THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 MARCH 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014757
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 28, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
March 28, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category511(1),(2).(3)
decDssitied only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
March 28, 1975
Table of Contents
Middle East: We present the major judgments from
the special estimate approved yesterday by the
intelligence community. (Page 1)
Egypt:
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South Vietnam: The evacuation airlift continued
yesterday, but civil order and military disci-
pline in Da Nang have deteriorated drastically.
(Page 5)
Cambodia: The US airlift was temporarily inter-
rupted as communist gunners continue to fire
artillery shells and rockets into Pochentong
Airport. (Page 7)
Greece-Turkey: The Greek government's mild reac-
tion last week to alleged Turkish violations
of Greek airspace has now hardened to a point
that could lead to an incident. (Page 8)
Note: USSR (Page 9)
Annex: The Situation in South Vietnam
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MIDDLE EAST
We present here the major judgments
from the latest estimate on the Middle
East which was approved yesterday by the
intelligence community.
Military readiness on both the Sinai and the
Golan fronts is at an increased level in the after-
math of the breakdown in disengagement-negotiations.
In this situation, there is a substantial chance
that either the Arabs or the Israelis will delib-
erately or by miscalculation resume hostilities
at any time. Indeed, we have disturbing indica-
tions on the Egyptian front that raise the pos-
sibility of an Egyptian-initiated attack or an
Israeli preemption within the next few days.
Barring this eventuality, we believe that
if there is no negotiating progress by early sum-
mer, the odds are high that Egypt and Syria will
open hostilities on both fronts and even higher
that Israel will fail or refuse to distinguish
between real and imagined provocations and will
strike first.
If arrangements are well under way within
the next few weeks, the Geneva conference could
provide the opportunity for further discussion
of serious issues and buy time against the re-
newal of hostilities. But we believe that un-
less the Arabs moderate their terms for attend-
ance of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
Israel is unlikely to go to Geneva. Even if
the conference can be convened, the respite gained
for serious negotiating will be brief--perhaps
less than a month--and we have little optimism
that significant progress can be made. The po-
sitions on both sides are very likely to harden
in a Geneva forum.
Egypt will probably extend the UN mandate
for a limited period if the Geneva conference is
in session or a date for it has been set by late
April when the mandate expires. Further exten-
sions are less likely, however, and would probably
be taken only in conjunction with Syria. For its
(continued)
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part, Syria will probably renew the mandate on the
Golan Heights only for a limited period and only if
provision has been made for the PLO to attend the
Geneva conference. Cancellation of the mandate could
provoke an Israeli attack, but the Syrians can now
count on Egyptian military support and both will run
this risk in the absence of diplomatic movement by
late May.
Egypt and Syria might urge Saudi Arabia to im-
pose an oil embargo and/or production cut before they
ventured to reopen hostilities. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the Saudis would use the oil weapon except
in the event of renewed warfare. A war would almost
certainly overcome Saudi hesitation. The Saudis are
not likely to employ price hikes or their financial
power as political weapons.
Despite the suspension of the step-by-step
negotiating process, we believe President Sadat
will try to preserve what he can of Egyptian-US
friendship and cooperation. But he is likely to
come under heavy pressure both at home and from
other Arabs to cool the relationship significantly.
This will not necessarily lead to a significant
warming in relations with the Soviets. Some surface
patching up of differences is likely to be attempted,
especially if the Egyptians expect new fighting and
anticipate a need for Soviet resupply, but the effect
will be limited.
In the event of another war and barring a deci-
sive defeat, Sadat will probably continue to look,
primarily to the US to mediate a settlement, attempt-
ing to remain independent of Soviet influence.
From the Soviet standpoint, the suspension of
disengagement negotiations is a significant plus,
but it is not without problems. The Soviets know
that, if any progress is made at Geneva, the Arabs
will tend to credit the US for Israeli concessions.
If, as seems likely, the Geneva conference
is unable to narrow Arab-Israeli differences,
(continued)
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the Soviets will be under some pressure from the
Syrians and other Arabs to improve Egypt's capa-
bility for war. If war breaks out, the Soviets
would resupply.
While the Soviets would probably prefer to
avoid war, we do not expect that they would make a
strong effort to deter the Arabs. Should a deci-
sive Israeli victory loom, the likelihood of So-
viet military intervention?probably initially in
a defensive posture--is higher than in October
1973.
