let them present their credentials.
Japan and North Vietnam agreed last fall to exchange
ambassadors, but Hanoi subsequently has parried Jap-
anese moves to open an embassy. North Vietnamese
officials have hinted to all three governments that
a "gesture of recognition" for the PRG would get
their envoys into the capital.
Even the French, who previously were reported
wavering on recognition, are now firmly against it.
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NOTE
OECD: The Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development has revised downward its al-
ready bleak world economic forecast for 1974. The
sharpest adjustment is in the forecast for the UK--
from no growth to an anticipated decline in output
of 2.4 percent. Sharp declines in real growth are
also anticipated for Japan and West Germany. The
rate of inflation is expected to accelerate in all
countries except Italy. The deficit in current
accounts--trade and services--in the seven major
industrial countries of the OECD is expected to
increase from less than $1 billion in 1973 to nearly
$30 billion in 1974.
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GREECE
The first ten weeks of rule by military police
chief Ioannidis have reinforced initial impressions
that his government would not end internal ferment
and that it could not cope effectively with the coun-
try's economic problems.
Outwardly, the regime appears to have a firm
grip on the situation. Student dissidents are back
in classes and, although said to be restive, have
yet to offer the kind of challenge that led to
Ioannidis' ouster of Papadopoulos. A factor in the
students' behavior undoubtedly is their fear that
the government will act on its promise to repress
any antigovernment demonstrations. Some government
officials, however, are convinced that student dem-
onstrations are inevitable.
Labor groups that played a part in the student-
led riots in November have also been quiet since the
coup. Extreme leftist elements also reportedly have
been ordered by their leaders to refrain from anti-
government activity. ,Many leftist leaders have been
arrested by previous regimes, and they probably fear
being shipped off again to remote island prisons if
their supporters challenge the Ioannidis government.
Opponents from the old political world seem more
frustrated than they had been under Papadopoulos.
Except for the exiled Andreas Papandreou and his sup-
porters, who are determined to continue working
against the regime, these former opposition politi-
cians do not appear to have the spirit for a test of
strength with the military.
Aside from keeping the lid on potential dissi-
dence, the new government has done little. Ioannidis'
style is to work behind the scenes, and he has failed
to convey a sense of direction to the government.
The men he has placed in charge of ministries and
departments are short on administrative talent.
There has been little movement toward dealing
with Greece's substantial economic problems--an in-
creasing wage-price spiral and trade deficit. Al-
though the failure to deal effectively with the
country's financial woes seems unlikely in itself
to bring Ioannidis down, it does give his detractors
yet another handle for criticism.
(continued)
Al
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There is growing evidence of ferment within the
regime itself. Some of Ioannidis' military colleagues
for example, are said to have demanded the removal of
Prime Minister Androutsopoulos, who is suspect to
them because he served in Papadopoulos' cabinet.
Much of the dissatisfaction with Androutsopoulos
comes from younger officers who have pressed for the
prosecution of all "corrupt" members of the old re-
gime. Some would even try Papadopoulos. Three for-
mer ministers allegedly tainted by graft and fraud
have been placed under house arrest. They have not
been charged with corruption, however, but with ac-
tivities "dangerous to the security of the state."
Androutsopoulos may stay for the time being, partic-
ularly since there is a shortage of "acceptable"
candidates for top positions. A cabinet shuffle
seems almost certain within a few months, however,
and he could be a casualty.
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