THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 APRIL 1975
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0006014784
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 29, 1975
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The President's Daily Brief
April 29, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 5B(I5.(21A3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 29, 1975
'Table' of Contents.
South Vietnam: The emergency evacuation of Ameri-
cans is under way. (Page 1)
Cambodia: "A special national congress" has decided
to retain Prince Sihanouk as nominal head of
state and Penn Nouth as prime minister. (Page 3)
France-MBFR: The possibility, that the US may with-
draw nuclear warheads and delivery systems as
part of a force reduction agreement has in-
creased France's apprehension about the MBFR
negotiations. (Page 5)
Notes: Israel-Jordan; France; Spain-NATO
(Pages 7 and 8)
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/ Tan An
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The US has begun the emergency
evacuation of remaining Americans from
South Vietnam. The effort encount-
ered some problems initially. The com-
munist assault on Saigon has closed Tan
Son Nhut airfield and Zed to panic and
chaos throughout the capital area.
The first US helicopters from a naval task
force off the coast landed at Tan Son Nhut with a
US marine security force, shortly after 2 a.m.-EDT.
The US commander of the evacuation operation reported
that some Americans in downtown Saigon had been un-
able to reach an evacuation point, but later re-
porting indicates a large number of Americans had ar-
rived at the US defense attache compound.
According to a late report, more than 2,000
people including several hundred Americans now have
been safely evacuated.
The evacuation of Americans from Can Tho has
encountered resistance from South Vietnamese forces.
The US consul general, together with 22 other Amer-
icans plus Filipinos and Vietnamese civilians, tried
to flee down the Mekong by boat, but they were at-
tacked by South Vietnamese helicopter gunships.
Late reports indicate they too have been rescued.
Communist forces began their attack early this
morning with massive artillery and rocket bombard-
ments of Tan Son Nhut airfield. Many South Viet-
namese aircraft were destroyed on the ground, but
others managed to take off despite the rubble and
heavy groundf ire. Some aircraft participated in
the defense of Saigon, while others flew to Can Tho.
A number of government aircraft and helicopters flew
to US ships off the coast or to bases in Thailand.
At least three South Vietnamese aircraft were shot
down over Saigon by SA-7 missiles.
The communists followed the Tan Son Nhut as-
sault with a spate of small attacks on the suburbs
of the capital. Government units just northwest of
Saigon abandoned their positions, and a number of
government outposts were lost as the result of ground
(continued)
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attacks. North Vietnamese sappers also penetrated
the southern edge of Saigon and attacked a large
military communications site. An intercepted mes-
sage had indicated that the North Vietnamese 7th
Division would try to take over Saigon's radio sta-
tion, but there are no reports of such an attempt.
The radio station is located a short distance from
the US embassy.
North Vietnamese forces also launched large-
scale attacks west and southwest of Saigon. A
large communist force supported by tanks attacked
the South Vietnamese 25th Division at Cu Chi, and
intercepts suggest the communists hope to push on
to the capital. Heavy fighting is occurring along
Route 4 southwest of Saigon, and the communist
forces attacking in that area could reach Cholon
and the outskirts of the capital within Hours.
East of Saigon, intercepted messages suggest
the North Vietnamese have captured Vung Tau and
Bien Hoa and are now pushing west.
The North Vietnamese assault on the capital
came on the heels of the communist rejection yes-
terday of President Minh's call for negotiations.
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong media have character-
ized the new Saigon government as just another "re-
actionary administration" and reiterated earlier
demands that the government's administrative struc-
ture "be abolished," its "war machine" dismantled
and that the US leave immediately. In a desperate
effort to meet some of these demands, the Minh
government today requested that all American per-
sonnel leave the country within 24 hours and an-
nounced plans to overhaul the governmental apparatus
and legalize the communist party. In another des-
perate gesture of reconciliation, Saigon Radio
today referred to the North Vietnamese and the Viet
Cong as "our brothers of the other side."
In his acceptance speech two days ago, Presi-
dent Minh asked for a cease-fire in order to ar-
range a "political solution within the framework
of the Paris Agreement" and called upon the South
Vietnamese military to "defend the remaining terri-
tory." It now seems clear, however, that Hanoi has-
rejected the gradual transfer of power and negotia-
tions on a co-equal governmental basis implied by
Minh and is determined to accept nothing short of
surrender.
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CAMBODIA
Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan
announced in a communique he read over
Phnom Penh radio yesterday that a "spe-
cial national congress" had "decided"
that Prince Sihanouk would remain nom-
inal head of state and that Penn Nouth
would be "allowed" to remain as prime
minister.
