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January 13, 2005
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Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591Memorandum For: Inspector GeneralSubject: Joint Response to Draft IG 9/11 ReportI. Introduction  13 January 2005The following is a joint response from all of the undersigned to the draft IG reporton 9/11. Overall, we would characterize the draft IG report conclusions asunreal. The environment the draft IG report describes does not bear anyresemblance to the one we worked in.? None of the participants, however, have been allowed to see the entire IGreport. Without reviewing the entire report and all the data available to the1G staff, it is impossible for us to accurately and completely respond.o In written communication, the IG indicated that they were notproviding the complete report to us for privacy reasons. We are inthe process of drafting a privacy waiver that we will sign to removethis as an issue of concern preventing us from reviewing copies ofthe entire report. We will submit this waiver to the IG soon andassume that will allow us to receive and review the next draft of theentire report. If this is not the case, we expect a written explanationof any further IG objections to our review of the entire report prior tosubmission to the DCI.? Neither has the IG given us access to all of the data used to generate itsconclusions, including statistical analyses that seem selective or flawedbased upon our review.? The letters we were all sent informing us of the review and the possibilityof Accountability Boards indicate we "may have failed to perform (our)responsibilities in a satisfactory manner," but do not identify whargtan-dardwe are being held to. -(43-For the sake of completeness, we ask that the joint and individual responses beincluded, at a minimum, as annexes to the final IG report. If we are given accessto the final report to be submitted to the DCI, we may revise these responsesand, in that case, would ask that the revisions be included for the sake of acomplete record.SECRET/ 'NOFORN/Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591SEC R ETL_N&F&RITI7`o By and large, factual errors in the sections individuals have been allowedto read will be corrected in their separate, individual responses. Thismemorandum will address broader issues, context, andmisrepresentations of the environment within CTC and the Agency as wellas we can without having the entire report available to us. -(-14)-The leadership team in place duripn thp n in! in tn Q/11/2001 (J. Cofer Black, BenL. Bonk, Henry A. Crumpton, and states as a preliminarypoint that it was responsible for the Center's actions within the constraintsplaced upon us by policy and the resources we had under our control. It is alsoour belief that to hold more junior officers responsible for the environment theyfound themselves in, and over which they had no control, would only encouragean environment of risk-aversion or discourage individuals from taking on the hardmissions. -(C.)-II. ContextAs best we can tell from the portions we have seen, the IG report lacksappreciation for a number of key contextual issues, and as a result significantlymisrepresents the environment that existed in CTC in 2001.A. Workload. Workload. First and foremost is the issue of CTC's workload. As a group,we strenuously dispute the IG findings that imply that the workload and stress inCTC were no greater than comparably sized groups elsewhere in the Agency.Those of us who worked in CTC during this time period attest that this is simplynot true. The workload, intensity, and crisis environment were not comparable toany other Headquarters unit. We believe the selective use of badge and otherdata is not representative of the workload of the Center. Specific corrections arebeing offered in the individual responses. 41.1)-Remarkably, the draft IG report fails to account for the fact that an IG Inspectionreport issued in August 2001?just one month before the attacks?reported onthe unusual workplace stresses in OTC. An excerpt from the ExecutiveHighlights (pages vi-vii) best sums up the environment:tfc-)- Stressful Work Environment. Center employees frequentlyoperate in a state of crisis?resulting from a series of terroristincidents and multiple known threats?and amidst strong demandsfrom policymakers and Agency senior managers. Moreover, asubstantial proportion of CTC personnel believe that their work unitdoes not have sufficient personnel to accomplish the mission. Thiscombination leads to employee burnout and leaves little timefor strategic reflection on both analysis and operations?potentially leading to missed opportunities. Employees told us  2Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 NOFORN)Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591SECRET/  that they deal with the situation by working extra hours andfrequently they have time for only the most essential tasks.Center officers noted that management is sensitive to this issue.Without more personnel, however, the OIG accepts that CTChas limited options to deal with this work environment; thecenter is nearly fully staffed and crises are part of the nature of thetarget.