THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014897
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 9, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
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September 9, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(1).12).13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 9, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: A new government may be announced in two
or three days. (Page 1)
Lebanon: Heavy fighting between Christians and Mus-
lims continued in Tripoli yesterday. (Page 3)
Israel-Syria: Israeli leaders have launched a press
campaign to quiet fears that Tel Aviv will be
forced into early interim negotiations with
Syria. (Page 5)
Turkey: Our embassy in Ankara concludes that a Con-
gressional reconfirmation of the arms embargo
is likely to result not only in immediate retal-
iatory measures, but also could lead to long-term
changes in Turkey's foreign policy orientation.
(Page 7)
USSR: Two prominent members of Moscow's Institute
of the USA and Canada have written articles de-
fending Soviet detente policy against Western
critics, and perhaps domestic skeptics as well.
(Page 9)
Note: Romania-Poland (Page 10)
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PORTUGAL
Prime Minister - designate Azevedo,
after consultation with the political
parties, has announced that a new gov-
ernment will be named in two or three
days. The anti-Communist faction of
Major Melo Antunes, meanwhile, has taken
steps to consolidate its position within
Portugal's ruling military councils.
The Antunes group, excluded from recent meet-
ings of the Revolutionary Council, quickly made its
presence felt when a revamped council met for the
first time yesterday. The council decided:
--To appoint Antunes supporter Vasco Lourenco
head of a committee to restructure both the
Revolutionary Council and the pro-Communist
Armed Forces General Assembly.
--To reinstate anti-Communist former council
members Melo Antunes and Vitor Alves.
--To prevent unauthorized announcements about
military units and their political views.
--To proscribe interviews by military figures
other than members of the council, in an ap-
parent attempt to prevent public statements by
former prime minister Goncalves and other pro-
Communist officers.
With the announced restructuring of the assem-
bly, the council, which since July has been rele-
gated to a purely advisory role, appeared to be re-
asserting itself as the supreme authority in the
country. The council also confirmed the military's
intention to play a dominant political role when it
launched an investigation into statements made by
a local leader of the center-left Popular Democratic
Party. The party official had urged that the Armed
Forces Movement be dissolved, that the Revolutionary
Council be scrapped, and that the military return
to its barracks and leave the running of the country
to civilian politicians.
(continued)
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It is not yet clear what effect, if any, the
Antunes group's new assertiveness will have on the
formation of the new government. During the strug-
gle to remove Goncalves, the Antunes faction report-
edly pursued a joint strategy with the Socialists
and Popular Democrats. The goodwill established dur-
ing that period could easily break down, however, if
the political parties' excessive demands for power
frustrate the military in its desire to form a gov-
ernment and get the country moving again.
US embassy sources reported yesterday that both
the democratic parties and the Communists could cause
trouble in the selection of a government, but last
evening Azevedo was confident that he could present
a cabinet soon. His confidence seemed to be borne
out by the Goncalves cabinet's announcement that it
will remain in office until the new government is
sworn in.
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LEBANON
Heavy fighting between Christians
and Muslims continued in the northern
port city of Tripoli yesterday. At
least 25 persons have been killed and
parts of the city have been looted.
Militiamen from the predominantly Muslim city
of Tripoli reportedly have taken up positions in
the hills overlooking the nearby Christian village
of Zagharta, and are shelling the town with mortars
and rocket-launched grenades. The attackers are
seeking revenge for the slaying on Sunday of 12
Muslims by Christian militiamen on the Tripoli-
Beirut highway.
Isolated elements of two fedayeen organiza-
tions, Fatah and the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine, are reported to have joined the
Muslims, but so far there is no evidence of involve-
ment by organized Palestinian forces.
Less-radical fedayeen leaders--including Pal-
estine Liberation Organization and Fatah chief
Yasir Arafat--are on the defensive, however, as a
result of their failure to win any concessions for
the Palestinians as part of the most recent Egyp-
tian-Israeli agreement. They will find it diffi-
cult to keep their followers on the sidelines if
the fighting continues.