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EGYPT
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The evacuation airlift continued
yesterday, but civil order and military
discipline in Da Nang have deteriorated
drastically. Although Saigon reportedly
has instructed the regional commander to
give the highest priority to security of
the airfield, troops that were defending
the city reportedly have broken and are
out of control.
Saigon is hurriedly formulating plans to rede-
ploy the four South Vietnamese divisions that are
besieged in the northern provinces. General Vien,
the chairman of the Joint General Staff, does not
believe Da Nang can be held and expects to move
the Marines and one division to the Saigon area
and relocate two other divisions to the central
coast. General Vien believes that the North Viet-
namese will rapidly send in-country units southward
to exploit the disarray among government forces.
The collapse of the government's forces in the
northern two thirds of South Vietnam has occurred
with such speed that the full magnitude of the dis-
aster has not yet registered in Saigon. Official
suppression of the worst news has helped to keep
the average man in the street only vaguely aware
that the situation is serious.
President Thieu is apparently concerned over
the announcement by former premier and vice presi-
dent Ky that he was coming out of retirement to
engage in political activity. The arrest hours
later of a number of political figures amid press
charges of coup plotting was probably intended as
a warning to all potential coup plotters, includ-
ing Ky and his friends.
There is currently no evidence of active plot-
ting among those who actually have the capability
to stage a coup--the senior military leadership.
Indeed, there seems to be some recognition that any
instability at this time could be very dangerous.
Many senior officers, however, are deeply ashamed
at the failure of the armed forces to protect ci-
vilians fleeing the communists, and they are bitter
at Thieu over the collapse of so much of the mili-
tary structure in the north. With this mood growing
(continued)
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among the military, it is probably only a matter
of time before an attempt is made to organize a
move to oust Thieu and replace him with a senior
military leader.
As news of the government's losses spreads in
the south, the popular mood in Saigon could turn
ugly. The communists are trying to add to the dis-
cord by offering amnesty to those who take even
limited steps toward accommodation with the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government.
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
Oudong
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CAMBODIA
Khmer communist gunners are contin-
uing to fire both artillery shells and
rockets into Pochentong Airport, tempo-
rarily interrupting the US airlift. No
US aircraft were at the airport when
the shelling resumed early this morning.
Cambodian army
ground operations to reoccupy the Tuol Leap staging
area northwest of the airfield are registering few
gains against heavy resistance.
Government forces at the isolated lower Mekong
River enclave of Neak Luong have recaptured one of
the three defensive positions northeast of the town
that fell on March 25. There are strong indications,
however, that a major communist assault against Neak
Luong may be imminent. According to intercepted
messages, insurgent forces plan to launch the at-
tack tonight and hope to take the town within one
week.
The Soviet Union is removing its remaining
personnel from Phnom Penh. The Soviet embassy has
been in caretaker status since 1973, when the USSR
allowed Sihanouk's government in exile to open an
office in Moscow. The Soviets did not, however,
sever formal ties with the Lon Nol government and
permitted Cambodia to maintain an embassy in Moscow.
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GREECE-TURKEY
The Greek government's mild reaction
last week to alleged Turkish violations
of Greek airspace has now hardened to a
point that could lead to an incident.
Missile units in Greece are reported to have
been ordered to prepare to react fighter
aircraft have been moved to the island of Limnos.
These are the first fighter aircraft to be sent to
any of the Greek islands close to the Turkish main-
land. Greek military leaders believe these moves
are necessary to ensure that Ankara will not take
the previous mild Greek diplomatic protests as a
sign of weakness.
There was another incident yesterday when
Greek planes drove off Turkish aircraft that had
briefly passed over Greek islands. The Greek for-
eign ministry is studying a detailed report from
the defense ministry before proceeding with any
diplomatic actions.
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NOTE
The US-USSR joint commercial commission will
meet in Moscow on April 10 for the first time since
the termination of the 1972 trade agreement at the
turn of the year.
The Soviets will probably be more confident
negotiators than in past,. acting on the con-
viction that their bargaining position vis-a-vis
the US has improved considerably in recent months.
They expect economic recession in the West to spur
the US to seek Soviet orders, and anticipate that
competition for:the Soviet market from other West-
ern countries will also stimulate American trade
concessions. The Soviets remain keenly interested
in expanded trade with the US, and continue to
prefer the US as the source of most capital, goods
and technology.