(S//NF) CTC also must cope with information overload, frequentlyresulting from successful operations against terrorist cells. MostCenter interviewees who had an opinion gave mixed reviews ofCTC's ability to effectively exploit the data the Center collects.They generally believed that the Center does its best to scope,scan, and prioritize information for immediate action. Someofficers acknowledged, however, that the demands placed on CTCdo not allow it to exploit all the information it collects. As aconsequence, the risk exists that a potential warning will gounidentified. Once again, the OIG recognizes that CTC haslimited options in dealing with this issue. . . " (Emphasisadded.)These conclusions were not surprising to those of us who worked in the Center.Just as important, however, is the fact that in August 2001 the OIG did notrecommend the Agency take any action to deal with these well-known workplacestresses. There is no/no recommendation for increased staffing in the 2001 IGreport. This undoubtedly reflected the IG's contemporaneous understanding thatthe Agency was stretched thin after the reductions of the 1990s and that therewas not much prospect that CTC was going to be given additional resourcesfrom elsewhere within the Agency. We had to "play the hand we were dealt," andthe August 2001 OIG report indicates we were doing the best we could under thecircumstances? That said, for completeness, we point out that in summer 2001 CTC wasworking on a formal proposal to expand the center, although we did notexpect that significant additional personnel would be forthcoming inresponse to this initiative based on responses to earlier, informal requestsfor additional resources.? It is also worth noting that the data selected by the IG that led it to reachits conclusion that we only "perceived" that we carried a heavy workload isseriously flawed. Our review is, of course, limited by not having access tothe data used by the IG. Although data problems are described inindividual responses, a couple of examples are worth noting here:  3Irter-aRt*Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 0063645917101-011N//o One of the time periods examined by the current IG draft (March2000) probably biases the data on hours worked downward. InMarch 2000, most people were coming off a 24/7 surge for theMillennium Threat. -Consequently, March was a time when peoplewere catching up after a crisis that had kept them here around theclock during the Millennium Threat, and they were still putting in anaverage of 9.5 hours per day, according to IG badge data. Wewould need to see, however, the data behind the IG conclusionsand compare it to other time periods to adequately respond to thisspecific item because the hours do seem low.o We also question the IG data for cable traffic. As noted in one ofthe individual responses, we could not duplicate the IG data basedon our searches. Our data shows double the amount of cabletraffic, compared to the numbers cited in the IG draft report. Wealso dispute the use of cable traffic as a measure of workload. -{8.).As a result of the nature and extent of CTC's workload and the limited resourcesavailable, we were often forced to conduct triage on incoming leads, cases, andlines of analysis, as acknowledged in the 2001 IG report. (EI/Nr)B. Resources. The central factor contributing to the stressful workloadenvironment described in the 2001 IG report?and well known to everyone in theCenter--involved funding and staffing.? On the funding front, CTC had witnessed growth in its base budgetthrough FY1998. Beginning with FY99, after the East Africa bombings,however, supplemental funding heavily influenced the CTC budget. When.the Center was also experiencing a growing mission. Funding shortfallsdeveloped in the lean years and produced a "stop-and-go" problem thatundermined our approach to building a consistent program. Indeed, afterthe Millennium Threat surge, the entire CTC management chain wasforced to spend a great deal of its time trying to cut non-personal servicesby about 25 percent to bring expenditures in line with budget realities.DC/CTC met with each group during early 2000 to look for programs andother expenditures that could be delayed or cut. These were not justinternal issues. We were faced with pressure from the NSC to maintainour operational tempo without adequate funding; at one point the NSCstaff even "encouraged" us to use personal services money to fundoperations, which our budget office informed us would potentially violateprovisions of the Anti-Deficiency Act. Supplemental funding was notavailable until August 2000, despite promises from the NSC staff.Funding discussions consumed a great deal of time for CTC management,taking place at about the same time the Center would have beenApproved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591-SEC-fiFR OFORMattempting to follow up on leads emerging from the Millennium period,including those that emerged out of the Malaysia meeting.? On the personnel front, the Center attempted to balance operational andanalytical demands with the skills and expertise it had available