THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 NOVEMBER 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007860
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 5, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
November 5, 1974
5
--"'Top?Sva(?geL, 25X1
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5 B( I ),( 2 ).( 3
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
November 5, 1974
Table of Contents
OAS: Concern over a possibly inconclusive vote on-
removal of OAS sanctions against Cuba has re-
placed the near agreement Latin American lead-
ers thought they had last month. (Page 1)
USSR-China: The Soviet ambassador protested to the
Chinese foreign ministry in mid-October concern-
ing the Continued detention of three helicopter
crewmen. (Page 3)
Note: Portugal-USSR (Page 4)
Annex: The Arab Summit Meeting
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OAS
Concern over a possibly inconclusive
vote on removal of Organization of Ameri-
can States' sanctions against Cuba has re-
placed the near agreement that Latin Ameri-
can leaders thought they had reached last?
month. To revive the consensus, the foreign
ministers' meeting that opens at Quito this
Friday will most likely try to redraft the
resolution for lifting sanctions in terms
that will ensure a favorable vote.
Only a few weeks ago, most Latin American gov-
ernments were confident that the coming conference
would rescind the ten-year-old sanctions so that any
government could associate with the Castro regime
without violating OAS policy. Several governments
had suggested that, although they had no intention
of establishing relations with Havana, they would
still vote to lift the sanctions.
The erosion of the consensus has occurred for
a number of reasons. Some of the governments, es-
pecially of the smaller countries, are most comfort-
able in following the US lead in international af-
fairs, and they have been disoriented by the lack of
advocacy or opposition to lifting the sanctions.
They have wondered if Chile and Uruguay, which have
presented new charges of Cuban subversion, are acting
as US surrogates.
The emphasis is likely to return to the need to
end the divisiveness produced by the Cuban issue and
to give the inter-American system a boost. Once the
delegations arrive at Quito, the majority probably
will be receptive to any formulation that does these
things without seeming to hand a victory to the Castro
regime. Most Latins agree that failure of the Quito
meeting to deal with the problem would damage regional
institutions. Only Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay are
likely to hold to a hard anti-Cuba line under any
circumstances.
(continued)
1
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Cuban efforts to overthrow Latin American gov-
ernments are at a low ebb. Tangible support of 'armed
revolutionaries is negligible/
Havana's shift from violent to more conventional
methods in recent years reflects a fundamental shift
in Castro's view of Cuba's role in the hemisphere. He
now collaborates with governments and groups that
conform to his loose definition of "patriotic and
independent," having withdrawn from his previously
intimate relationships with the revolutionary fac-
tions of the 1960s.
Castro is not likely to endanger the gains he
has made in the region for the sake of any marginal
revolutionary group. He could decide to support
armed revolutionary, groups in a few countries if
these. groups- should become well organized and seemed
to pose a significant threat to their host govern-
ments. Since this seems unlikely, the outlook for
the next few years is for a continuation of the
present tendency.
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USSR-CHINA
Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov deliv-
ered a protest to the Chinese foreign
ministry in mid-October concerning the
continued detention of the three heli-
copter crewmen seized on Chinese ter-
ritory last March.
Tolstikov's protest is the first known Soviet
diplomatic approach on this matter since June. As
a Radio Moscow broadcast makes clear, this effort
has been no more successful than others in obtaining
release of the prisoners or even of gaining access
to them.
There is little that Moscow can do to influence
the Chinese.
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NOTE
? Portugal-USSR: Portuguese Minister Without
Portfolio Cunhal, head of the Portuguese Communist
Party, returned to Lisbon on Sunday after a six-day
official visit to the USSR, the first by a Portuguese
government delegation. According to the press, Pres-
ident Podgorny "pledged" Soviet assistance in shoring
up Portugal's economy, but qualified his commitment
by noting that any aid would have to be "with regard
for available resources." This suggests the Soviets
will be tight-fisted in supplying any meat or grain,
items that are high on Lisbon's shopping list. Fur-
ther talks about a trade agreement will be held next
month.
?
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ARAB SUMMIT MEETING
An influential Egyptian editor warned
on the eve of the Rabat summit against
pursuing the kind of unanimity that "turns
into complete paralysis." The Arabs ig-
nored the warning.
By prejudging the ultimate sovereignty
of the West Bank, they effectively fore-
closed the possibility of any early prog-
ress on that front and may indeed have com-
plicated the prospect for progress else-
where. The question the summit had ini-
tially been intended to resolve--who should
negotiate with Israel for the return of the
West Bank--was rendered academic by the pre-
emptive judgment on who should eventually
rule the territory.
There would appear to be another,mes-
sage, deeper and more central to the over-
all issue of negotiations: that no Arab
leader, however flexible and realistic in
outlook, will place himself in the position
of thwarting the Palestine Liberation Organ-
ization, and that the PLO has won a role as
leader instead of follower in matters in-
volving the core issue in the Middle East
peace efforts.
The summit was a major foreign policy defeat
for President Sadat and a major triumph of tactical
maneuvering for Yasir Arafat. By going beyond the
immediate issue of Jordan versus the PLO as nego-
tiator for the West Bank to the broader and more
central question of which party ultimately governs
there, the PLO basically turned Sadat's own argu-
ments against him.
During months of preliminary negotiations on
the Jordan-PLO dispute, Sadat used vague promises
of long-range satisfaction for the Palestinians
as an inducement to the PLO to acquiesce in a deci-
sion that deferred its short-range aspirations and
granted a leading role to Jordan in the negotiations.