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VIETNAM
The situation in South Vietnam has
rapidly deteriorated since President
Thieu's decision in mid-March to shift
to a strategy of military retrenchment.
The following assessment of the situation
and analysis of South Vietnam's prospects
for this dry season was approved yester-
day as a special estimate by the United
States Intelligence Board.
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION
The Northern Coast
The situation is especially bleak in Military
Region 1. The government has conceded virtually
the whole region to the communists, and South Viet-
namese forces are now moving to an enclave around
Da Nang. The remnants of two of the four South
Vietnamese divisions in Military Region I are scat-
tered, and the communists are harassing them as they
pull back toward Da Nang. It is questionable if
the bulk of these troops will reach Da Nang, and the
government will be hard pressed to defend the city
without them. The communists, on the other hand,
have two fresh divisions west of the city, and they
are preparing to attack Da Nang. In addition, the
North Vietnamese 320B Division--one of Hanoi's five
remaining reserve divisions--is moving south.
The Central Coast
The government's military position in Military
Region 2 has also deteriorated rapidly. The South
Vietnamese have abandoned five highland provinces
and large parts of several others, and government
troops do not appear to be capable of standing up
to the communists. The South Vietnamese 23rd Divi-
sion and two ranger groups were badly mauled in the
fighting in Darlac Province, and five of the six
ranger groups withdrawing from Kontum and Pleiku
are in disarray. Large quantities of munitions and
fuel were abandoned at Kontum and Pleiku cities.
(continued)
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Communist attacks on the retreating column destroyed
or damaged hundreds of pieces of equipment, and
South Vietnamese troops abandoned large amounts of
hardware along the road--all of which was needed to
defend the coastal lowlands.
The North Vietnamese are far stronger than the
remaining government forces and are in a position to
deal a decisive blow in this region. The government
has just over one effective division in Military
Region 2, compared to five North Vietnamese divi-
sions; moreover, large numbers of replacements have
arrived in the highlands from North Vietnam.- Nha
Trang, the military headquarters for the region, is
lightly defended and probably will fall.
The South?
The fighting has eased somewhat north of Saigon,
but the situation remains serious. The government is
in the process of withdrawing from Binh Long Prov-
ince and has had losses in western Binh Duong Prov-
ince. The communists have thus far avoided a frontal
assault on Tay Ninh City, but several communist divi-
sions and independent regiments are pressing against
government troops from three sides. Since the city
will be costly to support and defend and most of the
population has already fled, serious consideration
is being given to abandoning this provincial capital
and drawing new defensive lines in the southeastern
portion of the province. In addition, recent com-
munist gains east of Saigon have forced the South
Vietnamese region commander to divert some troops
from the Tay Ninh front and Saigon, and this has
limited his capabilities to launch a counterattack
north and west of the capital.
In the delta, the situation is, for the moment,
relatively stable. Many of the communist main force
units suffered heavy losses in the fighting around
the turn of the year, but they are now rebuilding.
This stable situation, however, could quickly change
should Saigon move any sizable forces from the
delta to bolster the defenses of Military Region 3.
(continued)
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II. THE IMPACT OF THIEU'S STRATEGY
Thieu decided to evacuate the highlands and con-
centrate his forces along the populated coast and
around Saigon because he felt they were overextended,
faced with a greatly superior North Vietnamese army
force, and confronted with the prospect of dwindling
US aid. He clearly hoped to take the communists by
surprise, extracting his forces intact and ready to
fight before the communists could react. Thieu prob-
ably also calculated that by making his decision
secretly and presenting it to his senior military
commanders as a fait accompli, he would forestall
any coup plotting by them or a direct refusal to
carry out his orders.
The result, however, was that Thieu took his
own forces by surprise as much as he did the commu-
nists. /
/without any prior planning or clear
indication of the limits of the withdrawal, the re-
deployments have been generally disorderly. In the
northern two thirds of the country, most government
forces are cut off from each other and seized with
an evacuation mentality. Under these conditions,
some units have refused to fight.
The senior military leadership clearly has been
caught off balance by the direction which events
have taken, and their reaction has been one of dis-
may and depression. These attitudes also are re-
flected through the ranks.
