THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014774
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 17, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
-
April 17, 1975
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tur
t7 ?
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption categoot.5 11,121.(3)
declassified onh/ on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 171 1975
Table of Contents
Cambodia: The government surrendered this morning.
(Page 1)
Vietnam: Deputy Prime Minister Tran Van Don
is in contact with a spokesman for the
Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment. (Page 2)
USSR: A Central Committee meeting yesterday signals
the beginning of preparations for the next
party congress. (Page 6)
NATO: All members have agreed in principle to hold
a summit-level meeting at the end of May.
(Page 8)
Argentina: Leftist guerrilla groups plan increased
terrorism to protest the coming visit of Sec-
retary Kissinger. (Page 9)
Lebanon: Palestinian commandos and Phalanges Party
leaders yesterday agreed to a cease-fire in
Beirut. (Page 10)
Thailand: Foreign Minister Chatchai is encounter-
ing problems in his efforts to hasten estab-
lishment of formal ties with China. (Page 11)
Notes: China; MBFR; Libya; Portugal (Pages 12 and 13)
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CAMBODIA
The Cambodian government surrendered
this morning. A cease-fire reportedly is
in effect, and the capital is described as
calm.
The situation in the countryside is unclear,
but the government has instructed all of its pro-
vincial commanders to lay down their arms and stop
fighting.
Some 30 Westerners, including a number of US
journalists, were at last report holed up in a Phnom
Penh hotel. The Red Cross in Geneva declared the
hotel a neutral zone yesterday. The communists
have repeated their earlier orders fonthe safekeep-
ing of foreign nationals in the city.
Intercepted communist messages confirm plans
to evacuate large numbers of civilians from Phnom
Penh. The commander of one communist administra-
tive unit reported yesterday that he is ready to
accept responsibility" for between 400,000 and
500,000 people.
Cambodian military aircraft that escaped have
begun arriving in Thailand. Three planes carrying
nearly 90 officers and dependents landed at Utapao
airbase yesterday and more are expected. So far,
there is no word on whether any senior, government
officials have escaped.
On the international front, a number, of govern-
ments are moving to recognize Prince Sihanouk's
regime. Turkey announced its recognition yesterday.
Iran, Sweden, Finland, and Australia are likely to
follow soon. Canberra has pledged "substantial"
postwar reconstruction aid.
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VIETNAM
Deputu Prime Minister Tran Van
Don is in contact
with a spokesman for the Viet Cong's
Provisional Revolutionary Government.
Don was reminded that the Viet
Cong would never consider negotiations while Thieu
remains president. Such discussions. could begin
only'with a government headed by a "neutral" figure
and composed of "third force" personalities and
"leftists." This new government could include
"pro-American politicians."
the PRG spokesman stated
that communist strategy "at the moment" is to iso-
late Saigoh. The communists allegedly do not want
to attack Saigon directly, preferring to "take
their time" in assuming control, meanwhile allow-
ing evacuations to proceed in an "orderly" fashion.
If communist troops should move into the city
quickly, evacuations for "everyone" would be "im-
possible."
Don was
informed that he should assume control of the gov-
ernment "within 72 hours" and call for a cease-
fire. All Americans would be permitted to leave
the country except for a "core" that would be
needed to run the US embassy. In addition, any
Vietnamese who wished to leave, including those
at Hue and Da Nang, allegedly would also be given
safe passage.
The PRG spokesman indicated, however, that
the communists might be running out of patience
and that the "next week or two" would be crucial.
Saigon would be safe for that period, but, if talks
had not begun by then, communist forces would be
"in position" to take over the city.
(continued)
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\\THAIL\
MR 1
PHNOM PENH
r
Phan Rang
K?
MR 2
./".?
\?' CAPITAL
..???
nTh? SPECIAL
ZONE
MR 4
MR 3
'
Phan Thiet
.? I
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 25 50 75
Statute Miles
557711 4-75
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The scenario
from PRG contact could be a communist effort
to persuade someone in senior South Vietnamese gov-
ernment circles that a political settlement of the
conflict is still possible.
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The warnings 25X1
conform to the line passed by PRG representa- 25X1
tives overseas The 25X1
latter have maintained that the communists do not
want to attack Saigon but prefer a "political solu-
tion," but that this is impossible with Thieu still
in power.
