THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 OCTOBER 1976

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0006466874
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Publication Date: 
October 18, 1976
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 The President's Daily Brief October 18, 1976 9 Top S crea5xi Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Exempt from general decla.fication schedule of E 0 11652 exemption category 5B(I),(2),(3) declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY October 18, 1976 Table of Contents China: An announcement of changes in the Chinese leadership decided by the Central Committee seems likely soon. (Page 1) Lebanon: The six-member "mini-summit" convened yesterday in Saudi Arabia. Syrian President Asad has called 25X1 a temporary halt in the Syrian offensive (Page 1) Angola - South Africa: Notes: Western Europe; Rhodesia (Page 4) 25X1 25X1 (Page 2) 25X1 At Annex we discuss the origins of the leftist movement in China and trace its fortunes during the last 25 years. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CHINA: The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee plenum, which is presumed to have been held last week in Peking, appears to have ended on Friday. 25X1 ? A statement on changes in the Chi- nese leadership decided by the meeting seems likely soon.l 25X1 One notice specifically stated that major political actions were imminent. Peking will probably announce that Hua Kuo-feng is party chairman and may name new members and promotions within the Politburo. The state- ment may also officially disclose the arrests and fate of the four leading leftists. * * * 25X1 LEBANON: The six-mem- ber "mini-summit" con- vened in Saudi Arabia yesterday following a round of informal meet- ings on Saturday. Syr- ian President Asad, re- sponding to a request from the Saudis, has called a temporary halt to the Syrian offensive in Lebanon, ostensibly to facilitate negotia- tions at the summit. 25X1 1 --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 :IEDITERRANEAN SEA BEI RUT Beirut Internatioq Airport Sidon Tyr e L 620560 10-76 DAMASCUS IA MILES 20 KILOMETERS 20 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 ANGOLA - SrUTH AFRICA: 25X1 25X1 25X1 * * * 25X1 25X1 25X1 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY --continued Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 BRAllAVILLE KINSHASA AIRE ATLANTIC OCEA N r-u. c:;,' _ %Cunenerhydroelectric project 1 \ 0 150 SOU ',-WEST AFRICA (1.1 Kilometers MIBIA) \ 0 150 Statute Miles i 1? \ p3 620555 10-76 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 25X 25X * * * 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY --continued Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY The six members of Western Europe's joint float announced yester- day a realignment of the parities at which their currencies are offi- cially maintained against one another. Robert Mugabe, chief spokesman for the mili- tary wing of the Zim- babwe African National Union--which fields most of the insurgents active against the Rhodesian government--is likely to be elected president of ZANU later this week. NOTES At the start of trading today, the German mark will be revalued up- ward by 2 percent against the Bel- gian franc and Dutch guilder, 3 percent against the Swedish and Norwegian crowns, and 6 percent against the Dutch crown. Anticipation of the realignment has caused hectic trading condi- tions from time to time in recent months in world currency markets. Yesterday's move, however, fol- lowed a week of relative calm and apparently took most traders by surprise. Mugabe, rather than the current president of ZANU, Ndabaningi Sithole, was invited by the Brit- ish to the conference that opens in Geneva next week to prepare Rhodesia for legal independence under black majority rule. Overshadowing Mugabe in popularity among ZANU's guerrillas is Josiah Tongogara, now on trial in Zambia for assassination of one of his rivals. The Zambian government is said to be considering his re- lease because Tongogara's accep- tance of terms reached at Geneva is crucial if a cease-fire or de- escalation of guerrilla operations is to be achieved. The two other black nationalist leaders who will participate in the Geneva conference are Joshua Nkomo of the Zimbabwe African Peo- ple's Union and Bishop Abel Muzo- rewa of the African National Coun- cil. 