THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 OCTOBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014937
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 25, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
October 25, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2).13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
October 25, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Heavy fighting erupted in Beirut last
night, despite reinforced security forces
and a 24-hour curfew in some sections.
(Page 1)
Angola: The fighting has intensified significantly
during the past several days, and the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola is now
facing pressure on two fronts from the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of Angola.
(Page 3)
Spain: Moves for the transfer of power from Franco
to Prince Juan Carlos stalled yesterday, even
though the General reportedly suffered an-
other heart attack. (Page 4)
Notes: Spanish Sahara; Turkey; Vietnam (Page 5)
At Annex we present an assessment of what President
Sadat may hope to achieve during his visit to
Washington.
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LEBANON
Heavy fighting erupted in Beirut
again last night, despite reinforce-
ment of the overburdened security
forces by the army and the imposi-
tion of a 24-hour curfew in the hard-
est hit areas of the capital.
Army units have been given new policing duties
at strategic points in and around the city in an
effort to alleviate the security forces. The de-
cision to use army units on a limited scale report-
edly was worked out late Thursday by Prime Minister
Karami and Palestinian leaders and was probably
coupled with an agreement to supplement security
forces with 700 Palestinian military police.
In a speech to the Lebanese parliament yes-
terday, Karami nevertheless reiterated his opposi-
tion to using the Christian-officered army in a
broad security role. This has brought him heavy
criticism from right-wing Christians. Employing
the army on a larger scale would inflame sectarian
feelings and would be viewed by both leftists and
the less radical Palestinians as an effort to shore
up the Christians.
The decision to give the army added security
responsibilities may be the result of Syrian Pres-
ident Asad's meeting with PLO leader Yasir Arafat
and Saiqa leader Zuhayr Muhsin earlier this week.
Movement on the political front has been slow
and has been impeded by controversy over the proper
forum for resolving the crisis. The political sub-
committee of the national dialogue committee resumed
(continued)
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its deliberations yesterday on an agenda worked out
earlier in the week. The agenda includes considera-
tion of such controversial issues as: readjust-
ment of religious representation in government in-
stitutions, restructuring of the powers and prerog-
atives of the three branches of government, and
reorganization of the army.
The mere acceptance of the agenda is a setback
for Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil, who opposes
consideration of a reform program before security
is restored and such issues as the status of Pales-
tinians are resolved. Neither Jumayyil nor leftist
leader Kamal Jumblatt, his major antagonist, were
present for the debate on the agenda or yesterday's
session; both were represented by stand-ins. Ac-
cording to one press account, the subcommittee has
authorized the preparation of a study on sectarian-
ism in Lebanon.
The subcommittee's work has been further hamp-
ered by a growing public debate over the utility
of the "national dialogue" concept and its legality
in the face of parliament's constitutional authority.
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Cabinda
S. Salve or
- Ambri
Cax
WAND
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Henrique
de Carvalho
Port Amboim
Lobito
Bengu
a Li boa
.Serpa Pinto
Mocamedes
558717 10-75
SOU H-WEST AFRICA
(Intern tional Territory)
16
Alr ??? ?
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ANGOLA
The fighting has intensified signif-
icantly during the past several days, and
the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola is now facing pressure on two
fronts from the National Front for the
Liberation of Angola.
In northern Angola, recent fighting north of
Luanda has centered on the town of Quifangondo, the
site of the capital's vital water pumping station.
The Front appears to be stalled on the outskirts of
the town and is waiting to be supplied with ammuni-
tion. Popular Movement forces in Luanda reportedly
are nervous about the Front's offensive, and their
morale is low.
In the southern part of the country, the Popu-
lar Movement's hold on Sa da Bandeira is threatened
by a large National Front force that has driven to
within 18 miles of the city.
Organization of African Unity chairman Idi Amin
has called for an emergency meeting in Kampala to
discuss the Angolan situation. He is making a last-
ditch effort on behalf of the OAU to reconcile the
leaders of the three warring liberation groups.
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SPAIN
Moves for the transfer of power
from Franco to Prince Juan Carlos
stalled yesterday, even though the
General reportedly suffered another
heart attack.
It is not clear whether the delay is a result
of opposition from right-wing elements, or a general
reluctance to force Franco's retirement under cir-
cumstances which may return to haunt those who will
be working for the development of a more open polit-
ical system in the post-Franco period.
A key political figure claimed on Thursday
that practically all major military and political
figures had reached a consensus that Franco should
step down. A senior military officer has told one
of our embassy officers that Franco now would have
to retire, regardless of his health status./
25X1
Madrid remains calm, but armed guards have
been increased at several locations, including the
Portuguese and US embassies.
