THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 JUNE 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014815
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 4, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP-79T00936A012600010052-0
The President's Daily Brief
June 4, 1975
5
T'rl4e.425X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 5B(I1.(2).(3)
declassified onry on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
June 4, 1975
Table of Contents
Laos: Neither Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma nor
his Pathet Lao deputy, Phoumi Vongvichit,
broke new ground in their conversations with
Assistant Secretary Habib. (Page 1)
Portugal: Socialist Party leader Soares believes
that West European governments should link
assistance to Portugal with demands that Com-
munist influence in Lisbon be curtailed.
(Page 3)
USSR: The Soviets have told some Italian diplomats
that there has been a leftward turn in China's
domestic politics. (Page 4)
Thailand: The Thai military are beginning to show
impatience with the Khukrit government, but
there is no firm evidence at this time that
they are considering its overthrow. (Page 5)
The Philippines: President Marcos' security ad-
visers have been ordered to draft options for
a new arrangement to govern US military bases.
(Page 6)
Ethiopia: Fighting involving Afar tribesmen in the
eastern part of the country may be the start
of a full-scale revolt against the ruling mil-
itary council. (Page 8)
Notes: Portugal; Iraq-Syria; Egypt (Page 9)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and
his Pathet Lao deputy, Phoumi Vongvichit,
broke no new ground in separate conver-
sations on June 2 and 3 with Assistant
Secretary Habib.
Both Lao leaders reasserted in positive terms
the communist-dominated coalition government's
desire to maintain "good" relations with the US.
They also made a strong pitch for continued US
assistance, but with the standard Pathet Lao caveat
that such aid must be unconditional and given di-
rectly to the Lao government. Phoumi essentially
repeated a line he had taken earlier with the US
charge and acting USAID director. He said that US
assistance would be welcome--particularly during
a "healing the wounds of war" phase of economic
development. This phrasing puts US aid in the con-
text of war reparations.
Phoumi said that he would personally supervise
the forthcoming negotiations on a new assistance
agreement. He also indicated that he did not
"think" there would be any more "disorders" di-
rected against Americans in Vientiane.
Meanwhile, Souvanna's acquiescence to Pathet
Lao viewpoints came through clearly in his discus-
sions with Habib. He repeatedly emphasized that,
in his view, "nothing had changed" in the Lao-
American relationship. The Prime Minister blamed
excited young people" for the recent anti-American
demonstrations in Vientiane and argued that USAID,
not the US, was the prime target.
Souvanna also maintained that there had been
no real change in Laos, merely an "evolution of
attitudes." The Pathet Lao, according to Souvanna,
had no intention of taking over Laos--at least
not for another "five or six years." The Lao com-
munists, he insisted, were "reasonable national-
ists" who respected the monarchy and who had never
formed a separate government during their long
years of isolation in Sam Neua.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
25X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
USSR
,
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PORTUGAL
Socialist Party leader Mario Soares
believes that West European governments
should Zink assistance to Portugal with
demands that Communist influence in Lis-
bon be curtailed.
Soares' position has already gotten encourage-
ment from West European Socialists. Former chan-
cellor Brandt, Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, and
Swedish Prime Minister Palme expressed their sup-
port for their Portuguese colleagues at a press con-
ference in Vienna on May 25. They also warned of
the dangers to East-West relations if the Communists
try to strengthen their position in the government.
Last week, the Norwegian and Luxembourg trade union
federations also expressed strong backing for the
Portuguese Socialists. French Socialist Party
leader Mitterrand recently came out in support of
Soares' anti-communist line in the Republica af-
fair, but this stance is now causing further strains
in the Socialist-Communist alliance in France.
Soares is also trying to establish a direct
link between the EC's provision of economic assist-
ance to Portugal and the maintenance of democratic
institutions. At the conclusion of a three-day
visit to Lisbon yesterday, Irish Foreign Minister
Garrett FitzGerald--at present, president of the
EC Council--underlined the EC's desire to provide
Portugal with financial, industrial and agricultural
assistance. While not establishing political con-
ditions for such aid, FitzGerald noted the importance
of maintaining a pluralist democracy and freedom of
expression in Portugal. Plans for an EC-Portuguese
ministerial meeting scheduled for this fall were
also discussed.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
The Soviets have told some
diplomats that there has been a turn
leftward in China's domestic politics.
Moscow's purpose evidently is to suggest
to the US and others in the West that any
improvement in relations with China will
not be durable. This Zine appears timed
both to counter whatever gains Chinese
Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping may have
made during his visit to Western Europe
last month and to raise questions prior
to your trip to Peking.
The Soviet message was conveyed forcefully
by Mikhail Kapitsa, chief of the foreign ministry's
Far East division. He asserted that Premier Chou
En-lai's position had been weakened by the National
People's Congress and that the "Shanghai" group,
including Mao's wife Chiang Ching, had moved into
dominant positions overseeing the party and the
government.
Kapitsa made these statements as if they were
beyond dispute. In fact, Chiang Ching has not been
appointed to the Politburo standing committee, nor
have the leftists gained control of it or the
party's control commission, as Kapitsa claimed.
Moreover, the Soviets themselves have heretofore
interpreted the National People's Congress as a
victory for Chou and the moderates.
The Soviet official told that
the new predominance of the Shanghai group would
lead to an intensification of China's struggle
against both the Soviet Union and the US. He did
not speculate about what new policies Peking would
follow, but he implied that there is a good pos-
sibility of tougher days ahead in Sino-Soviet re-
lations.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THAILAND
The Thai military are beginning to
show impatience with the Khukrit govern-
ment
The military have little faith in the civilian
government's ability to maintain order and are
watching the administration's handling of current
labor unrest. Military officers also have been
displeased with the way Prime Minister Khukrit of-
ficially criticized the US in connection with the
Mayaguez incident and have voiced concern over Khu-
krit's advocacy of accelerated US military with-
drawal. In addition, some officers have reserva-
tions about the haste with which the foreign minis-
try is moving to establish ties with Hanoi and Pe-
king.