The arrival of additional combat
units north of Saigon, coupled with
heavy government 'losses east of the
capital, is setting the stage for
strong new communist attacks within
the next two weeks along the western,
northern, and eastern approaches to
Saigon.
the commu-
nists will waste little time in exploiting their
overwhelming advantage in terms of troops and fire-
power. the communist 9th Divi-
sion, which has recently moved south into Hau Nghia
Province, will soon attack the South Vietnamese 25th
Division guarding Route 1 and the western approaches
to Saigon0
communist units, probably sappers and artillery,
will attack the capital itself.
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communists have issued instructions
calling for "final" assaults on remaining govern-
ment positions, including Saigon. 25X1
fresh combat units have arrived in the 25X1
provinces around Saigon and all corn- 25)(1
munist resources will be used to achieve final
victory by May 19--the anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's
birth.
Radio direction finding of April 16 confirms
that the headquarters of both the North Vietnamese
1st Corps and its subordinate 312th Division are
rapidly approaching Military Region 3. The corps
(continued)
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headquarters is now in northwestern Quang Duc Prov-
ince, while the 312th headquarters is along the
Cambodian border just north of the region. These
units left North Vietnam less than two weeks ago.
Three other subordinate divisions are on the move
south.
The communists also are moving divisions into
the region from farther north in South Vietnam.
Documents captured near Xuan Loc indicate that ele-
ments of the North Vietnamese 325th Division have
arrived in that area. Two other divisions in the
southern highlands--the 10th and the 316th--have
shown signs of shifting into Military Region 3.
South Vietnamese forces are still holding Xuan
Loc, but government positions around the city and
the roads west of the town are rapidly becoming in-
defensible.
The North Vietnamese launched strong new at-
tacks on the airborne brigade just outside of Xuan
Loc yesterday. Since other government units defend-
ing the perimeter of the city were not attacked,
regional officials believe the communists have de-
liberately struck the strongest unit, hoping to in-
flict a major loss and thereby sap the resolve of
the remaining forces.
The communists have also been putting heavy
pressure on the junction of routes 1 and 20 west of
Xuan Loc and now control the intersection and much
of the surrounding terrain. A series of sharp at-
tacks yesterday on a South Vietnamese regiment forced
the unit to destroy its artillery and disperse.
With the recent fall of Kiem Tan district town
on Route 20 and the rout of the South Vietnamese
regiment, the communists now have complete control
of this highway and can bring additional combat
units directly to the battlefront from the southern
highlands. The communists may decide to leave the
city isolated and move much of their force west
toward Bien Hoa and Saigon.
Communist forces also routed government defend-
ers at Phan Rang yesterday. Some remnants of a re-
cently rebuilt 2nd Division regiment were apparently
evacuated by sea. The few survivors of the airborne
and ranger units assigned there are believed to be
trying to withdraw overland toward Phan Thiet, which
may be the communists' next target.
(continued)
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Some regional officials are blaming President
Thieu for the defeat at Phan Rang because he per-
sonally ordered the deployment of the now-shattered
forces to that exposed northern enclave.
In the delta, at least two additional North
Vietnamese regiments have moved into Dinh Tuong
Province from the Moc Hoa - Cambodian border area,
the North Vietnamese
could have as many as nine infantry regiments con-
centrated in the province, and Saigon could soon
lose control of Route 4, its lifeline to the delta.
The commander of the delta region realigned
some of his forces yesterday to counter this new
communist buildup. He has assigned both the South
Vietnamese 7th and 9th divisions to the most threat-
ened areas in the northeast of the region.
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USSR
A Soviet party Central Committee
meeting in Moscow yesterday signaled the
beginning of preparations for the next
party congress. The removal of trade
union chief Aleksandr Shelepin from the
Politburo by the central committee elim-
inates one of the potential runners in
the long-term race to succeed General
Secretary Brezhnev, but otherwise does
little to clarify the succession picture.
Brezhnev-was clearly in charge at the plenum.,
He delivered a-report on-plans.for the congress,
which is now set-to open on February 24, 1976. For-
eign Minister Gromyko delivered a report-on foreign
affairs. This report is usually given by Brezhnev,
and the change continues the trend toward greater
collectivity in the leadership that has been appar-
ent since the General Secretary's illness this win-
ter.
The decision setting the date for the party
congress came earlier and more smoothly than it did
for the 24th congress in 1971. This suggests satis-
faction on the part of the leaders with present po-
litical conditions and confidence in their ability
to set the course of the Soviet Union over the next
five years.
The announcement of the opening date for the
congress is likely to: trigger a cycle of.party meet-
ings beginning at the lower levels in the fall and
continuing up through successively more important
party organizations, ending by late. January or early
February. Personnel shifts will probably be occur-
ring from now on at all levels within the party, and
the outcome of these shifts will determine the rela-
tive political strengths of the various Soviet lead-
ers for the next several years.
