THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 NOVEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466894
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 10, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
/
November 10, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 513(1)A2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
November 10, 1976
Table of Contents
China-Thailand:
(Page 1) 25X1
Notes: South Korea; USSR; Egypt; Zambia-Rhodesia; Namibia;
Yugoslavia-USSR; Lebanon (Pages 2, 3, 4, and 5)
At Annex we present the Key Judgments of the National Intelligence
Estimate, "Soviet Military Policy in The Third World."
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHINA-THAILAND:
* * *
--continued
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South Korea
Soviet General Secretary
Brezhnev displayed his
continuing interest in
progress in USSR-US re-
lations during the din-
ner last night for vis-
iting Polish party chief
Gierek.
The Egyptian cabinet
shuffle announced yes-
terday may help to
strengthen the manage-
ment of Egypt's shaky
economy.
NOTES
Brezhnev said that Moscow consid-
ers the adoption of specific and
effective measures to curb the arms
race as essential and realistic.
He expressed the hope that now
that the elections in West Germany
and the US are over, the USSR could
count on more interaction in solv-
ing major bilateral and interna-
tional problems.
Long-time Egyptian economist Abdul
Munim Qaysuni was given the newly
created post of deputy prime min-
ister for financial and economic
affairs--a portfolio that will give
him overall supervision of the
ministries dealing with economic
matters. Two close associates of
Qaysuni have been named to head the
ministries of economy and finance.
Qaysuni's reputation as a capable
economist may help to attract some
of the reputable economists who had
left government service in frustra-
tion over political restrictions or
economic mismanagement.
--continued
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Zambia
Khodesian
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The latest session of
the multiracial Namibian
constitutional confer-
ence that began this
week in Windhoek, the
territorial capital,
will consider a reso-
lution calling for the
establishment of a mul-
tiracial interim govern-
ment to manage the
transition from the
present territorial ad-
ministration to an in-
dependent government.
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A target date for independence
proposed by the constitutional
committee is December 31, 1978.
South Africa's goal for Namibia
apparently is a loose federal
system that would permit the
whites--who comprise 12 percent
of the population--to control
the area's mineral resources.
Non-white delegations, on the
other hand, want a central govern-
ment--dominated by non-whites--to
control natural resources.
Non-white delegates are likely to
reject any interim arrangements
that perpetuate existing ethnic
--continued
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FRANCE
AUSTRIA HUNGARY USSR
ROMANIA.ep
BELGRADE* BLACK SEA
BULGARIA
MOROCCO
*?Malta
13 of,.!oru
-"Dardanelles
AE,Gf AN
RECE-
TURKEY
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CYPRUS
LEBANON
ISRAEL
SYRIA
f
620649 11.76
ALGERIA
250 Miles
250 Kilometers
LIBYA
\------ CAIRO*
EGYPT
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homelands unless a start is made
toward setting up a central gov-
ernment responsive to the non-
white majority.
South African Prime Minister
Vorster has said his government
will consider favorably any draft
constitution or any interim rec-
ommendation that is adopted by a
plenary session of the conference.
So far, however, he has not clearly
backed the one moderate member of
the white delegation who has served
as mediator between his hard-line
colleagues and non-white delegates.
* * *
The Yugoslays/ I
/to per-
mit repair of some Soviet naval ships now officially
Soviet naval ships at use only the extensive and modern
the naval shipyard at repair facilities at Tivat; access
Sibenik. to the repair facility at Sibenik
would eventually allow repair of
more warships simultaneously.
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The loss of access to the exten-
sive repair facilities in Egypt
last April prompted Moscow to
increase efforts to gain expanded
access to Yugoslav naval shipyards.
The Yugoslays probably would impose
more restrictions than the Egyp-
tians.
The Soviets want increased access
to large shipyards in the Mediter-
ranean primarily for submarine
repair. Sibenik was last seen on
satellite photography in 1975. Its
primary repair facilities--both
completed and under construction--
could not accommodate the Soviet
attack submarines used in the Med-
iterranean, although the facili-
ties could be improved either by
new Yugoslav construction or by
sending a large Soviet drydock to
the port.