Army Commander
Krit's political maneuvering has recently led to
widespread questioning of his leadership among
younger officers.
A precipitate move against the government
would almost certainly incur the displeasure of
the King, in addition to risking disorders among
radical students and other leftist elements.
some of the press have attempted
to make the US the scapegoat for recent anti-Viet-
namese demonstrations in northeast Thailand and
would be quick to allege a US hand in the affair.
a growth in governmental instability or per-
sistent civilian disregard for armed forces' inter-
ests in the months ahead could markedly increase
the possibility of military intervention.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
zoX1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Northern Luzon Major U.S. Bases
SOI 'TN
CHI' 4
SEA
_
-1-,90yA4v
PHILIPPIVE
SEA
Subic Bay Naval
558008 6-75
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PHILIPPINES
President Marcos' security advisers
have been ordered to draft options for a
new arrangement to govern US military
bases, including a Philippine take-over.
Despite his recent nationalistic rhetoric,
Marcos apparently wants an arrangement
that both Washington and Manila can live
with.
Marcos and his security advisers have assured
the ambassador and other US officials that the Phil-
ippines plans no precipitate action against US
bases. Marcos recognizes that the Philippines has
deep political and economic relations with the US.
Marcos has raised US base arrangements at vari-
ous times in the past, but has never scheduled the
high-level discussions needed for a new treaty. He
has preferred to keep the issue unresolved as a con-
venient nationalist theme that he can take up when-
ever foreign or domestic conditions make it useful.
This time, however, there are fresh elements:
--Marcos is showing new interest in being taken
seriously as a member of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, which favors the even-
tual removal of foreign bases from Southeast
Asia.
--Marcos has begun exploring Manila's chances
for gaining admittance to the nonaligned club.
--Though US bases do not seem a bar to improved
Philippine relations with most communist states,
Hanoi has raised the subject.
Marcos probably has not yet decided how he wants
to restructure US-Philippine relations, but his re-
cent statements have stressed
certain themes:
(continued)
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
--Marcos has long felt that the Mutual Defense
Treaty allows the US too many loopholes and that
the major threat to his security is internal
subversion that is not covered by the treaty.
He may want a broader commitment.
--Marcos wants to improve the Philippines' own
military, much of which is poorly equipped and
badly trained. He may want US assistance for
a modernization program, including a local weap-
ons industry.
--Long unhappy with the extraterritorial nature
of the US bases, Marcos wishes to assert greater
control over them. He wants at least cosmetic
changes that would make the bases technically
Philippine and provide compensation such as rent.
Marcos will probably address himself, to the US
base issue when he returns from China in mid-June.
Past experience suggests the process will be slow
and careful, but accompanied by a great deal of
speechifying.
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ETHIOPIA
Fighting broke out on June 1 between
Ethiopian security forces and Afar tribes-
men in the eastern part of the country in
what may be the beginning of a full-scale
Afar revolt against the ruling military
council in Addis Ababa.
The Afar, who were allowed extensive autonomy
under Haile Selassie, have been suspicious of Ethi-
opia's military rulers since they came to power
last year. Although their leader, Sultan Ali Mirah,
was one of the few major tribal figures not arrested
during the council's roundup of traditional leaders,
the Afar believed the council would eventually move
against him as part of its campaign to destroy Ethi-
opia's former ruling class. Ali Mirah refused re-
peated council requests that he come to Addis Ababa.
Last week, delegates from the council traveled
to Afar territory, ostensibly to seek an accommoda-
tion with Ali Mirah. At the same time, the council
sent military reinforcements to the area. The
Afar probably interpreted this as the beginning of
a move against them and decided to strike first.
Ali Mirah, meanwhile, has taken refuge in the neigh-
boring French Territory of the Afars and Issas. His
tribesmen will probably continue to resist the im-
position of central government control.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
The government-controlled Portuguese press has
begun alluding to the US role in the Azores.
On May 31, a leading daily devoted nearly an
entire page to tying the deteriorating situation
in the islands to "reactionary and imperialist
escalation." The paper criticized Azorean autonomy
and independence groups and charged that employees
of the US consulate are members of the now disbanded
Movement for the Self-Determination of the Azorean
People. It also criticized activities of Portuguese
immigrants in the US, including "aggressive and in-
sulting actions" against Portuguese Information
Minister Jesuino during his recent visit to the US.
Major Portuguese dailies on June 2 also devoted
considerable space to the possibility that the
Azores may break away from the mainland.
After pursuing a largely one-sided quarrel
with Iraq over the past two months, Syria yesterday
abruptly announced it would release more Euphrates
River water to Iraq as a "gesture of good will."
Iraq will be relieved by the Syrian gesture;
the cutback in the flow of Euphrates water threat-
ened the livelihood of thousands of Iraqi farmers.
Baghdad nevertheless has refused to be provoked by
Syrian harassment and propaganda, apparently be-
lieving that President Asad would drop the dispute
once it had served his purposes. Asad probably be-
lieves he has amply demonstrated that Syria can ex-
ert severe economic pressure on Baghdad at any time
if the Iraqis try to meddle in Syrian internal
affairs. The release of the Euphrates water will
not end either Iraqi political intrigue in Syria
or Asad's antipathy for the Baghdad regime, but it
should ease tensions, at least temporarily.
9
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0
Declassified in Pari - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79?T00936A012600010052-0
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010052-0