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Azores
(Port) Cf;,
DAKA
,z)
NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
2(iI0
STATUTE MILES
Mad iera Islands
(Port)
Canary Islands cf)
(Spain)
aito LISBON
PO
GAL SPAIN
sea
ibraltar aneat'
(U.K.) MedOrr
Beni Ounif
Bechar
Cl I A
? ah
EL AAI
SPANISH
SAHARA
MAURITANIA
OUAKCHOTT
BANJU
GAMBIA
558720 10-75
BISAU,
DAHOM
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NOTES
There are new signs that Morocco will postpone
its planned mass march into Spanish Sahara.
Moroccan officials said yesterday, that the
march, expected to begin early next week, may be
delayed several days. Moroccan spokesmen have de-
clared, however, that nothing will stop the march.
King Hassan is probably allowing time for the talks
now under way with Spain to produce results. He may
recognize that Spanish officials are reluctant to
make any policy initiative until Franco dies or
power is transferred to Juan Carlos. Hassan also
is awaiting the arrival on Sunday of UN Secretary
General Waldheim.
With negotiations on the status of the US
bases scheduled to begin next week, Turkish Prime
Minister Demirel is still trying to reach a con-
sensus within his coalition that would allow him
to act on both the base issue and the Cyprus prob-
lem.
He is having difficulty, however, with the
most troublesome coalition partner, Necmettin
Erbakan, who appears determined to maintain his
obstructionist position within the government de-
spite his party's substantial losses in the recent
midterm senatorial election. The government prob-
ably will survive, but the Prime Minister's ability
to act decisively will be hampered by the continued
bickering. The military, meanwhile, wants to con-
solidate gains made last summer on Cyprus, restore
relations with the US, and ease Turkey's sense of
international isolation. Military leaders gener-
ally agree that the government's continuing inac-
tion is exacerbating these sensitive problems.
They may already have put pressure on the politi-
cians--Demirel in particular--to reach some solu-
tion on the Cyprus issue and to move to normalize
relations with the US.
The Vietnamese are rounding up some US ground
tactical communications equipment for delivery to
the Soviets and Chinese, according to intercepted
messages.
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EGYPT
President Sadat's isolation in the
Arab world as a result of the second
Sinai agreement will be critical prima-
rily as it affects his domestic position.
He will Zook to the US for insurance
against an erosion of his support at
home.
Despite criticism from Egyptian leftists, who
instinctively oppose Sadat's policies, especially
the disengagement agreement, the majority of Egyp-
tians currently support the agreement and back
Sadat.
--They had grown restive over the continuing
no-war, no-peace situation and are pleased
that demonstrable progress has been made to-
ward a return of more Egyptian territory.
--They anticipate that the respite from prep-
arations for war will give the government time
to concentrate on revitalizing the economy and
will encourage foreign investors who have been
deterred by the possibility of war.
--They rally around Sadat precisely because
the other Arabs are so vehemently criticizing
him and the agreement.
Indeed, the criticism by outsiders is probably
Sadat's strongest domestic prop at the moment.
Egyptians think of themselves as better than other
Arabs and do not like being told by Arab brethren
how to run Egyptian affairs.
The Egyptians believe, with a touch of self-
pity, that, while they have borne the brunt of four
wars in the service of other Arabs, the others have
received arms and oil money in abundance. As a re-
sult, Egyptians deeply resent that they or their
president should be tagged an Arab traitor.
Dangers for Sadat nonetheless lurk amid the
very things that now work to his advantage. Egyp-
tian satisfaction with the progress made in nego-
tiations will wane as time passes, and is likely to
change to impatience as months pass and Sadat does
not press very soon for more negotiations.
(continued)
Al
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If the next few years do not bring either ne-
gotiated territorial returns or war, discontent
could become a problem within the military. Senior
military officers are generally satisfied with the
disengagement agreement because they recognize that
Egypt probably could not have succeeded in taking
by force the territory it has retrieved through ne-
gotiation. Many younger officers, however, seem to
have an exaggerated notion of Egypt's military cap-
abilities and apparently believe that Cairo might
have achieved more militarily.
Discontent in the armed forces could be magni-
fied if the virtual termination of Soviet military
deliveries is not compensated by a substantial in-
flux of equipment from other sources.
Economic Expectations
Sadat faces a difficult time economically.
While the disengagement agreement is welcomed for
the economic benefits that are expected to flow
from it, trouble will arise if the benefits are
not soon evident to the man in the street, who is
weary of food lines, shortages of essential commod-
ities, and the high prices of those he can obtain.