--continued
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The deployment of the
Arab security force in
Beirut was delayed by
procedural differences
yesterday.
* * *
Syrian contingents of the security
force preparing to enter the capi-
tal halted their advance east of
the city while leaders of the large
Christian militias conferred again
with Lebanese President Sarkis.
The talks are aimed at arranging a
simultaneous entry of Syrian forces
into Christian and Muslim quarters
of the city.
* * *
--continued
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USSR
We present here the Key Judgments of the
National Intelligence Estimate, "Soviet
Military Policy in The Third World."
The Soviets perceive the Third World as a primary
arena for the USSR's competition with the West and
with China. Existing political constellations and
ongoing Soviet programs suggest the following area
priorities:
--The Middle East will remain the major focus
of Soviet military activities in the Third
World. As long as Soviet relations with Egypt
remain sour, Syria will continue to be the
largest recipient of Soviet military aid in
the area. Moscow will probably emphasize ef-
forts in other Arab countries--Iraq, Libya,
and Algeria.
--Southern Africa is the area of greatest cur-
rent potential for the USSR. The Soviets will
doubtless be alert to opportunities to exploit
troubles there even though they will have lit-
tle ability to control or even predict develop-
ments.
--In other areas, India, Somalia, and Cuba will
continue to be the focal points of Soviet mili-
tary policy. Moscow apparently intends to go
on looking for new clients, but the Soviets do
not seem to expect any major changes in Asia
or Latin America in the immediate future.
As they have been expanding their activities in :the
Third World, the Soviets have seen a reduction in
Western military presence and influence there. The
Sovietshave given their highest priority to areas
of strategic importance such as the Middle East but
have also taken advantage of opportunities to use
their military activities to weaken the West in
areas as far flung as Cuba and Angola. While the
Soviets continue to support the spread of Communism,
the ideology of potential clients has not generally
hampered the development of a military relationship;
pragmatism and opportunism will be the Soviet guide
in seeking new military relations.
There are a number of factors which inhibit growth
of Soviet military presence in the Third World:
--continued
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--The intense nationalism of most Third World
countries makes them determined not to grant
more than minimal use of facilities for Soviet
forces.
--Regional powers have emerged which are loath
to see any outside power play a dominant role.
--The Soviets are vulnerable to the vicissitudes
of the Third World politics, changes in domestic
regimes, and reversals in the attitudes of local
leaders.
--The Soviets have been able to make only lim-
ited advances in competing with Western cul-
tural, political, and economic influence.
--The continued presence of US and other West-
ern military forces in the Third World remains
an inhibition on Soviet military activities.
Despite major setbacks in Indonesia, Egypt, and the
Sudan, the Soviets are convinced that their efforts
in the Third World have significantly increased Mos-
cow's prestige and influence in world affairs and
have contributed to Soviet national security. The
motivation of Moscow's military activity is an as-
pect of its overall competition with the West, ex-
pressed in the Third World in efforts to weaken
Western military, economic, and political positions
while strengthening those of the USSR. Competition
with China in this same arena reinforces this moti-
vation. Given Soviet persistence, it is extremely
unlikely that any future setbacks would cause the
USSR to reverse course.
To achieve their objectives the Soviets use a vari-
ety of military instruments in Third World countries.
Military aid has been Moscow's principal instrument,
and its use is likely to increase. Over the last
ten years Moscow has signed some $15 billion worth
of arms agreements, and two thirds of that amount
was negotiated in the last five years. The Soviets
have little interest in reaching agreements to re-
strain arms deliveries. Their efforts to expand
their influence rest so heavily on this instrument
that they would regard restrictions on military aid
as drastically curtailing their opportunities.
