THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 NOVEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466905
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 23, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
November 23, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 I 1652
exemption category, 5BI 1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
November 23, 1976
Table of Contents
Israel-Lebanon:
(Page 1)
Greece-Turkey: The Greeks and Turks claim that their recently
concluded talks on the Aegean continental shelf have set
the stage for serious substantive negotiations; any follow-
up talks, however, are likely to be intermittent and pro-
tracted. (Page 2)
Notes: Iraq; China; Mexico; USSR-Poland; Jamaica (Pages 4, 5,
and 6)
At Annex, we look at the post-Lebanon status of the Palestinians.
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ISRAEL-LEBANON:
--continued
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*
GREECE-TURKEY: The
Greeks and Turks claim
that their recently
concluded talks in
Bern on the Aegean con-
tinental shelf have
set the stage for seri-
ous substantive negoti-
ations in the coming
months. Any follow-up
negotiations, however,
are likely to be inter-
mittent and protracted.
Although the agreement
offers considerable
scope for differing in-
terpretations, both
governments seem con-
tent for the time being
to limit their jockey-
ing and to seek some
narrowing of their dif-
ferences.
*
*
A committee of experts, which is
to be established, will work in
secret on the question of delimi-
tation of the shelf. Each govern-
ment has contacted at least one
country that has been involved in
a similar dispute.
According to a communique issued
in Bern, the two countries have
also agreed not to take any ac-
tions in the Aegean that could
disrupt the talks and not to try
to discredit each other in their
bilateral relations with other
states. In practical terms, this
apparently means that the Turks
agreed not to engage in oil ex-
ploration in contested waters and
the Greeks undertook not to lobby
in the US and in Western Europe
against Turkey.
This was also clear in the talks
on Aegean airspace that were held
in Paris simultaneously with
those in Bern. The two sides
agreed to set up a hot line con-
necting the Greek and Turkish air
defense command centers, and they
moved closer to agreement on the
--continued
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question of advance notification
for military flights--the major
stumbling block in the talks.
The main airspace issue now is
the question of the boundaries
of the zone within which flights
must be announced in advance.
This will doubtless be taken up
in the next round of talks on
the subject.
* * *
--continued
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Iraq has withdrawn a
division from its bor-
der with Syria.
The status of Chinese
Foreign Minister Chiao
Kuan-hua seems to be in
question.
NOTES
at least one aivision re-
turned to its home garrison fol-
lowing large-scale exercises held
near the border in early November.
The withdrawal of a division would
leave about 40,000 troops in west-
ern Iraq--down from some 80,000 in
July. Iraq would have one armored
division in the west, another ar-
mored division along the Euphrates,
and a mountain infantry division in
the northwest.
The Iraqis have scheduled training
in the near future and may use this
as a cover for additional withdraw-
als.
* * *
Rumors are circulating in China and
in Chinese missions abroad that
Chiao will be removed as foreign
minister. He last appeared in
public on November 11 and since
that time has missed two important
visits at which he would normally
be present.
Chiao's political difficulties--
if indeed they exist--would seem
to be related to domestic issues
and not to his conduct of foreign
policy.
There is no reason to believe that
Chiao was linked to the four left-
ists now under attack. By most
accounts, he gets along well with
new party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng.
--continued
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Mexico yesterday tempo-
rarily suspended the sale
and purchase of all for-
eign currencies and gold
coins by banks as the
result of massive capital
flight in recent days.
The Soviet economic aid
package to Poland--agreed
upon during Polish party
leader Gierek's visit to
Moscow--includes resump-
tion of grain deliveries,
shipments of raw mate-
rials above planned lev-
els, and increased de-
liveries of consumer
goods.
* * *
The capital flight was caused, in
turn, by declining confidence in
the private business sector, recent
coup rumors, and President Eche-
verria's abrupt expropriation last
Friday of about 250,000 acres of
rich farm land.
The expropriation will pose a seri-
ous problem for President-elect Lo-
pez Portillo, who takes office on
December I. He has indicated that
he will try to avoid division of
land holdings because it creates
uneconomic units that hinder agri-
cultural production. Business and
conservative interests will urge
Lopez Portillo to rescind the de-
cision, but he will find this dif-
ficult to do because of strong
pressures from peasant groups.