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CHINA Mao Tse-tung, writing some ten years ago about the issue of factionalism within the Chinese Communist Party, implied that whatever the political balance at any given time, neither the left nor right wing of the party could ever be totally eliminated. This judgment was almost certainly correct. Broadly speaking, those officials who--in the course of the party's growth and conflict with the Kuomin- tang and the Japanese--tended to emphasize organiza- tional discipline, problem solving, and the practical issues of governing and building a modern economy coalesced into the party's right wing. Those who insisted that the party could not simply develop into a governing class, who believed that the rapid development of a technological elite would undermine ideological purity, and who felt that ideological indoctrination and the nurturing of mass enthusiasm were the keys to the solution of China's numerous economic and other problems formed the core of the party's left wing. Great Leap Forward Throughout most of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the right wing was dominant. A marked exception, however, was the Great Leap Forward of 1959. Spurn- ing close party supervision for techniques of mass enthusiasm and introducing a rather hysterical style of leadership, it seemed distinctly "leftist" in orientation. As the campaign progressed, con- trol procedures broke down, the movement ran into difficulty, and in the wake of crop failures China suffered several years of famine and economic dis- location. As a result of the Great Leap, the bureaucrats in control of the party machine were reinforced in their distrust of mass agitation techniques and of "unreliable" subordinate cadre. Moreover, many senior party officials came to distrust the judg- ment of Chairman Mao, who had backed the Great Leap experiment. Low-level officials resented the blame placed on them and ideologues chafed at the new emphasis placed on techniques that "would work." --continued Al FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Cultural Revolution Over the years, a variety of tensions developed-- personal, institutional, and ideological--that Mao exploited when he reasserted his authority over party bureaucrats in the mid-1960s. To humble the party machine, however, he particu- larly used two groups. One was composed of ideal- istic but discontented youth in the institutions of higher learning, who were to form the core of the Red Guard formations. The other included the then defense minister, Lin Piao, and a number of his close associates in the central military establish- ment who were at that time in open revolt against the party bureaucrats. The resultant explosion--the Cultural Revolution-- tore the party to pieces and deeply rent the social and economic fabric of the country. This chaotic political movement, which ran from the spring of 1966 to the autumn of 1968, is the central refer- ence point of all subsequent political developments in China. Political fissures and personal animosi- ties engendered by the movement have never healed. The period from the summer of 1966 to the summer of 1967 was the high-water point for the lefts it has been in slow but irregular decline ever since. Leftist attacks on provincial military administra- tors turned many of these individuals against the ideologues and their allies and also caused a split between Lin Piao and his Peking associates on the one hand and the provincial satraps on the other. Pressure from the military and from Chou En-lai, plus the "objective" fact of increasing chaos throughout the country, led to a closeout of the Cultural Revo- lution in 1968. Institutionalism of Left Wing Despite this major setback to the leftist cause, leftist strength, still consider- able, was now institutionalized. As party committees were reconstituted throughout the country, young "radicals" shared power, although usually in a subordinate position, with military, --continued A2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY bureaucratic, and party figures. The ninth party congress, meeting in the spring of 1969, elected to the Politburo three civilian leftists who had achieved prominence during the Cultural Revolution-- Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan--as well as Lin's military associates. Two other left- ists and Lin himself were elected to the Politburo standing committee. The leftist position, however, was weaker than it seemed. Ironically, the left, which put its faith in the "masses," had in fact alienated much of the populace through its excesses in the Cultural Revo- lution and its evident inability to manage the country during its period of ascendancy. Moreover, the provincial military remained deeply hostile. A reaction quickly set in, and orthodox management returned to power. Continuing Decline of the Left Lin Piao, finding "leftism" a weak reed on which to lean, now attempted to make common cause with his estranged regional military commanders--an effort that led to his attempted "coup" in the autumn of 1971. The elimination from the Politburo of Lin's close military associates in the wake of his death left the remaining top leftists--Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan--isolated on that body. Weakened in the provinces, the leftists retained firm control of the educational and cultural spheres--areas about which they were particularly concerned but which were not nearly such important sources of