Shelepin has long been regarded warily by some
of his colleagues as a man with a dangerous combina-
tion of ability and ambition, and his departure
from the Kremlin removes a potential element of in-
stability in the leadership. Ever since he mounted
a serious but unsuccessful challenge to Brezhnev's
leadership in 1965, his career has been on a pre-
cipitous slide. In 1967 he was removed from the
party Secretariat and given the trade union post--
traditionally a powerless figurehead position.
(continued)
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The plenum also issued a resolution
expressing satisfaction with the fruits
of Moscow's four-year "peace program"
and endorsing the continuation of detente.
The resolution attributed the success of
Soviet foreign policy to Soviet economic
and military strength, while noting that
"forces of war and reaction" are still
alive.
The resolution approved further progress in
the force reduction talks and strategic arms nego-
tiations by holding that political detente must be
accompanied by military detente, including arms
reductions. It also noted the continuing importance
of bilateral and multilateral summitry.
It made no mention of China or Vietnam. The
omission of the former may reflect a decision to
avoid the appearance of polemics with Peking when
the Soviet Union is trying to pave the way for an
international conference of communist parties. In
leaving out Vietnam, the Soviets could be showing
some sensitivity to the implications for detente
of communist 'gains there.
The plenum's emphasis on foreign policy jibes
with reports that Moscow has begun a broad assess-
ment of Soviet relations with the West ?in prepara-
tion for the party congress./
//they have reached the following preliminary
conclusions:
--World developments since the last party con-
gress in 1971 have demonstrated the correct-
ness of detente, and the policy should be con-
tinued.
--The capitalist powers retain great strength
and resilience, and will rebound from their
current economic crisis.
--The economic rewards of detente, especially
the increased import of Western technology,
will not in themselves obviate the need for
changes in the Soviet political and economic
structure if the USSR is to close the techno-
logical gap with the West.
.)
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NATO
All NATO members have now agreed in
principle to hold a summit-level meeting
at the end of May, but some have reserva-
tions about its usefulness. The French,
among the more skeptical, may be repre-
sented by someone other than President
Giscard. West Germany, Great Britain,
Norway, and Belgium definitely favor hold-
ing the meeting.
The Canadians and Dutch in particular fear that
the NATO summit will affect adversely Western chances
for obtaining meaningful results from the European se-
curity conference in Geneva. They reason that the So-
viets might view the summit as evidence of a Western
desire to wind up the conference quickly, and that Mos-
cow will therefore refuse to offer any compromises on
outstanding issues.
France recognizes the importance of your reaf-
firming the US commitment to the Alliance even
though, according to the French ambassador to NATO,
it has "difficulty" in seeing the value of a summit.
France therefore will contribute to preparing a
communique and will assist in the public relations
aspects of the meeting. Paris may send Premier
Chirac or Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues to the
conference. Portuguese representation may also be
at a level lower than head of government.
All NATO representatives seem to agree that
the agenda for the meeting should be broad, and the
communique short but substantive. They appear to
be moving toward a consensus that the foreign min-
isters should do the preparatory work on May 29 and
that the heads of government should meet formally
only on May 30.
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ARGENTINA
Leftist guerrilla groups are plan-
ning an escalation of terrorism over the
next several days to protest the coming
visit of Secretary Kissinger.
arranged/
/massive security precautions are being
During the past few days terrorists have struck
several military installations throughout the coun-
try and tried, for the second time, to kill the
chief of the Federal Police. These particular at-
tacks probably are a result of the growing concern
among terrorist leaders over the threat posed by
right-wing death squads.
The Peron government has scored some successes
against the well-organized extremists, but a turning
point in the struggle is not yet in sight. As many
as 300 people may have been killed in political
violence this year. Until the security services
achieve a significant intelligence breakthrough--
and are able to follow up on it--the running battle
in the streets between right and left-will continue.
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LEBANON
Palestinian commandos and Phalanges
Party leaders yesterday agreed to a
cease-fire in Beirut. The accord is to
be enforced by the Lebanese internal se-
curity services, rather than the army
which has managed to stay out of the
fighting.
President Franjiyah and other Christian lead-
ers apparently persuaded Phalanges Party leaders
that prolonged fighting would draw in major feda-
yeen units that could quickly overwhelm the Phalang-
ists. The radical Palestinian groups presumably
agreed to the cease-fire when they realized that
the larger fedayeen organizations, Fatah and Saiqa,
did not plan to enter the fighting in force.