* * *
The package reportedly also in-
cludes a low-interest 1-million
ruble loan, worth $1.3 billion at
the current exchange rate, but
this is still unconfirmed. If the
credit materializes, it probably
would be used to finance increased
imports of machinery, raw materials,
and possibly grain. It also would
allow Poland to divert some of its
exports to markets other than the
USSR.
--continued
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Jamaican Prime Minister
Manley's People's Na-
tional Party and the
_
opposition Jamaica La-
bor Party appear to be
running nearly even in
their campaign for gen-
eral elections that
will be held on Decem-
ber 15.
The resumption of Soviet grain de-
liveries and increased shipments
of raw materials will allow Poland
to curb further the growth of its
hard-currency imports in 1977.
Poland reportedly will receive
shipments of oil next year at this
year's prices.
* * *
The Labor Party has been campaign-
ing hard for several months. The
elections will be held under a
state of emergency, and Manley can
be expected to use the broad powers
granted him to intimidate the oppo-
sition and even to carry out mas-
sive arrests if he deems it neces-
sary to ensure his re-election.
Manley has been stressing the theme
of "national unity against imperial-
ism," and may increase his attacks
on the US.
* * *
--continued
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THE PALESTINIANS AFTER LEBANON
Yasir Arafat's recent indication to Saudi
Arabian officials that the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization is willing to negotiate
a settlement with Israel is a measure of how
closely the Palestinians' defeat in Lebanon
has forced Arafat to align himself with the
key Arab states interested in a settlement.
He needs their support for his continued ten-
ure as PLO chief.
Arafat will find it increasingly difficult
to preserve the PLO's independence and he
will now have to emphasize the pursuit of
a more purely political strategy to secure
both his position and the goals of the Pal-
estinian moderates. The alternative--a re-
turn to terrorism--would alienate his Arab
backers and could cost him his position.
The Palestinians gravely miscalculated when they
took sides in Lebanon's civil war. They have been
dealt a decisive military defeat by the Syrians,
previously their staunchest allies.
The movement has also lost most of the political
standing it won at the 1974 Rabat summit, when the
PLO was formally designated the sole representative
of the Palestinians at the expense of King Husayn.
A look at the post-Lebanon status of the Palestin-
ians suggests that:
--The PLO will be unable to challenge Syria
for the foreseeable future, either in Lebanon
or in broader Middle Eastern affairs.
--Arafat will do his best to play other
Arab states off against Syria in order to
salvage a sphere of autonomy. His success
will be limited because with the exception
of the mavericks--Iraq and Libya--the Arab
states have become convinced that a free-
wheeling Palestinian movement is a threat.
--continued
Al
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--Arafat is likely to retain his position
as head of the PLO and spokesman for the
Palestinian movement. He probably will re-
main willing and able to commit the main
body of the PLO to peace negotiations if
he becomes convinced he can make concrete
gains.
--Syria's domination of the PLO, control
of Lebanon, and closer ties with Jordan
will give it a strong hand in the event
of renewed Middle East negotiations.
--The PLO probably would be willing, if in-
vited, to participate in a new round of peace
talks as part of a joint Arab or mixed Syrian-
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
--The PLO almost certainly is prepared to
recognize Israel in return for the crea-
tion of an independent "Palestine" made up
of the West Bank and Gaza.
--Fedayeen leaders are under increasing
pressure from their militant followers
to turn again to terrorism to redress
their grievances against the Arab
states as well as Israel. This pressure
will grow more intense if the Palestin-
ians--involved in negotiations or not--
realize no diplomatic gains.
Syrian-Palestinian Accommodation
Arafat--and his moderate followers in Fatah and the
PLO--had come to recognize months before the Riyadh
summit that accommodation with Syria was the only
way to go. It was clear by the end of the summer
that prolongation of the fighting would simply
drain the Palestinians.
At the Riyadh summit in October, Arafat committed
the Palestinians to a withdrawal from the few mil-
itary positions they retained--even if this meant
an open breach with the Lebanese leftists--and a
--continued
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return to the refugee camps under the terms of the
Cairo accords. He dropped the Palestinians' insis-
tence on a mutual Syrian withdrawal, and agreed to
accept, as guarantor of the peace, a pan-Arab secu-
rity force that, in reality, consisted overwhelmingly
of Syrian troops.
Arafat will continue to maneuver against Syria to
the extent he can, but he will be very careful to
preserve his accommodation with President Asad. The
Palestinian movement survived the loss of Jordan as
a base of operations, but it needs, at a minimum, a
physical presence in Lebanon if it is to retain any
credibility as an independent force against Israel.