Karami, a Muslim, apparently is at odds with
Interior Minister Camille Shamun, a conservative
Christian, over how to deal with the current situa-
tion. Shamun, according to press reports, has
threatened to resign unless the Lebanese army is
,called in to stop the violence. Karami opposes
such a strategy on the grounds that use of the
predominantly Christian-officered army would antag-
onize his Muslim and leftist supporters and lead to
more serious hostilities.
(continued)
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The army has not been called on to put down
civil unrest in Lebanon since the spring of 1973,
when its battle with the fedayeen brought Syria to
the verge of moving its troops into the country.
The Lebanese government used only internal security
forces during the unrest of April, May, and June of
this year.
A government spokesman claimed yesterday that
the cabinet had "adopted several decisions that
hopefully will lead to the pacification of the sit-
uation." He offered no specifics, however, and his
rhetoric appeared designed primarily to cover the
disagreement between Karami and Shamun.
The cabinet will meet again today. If it again
fails to come up with effective countermeasures, the
fighting is likely to spread to other Lebanese cities,
and ultimately could lead to the collapse of Karami's
two-month-old "salvation cabinet."
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ISRAEL-SYRIA
Government leaders in Tel Aviv appear
to have launched a press campaign to quiet
widespread fears that Israel will be forced
into early interim negotiations with Syria.
At the same time, Prime Minister Rabin has
hinted that Tel Aviv may have to confront
the issue of negotiations with Damascus
before the UN forces' mandate on the Golan
expires at the end of November.
Interviews with Rabin, Defense Minister Peres,
and Foreign Minister Allon--the team that negotiated
the pact with Egypt--appeared late last week in all
major Israel dailies. All three denied that nego-
tiations for an interim agreement with Syria are
linked to the latest accord with Egypt. Rabin em-
phasized that the government has committed itself
only to a willingness to discuss an overall settle-
ment with Damascus, and that the pact with Egypt
stands on its own.
Rabin acknowledged that the expiration of the
UN forces' mandate on the Golan on November 30 may
force Tel Aviv to deal with the issue of negotia-
tions sooner than it would like. Rabin hinted
strongly, however, that Israel would not take the
initiative but would leave it to the US to come
up with a proposal. Rabin prefers to put off ne-
gotiations with the Syrians not only until the
agreement with Egypt is fully implemented--a matter
of about five months--but also until a trial period
has verified that Cairo is living up to the accord.
In a carefully worded statement, Rabin said
he sees virtually no possibility that Damascus
would accept the limited concessions Tel Aviv is
prepared to make as part of another interim settle-
ment on the Golan. He described the concessions
as "cosmetic changes of a few hundred meters in a
few sectors" of the present disengagement line. ,
Rabin specifically ruled out anything that would
interfere with the status of the Israeli Golan
settlements or with the present Israeli defense
lines.
(continued)
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Defense Minister Peres, who has publicly ad-
vocated renewed contacts with Damascus, said there
is little chance of negotiations "in the foresee-
able future" because Israel will be too involved
in implementing the agreement with Egypt. He added
that although Israel might make some "gesture," no
major steps in Middle East peace negotiations were
likely until after the US presidential elections.
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TURKEY
Our embassy in Ankara has assessed
possible Turkish reactions to Congres-
sional reconsideration of the arms em-
bargo. It concludes that a reconfirma-
tion of the embargo is likely to result
not only in immediate retaliatory meas-
ures, but also could lead to long-term
changes in Turkey's foreign policy ori-
entation. Even if the embargo is lifted,
the Turks will insist on renegotiating
the defense cooperation agreement with
the US, and there will be no return to
the status quo ante.
Should the embargo be sustained, the embassy
believes the Turks will intensify their search for
new sources of military equipment and take new ac-
tions against the US that would probably include:
--Evicting the US
and requesting that personnel
be withdrawn from Turkey.
--Requesting that US military aid teams de-
part.
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--Tightening customs and administrative con-25X1
trols that are already creating difficulties
for US military personnel assigned to Turkey.
The embassy believes the Turks would be inter-
ested in maintaining only
the F-4 squadron at Incirlik, the two NATO head-
quarters at Izmir, and possibly communications
sites related to the foregoing activities.
