THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 FEBRUARY 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007669
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 8, 1974

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
The President's Daily Brief
February 8, 1974
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 1 1652
exemption category SB( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
'February 8, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Hanoi has held two Central Committee plenums in the
past few months to decide plans and strategy in
both North and South Vietnam. Although the Commu-
nists are still talking about an eventual offensive
in the South, they consider their situation weak.
(Page 1)
The miners' executive committee is meeting today to
decide whether to accede to Prime Minister Heath's
request to postpone the strike until after the elec-
tion on February 28. (Page 3)
Syria
(Page 4)
Kuwait
(Page 5)
A draft constitutional amendment to provide for a
referendum on merger with Libya leaves the Tunisian
Government ample room to postpone indefinitely the
union agreement signed on January 12. (Page 8)
Notes on Libya, Laos, Vietnam, Turkey, and Nation-
alist China appear on Pages 7 and 8.
The succession problem in the Soviet Union is dis-
cussed at Annex.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
Hanoi has apparently held two Central Committee
plenums in the past few months--the first such meet-
ings since the signing of the Paris accord. Together
they provided guidance for the party rank and file
on Communist plans and strategy in both North and
South Vietnam.
The first of the plenums (the 21st since the
last party congress in 1960) was apparently held
last fall and dealt with future strategy in South
Vietnam. As usual with meetings on the South, the 25X1
North Vietnamese have not mentioned the plenum pub-
licly, but extensive information on it is becrin74ng
to arrive
Guidance from this plenum makes the fol- 25X1
lowing,Igeneral points:
--At some time the Communist side will again
go on the offensive and achieve final victory
in,the South.
--That time is a good distance away, however,
and for now the Communist side is to build up
its forces, defend its territory, and try to
improve its political position.
--Even though it may be years before these
efforts bear fruit (one rallier says he was
told to expect victory in the period 1979-84),
troops and party cadre are to have faith in
the party's omniscience and in the inevitability
of a final victorious assault.
In contrast to the 21st plenum, the 22nd was
played up immediately by North Vietnamese media.
It apparently convened late last month and seems
to have been concerned principally with the recon-
struction of North Vietnam. It may have laid down
guidelines for a five-year plan beginning in 1976,
and for one-year plans in the two intervening years.
Briefers in the South are now informing party
cadre of the 21st plenum's resolution on southern
strategy. One such briefing
gives insight into the party's
bleak assessment of the Communists' present situa-
tion in the South. admits that
the Viet Cong control few people, have lost access
to the bulk of the population, cannot find recruits
for their guerrilla units, and are experiencing se-
rious economic problems. It acknowledges Saigon's
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
25X1
2bAl
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
increased influence in the countryside, noting that
the Thieu regime is strong "from the central level
to the village and hamlet level." Saigon is also
given high marks for its "well-trained and well-
equipped army," its effective internal security
forces,
25X1
Beyond urging careful doses of increased mili-
tary action, provide little specific 25X1
guidance for overcoming these problems. note 25X1
vaguely that several factors, notably in the eco-
nomic sphere, are working against Saigon, and 25X1
say that Communist-controlled areas inside South
Vietnam and aid from "socialist" and "independent"
countries abroad are important assets.
One of the more revealing aspects of this ac-
count is the credibility gap that apparently exists
between lower level cadre and the party leadership.
Local cadre are told explicitly that, despite their
confusion and puzzlement, they must have confidence
in their leaders and follow party guidance. Much
of the early part of the resolution is an histori-
cal account of the victories of the revolution,
pointing out that even in times when things looked
bad, the party leadership ultimately developed a
successful strategy. The message for local Viet
Cong advocates of a major offensive is that only
the leadership can determine both the timing and
propriety of such a policy.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
UK
The miners' executive committee is meeting today
to decide whether to accede to Prime Minister Heath's
request to postpone the strike until after the elec-
tion on February 28. The union president, a moderate,
believes that the strike ought to be deferred. Some
of the militants on the committee, however, are op-
posed. The Labor Party will probably ask the miners
to delay their action, since the party is already
saddled with an election manifesto that is unlikely
to appeal to the electorate.
One of Heath's principal goals is to increase
the Tpries parliamentary majority, which now stands
at 15. If he is successful, he will consider this a
mandate to continue his coUnterinflation program and
request tougher measures to regulate industrial rela-
tions. Most late opinion polls give the opposition
Labor Party a slight but hardly significant lead.
Government and private estimates of the economic
effects of a strike--particularly -a lengthy one--may.
have convinced Heath that an election was necessary.
Leaders of the Confederation of British Industry
urged Heath this week to try to avert the strike lest
it lead to the worst economic catastrophe-since World
War II. As many as 4 million workers could be unem-
ployed, steel_production could be cut in half within
three weeks, and Severe power restrictions would have
to be imposed within five weeks.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SYRIA
President Asad believes Syria should attend the
Geneva peace conference, but that he is concerned
about continued opposition within the army, the
fedayeen, and a faction of the Baath Party, for
which Foreign Minister Khaddam is the principal
s okesman.
the Khaddam faction distrust President Sadat,
who they believe is more interested in recovering
the Sinai than in cooperating with Syria. The
group opposes further cooperation with Cairo and
favors closer ties with Iraq and the continuation
of the oil embargo.
