Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
September 27, 2017
Document Release Date: 
October 4, 2017
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 29, 1957
PDF icon DOC_0006137053.pdf286.91 KB
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release 2017/09/26 006137053 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 006137053 30 April 1957 -Final ' IAC Approved PROPOSED BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONYUrszt on 'TBE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM"* INTRODUCTION 1. The purpose of this presentation is to.furnish a summary of the US intelligence community's latest estimates of Soviet guided missile capabilities and probable programs. The intelligence community includes the intelligence organizations of the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which has a coordinating responsibility in the. field of. national intelligence. Inasmuch as our intelligence community is responsible for producing intelligence on foreign'powers'and is neither responsible nor qualified to evaluate comparable US programs, this presenta- tion will be limited to a discussion of our best intelligence assessment of the Soviet guided missile program. The data for this briefing are based on our most recent community estimates. BACKGROUND 2. Although the USSR had no known guided missile program at the close ' C)? World War II, we have conclusive evidence of a great postwar Soviet * The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstains, the saject betng outside-his juriediction. This materiel contains intorThation attecting Ind national defense cf Ole within the meaning of the espionage laws, Tilic 18, B er -s. T55115902-Final and 794, the transmission or icy, Ilion sat acaAmela Copy 110 of 45 rr-- � 'n thy manner to on unauthorized person is. � Page 1 of 8 p.onieiled by low, Approved for Release: 2017/09/26006137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 %el 0 �TOP-"EiEer interest in guided missiles, mAny strong indications of a large and active research and development program, and firm evidence of the present opera- tional deployment of a surface:to-air missile defense system around Moscow".. . Unfortunately, the viry effective security surranuling the entire Soviet military complex, and particularly around sensitive areas such as their guided missile program, hampers our gathering of intelligence. This in especially tvue on the details of specific guided missile systems. There- fore, in order to estimate these specific Soviet missile capabilities in a field where positive intelligence is not always available, we are forced to develop our estimates from: (a) all available evidence of Soviet missile activity EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Y(b) general knowledge of the ",,tate-of-the-:'t" in the guided missile field in the US; an?! (c) known ani estimated SovieZ capabilities in related fields. Our estimmtes of the intended !soot of. the &octet program, as contrasted to ::apabilities, are based largely on probable Soviet military requirements for missiles in relation to other military weapons system2. 3. Lot me enlarge somewhlt upon what is meant by "available evidence of Soviet missile activity". lAmedioxely after World War II, the Soviets initiated a thorough and systmmatic exploitation of German guided missiles and miasile personalities, faciltties, and equipment. From this exploita- tton, mt believe the Soviets obtained foln general reeults: (a) the acqgisition of operational an prototype minsiles, research and production facilities and equipment, antt approximately hoo German missile specialists; (b) completed studies of German achievements prior to the war's end--1945; (c) the familiarization of Soviet personnel with German techniques of research, development, to3ting, and production of missiles and components; TS#115902-Final B Copy 440 of 45 Page 2 of 8 20P�BECEET� Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 ApprovedforRelease 2017/09/26C06137053' 144.1 (:) �7447-4�66Itier and (d) further technical studies and limited, hardware development per- formed by German scientists. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs 4. Most of the German missile scientists and technicians taken. to the . USSR have been returned to Germany. \ Although we cannot ace/retell assess the degree to which the German missile contributions have heel incorporated in the native Soviet. guided missile program, we believe that by 1948 the USSR bad raised the level of its guided missile knowleiGe to that which existed ie Germany at the close of World War II. We t:arefore estimate that a concerted and continuous native Soviet guided. missile research and. development program could have begun in 1948. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs 5. / /out knowledse of Soviet capabilieles in related fields such as electrcnics, aerodynamicc propulsion, and nuclear energy, are ueed in our assessment of Soviet seeded missile capabilities and probable programs. C. The dates given in this brie:Ing are the earliest probable years .arring which one or more missiles coued have been serially produced and placed in the hands of trained personnel of one operational unit, thus constituting .a limited capability for operational emeloyment. It should be noted that an additional period of time, varying from a few months to several years depending upon the missile system, would be required before we are faced with a significant threat in terms of actual employment in 4. ' general war. Our current estimate is based on the judgeeent that the USeR does not now intend to initiate general war delflerately, and is not nos T*115902-Final Cog? 540 of 45 'lase 3 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 _-M:4=4;PeitET- preparing for general war as of any particular future date. Our estimate on which this beefing is based covers the period through 1966, although, of course, estWates as to future years are sUbject to revision as new intelligence hecomes available. ' SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES 'GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ' 7. We estimate that the Soviet guided missile program is extensive and enjoys's very high priority. 8. .We believe that the USSR has the native scientific resources and .capabilities to develop during this period advanced types of guided missile . systems, in all categories for which it has military requirements: 9. We es imate. that the USSR has the industrial base and related induntrial experience to series produce the missile systems it will develop during this period. However, in view of competing demands, the limited availability of electronic equipment will seriously restrict the extent and variety of Soviet guided missile production until about 1958. Thereafter, expanding electronics production will probably make this restriction much less severe. . 