real power as control of the party and government machinery--and somewhat less firm con- trol over the propaganda apparatus. The leading leftists still retained a somewhat equiv- ocal relationship to Mao Tse-tung. In 1970 and again after the fall of Lin Piao, the Chairman had dissociated himself from the leftist leaders--par- ticularly his wife, Chiang Ching--but he still found them a useful counterweight to pressures from the military and from the conservative bureaucrats, now led by Chou En-lai. In these circumstances the leftist trio retained veto power over numerous high-level decisions and appointments. --continued A3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY The onset of Chou En-lai's illness--known in the upper echelons of the Chinese leadership by 1973-- tended to upset the tentative balance that had been established following the fall of Lin Piao. Offi- cials dependent on Chou were uncertain of their fu- ture. The left, in preparation for the inevitable succession and in recognition of its own relative weakness, began a flirtation with the still dis- gruntled military which, although never very suc- cessful, continued until October 6 and 7, 1976. A Standoff The tenth party congress, convened in the summer of 1973, was probably primarily designed to deal with the succession problem. The result was largely a standoff. Although Chou and his allies lost little ground, the leftists were able to exclude Teng Hsiao-ping, "rehabilitated" the previous spring, from the Politburo. Wang Hung-wen, a young Shanghai protege of Chang Chun-chiao, was elected to the third position in the party hierarchy. The one re- maining military man on the Politburo with leftist sympathies, Li Te-sheng, was elevated to the stand- ing committee. The congress actually settled nothing and was im- mediately followed by the so-called anti-Confucius campaign--a feuding between left and right. But by the end of 1974, the left had been turned back. Teng Hsiao-ping At a party plenum in late 1974, Teng Hsiao-ping was elected to the Politburo standing committee and was made chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army. Li Te-sheng was dropped from the standing committee. The ascendancy of Teng Hsiao-ping, however, raised in acute form the issue of the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution. Teng--the only "rehabilitated" official on the Politburo--was a continuing provoca- tion to the left. Moreover, he made no attempt to disguise his contempt for the Cultural Revolution and all its works. In addition, anticipating Chou's coming death, he pressed ahead at great speed with programs reminiscent of the early 1960s. In the process, Teng alienated significant military leaders--who stood aside when the left renewed its attack on him after Chou En-lai's death. --continued A4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Following the fall of Teng Hsiao-ping, leftist lead- ers opened a general attack on the many party offi- cials "rehabilitated" since 1969--a threatening ges- ture that merely served to unite the bureaucrats in opposition to the leftists. Further, the leftists attacked Teng's military policy even while seeking alliances with military commanders. Fall of the Leftist Quartet The continued leftist agitation from late 1973 prob- ably convinced considerable numbers of influential figures in the party and military establishments that political stability could not be achieved in China unless the leftist leaders were removed from positions of influence. The fall of the leftist quartet was probably inevitable; only the timing was a surprise. It still is not clear whether the leftist leaders attempted a desperate move in early October or whether the right--above all the military--under- took a pre-emptive one. In either case, the light- ning purge of October 6 and 7 clearly revealed the relative weakness of the left in real power terms. Residual Leftist Strength At the same time, leftist strength almost certainly has not vanished. Hua Kuo-feng recently claimed that the Chinese Communist Party has 30 million mem- bers. If, as a conservative estimate, a quarter of this number is leftist in outlook, such members would total seven and a half million--a sizable pressure group. Even if the arrest of the leftist quartet should be followed by a purge of some 100,000 to 200,000 followers--a number comparable to those purged during the Cultural Revolution--a huge body of leftists would remain to reassert them- selves as other pressures build in China. If a new round of struggle develops in the near fu- ture, it is likely to be between civilian party mem- bers and a newly confident and assertive military. Over the longer term, if the return to the methods and practices of the 1950s and 1960s continues, pressures will probably build again within the Chi- nese political system in reaction to the rigid bureaucratic "command style." A5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000300020007-1