Although the announcement leaves little doubt
that Sihanouk and Penn Nouth will be severely cir-
cumscribed, Samphan's reference to "thorough review
and debate" suggests that the decision to: allow the
two any role was a bitter pill for some communist
leaders to swallow. In this regard, Samphan hinted
that other non-communist figures--such as Foreign
Minister Sarin Chak--may be on their way out by
saying that they would be "rewarded according to
their respective contributions and abilities."
In the communique,. Samphan backtracked on the
communists' previously stated willingness to accept
"all unconditional aid." He made allusions, instead,
to "foreign interferences...under the form of human-
itarianism." At thesame time, however, he spoke
of "striving-ta develop unity with...people through-
out the world," including "peace and justice loving
Americans," and again stressed a "nonaligned and
neutral" foreign policy.
In addition to: the communique? Phnom Penh radio
over the weekend broadcast its first postwar "edi-
torial." A relatively new art form for Khmer com-
munist-propagandists, the editorial was noteworthy
for its references to "the great Cambodian revolu-
tionary organization" that achieved victory through
its "clear-sighted and correct line." However ob-
lique, this is the first public acknowledgment of
the dominant role played by the covert -Khmer Commu-
nist-Party.
(continued)
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Meanwhile, a recent message from the Khmer
Communist Party Central Committee has confirmed
communist plans to expel large numbers of non-Cam-
bodians from Phnom Penh. A communist commander in
northwestern Cambodia was ordered to send 22 vehi-
cles to the provincial capital of Pursat on April 30
to pick up a large number of "foreigners" and trans-
port them to the town of Poipet on the Thai border.
The Central Committee stated that "all foreigners"
should be expelled "quickly" because they created
"many complex political problems."
that press reports of a Cambodian communist buildup
along the Thai border are exaggerated. Thai of
have expressed anxiety over the proximity of
Khmer communist forces to Thailand, but there is
no evidence that the communists are massing troops
along the border. Khmer communist forces are still
attempting to consolidate their control, and al-
leged border violations probably have involved pur-
suit of fleeing Cambodians.
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FRANCE-MBFR
The possibility that the US may with-
draw nuclear warheads and delivery systems
as part of a force reduction agreement has
increased France's apprehension about the
MBFR negotiations.
The French, who opted not to participate in
the Vienna talks, have long expressed concern that
the talks could result in an agreement that would
inhibit future European defense cooperation ven-
tures and weaken NATO's defensive capabilities.
the force reduction talks are
now moving into a critical phase and is making a
concerted effort to put its skeptical views on rec-
ord.
the Soviet Un-
ion's real purpose in MBFR is to obtain a means to
frustrate future European defense cooperation and
to influence West European affairs in general.
France is concerned about the long-term
rather than the short-term effects on the security
of Western Europe if the US offered to withdraw
military elements.
In particular, the French fear that:
--Reducing "Allied" air forces would erode
NATO's conventional tactical air capabilities
and might affect NATO's capability to deploy
and use tactical nuclear weapons.
--Accepting a ceiling on US tactical nuclear
warheads might prohibit future technological
changes that could bolster NATO's strategy of
deterrence.
--A cutback in US nuclear delivery systems
would have deleterious consequences for the
Allies' military flexibility.
(continued)
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--A trade-off of US nuclear elements for a
Soviet tank army would decrease Western secu-
rity because the Soviets could easily rein-
troduce the tanks.
--Verifying any force reduction agreement would
be extremely difficult.
The French probably will continue their efforts
in other forums to dissuade the US and NATO from
proposing the bargain concerning nuclear elements
and a tank army. They may have some difficulty,
however. Most of the NATO participants in the
Vienna talks agree in principle that the so-called
nuclear sweetener is the West's only trump card and
that it should be played relatively soon in an ef-
fort to break the deadlock.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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NOTES
Israeli
"French
(continued)
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The initial reaction by NATO members to our
demarche requesting early consideration of Spain's
relationship with the Alliance has been negative.
Most NATO members, in fact, are decidedly cool
to any initiatives at this time to bring Spain
closer to membership. Many favor eventual ties
with Spain, but believe closer relations with the
Franco regime could have serious political conse-
quences in their own countries and weaken public
support for the Alliance. Some also argue that
premature links with Madrid might cause a popular
reaction in Spain against NATO when Franco passes
from the scene. French and West German officials
show the most positive interest in the problem,
while the Belgian government is the most negative.
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Top Secret
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