10. In consonance with missions to be accomplished, we estimate that the USSR has requirements for various sizes of nuclear, high explosive (HE), and chemical (CW) warheads, and has the capability to develop them on time scales consistent with the missiles in which they would be employed. In view of carpeting demands, the availability of fissionable materials will impose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead production between now and 1966.- _10A-FirtettEr Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 TS#115902-Final B Copy 44) of 45 Page T7Of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 %id -.TJaP.-"Seentr SPECIFIC MISSTUI CAPABILITIES U. The following dates for specific missile capabilities give the earliest probable years in which we ettimate the threat agAll begin, but, as previously indicated, an additionnl period of time, varying with missile type, would be required for these missiles to bei:ome available in quantity. 12. Surface-to-Air Missiles. We estimate tat surface-to-air missile .systems have one of the highest pilorities.amOng Cwrent'Soviet military programs. At Moscow, an extensi.e.system of surface-toLair missile sites has been constructed, and all n...tes are probably.noW wrational. This system can probably direct a vary high rate of fire agairist multiple targets at maximum altitudes of about 60,000 feet and maximum hori:ontal ranges of 'about 25 nautical miles. 13. During the pericit 1958-1961, surface-to-air ante= with increased range and altitude capabilities for static defense of critical areas, and with law and high altitule capabilities far defense of static t4rgets, field forces, and naval vesse..s, could probably become available for olorational emplOyment. Some tilts between 1963 and 1966, the USSR could probably have in operation a surface-to-air system of sow: capability afiainst the )CBM. 14. We estimne that series production of surface-to-air guided. missiles is now vAderway in the USSR, and that It will probably protbne such missiles IA:large quantities. Nuclear warheads could now be incor- porated int(' a limited number of burfaze-to-air nissiles. We estimate '.bat 'some percultage of surface-to-air missiles will le so equipped between now.and TS#115902-Final B Copy 44)of 45 Page 5 of 8 TOP CECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 kid 44241--SECRE'r 15. Air-to-Air Missiles. Despite a lack of significant intelligence, we estimate that the USSR has pursued the development of air-to-air missiles, and that it could now have in operational use a 2-3 nautical Mile range missile capable of tail-cone attacks in good weather. It is probable that the USSR could haven. 5 nautical mile all-weather missile operational in 1958 and a 15-20 nautical mile all-weather missile, capable Of employing a nuclear warhead in 1960. 16. Air-to-Surface Missiles. In 1955 the USSR could probably have had a 20 nautical mile subsonic air-to-surface missile available for operational use. In 1956-1957 a 55 nautical mile subsonic missile could probably be available, and there. is some evidence that such a missile has reached at leistfinal flight test stage. A 55 nautical mile supersonic missile could probably be available. in 1958. These missiles, designed primarily as anti-ship weapons, could also be employed against isolated and well-defined radar targets on land. In 1961, a 100 nautical mile supersonic Missile could. probably be available for employment by heavy bombers. Each of these missile types could employ nuclear warheads. . 16. Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles with up to 350 Nautical Miles Range. There is considerable evidence of Soviet development of short-range surface-to-surface missiles, and we estimate that the USSR wild probably have had available for operational use in 1954 ballistic missiles with the following maximum ranges: 75 nautical miles, 175-200 nautical miles, and 350 nautical miles. These types could be equipped with nuclear warheada. However, the USSR would probably consider CW warheads desirable for certain specific purposes, and might employ BE in the two shorter-range types. Approved for for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 TS#115902-Final B Copy 44) of 45 Page -6-3f 8 � Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053' SeteitEr 18. Surface-to.-Surface Ballistic Missiles with 700-1600 Nautical Miles Range. Evidence on Soviet development programs leads us to estimate that the USER could probably have had a 700 nautical mile maximum range ballistic missile for operational use in 1956. We have firm evidence that in 1949 the USSR was interested in a 1600 nautical mile intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) and we believe it is a logical step in the Soviet development program.. We estimate that the USER is developing an IRBM, and that it could probably have such a missile in operation in 1959. Both, these. missile types would probably employ nuclear warheads. We 'believe the USSR would rapidly acquire a. considerable number of both the 700 nautical mile- � and the 1660 nautical mile missiles. ,19. Intercontinental Ballistic Miesiles with 5500 Nautical Miles Range. We have no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM, but we believe its development .has probably been a high priority goal of the Soviet ballistic missile' program. We estimate that the USSR could probably have a 5500 nautical mile ICBM ready for operational use in 1960-1961. We believe that the USSR will seek to acquire a considerable number of ICBM's with nuclear warheads as rapidly as possible. � 20. Submarine-launched Surface-to-Surface Missiles. We believe the US would probably have developed cruise-type missiles initially, and there is some evidence pointing to the existence of Soviet sUbmarines � equipped to carry such missiles. The USSR could probably have had in operation in 1955 a subsonic turbojet missile capable of a maximum range of 500 nautical miles, and a supersonic missile capable of this range could TS#115902-Final B Copy ...or2 of 45 Page 7,ef 8 _IDP-srsefter Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 �., s0aL4weRtnr- probably be in operation in 1957. A supersonic cruise-type missile capable of rangcoup to 1000 nautical miles could probably be operational in 1962. These missile types would 'require nuclear warheads. With a vigorous program, the USSR might achieve an operational sub:thrine-launched IRBM system sometime during the period 1964-1966. 21. Earth Satellite Vehicle. The USSR will probably make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. We believe that the USSR has the capability of orbfAing, in 1957, a satellite vehicle which could acquire scientific information and data of limited military value. A satellite vehicle possessing substantial reconnaissance capabilities of military value could probably -be orbited in the.period 1963-1965. -TOP-SlieftEr Approved for Release: 2017/09/26 C06137053 TS#115902-Final B Copy Sof 45 Page 8 of 8