The Baath-dominated National Progressive Front-?
-
an umbrella organization for all of Syria's major
political, parties--is apparently also sharply di-
vided between Khaddam's supporters and those, os-
tensibly led by Prime Minister Ayyubii who favor
disengaaement talks and continued cooperation with
EayPt.
Because of this discord, Asad appears to be
taking a variety of steps to try to line up mili-
tary and political support before making a final
?decision on negotiations with Israel.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936-A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
KUWAIT-USSR
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT 9NLY
TEISIA
A draft constitutional amendment to provide for
a referendum on merger with Libya leaves the Tunisian
Government ample room to postpone indefinitely the
union agreement signed on January 12. As presented
to the National Assembly by Prime Minister Nouira,
the amendment calls for a consultative process lead-
ing toward a treaty that would still have to be
ratified by the National Assembly before a referendum
could be held.
The postponement of the merger,
is having
an unsettling effect on Tunisian politics. Presiden-
tial hopefuls are maneuvering for positions of strength
and forming alliances in the belief that the period
of transition from President Bourguiba to another
leader has finally begun.
Much will depend on how soon the 70-year-old
Bourguiba returns from medical treatment and several
weeks of rest in Switzerland, and whether he recon-
siders his decision to run for re-election next No-
vember. Prime Minister Nouira, his deputy and party
director Mohamed Sayah, and Interior Minister
Belkhodja hold the key positions while Bourguiba is
out of the country. All three are potential presi-
dential timber. They joined forces to shelve the
union agreement with Libya, and they were instrumen-
tal in getting Bourguiba to sack ex-foreign minister
Masmoudi, still another contender for power.
There has been no hard evidence that the mili-
tary will abandon its traditionally apolitical role
during this period of transition. Younger officers
who, like their civilian counterparts, saw prospects
for money and promotion in the merger, were disap-
pointed when it was shelved, but they do not appear
to be actively opposing the government decision.
The Interior Minister is nonetheless concerned about
the possibility of subversion from the military;
surveillance of officers has ?been increased and a
civilian watchdog over the military has been appointed.
These moves could provoke far greater resentment among
the military than the government's retreat from the
merger.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Libya: Libyan Prime Minister Jallud has left
on a visit to Warsaw, Moscow, and possibly Prague.
Jallud last visited the USSR about two years ago.
He will probably discuss arms purchases, since Mos-
cow and Prague have been the primary suppliers of
military equipment to the Libyan Army. The Prime
Minister is also seeking technological cooperation
from all three countries.
Laos: Prime Minister Souvanna has defused
potentially troublesome student discontent in Laos,
at least for the moment, On February 5, he convinced
leaders of the Vientiane-based Lao Student Federa-
tion, which has organized and supported recent stu-
dent demonstrations in the central and southern prov-
inces, that they should hold off on protests in Vien-
tiane for the time being. He told them that demon-
strations could disrupt his efforts to form a new
coalition government. Students in Savannakhet have
apparently also agreed to suspend demonstrations.
The students had earlier occupied the USAID compound
and the Thai-owned radio station in Savannakhet, but
they did no damage to either installation. No anti-
US overtones were apparent in the students' activities
Vietnam: The Thieu government is organizing a
nationwide campaign to drum up popular support for
its position on the Paracel Islands dispute. The
government probably hopes to head off criticism of
its military setback and of its unsuccessful diplo-
matic efforts to get international support. The?
campaign is unlikely to increase positive support
for the government, but the appeals ?to patriotism
may temporarily divert some attention from domestic
problems.
Turkey: Prime Minister Ecevit's coalition
cabinet received a narrow vote of confidence yester-
day from the National Assembly. The vote completes
the formal process of installing a new government
following elections last October. Ecevit has indi-
cated that he wirl soon seek talks with the US to
reconsider the two-and-a-half-year ban on opium-
poppy cultivation. He reiterated in parliament,
however, his pledge to consider "humanitarian con-
cerns" while ending the "unfair treatment" of poppy
farmers.
(continued)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Nationalist China: Premier Chiang Ching-kuo
has approved a plan to reduce the armed forces from
560,000 to 500,000 men by July 1, 1979.
8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Declassified in .Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012-000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SUCCESSION IN THE SOVIET UNION
The succession problem for the Soviet leader-
ship is complicated by the fact ?that Brezhnev and
his contemporaries are a clique of older men, held
together by balance of power and self-interest. As
a group, they have been a great stabilizing factor
in leadership politics. Men in their late 60s and
early 70s (see chart) hold the party's top position
(Brezhnev), two unofficial party positions as "sec-
ond" secretary (Suslov and Kirilenko), the premier-
ship (Kosygin), and the presidency (Podgorny), as
well as lesser offices represented on the Politburo.