to it duringa period when the entire Agency was understaffed. Again, the 2001 IGreport acknowledges this issue, reports on initiatives underway within theCenter to cope with it, and makes some suggestions as to furtherimprovements. The report on page 45 concludes:o "CTC has limited options for dealing with this perceived personnelshortage. . .Center employees are managing this perceivedshortage in a way that leaves many vulnerable to burnout andallows little time for strategic work. Personnel regularly work extrahours and are only able to perform what they perceive to be theessential tasks. One manager commented that the demand on thestaff means that they go from crisis to crisis and are not able to lookat trends or more long-range issues to get ahead of the terrorists."What does does all of this say about the environment in the years leading up to theattacks of 9/11? That there was widespread recognition within the Center, the01G, and the Agency of funding and staffing concerns, but that the environmentdid not allow for significant change. Certainly, neither funding nor staffing levelswere within the control of CTC management. Other Agency programs hadalready been cut to the bone, and CTC was widely viewed as having beenrelatively protected from the cuts of the 1990s. Even within the Center, the 2001IG report on page 45 acknowledges we had tried to move resources to work theal-Qa'ida target without gutting other key CT programs.  (C)  Finally, the draft 10 report is schizophrenic. It accuses some officers of nothaving provided or obtained adequate resources for the Center to conduct itsmission. At the same time, it claims that other officers had sufficient resources, ifonly they had utilized them more effectively. -Hi-C. August 2001 IG Report. It is worth noting the contradictions between the2001 IG report on CTC and the current draft IG report. The conclusions are sostrikingly different that any comparison clearly points out how big a role hindsightplays in criticizing the actions of CTCofficers from the vantage point of 2005. Onthree broad issues covered in the current draft, the 2001 IG report reachesfundamentally different conclusions. These three charges lie behind most of therecommendations for accountability boards:SECRET/5FORApproved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591SECRET/OFORN/? The current draft criticizes and recommends accountability boards fornearly every CTC manager in the chain of command dealing with al-Qa'ida issues. Yet the 2001 report on page iii of the Executive Highlightsconcluded: "The DCI Counterterrorist Center is a well-managed 'component that successfully carries out the Agency's counterterroristresponsibilities to collect and analyze intelligence on internationalterrorism and to undermine the capabilities of terrorist groups."?As noted above, the 2001 report concludes that CTC officers worked in astressful and often crisis-driven environment amidst strong demands frompolicymakers and senior Agency officials that prevented the organizationfrom exploiting all of the information it collected and that forced officers toprioritize their actions based on short-term demands. And, mostimportantly, that CTC had few options to address these issues. Yet thecurrent draft claims that units within CTC were either adequately staffed,not overworked, or could have been reinforced by scaling back work thatthe IG now retrospectively claims was unproductive or not related to al-Qa'ida. We fundamentally disagree with the IG view that "continuedemphasis on terror groups other than al-Qa'ida raises questions". CTCwas charged with conducting collection, analysis, and operations againstinternational terrorism, not just al-Qa'ida. Not only were we dealing withthe threat to US interests posed by these other groups, but also the policycommunity was and is concerned about more than just al-Qa'ida. Theyexpected and demanded that we work these issues. This is especiallytrue with respect to Hizballah, which prior to 9/11 had killed moreAmericans than any terrorist group. But even smaller groups, such as the posed threats to US interests. Rpnrlitions Branch helped captureand render This capture was a key event  Even today the CIA does not have the luxury of devoting all ofCTC's resources to just al-Qa'ida. Unless the IG intends to recommendthat Agency management stop doing these things now, this criticism isabsurd and a red herring.? The current draft report also claims that the analytic cadre was large andexperienced enough to have produced more and better strategic analysis.But, the 2001 report at page 27 acknowledges that: "AIG management isaware of the relative inexperience of the analyst cadre and the timepressure. noted that the cadre is relatively junior, and some lackthe experience to conduct sophisticated long-term analysis." And on pageiv of the Executive Highlights, the IG notes that "Customers describe CTCas the leading source of expertise on terrorism... (but) worry that Centeranalysts do not have the time to spot trends or to knit together the threadsfrom the flood of information." (S/INF)SEC ri ETA6r/NOMFIN/,Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591sEcncr, 