--continued
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In recent years, the Soviets have been exporting
more of their latest and best conventional equipment
Air defense missiles and interceptors will continue
to be among Moscow's best selling items. Increas-
ingly sophisticated weapons will require Third World
clients to rely more heavily on Moscow for spares,
credits, and advisers to train local personnel.
The Soviets continue to regard insurgencies as in-
struments to advance their position, and will sup-
port such groups as the PLO and guerrilla movements
in southern Africa. We believe that Moscow will
probably continue to act more boldly than in years
past in support of liberation movements. Moscow's
confidence has been bolstered by its current per-
ception of Western disinclination to counter So-
viet activities in the Third World, its tested ex-
perience in supporting Cuban forces in Africa, and
its improved military capabilities. Soviet aid,
often small in absolute terms, can have a decisive
effect in unstable situations such as Angola. So-
viet-Cuban cooperation in supporting a national
liberation movement there may be repeated if suit-
able opportunities arise, but only when both coun-
tries judge such activity to be in their interest.
The Soviets deploy military forces to the Third
World--primarily naval and air--which share in po-
tential wartime missions and perform a variety of
political and military roles by demonstrating So-
viet support to Third World countries. Barring
serious long-term crises or other unusual circum-
stances, Soviet general purpose naval deployments
will probably not increase greatly in numbers but
will grow significantly in capabilities. But So-
viet air deployments to distant areas will often
require overflight and staging privileges which
the USSR may find difficult and sometimes impossi-
ble to obtain.
As Moscow's military presence in distant areas has
increased, Soviet needs for supporting facilities
have risen. The Soviets will almost certainly con-
tinue to seek access to facilities primarily in the
Mediterranean and to a lesser extent in West Africa
and the Indian Ocean.?
--In the Mediterranean, we believe that Soviet
prospects for gaining access to facilities com-
parable to those they lost in Egypt are dim.
--continued
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--In the Atlantic, the Soviets probably hope
to obtain port and air facilities in Angola as
a hedge against further troubles in Guinea.
--Given the assets they have in Somalia, the
Soviets have less pressing requirements for
additional facilities in the Indian Ocean but
will continue looking.
In Third World crises Soviet forces have been used
to provide assistance to the USSR's clients. The
most extensive recent effort was in Egypt in 1970
when the Soviets deployed, over a period of months,
aircraft and surface-to-air missiles manned by So-
viet pilots and missile crews operating under their
own command and control network. The Soviets have
also endeavored to inhibit possible US actions and
provide a visible symbol of Soviet support by in-
terpositioning naval forces. Nevertheless, Moscow
will be careful to avoid actions which risk precip-
itating a direct military confrontation with the US.
The Soviets have other military forces which could
be employed in the Third World. Although Soviet
ground, airborne, and amphibious forces are designed
primarily for operations near the USSR, their train-
ing, coupled with the diversity and quality of their
equipment, gives them a capacity to act in crisis
situations. The Soviets have never conducted a mil-
itary campaign in the Third World but, should they
decide to intervene rapidly on the ground, the So-
viets could send airborne units or small naval in-
fantry contingents. Much larger ground forces
could be moved by the Soviet merchant marine if
there were enough time and no opposition.
Over the next decade, force improvements will con-
tinue to enhance Soviet capabilities to assist cli-
ents by supplementing local defenses. The USSR
will be able to make more credible demonstrations
of force and the Soviet navy will have better capa-
bilities for interposition. The Soviets will also
improve their capabilities for direct assault. But
beyond the range of land-based air support, Soviet
capabilities will still be deficient to carry out
an amphibious assault against determined opposition
by sizable armed forces. The Soviets will face the
same problems as today of limited air cover and
assault lift and vulnerable lines of communications.
--continued
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Although Soviet capabilities for direct assault will
remain limited, that will not keep Moscow from con-
tinuing its efforts to cultivate military relations
with Third World countries and to support insurgen-
cies. Soviet involvement in conflicts in the Third
World is likely to take the form of interposition-
ing naval forces, participation of advisers in com-
bat, and the introduction of air defense units to
assist a client.
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