THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 AUGUST 1975
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0006014870
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 8, 1975
File:
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RbP79T00936A012700010050-1 ,04)
The President's Daily Brief
August 8, 1975
5
-.."--7077-"Ste44425X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010050-1
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedulc of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(12,12)13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010050-1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
August 8, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The country's radical leaders face an
increasingly rebellious population supported
by some military units in the north. Mean-
while, Azorean separatists are more deter-
mined than ever to seek independence. (Page 1)
Turkey: Ankara is unlikely to put its relationship
with the US back on its old footing, even if
the arms embargo is lifted. (Page 3)
Note: North Vietnam - Thailand; USSR (submarine);
France - Saudi Arabia
(Pages 5 and 6)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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50
MILES
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PORTUGAL
Portugal's radical leaders are
confronted with an increasingly re-
bellious population, whose cause is
supported by some military units in
the north.
Yesterday, Portuguese army units in the north
openly defied orders from Lisbon to quell anti-
Communist disturbances. One press report says the
units presented the commander of the northern region
with a petition supporting the creation of a multi-
party government.
The momentum for a direct challenge of this
type has been building all week. If it continues,
the leaders of the ruling Armed Forces Movement
will face several options:
--They can accede to the demand for a multi-
party socialist state. This would be a major
victory for the democratic political parties
and the less radical, pro-Western faction in
the Revolutionary Council.
--They can try to ignore the demands and at-
tempt to impose a severe clampdown. Some hint
of this course of action is evident in recent
high-level discussions of new press censorship
and austerity measures.
--They can try to consolidate their support
in Lisbon and in the south--in effect cutting
the dissident areas adrift--in the hope that
they can avoid a major test of strength now
and reimpose their influence in dissident areas
later.
Because anti-Communist sentiment is increasing
not only in the north but elsewhere in the country
and because the discipline of military units neces-
sary to quell a rebellion is at a low ebb, common
sense would seem to dictate some concessions by
radical officers and the Communists. Most press
accounts, however, indicate that the Armed Forces
Movement is not yet ready to give in.
(continued)
1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The press in Lisbon is predicting that the
government that is scheduled to be sworn in today
will again be led by Vasco Goncalves and that it
will be made up largely of radical officers, Com-
munists, or Communist-sympathizers. The Socialist
and Popular Democratic parties reportedly will not
be represented. This situation could change after
internal security chief Carvalho and Army Chief of
Staff Fabiao report to the Movement on their tour
of the northern area and present their views on the
mood of the populace.
Late reports indicate that anti-Goncalves ele-
ments are still making an effort to persuade Presi-
dent Costa Gomes to head off the installation of
the new government, which they have publicly de-
nounced as "manifestly incapable."
Azorean separatists are more
determined than ever to seek inde-
pendence from the mainland.
Leaders of the Front for the Liberation of
the Azores told our embassy officials in Lisbon
that they are prepared to cooperate with anti-Com-
munists on the mainland, but do not intend to lose
sight of their long-range goal of independence.
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Anti-Communists on
the
go
the
mainland had hoped
slowly in the
threat of losing
to convince the separatists to
quest for independence because
the Azores would be additional leverage against a
Communist take-over on the mainland. The military
governor of the Azores, meanwhile, claims he will
not support an independence movement unless he is
convinced the mainland is in Communist hands.
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TURKEY
Turkey is unlikely to put its re-
lationship with the US back on its old
footing even if the arms embargo is
lifted.
Turkish commanders will probably retain the
administrative command they now exercise over pre-
viously US-controlled installations, and it is pos-
sible that the Turks will charge rent and/or place
the installations under a "NATO umbrella."
Opposition leader Ecevit, however, has re-
cently ruled out either a rental arrangement or
placing the bases under NATO control. In part
with an eye on the upcoming senate elections, he
has accused the government of not being decisive
enough in its countermeasures. He also has raised
questions about the continued presence of American
forces in Turkey. In fact, the embargo has given
impetus to those elements in Ecevit's party and in
the country who advocate a nonaligned or at least
a more independent policy. It is clear that Ecevit
and his Republican People's Party will push for a
diminution of the US role whether the embargo is
lifted or not.
Demirel is also having trouble with his Sal-
vationist Party coalition partner, Deputy Prime
Minister Erbakan, who has been privately critical
of the Prime Minister's handling of the retaliatory
measures against the US bases; he would have pre-
ferred stronger action./
(continued)
3
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Six months after the imposition of
the US arms embargo, the capabilities of
the Turkish armed forces have declined to
the point that Turkey would have diffi-
culty meeting its obligations as a NATO
ally.
Information is limited on the immediate ef-
fects of the embargo, due to restrictions on the
access of US personnel. We do know that the air
force has had the most problems; the number of air-
craft grounded for repairs has increased consider-
ably. The army is resorting to cannibalization and
is reducing the use of equipment in order to keep
major items operable. The navy has been the least
affected. Cannibalization and Turkish manufacture
of small parts, however, will not be sufficient to
sustain Turkey's military capabilities much longer.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
The North Vietnamese party daily carried an
editorial yesterday strongly supporting Thai in-
surgency forces; the editorial is one of a series,
published over the past month, that is critical of
Thai foreign policy.
The North Vietnamese obviously are smarting
over Bangkok's refusal to resume diplomatic discus-
sions in Hanoi--delivered in an unusually blunt
note from Foreign Minister Chatchai in late June.
In addition, they are presumably suspicious of
Bangkok's quick establishment of formal relations
with China. The commentaries are particularly
critical of Thai relations with the US, charging
Bangkok with continued "collusion" and lack of
sincerity in efforts to remove US military forces.
Soviet
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A Soviet submarine in the Mediterranean may
be in trouble.
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A US naval
reconnaissance aircraft yesterday sighted an F-
class submarine on the surface next to a Kashin-
class ASW ship. Other ships have now reached the
area and the group is moving slowly toward the
Egyptian coast. We do not know the nature of the
problem.
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Arabia
French'
I Saudi
6
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Top Secret
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