Grumbling against Thieu's leadership has grown
in the wake of military reverses, but events have
moved so rapidly that there has been little coup
talk. It is widely recognized that a coup at this
time would be disastrous.* But the situation is
such that pressures for Thieu's resignation or forc-
ible removal could quickly emerge.
*The South Vietnamese government move on March
27 to arrest "plotters" against the government was
basically a warning to opposition elements; those
involved did not represent any serious threat to
Thieu.
(continued)
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A source of disorder lies in the refugee prob-
lem which has caught the government ill-prepared to
cope with the massive numbers of refugees generated
in military regions 1 and 2. According to the latest
estimates, there may now be upwards of a million
displaced persons crowded into Da Nang awaiting
evacuation to coastal Military Region 2. But the
government has inadequate resources to accomplish
this mass evacuation in a short period, and there
is a serious risk of riots and fighting in the rush
to evacuate. Moreover, those who are brought out-
may have to be moved again--thereby creating addi-
tional pressures on the government.
Apart from the reverses suffered in South Viet-
nam, there are external factors which could further
undermine the South Vietnamese government. The col-
lapse of Cambodia, for example, would bring added
psychological pressure on Saigon. The continuing
debate in the US on the question of US aid to South
Vietnam is ?also an unsettling factor. Thieu prob-
ably assumes that he will have to rely on what he
already has; but if the South Vietnamese in general
come to believe that the US will not respond with?
additional assistance to meet the new situation,
this will fuel defeatism.
III. PROSPECTS
The communists have the capability to exploit
their gains, and we believe they will. In so doing,
they will try to destroy the remaining government
forces in military regions 1 and 2. At the moment,
the situation in Da Nang is chaotic. Considering
the forces that North Vietnam can bring to bear
against Da Nang, the poor state of South Vietnamese
armed forces defenses there, and the widespread
panic in the city, its defenses could simply col-
lapse. In any event, it will be lost within two
weeks to a North Vietnamese attack, perhaps within
a few days if the Marine division is removed from
the city's defense. Thieu is already considering
this move; his strategy has been to save his forces
from being destroyed in overextended positions.
In Military Region 2, the thinly stretched
government forces will be no match for the five
North Vietnamese divisions. There are already
(continued)
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indications that the communists are planning to at-
tack several major population centers in the region.
In the face of strong communist attacks, the South
Vietnamese will be unable to maintain these enclaves
In military regions 3 and 4, the government
currently has a substantial edge in forces and is
expected to maintain a strong defense line around
the heavily populated and rice growing areas, but
some retraction of defenses is probable. Tay Ninh
City has been a major goal of the communists this
dry season. The South Vietnamese have fought hard
to hold the city thus far, and we believe they can
continue to do so, although they may decide to
abandon ?the city because of the risks and costs in-
volved in defending it.
In sum, the South Vietnamese withdrawals amount
to a major defeat. As matters now stand, Thieu is
faced with:
--Reasserting effective control over his com-
manders.
--Extracting key force elements and equipment
from military regions 1 and 2.
--Organizing a strong defense of the Saigon
area and Military Region 4.
Communist momentum, however, will be hard to
stop, and the North Vietnamese may be tempted to
commit the remaining portion of their strategic re-
serve to exploit the situation. Even if they do
so, we believe that the South Vietnamese govern-
ment's military strength in the southern part of
the country will enable it to survive the current
dry season, although additional losses are certain.
Logistic factors, for example, would probably
bar a quick assault on Saigon since the communists
now lack supply stocks in forward positions in Mil-
itary Region 3, and their prepositioning will be
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time consuming. In addition, even the decision to
commit the strategic reserve means that forces will
have to be marshaled and deployed. In so doing,
the communists will run into time and distance fac-
tors, and the complexities of assembling units and
moving them over long lines of communications in an
environment where rapid or orderly deployment is in-
hibited. Finally, the South Vietnamese forces in
military regions 3 and 4--including the territorial
forces--remain intact and able to give a good ac-
count of themselves.
Even so, the South Vietnamese government will
probably be left with control over little more than
the delta and Saigon and surrounding populated areas.
It would thus face further communist pressure from
a position substantially weaker than our previous
estimates, with the result likely to be defeat by
early 1976. The communists will keep up their mili-
tary pressure to topple the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment by outright defeat, unless there have been
political changes in Saigon that open the way to a
new settlement on near-surrender terms.
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