Power balance and self-interest have restrained
Brezhnev in his attempts at self-aggrandizement, on
the one hand, and, on the other, have inhibited chal-
lenges to his position which would threaten the top
leadership as a whole.
Brezhnev is, in fact, the youngest member of
the senior group of leaders, and this may encourage
him to hope that he can survive a generational turn-
over within the group. If he considers such a turn-
over highly likely in the near future, he could build
alliances with younger leaders and perhaps join them
in an effort to ease out some of his senior col-
leagues. In the process, he might even be able to
add to his own titles either Podgorny's presidency
or Kosygin's premiership, a frequently rumored am-
bition. This course would be risky, and it would
go against Brezhnev's conservative nature and style.
It also would require repairing some personal and
organizational relationships with the younger lead-
ers.
The other senior leaders seem generally to have
little ambition beyond preserving their own status.
Kirilenko, who is the same age as Brezhnev, is prob-
ably the only one who entertains even a flicker of
hope of becoming general secretary. This kind of
defensive outlook on the part of the senior leaders
means that they probably are not eager to break ranks
and, in collaboration with junior colleagues, to in-
itiate a shake-up.
The problem for the younger leaders of today is
not, as it was for Brezhnev and company in 1964,
combining to topple the party leader. The best they
can hope for in the short run is simply to begin to
pick away at the phalanx of aging superiors. Given
Brezhnev's predominant position, the most realistic
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
and logical course would be an alliance of the
younger officials with him against some of the older
leaders. Political divisions among the younger men
and various ties with the seniors, however, would
be complicating factors.
Illness or death, however, may help to break
up the logjam at the top of the Soviet hierarchy.
Should Brezhnev die or be incapacitated in the not-
too-distant future, Party Secretary Kirilenko would
be the best bet to succeed him. Kirilenko's pros-
pects will diminish with each additional year that
Brezhnev remains on the scene, and those of First
Deputy Premier Mazurov, Moscow party boss Grishin,
KGB Chairman Andropov, and--to a lesser extent--
Minister of Agriculture Polyansky and Trade Union
chief Shelepin are likely to improve if Brezhnev re-
mains in office for another two years or so.
For the moment, how-
ever, Kirilenko remains the
odds-on choice to replace
Brezhnev. As a successor
to the General Secretary,
Kirilenko would stand as
a fairly orthodox Marxist-
Leninist, and, at least
initially, he would be more
cautious about dealing with
the West. Kirilenko's pub-
lic support of detente is
infrequent and often condi-
tional, and he has been in
the forefront of those who
champion the "Brezhnev Doc-
trine" of limited sover-
eignty. He was widely re-
ported to have urged the
Soviet invasion of Czecho-
slovakia, despite doubts
expressed by Suslov and
others.
In his public statements, Kirilenko has come as
close as any other top Soviet leader to advocating
explicitly a vigorous foreign policy. He has termed
aid to the Vietnamese and Arabs not only a "revolu-
tionary duty," but also a requirement of Soviet secu-
rity. He has strongly criticized the Communist Chi-
nese leadership and has defended the Soviet policy
of attacking Peking's political and ideological po-
sitions, but he has not shut the door on an eventual
reconciliation with China.
(continued)
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
25X1
Declassified in P;1 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Kirilenko 's relative militancy in foreign policy
statements has its corollary in domestic policies,
especially in the cultural and social spheres. Al-
though in recent years he apparently has accepted
the rationale behind increased consumer-goods pro-
duction, he has argued against major increases in
the allocation of resources to agriculture and
housing, and he puts greater emphasis on exhortation
and persuasion than on material incentives for im-
proving labor productivity. Kirilenko has revealed
something of a pragmatic attitude toward economic
management, however; his speeches on this theme have
consistently promoted less dogmatic solutions to
managerial problems.
Little is known of Kirilenko'sreal views on
defense and strategic questions. His only public
statement to date.on SALT was a strictly pro forma
assertion in April 1970 that the talks can produce
results "if the-United States-makes an honest at-
tempt to solve the problem at hand and does not try
to achieve one-sided gains." This cautious remark
was consistent with Kirilenko's generally wary at-
titude toward the US. These views no doubt underlie
Kirilenko's repeatedly expressed opinion that a
"dangerous international situation makes it neces
sary to increase the USSR's defense capabilities."
Against this background, Kirilenko, as general
secretary, Would probably be somewhat more imagina-
tive in the field of domestic affairs than Brezhnev
has been. In foreign affairs, KirilenkoS regime
probably would not undertake any sharp departures
from the course that has been followed under Brezh
nev0 Whatever his personal views-on policy, as a
compromise candidate he could not move any further
than his Politburo colleagues would allow. Any
gradual shift in foreign policy underhis leadership
would probably be away from detente rather. than to-
ward it.
Kirilenko's style of leadership would probably
be less colorful and exuberant than Brezhnev's.
Kirilenko gives the appearance of a modest, effi-
cient administrator, not a politician who enjoys
being on the hustings. Such a change in style would
be in step with a probable return to a more collec-
tive leadership following a change at the top,
A3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012000010004-9