Sadat had wanted to evade the question of sovereignty,
concentrating instead at the summit on a formula that
would satisfy the PLO without excluding Jordan from
a meaningful role or predetermining the fate of the
West Bank.
(continued)
Al
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The precise roles played by the individual lead-
ers in the deliberations are not yet known. Much of
the evidence thus far indicates that the die was cast
during the preliminary foreign ministers' conference
and that Arafat arrived at the summit confident he
could force through his maximum position.
The summit itself seems to have concentrated on
the cosmetic: the effort to bring King Husayn along,
the attempt to induce Arafat to patch up or paper
over his differences with Husayn, and the further
effort to establish specific negotiating roles for
Jordan and the PLO. Although a time-consuming proc-
ess, the first two apparently were not difficult to
accomplish. Husayn gave in with good grace, in the
interests of preserving some standing in the Arab
world and of obtaining the increased subsidies that
are apparently his payoff; for Arafat, magnanimity
was not hard to affect.
A decision on the third is still to be made,
and when it comes, it will be anticlimactic. Unless
the Arabs decide to allot Jordan a role in the fu-
ture governance of the West Bank, ?the decision will
do no more than put a further gloss on a one-sided
PLO victory. If the Arabs maintain that the fate
of the West Bank is a foregone conclusion, the Is-
raelis would be no readier to negotiate a PLO take-
over with Jordan than they would with the PLO.
Military Matters
Military matters were clearly an important
agenda item. The allocation of major subsidies to
the front-line states, the call for a unified mili-
tary command, and the intended military character
of the follow-up talks to be held by the front-line
leaders all point to an expectation that increased
military preparedness is necessary to match the
harder line adopted for dealings with Israel. Ref-
erences to economic warfare, however, were muted
until the last moment, when King Hassan's summation
speech veered sharply to warn that the Arabs' fi-
nancial might constitutes a potent weapon against
Israel and the West.
Sadat doubtless feels discomfiture at the re-
sounding failure of his months-long attempt to ar-
range a resolution of the Jordan-PLO dispute. He
nevertheless hopes to capitalize on the summit's
decision in order to demonstrate to the US and,
through it, to Israel that the Middle East will
never see peace until Israel ultimately accepts the
PLO as an entity and a legally constituted neighbor
(continued)
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Syria's Position
President Asad is less disconcerted by the sum-
mit's outcome. Foreign Minister Khaddam's delibera-
tions immediately preceding the summit point to a
conscious Syrian attempt to ensure that the situation
developed as it did. The Syrians had several, motives:
--Asad saw no prospect for early progress on
the West Bank under any circumstances and chose
to close off that front as an object of concen-
tration for the near term in an effort to force
the Israelis to look again to the Golan front.
--Syria's primary aim was to limit Egypt's free-
dom to negotiate unilaterally with Israel. The
Syrians may have hoped that a setback for Sadat's
Jordan-PLO policy would effectively nip any
further expectations Sadat might entertain that
he could stray from the fold.
The assumption that Sadat and Asad thus intend,
eath for his .own reasons, to use the summit as a
mea of direct or indirect pressure on the US leaves
unanswered the. question of what they expect next in
negotiations- _Both probably recognize that pre-
judging the sovereignty of the West Bank complicates
the negotiations on that front.
It can be argued that both should feel fortified
by the solidarity forged at the summit to press for
an all-encompassing settlement In a Geneva context,
recognizing that this has been made more difficult
but believing_that_the Arabs. are now in a better
position to force their will. On the other hand,
having satisfied the PLO, they may feel free to let
the West Bank question gestate for a while, and turn
toward interim agreements on the Golan and Sinai
fronts.
Sadat has consistently resisted pressure for a
resumption of the Geneva conference until Arab strat-
egy could be unified at the summit. With this now
accomplished as far as most of the other Arabs are
concerned--undoubtedly at some cost to his standing
among the Arabs--Sadat may feel that his freedom of
action on negotiations has been constricted and that
he has no choice but to bow to pressures, particu-
larly Syrian, to go for the all-or-nothing approach.
At the, same time, Sadat has seemed to try to
clear the way for a move to keep negotiations on an
interim basis outside Geneva. He has stated publicly
that so long as he remains committed to a final set-
tlement that includes all Arab demands, Egypt should
(continued)
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have "freedom of movement" to pursue the negotiations
by partial stages. The recovery of any part of any
Arab territory, the line goes, in the end aids all
Arabs.
Outlook
We think Sadat still would like to proceed by
stages; for domestic reasons, he needs further evi-
dence of progress for Egypt. The question, however,
is whether he can.
The problem is less the obstacles imposed by
other Arabs, even the now ascendant PLO, than the
strong objections posed by Syria. Indeed, the posi-
tion of Syria and Asad's perception of his own pros-
pects for progress on the Golan Heights may well be
the key to further movement in the negotiations.
The Syrians' anxiety would probably be diminished,
as would their pressure for a reconvened Geneva
conference, if they were assured that interim nego-
tiations on the Sinai would be accompanied by simi-
lar moves on the Golan Heights.
Rabat has heightened the possibility of war by
limiting both Israeli and Arab negotiating options.
Having in a sense created their own logjam, the
Arabs might ultimately decide that the only way to
break it is to reopen hostilities.
At the same time, there is no evidence that the
Arabs believe the military option serves their inter-
ests any better now than it did before the summit.
They probably believe that the pressure is now more
heavily on the US and Israel to move; the time span
of their patience may therefore be.shorter. But it
does not yet seem to have run out.
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