Over the longer term, the Turks are likely to
seek a new foreign policy orientation if the em-
bargo remains in effect. The embassy believes that
Turkey would seek out a new political-military for-
mula from among several options. These are listed
in the order in which they might be tried:
--Stay in NATO despite deteriorating relations
with the US; the inability of the other NATO
countries to fill the military equipment gap
would incline Turkey to search elsewhere.
(continued)
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--Gradually disengage from NATO; a final break
would be avoided for some time and accomplished
only after extensive national debate.
--Seek closer relations with Iran and Pakistan;
this is likely in any event, but would be pur-
sued with greater vigor in the wake of a NATO
withdrawal.
--Seek closer relations with the Arab countries;
again, efforts in this direction are likely
anyway, but they would be emphasized much more
if Turkey decided to reduce or sever its ties
to NATO.
--Reorient its foreign policy toward the Third
World; such a shift from Ataturk's pro-Western
outlook would be wrenching and could only come
if there had been a complete break with NATO.
--Pursue a policy of detente with the USSR
without altering Ankara's fundamental distrust
of that country; efforts in this direction
have, in fact, been under way for some time,
but would likely be accelerated after, or in
conjunction with, a phase-out from NATO.
--Move toward closer relations with the USSR;
such a drastic step would only be adopted in
extreme circumstances and with great reluctance,
but cannot be ruled out if other options failed.
If Embargo is Lifted
The embassy believes that even if the embargo
is lifted, the strain on US-Turkish relations would
remain. The Turks probably will not agree to turn
the clock back to the pre-embargo period. They are
likely to seek early negotiations to revise the
defense agreement and to maintain the current "pro-
visional status" of US bases until a new arrangement
is developed.
Even in this most favorable of circum-
stances, the Turks would probably try to incorporate
many of the features of the current "provisional
status" in any new agreement.
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USSR
Two prominent members of the USSR's
Institute of the USA and Canada have
written articles defending Soviet detente
policy against Western critics, and per-
haps against domestic skeptics as well.
The articles seem to be fresh evidence
of Moscow's concern over what it regards
as a new outbreak of anti-Soviet senti-
ment in the West, particularly in the US.
In an article published in Izvestia on Sep-
tember 4, Georgy Arbatov, the director of the In-
stitute and Moscow's leading authority on the US,
seems to be reassuring his domestic readers that
support for detente remains strong in the US. He
implicitly cautions his Soviet readers not to over-
estimate the strength of detente's opponents and
not to turn away from a policy that has brought
the USSR "striking" achievements.
In a clear message to Western critics, Arbatov
denies that the Soviets are seeking to use detente
to "nudge forward" class and national liberation
struggles. At the same time, however, he rejects
the idea that detente entails a Soviet obligation
to preserve the "social status quo." In essence,
Arbatov argues that the USSR has every right under
detente to support its friends.
In an article in the current issue of the
Soviet journal International Affairs, Genrikh
Trofimenko, a senior staff member in Arbatov's
Institute, contends that bilateral relations have
attained a "certain stability" that can sustain
tension-producing shocks. He cites the Middle
East war in October 1973 and US trade legislation
of last year as sources of tension whose effects
have been fully overcome.
Trofimenko adds to this rosy assessment the
view that enemies of detente in the US will be
overcome. In support of this assertion he claims
that even the US "establishment" now supports
detente with the USSR. Trofimenko professes con-
fidence that economic relations will be normalized
and that further progress will be made on limiting
strategic weapons.
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NOTE
The Romanian and Polish agricultural ministers
will be iTi-PaailToon this month to discuss bilat-
eral cooperation with the US.
Romanian minister Miculescu, who also is dep-
uty prime minister, hopes to sign a statement of
agricultural cooperation when he returns to Washing-
ton this week from a Midwest tour. He also wants
to establish cooperation on long-term agricultural
research with several US universities, obtain seeds
to replace those lost in the July floods, and re-
ceive additional US credits to buy cotton. Poland's
agricultural minister Barcikowski will arrive on
September 20 to discuss credits and purchases of
US grain. Warsaw probably wants to import 3 to 4
million tons of grain this year to support an ex-
pansion of livestock production and to offset
shortfalls in grain and drought-stricken fodder
crops. Because of the USSR's poor grain harvest,
any of these requirements will likely have to be
met by purchases of US grain.
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