11\101-0RN/1Ultimately, the 2001 IG report made only three recommendations?to develop awritten strategy for the  to developa plan for the Language Exploitation Branch to address workflow and moraleissues, and to prepare detailed, written career guidance for each discrete CTChome-based occupation. None of these three recommendations changed any ofthe conditions over which the Center is now being criticized. Although there wereother suggestions made, most fell into areas where CTC was already working toaddress problems or fell outside our ability to influence the outcomes, asimplicitly acknowledged in the 2001 IG report. -(9)-Hindsight should not drive the conclusions of a review like this one. The currentdraft IG report is clearly written from a perspective that ignores the realities of thetime and tries to blame individuals for systemic issues that were well beyond theircontrol. It is clear there were systemic issues at work here that went beyondwhat CTC or even CIA could control, and that these issues were either notrecognized at the time or were uncorrectable in that environment. They werenot, however, individual failings. (.0.)III. Key IssuesA. Watchlistino & Passing Intelligence to the FBI  These two topics are frequently treated as part of one issue, when they are, infact, distinct. -H.)-(1.) Watchlisting?the Visa Viper Program. This was a systemic issue,for theUSG, not one associated with one or two individuals or units within CIA or CTC.For CIA, per long established guidance as promulgated regularly inflagging individuals for watchlistino was primarily a field function. Theinstructed the stations either to flan the individuals locally, Although UBL was a "virtual" station, it obviously did not have acorresponding Embassy/Consulate to work with on Visa Viper-related issues, itfunctioned as a Headquarters element, not a Station. -(15)-The Visa Viper function was a dialogue between the field recipient of informationmeeting watchlisting thresholds, and either the consular office  or CTC/RR.A survey of queries from Field Stations (sample from in May 1999is attached, as is the CTC/RR response) in 1999 about watchlisting proceduresindicates that there was a regular dialogue between the field and CTC Reportsover the Visa Viper watchlistin function. As noted by one of the former Chiefs ofCTC, the Center sent out to all Stations and Bases explaining theimportance of the Visa Viper program and providing instructions on how to7Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591moreirtmsupport the program. As he recalls, the language in these cables waspainstakingly negotiated with State Department. Visa Viper reporting channelsexplicitly did not include Headquarters-based targeting officers or operationsmanagers. Headquarters served as an informal backstop for the field on thisprogram. The 2001 IG report makes no recommendations on the Visa Vipersystem. Further, because all of this involved a nomination process for a programthat CIA did not control, responsibility was diffuse. After 9/11, Tiger Teams wereestablished to improve the program. To attach responsibility to one or twoindividuals is to hold them inappropriately responsible for a system no one couldindividually control. -(6)-(2.) Sharing intelligence with the FBI. Passing information to the FBI on al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi is an entirely separate issue from the Visa Viper program.The written record indicates the CIA passed, at least informally, the antinformation to the Bureau. Travel information was dissemi theFBI and the Rurpeu waq ripArly briefed on the results ofIn addition, a number of FBI officers?in the Centerand at the Bureau?were clearly aware of the information. At most, CTC can befaulted for not following through with a formal CIR on al-Mihdhar's visa. Thiswould have left an official record of the information passed to the FBI, althoughwe believe copies were informally sent to the Bureau. But, again, CTC clearlyintended to share the information with the Bureau, did in fact share information,and did not purposefully withhold anything. -(9)-B. Strateoic AnalysisTwo key points that are lost in the lengthy IG discussion of strategic analysis areworth noting in order to present a balanced understanding of this issue. 469?? Was there a Way to realistically do more without the commitment ofadditional resources? The current IG report indicates that CTC shouldhave produced more strategic analysis. The management chain and mostof the analysts all wanted to produce more strategic analysis. Indeed, atone point in the August 2001 IG report states at page 24: " . .. some ofthe more senior analysts cited their disappointment at perceptions thatmanagement was attempting to emphasize long-term research at theexpense of support to operations because they had been attracted to CTCby the opportunity to undertake nontraditional analysis." The problem wasinadequate resources. Even in the resource-constrained environment ofthe time, the current IG draft report clearly indicates that AIG producedseveral strategic analytic pieces every year in the runup to 9/11.? Did any key policymaker not understand the