The Palestinians in Lebanon
Arafat knows, of course, that Syria would not now
allow the fedayeen to mount unrestricted terrorist
attacks across the Lebanon-Israel border, even if
the fedayeen were able and Israel vulnerable. But
he also knows that it is not in Syria's interest to
destroy the effectiveness of the fedayeen altogether,
and probably hopes Asad will permit an occasional
terrorist action to remind Israel that this weapon
is still available to the Arabs.
A Syria facing Israel over the negotiating table
needs whatever leverage it can get, and the threat
of renewed fedayeen activity--strictly controlled
by Damascus--is useful to Asad.
Arafat is probably willing to abide by the Cairo
accords--Lebanese-Palestinian agreements signed in
1969 and 1973. These guarantee the fedayeen almost
free run of the refugee camps and their commando
bases in the east and south
Arafat will not give up trying to win for the Pal-
estinians some kind of political role in Lebanon.
There are half a million Palestinians in Lebanon,
a quarter of the country's population. A sizable
proportion live outside the refugee camps. It
would not be feasible to isolate them from the
country's political life, particularly because
--continued
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they are the natural allies of the segment of the
political system that has been denied the political
and economic privileges enjoyed by the Christian and
Sunni Muslim elite.
It was the system's inability to absorb the Pales-
tinian presence that pushed Lebanon into civil war
in the first place. Without somewhere else for the
Palestinians to go--and there is nowhere else in the
absence of some kind of Middle East settlement--they
will continue to play a role in Lebanon.
Arafat hopes Asad will come to see that a Fatah al-
lied with Damascus can promote Syria's interests in
Lebanon and in the fedayeen movement better than a
Syrian-controlled group like Saiqa that has little
political or military strength.
West Bank Palestinians
The principal Arab states as well as Israel have
made modest efforts to enhance the influence of Pal-
estinians from the West Bank and Gaza within or
outside the PLO as a way of diluting or eliminating
Arafat's control of the Palestinian movement. Sev-
eral members of the PLO executive committee are of
West Bank background, and one, Abd al-Muhsin Abu
Mayzar, has been bruited as a possible successor to
Arafat.
The West Bankers now on the executive committee, how-
ever, are of varied political outlook, and they all
owe their positions to Arafat.
Anti-Arafat maneuvers seem to have little support
among West Bank residents. West Bankers support
the PLO as the only genuine Palestinian organiza-
tion now in existence, and they see Arafat as the
symbol of the Palestinian cause. They regard the
PLO as the only group dedicated to ending the Is-
raeli occupation. The Arab states, in the West
Bank view, are cynically using the Palestinians as
pawns to further their own interests.
Inhabitants of the West Bank probably would take a
more active interest in their own political future
should the existence of some kind of West Bank
--continued
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state, independent or semi-autonomous, seem likely
in the near future. In the absence of such a devel-
opment, West Bank leaders seem inclined to support
Arafat passively, while minimizing their cooperation
with Israeli authorities.
The Palestinians and Peace Talks
The moderates who control the PLO probably are pre-
pared to drop their declared objective of settling
for nothing less than an independent secular state
with Israel proper at its heart. The basic PLO aim
appears to be the creation of a PLO-governed, inde-
pendent Palestine made up of the West Bank and Gaza.
Arafat and the present leadership will not, however,
play their only strong card in advance by recognizing
Israel before peace talks begin.
If a compromise were reached giving the Palestinians
a West Bank state, a significant body of fedayeen
opinion--the "rejectionist" groups and perhaps the
extremist members of Fatah--would presumably refuse
to adhere to the settlement and would commit them-
selves to continued guerrilla warfare against Is-
rael. They would assume that the new West Bank
state of Palestine would give them safehaven. The
rejectionists, frustrated, probably would turn as
well to international terrorism.
A Palestinian leader other than Arafat would have
even more difficulty than he in reaching compromises
in negotiations. Although a Syrian-backed successor
presumably would be more moderate than Arafat, most
of the leading Fatah contenders favor tougher tactics
in dealing with Israel. In addition, none of them
has Arafat's prestige or ability to sell a contro-
versial settlement to his followers without making
it appear to be an abandonment of the Palestinian
cause.
With Arafat in control, however, the near-term out-
look is somewhat more encouraging: the PLO has been
chastened by its defeat in Lebanon, but is still
able to project enough credibility to make concil-
iation possible.
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