THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 NOVEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466900
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 17, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
/
November 17, 1976
2
- Tor s 4),( 1
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Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E 0 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
November 17, 1976
Table of Contents
PLO-Israel:
(Page 1)
South Africa - Rhodesia:
(Page 2)
USSR: since mid-
October the Soviets have dismantled 12 more older ICBM
launchers and have begun dismantling 13 others. (Page 3)
Chile: By announcing its intention to release 323 political
prisoners, the Pinochet government probably hopes to lessen
the impact of a critical UN report and improve its image
with the next US administration. (Page 4)
Note: Greece (Page .5)
At Annex, we examine Israel's appraisal of the effect on its
strategic position of the collapse of Lebanon's political
system and the increased Syrian influence there.
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PLO-ISRAEL:
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2
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1
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--continued
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SOUTH AFRICA - RHODESIA:
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* *
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*
2
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Number of Older Missile Launchers
STATUS OF DISMANTLING OF OLDER SOVIET MISSILE LAUNCHERS
INITIATIONS
210
150
100
50
210
150
100
50
Initiation Obligations
F
11
COMPLETIONS
Performance
Completion Obligations
P
Observed Performance
1976
1975
1977 1978
Status of Soviet ICBM Dismantling
620681 11-76 CIA
Obligations
March 1
June
July
August
September
October
Required number of
launchers with:
Dismantling Complete
51
51
51
51
51
67
Dismantling Initiated
0
16
28
28
44
56
51
67
79
79
95
123
Observed Performance (Dec 4- (Mar 22- (Jul 9- (Aug 4- (Sep 7- (Oct 12-
Mar 29) May 17) Aug 3) Sep 6) Oct 19) Nov 5)
Dismantling Complete
8
13-16
33
33
39
51
Dismantling in Progress
43
38-35
20
46
69
70
51
51
53
79
108
121
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USSR:
since mid-October
the Soviets have com-
pleted the dismantling
of 12 more older ICBM
launchers and have be-
gun dismantling 13 oth-
ers. Additional dis-
mantling activity could
have occurred, however;
of the 209 original SS-7
and SS-8 launchers,
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As of November 5 the Soviets had 2bAl
at least 121 launchers in varying
stages of dismantlement, of which
51 can be considered fully dis-
mantled according to the procedures
established by the Protocol to the
Standing Consultative Commission.
An additional 20 launchers have
been rendered unusable and could
not be returned to operational
status in substantially less time 25X1
than would be required for new con 25X1
structi on.
The Soviets were obligated to have
67 launchers fully dismantled or
destroyed by early October and to
have work underway on 56 others by
late October. The Soviets will
soon incur additional dismantling
obligations. A Delta-class sub-
marine with 16 missile launchers
3
--continued
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CHILE: The government's
announcement of its de-
cision to release 323
persons imprisoned under
the state of siege is a
concession to interna-
tional criticism.
*
probably will begin sea trials
later this month or early in Decem-
ber. This will require the USSR
to begin dismantling 16 more of its
older launchers.
*
*
A spokesman of the Pinochet govern-
ment said 18 other prisoners "too
dangerous to be freed in Chile"
would be expelled if some country
would accept them. The spokesman
said two of them--Communist Party
chief Luis Corvalan and a former
senator of the Allende coalition--
would be released only if the USSR
and Cuba would reciprocate by free-
ing two prominent prisoners.
By releasing its prisoners, the
Pinochet government probably hopes
to lessen the impact of a critical
report recently circulated by the
UN human rights investigating group
and improve its image with the next
US administration. The govern-
ment's action is also a tacit ad-
mission that internal security is
no longer a problem since any new
roundup of "subversives" would
provoke even more intense criticism
abroad.
* * *
--continued
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Leftist students in
Greece seem bent on
marching on the US em-
bassy in Athens today
despite government ef-
forts to dissuade them.
NOTE
If both students and government
remain adamant, some violence is
likely. Greek security forces
should be able to protect both the
embassy and the consulate general
in Salonica, where a similar march
is scheduled to take place.
The activity is in commemoration
of a student uprising in 1973 that
brought down one junta only to
have it replaced by another. The
marches reflect the standard left-
ist charge, which many Greeks be-
lieve, that the US installed, and
supported the juntas and was re-
sponsible for their policy toward
Cyprus.
--continued
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Tel Aviv-Yafo.
Mediterranean Sea
Lebanon/ 1",///S yria
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HEIGHTS
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Dead Sea
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Amman
ordan
Israel
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Jordan
0 5,0 Mlles
o 510 Kilometers
Red Sea
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Saudi
Arabia
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ISRAEL-LEBANON
Most Israeli leaders believe that the
collapse of Lebanon's political system
and the rise in Syrian influence there
will inevitably lead to a weakening of
Israel's strategic position--if not now,
then certainly in the long run. Prime
Minister Rabin's government has felt
powerless to prevent these developments
and would even concede that Lebanon
could have rapidly undergone what for
Israel would have been a much more po-
tentially dangerous transformation had
Syria not intervened in the way it did.