serious nature of thethreat? Regardless of the number of formal analytic pieces produced,there is no indication that policymakers and others were not informed of8Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591the seriousness of the threat. Policymaker understanding of the threatrather than the quantity of research papers completed is the best measureof whether "enough" analysis was produced. Perhaps the best indicationof senior policymaker understanding is embedded in the Memoranda ofNotification providing the Agency with its covert action authorities fordealing with UBL and al-Qa'ida. Many of the MONs include a threatassessment. But more importantly, the fact that policymakers clearlyrecognized the seriousness of the threat is demonstrated by the nature ofthe extraordinary authorities the CIA was granted after 1998. Indeed,based on testimony in front of the 9/11 Commission, policymakers claim tohave given us far more authority than a strict reading of the MONs wouldjustify. Not once did any senior official indicate that they held backbecause they did not understand or view the threat seriously. Line 827 ofthe current IG draft says: "the team's review confirms that CIA kept seniorpolicy makers aware of the threat." Traditional research papers are onlyone way of conveying intelligence. On this topic, multiple approacheswere used that ranged from classified briefings for senior officials via theNSC-chaired CSG, to briefings on the Hill, to unclassified testimony by theDCI during his annual Worldwide Threat Briefings. It is not at all clearwhat standard the IG is using to decide that we did not produce "enough"strategic analysis. With the resources then available, CTC concentratedon producing analysis that would not only inform, but also lead to action.(f.',//Nr)In any event, the implicit belief expressed by the IG draft that the shortfall instrategic analysis?as defined by the IG?was somehow a material failing isbelied by history. Strategic analysis can help people understand a problem; but itis clear the policymakers within the government, by their own admission, alreadyunderstood the nature of the threat. Strategic analysis is not a substitute fortactical analytic and operational actions to prevent an attack. And, asdemonstrated by the 1995 NIE and the 1997 update, warnings drawn solely fromlogical analytical conclusions?in this case about the threat to civil aviation in theUnited States?do not usually convince anyone to spend large sums of money tocounter a threat that has not been documented. -(4?)-C. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM).The IG charges with respect to KSM are perplexing. With the benefit of muchhindsight the IG draft claims that analysts and operators should have recognizedKSM's links to al-Qa'ida earlier and more clearly. These connections weresimply not as clear as the IG implies prior to our debriefings of KSM after hiscapture. Even then, the picture that emerges is not completely consistent withthe one painted by the 10. On top of this, however, the IG report does notpresent a credible scenario as to the implications of our limited understanding ofthe role played by KSM.Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591? KSM was already indicted and being pursued by the Renditions Branchwithin CTC. On this point the IG reports ignores USG policy issues. Lawenforcement was a key component?some would argue the keycomponent?of USG counterterrorist policy prior to 9/11. We wereimplementers of USG policy, and as such were pursuing KSM within thebounds of that policy. In fact, the main reason for having a RenditionsBranch within CTC was to provide support to the law enforcementcommunity in implementing USG policy. The Branch served as a keyfocal point for interaction with the FBI.? Our pursuit would not somehow have been made successful by this lastlinkage. It is not as if CTC did not capture and render KSM because wewere not able to document his role in al-Qa'ida beginning in the late1990s. Indeed, debriefs of KSM clearly indicate thatthe CTC view of his role in al-Qa'ida throughout the 1990s was largelyaccurate. In the mid-1990s, KSM decided that he was not interested inbecoming a member of AQ, and it was not until after 1997 that hiscontacts brought him closer to AQ. Even then because of a personaldislike for Sayf KSM limited his linkages to work for MuhammadAtif. It was not until KSM relocated to Qandahar in 1999 that his rolewithin AQ grew beyond his fairly autonomous connections with Atif.? Assigning the hunt for KSM to the Renditions Branch was also a logicalway to share the workload within CTC. Yet the 1G draft claims that thiswas a mistake an s_thatan already overworked UBL unit should have beengiven primacy. f& +FR'Overall, the IG's emphasis on KSM is in part like a "red herring" borne of 20/20hindsight. (s)?D. Management (Coordination & Cooperation).The current IG draft criticizes the interaction between CTC and regional divisions,especially NE Division. These criticisms are an exaggeration of the constructivetensions that have always, and will always, exist between functional and regionalorganizations. Again, the 2001 1G report presents