The moderate Palestinians refused to involve
their organizations almost certainly because they
believed that a major encounter with the Lebanese
army would play into the hands of Arab "rejection-
ists" and further reduce the likelihood that the
PLO would be invited to the Geneva talks.
Action taken by the head of the Syrian-con-
trolled Saiqa organization to keep his followers
out of the dispute also suggests that the Syrian
government counseled restraint.
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THAILAND
Foreign Minister Chatchai is en-
countering problems in his efforts to
hasten establishment of formal ties
with China. He now considers it unlikely
that relations can be normalized before
the end of the year.
One of the most formidable difficulties con-
fronting Bangkok concerns the legal status of Thai-
land's 800,000 overseas Chinese. Many of these
people have kept their citizenship with the Nation-
alist government on Taiwan. They would seem to
have the alternatives of either switching their
citizenship to Peking once Bangkok severed its ties
with Taiwan or applying for Thai citizenship. The
offer of Thai citizenship to this group, whose po-
litical loyalties have long been suspect, is a
highly controversial issue within the government.
The Thai foreign ministry reportedly intends to
consult Malaysian officials as to how. Kuala Lumpur
dealt with this problem when it recognized Peking.
Chatchai is under pressure from military and
police officials to move slowly in normalizing re-
lations,lest a Chinese embassy in Bangkok serve as
a center for espionage and subversion. He will
also have to take into consideration the views of
the politically powerful Chinese businessmen, many
of whom have extensive commercial dealings with
Taiwan.
Chatchai.is.encountering opposition from
within his own ministry. A recent. meeting of the
China policy committee overruled his plans for a
self-initiated,trip.to Peking.
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NOTES
China's first original comment on the South
Vietnam refugee situation, a People's Daily "com-
mentator" article on April 13, continues the low-
key, moderately worded coverage that has character-
ized Chinese treatment of recent developments in
South Vietnam.
In language similar to that employed in earlier
press coverage of the US role in Vietnam, the article
warns the US that it will have failed to "learn the
lessons of history" if it continues to "intervene"
in the south. The article also refers to the "fu-
tility" of US expenditures in Vietnam, reflecting
Peking's recent stress on US "misuse" of its re-
sources in. Indochina when the areas of primary con-
cern in Peking's eyes should be Europe and the
Middle East. Recent Chinese propaganda has sug-
gested that the US would be better served if it
dedicated its resources to areas where the Soviet
"threat" is greater.
The fifth round of the Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions talks in Vienna ends today. There
has been no progress in resolving basic differences,
and the talks remain stalemated. They will resume
in mid-May.
Both East and West marked time during this
round. Neither side has shown signs that it is
overly disturbed by the lack of progress. The
Soviets have never appeared to be under time pres-
sure, and various Soviet officials have implied
that there would be no movement in Vienna until
the European security, conference in Geneva concludes
in a satisfactory manner. Moreover, there is some
evidence that the Soviets are aware that the US is
considering making an offer to withdraw from Europe
some nuclear warheads and delivery systems. They
apparently are content to await such an initiative.
The West Europeans, who have expressed some concern
about the stalemate in the past, apparently are
also willing to wait for a formal US proposal along
this line.
(continued)
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Libya has again signaled an interest in improv-
ing relations with the US. This time it has asked
for US approval of an ambassadorial nominee and has
lifted the numerical ceiling on US embassy personnel
it imposed in 1972.
The Libyan foreign ministry official who in-
formed our charge early this week of the latest
move said the decision had been made by President
Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council. The
official--probably under directions from his supe-
riors--did not directly link the move with Tripoli's
interest in improving ties with Washington, but did
offer his "personal" hope that the gesture would
"keep the ball rolling." As in the case of Libya's
decision in January to lift its oil embargo against
the US, this latest move will not be publicized nor
will a formal notification be issued. Qadhafi's
willingness to engage in a dialogue with the US will
have limits, and probably he will continue to avoid
any discussion of his policy toward Israel.
The Portuguese cabinet yesterday announced
measures to nationalize more basic industries, con-
trol prices, and begin agrarian reform.
As in the nationalization of banks and insur-
ance companies last month, foreign businesses are
largely unaffected by the latest measures. Mean-
while, Prime Minister Gonclaves has tried to raise
tensions by warning that Portugal should prepare
itself for a possible international "economic boy-
cott" designed to obstruct the revolution.
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