Although the Israelis remain wary of Syrian inten-
tions, they have not been displeased by the unusual
and unexpected turn of events in recent months in
Lebanon. The Syrians' split with the Palestinian
guerrillas and tactical alliance with the Lebanese
Christians last spring came not only as a pleasant
surprise to Israeli leaders but also did much to re-
duce domestic pressures on them to become more di-
rectly involved in the crisis.
The Pluses...
Israel has reaped a number of benefits as a by-
product of the Lebanese conflict. The preoccupa-
tion of the Palestinians, Syria, and nearly every
other principal Arab state with Lebanon has resulted
in:
--A virtual suspension of fedayeen terrorist
raids on northern Israel.
--A relaxation of military tensions on the
Golan Heights.
--A welcome breather from Arab pressures to
resume negotiations for further tactical with-
drawals.
--Until recently, a deepening of the split be-
tween Israel's two main adversaries, Egypt
and Syria.
--continued
Al
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The Israelis believe their policy of "calculated
restraint" toward Syrian intervention and their
covert aid to the Lebanese Christians have also
succeeded in keeping the growth of Syrian influence
in Lebanon within acceptable limits and in helping
to weaken the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Israeli support has also helped the Christians to
preserve some measure of independence and, of more
immediate importance to Tel Aviv, to gain control
over areas in southern Lebanon once used by the
fedayeen to stage terrorist attacks on Israeli set-
tlements.
...And Possible Minuses
Despite these pluses, the long term consequences of
what has happened in Lebanon are far less clear and
worry Israel.
With characteristic pessimism, many of Israel's
leading press commentators see Lebanon inevitably
slipping from its relative neutral status into the
ranks of the Arab confrontation states under the
influence of a stronger, more aggressive Syria, and
the closing of Arab ranks once more against Israel.
Some have already expressed alarm over the recon-
ciliation between Egypt and Syria, expecting the
Arabs, at a minimum, to shift their anti-Israeli
propaganda campaign back into high gear.
Foreign Minister Allon and Minister of Defense
Peres as well as other Israeli officials have ex-
pressed similar concerns about the future. Israeli
Chief of Staff Gur recently discounted any immedi-
ate military threat from Syrian troops in Lebanon,
noting that the current division of Syrian forces
between Lebanon and the Golan Heights puts Syria
at a greater military disadvantage than Israel.
, South Lebanon
The Israelis will keep a close watch especially on
southern Lebanon for any indication of a change in
Syrian intentions. The Rabin government has al-
ready warned Damascus publicly, and apparently
through diplomatic channels, that it will not tol-
erate a resumption of fedayeen cross-border opera-
tions from territory under Syrian control.
--continued
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Israel will continue its arms aid to Christian
forces operating in the south in order to:
--Help them to consolidate their hold over
areas along the Lebanese-Israeli border.
--Strengthen their overall bargaining position
in the negotiations yet to come over Lebanon's
future.
--Encourage them to continue to look to Israel
for support.
As for the Palestinians, they appear too
weak and preoccupied with merely surviv-
ing at present to challenge the Chris-
tians' hold in the south. It is highly
likely that Israeli pressure combined
with Syria's attempts to exert greater
control over the PLO will sharply cur-
tail, if not eliminate, the fedayeen
capacity for staging cross-border oper-
ations from Lebanon.
Beyond Lebanon
Despite its transient importance, neither the Is-
raelis nor the Arabs have ever regarded the Leba-
nese crisis as anything more than a sideshow to the
main Arab-Israeli dispute. The Israelis have al-
ready begun to focus on what the Arabs are likely
to do now that the war is almost behind them and
especially on the implications for Israel of the
Syrian-Egyptian rapprochement.
In general, the Lebanese civil war does not appear
to have changed the Israelis' thinking about Syria
or the other Arabs in any basic way. The Syrian-
PLO split has at most encouraged the Rabin govern-
ment to believe that it may be possible eventually
to reach a better accommodation with Damascus. But
Prime Minister Rabin still believes that the Arab
states are not yet ready to make peace with Israel
and that more interim agreements are the best that
can be achieved for now.
--continued
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The Israelis expect at a minimum that
the Arabs will push for a resumption of
the Geneva peace talks next year and in-
crease their pressure on the US to ex-
tract concessions from Israel. Beyond
that, the Israelis are unsure whether
the reconciliation between Cairo and
Damascus will result in a softening of
Syria's position or a hardening of
Egypt's.
Rabin recently has expressed the concern that Syria,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia might put pressure on the
Palestinians to abandon terrorism and moderate their
political position in order to make it difficult
for the US, and in turn, Israel to continue to deny
the PLO a role in the peace talks. Israeli leaders
especially fear that the US might go along with
such a move.
Whatever tactics the Arabs adopt, however, the Is-
raelis are unlikely to change their basic negoti-
ating strategy. Rabin is no more anxious now than
he ever was to move ahead rapidly toward additional
agreements.
Time remains a valuable commodity to the Israelis
in any future agreements, almost as valuable as
territory itself. Rabin wants time for Israel to
strengthen its military defenses, to see whether
the Arabs will live up to their past agreements,
to test the sincerity of those Arab leaders who
profess to be willing to live in peace with Israel
and to accept its permanency, and to adjust psycho-
logically and politically to shrinking security
borders, if it comes to that.
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Top Secret
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