a completely different pictureof these interactions. Although it acknowledges differences, it documents thatabout two-thirds of field officers praised CTC (on page 13), 70 percent ofHeadquarters officers were satisfied with their interaction with CTC, and 78per cent rated the overall quality of [tie work relationship as good or excellent (urnpage 16). On top of this, senior management worked closely together to dealwith any issues that arose on an almost daily basis. The current IG draft doesnot take into account all of the communications that took place on a regularbasis: meetings, phone calls, and perhaps most important, countless ad hocE RET/i10Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591informal exchanges: Criticism of management on this issue seems like anotherred herring. -(-9)-E. Liaison Relationships and  The draft OIG report notes that CTC struck a balance between liaison andunilateral operations, especially after mid  1999 when CTC mananempnt hPrinnan in ?  Thiscontext is critical in understanding CTC's overall liaison program, especiallyagainst al-Qa'ida. The focal point for all CT liaison efforts rested with theindividual chiefs of station and the specific station; CTC aimed to complementthese liaison efforts through a variety of means, where theywere deemed likely to be effective. Many factors played into the decisionabout how to achieve operational liaison objectives and, thus, where to placeAnd, often, CTC decided to leverage liaison using means other than athe OIG ignores or fails to appreciate the many nuances of CTC's liaisonoperations. (8/114r)The draft OIG report specifically states that: uThe was neithersystematic nor focused on developing liaison service capabilitiesagainst CTC's principal threat?al-Qa'ida?prior to 9/11." Re arding the al-Qa'ida sanctuary in Afghanistan,because CTCaccurately judged that other liaison efforts would be more effective, and the IG'sreport points to nothing that disproves CTC's judgment--only supposition.(SIINF)  Moreover, our focus was on Afghanistan,? CTC,??Si.222 . '2 .112highly productiveI hese and other efforts, underscored by multiple trips of senior CIAofficers to the area (to include DCI, C/CTC, DC/CTCprior to 9/11, led to robust Fl collectiontvier_efistil 1Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 US Special Forces intoAfghanistan after 9/11. For the IG to conclude that CTC failed because itis to ignore political context, operationalreality, and ultimately t e success of a robust liaison effort. CTC shouldbe lauded for this liaison program. -(-917trThe 01 dr ft r ort  the CIA built andmanaged a superior unilateral foreign intelligence and covert action program.Again, CTC's judgment' in retrospect, exactly onthe mark. .(&,'N)-The OIG draft report also questions why CTC did not honorCi .1 ? a a a ? ? ths prior to al-Qa'ida's attack onthe USS Cole, chided a senior CTC officerabout "America's creation of UBL...and how Saudi Arabia had no responsibility inthis matter." Even as late as the summer of 2001, the Saudis insisted to DC/CTCthat they had everything under control inside the Kingdom and did not need ourhelp. Pre-911 this was a UISIIFinally, the OIG draft report states that theYet, the OIG report does not address resourneAavailableApproved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591f.3ECRETi JOFORNI/Signature BlocksJ. Cofer BlackFormer Chief, CTCBen L. BonkFormer Deputy Chief, CTCHenry A. CrumptonSECRET/  13NOFORNIApproved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591CRET/trofferrtriApproved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591 Approved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591ECRETi NOr011N11CTC Front Office Management Statement & Signature Blocks  Finally, the former CTC front office wants to re-emphasize that we wereresponsible for the activities of the Center under our watch. We believe it is notappropriate for more junior officers to be held responsible for conditions overwhich they had no control. All of the undersigned believe that the Centeradmirably discharged its responsibilities even under the constraints under whichit was operating. If we were not always successful, it was not for want of trying ordedication to the mission. We are proud to have served with our fellow officerson the front line in the war against terrorism during this difficult and stressfulperiod. There was no more expert and determined group of individualsanywhere than those who labored in anonymity within CTC to protect our countryand our fellow citizens. CTC's capabilities are clearly demonstrated by the long-series of operations and analyses conducted by the Center that set the stage forthe USG response to the 9/11 attacks, and perhaps more dramatically by thesuccess achieved when previous restrictions and resource constraints wereremoved. The country and we owe a debt of gratitude to those who gave ofthemselves before and after 9/11 to fight the terrorists who plot attacks againstAmerica. It was an honor to serve with them. fl:})-J. Cofer BlackFormer Chief, CTCBen L. BonkFormer Deputy Chief, CTCHenry A. CrumptonEEC /157110FIIIITTApproved for Release: 2015/07/02 006364591