The government has raised expectations to a
high pitch, and it will be hard pressed to fulfill
them. "Economic grievances will provide leftist
agitators a fertile ground for fomenting political
protest.
Sadat faces another internal danger because
of the position in which the disengagement agree-
ment has placed him with other Arabs. The same
feeling of superiority that now brings applause
when Sadat damns another Arab country might ulti-
mately cause the Egyptians to rue the day when the
disengagement, and Sadat, has so turned the other
Arabs against Egypt that it is no longer able to
exercise that superiority.
This sentiment is already apparent among left-
ists in Egypt, and Sadat could become much more
vulnerable to charges of destroying a legacy of
Arab leadership that Nasir devoted his life to
building. Even those Egyptians who support Sadat
might be made to believe, through an emotional evo-
cation of the hero Nasir, that things were somehow
better before Sadat came along.
(continued)
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Economic Aims
Since late 1973, Sadat has been trying to over-
come six years of zero growth and declining living
standards. He aims to overhaul Egypt's highly in-
efficient economic structure, to entice foreign in-
vestment, and reorient the Egyptian economy so that
it can begin to compete in Western markets.
Sadat has rebuilt much of the war-damaged
canal zone and stabilized the Egyptian standard of
living. These successes have been financed by the
rich Arab states, whose assistance jumped from $650
million in 1973 to $2 billion in 1975.
This money allowed the value of Egyptian im-
ports to rise 90 percent in 1974 and some 60 per-
cent this year. As a result, the current-account
deficit for 1975 will likely reach $3 billion, one
of the largest among the developing countries.
Sadat must, however, maintain economic momen-
tum. A continuation of the 5-percent growth rate
will require financial assistance equal to 1975 and
for at least the next few years. Egypt will earn
foreign exchange from the Suez Canal and from Sinai
oil, but the increases will just offset expected
hikes in imports.
Sadat so far has been unable to line up the
financial support needed. The rich Arabs have kept
him on a hand-to-mouth basis. This has deterred
Egyptian long-term planning and has led to exces-
sive short-term commercial borrowing, designed in
part to force Arab donors to rescue Cairo from its
financial straits. This financial brinksmanship
has in turn reinforced Arab distrust of Egyptian
administrators and has further delayed long-term
aid.
Unable to secure a satisfactory financial com-
mitment from other Arabs, the Sadat government has
sought since last year to extend the moratorium on
the military debt to the USSR. Moscow so far has
refused; Egypt is in arrears, and shipments of So-
viet military goods have all but stopped.
Failure to reach a financial accommodation
with the USSR would be costly to Egypt in the ab-
sence of further Western or Arab assistance. If
(continued)
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Soviet repayment terms are to be met, Cairo must
divert to the USSR $300 million annually in goods
now being shipped to the West. Continued refusal
to pay Moscow may threaten Egyptian exports to the
USSR. Because Egypt would have a hard time market-
ing these goods elsewhere, an additional hard-cur-
rency outlay of perhaps $300 million would be re-
quired to replace Soviet with Western goods.
Looking to the US
Sadat will look to the US for the economic and
military aid he believes will be needed to shore up
his position against possible domestic threats.
On the economic side, he probably will seek a
multi-year economic aid commitment large enough to
serve as an example for other donors. He will also
want sufficient technical and administrative sup-
port, through either a bilateral agreement or a
consortium arrangement, to inspire substantial long-
term Arab aid and investment.
On the military side, he will ask the US to
lift its embargo on arms shipments to Egypt. The
fact that the US delivers arms to Israel does not
in itself bother Sadat; he recognizes this as a
necessary ingredient in Washington's ability to
press Israel diplomatically.
What does bother him is that the US does not
deliver arms to Egypt. This uneven treatment, this
lower priority accorded Egypt, is in his mind al-
most the only thing still wrong in the US-Egypt-
Israel triangle.
He does not expect parity, and he does not
want to be dependent again on a single source of
arms. He does hope for some US military equipment,
both as a symbol that Egypt is as important to the
US as is Israel, and as a means of righting what he
sees as the heavy imbalance caused by Israel's re-
armament when Egypt's prime source of arms is all
but cut off.
Sadat needs US arms for reasons more important
than simply his frame of mind. He has frequently
been subject to criticism from the Egyptian mili-
tary for endangering Egypt's supply of Soviet equip-
ment. Unless he can obtain a relatively steady
flow of arms, preferably from the US, he is likely
to come under attack for seeming to condone US ef-
forts to reinforce Israel's military superiority
while allowing Egypt to lapse still deeper into
military inferiority.
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Top Secret
-
-,
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