THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 JANUARY 1977

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466945
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 11, 1977

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
The President's Daily Brief
January 11, 1977
2
p
-----sr--5c6.42.Z1
o ,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption cssegory 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
January 11, 1977
Table of Contents
Arab States: The foreign ministers of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and
five Arab oil states yesterday ended their discussions on 25X1
further financial assistance for the "confrontation states."
Saudi Arabia reportedly has prepared a new policy on this
issue. (Page 1)
South Korea:
(Page 2)
Chile: The government is beginning to obtain military assistance
that was denied it for several years because of its human
rights practices. (Page 3)
Note: Syria-USSR; Poland (Pages 5 and 6)
At Annex we present the conclusions and major points of the un-
classified annual review of the CIA's estimate of the rela-
tive dollar costs of US and Soviet military activities.
FOR TI-IF PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ARAB STATES: The foreign
ministers of Egypt, Syria
Jordan, and five Arab
oil states ended their
discussions in Riyadh
yesterday on further
financial assistance
for the "confrontation
states."
Prime Minister Mudar Badran of
Jordan, who acted as chairman of
the meeting, said recommendations
will be referred to the heads of
state for consideration and the
foreign ministers will meet in
Cairo on Saturday to implement the
decisions. Jordan, Syria, and
Egypt are arguing that a resolu-
tion on aid passed at the Arab sum-
mit in Rabat in 1974 required not
just a single payment by the oil
states, but an annual contribution
until the conflict with Israel is
resolved.
Egypt is not enthusiastic about
formalizing a multilateral subsidy
arrangement. For years, President
Sadat has tried to tie Saudi Ara-
bia, the key donor state, to a
long-term financial commitment
that would be bilateral and private.
Saudi leaders are anxious to forge
a united Arab front in preparation
for renewed peace negotiations, 25X1
however, and might accept an ex-
tended unilateral commitment.
Partly in deference to Sadat's
views, the Saudis apparently in-
tend to make clear that any new
policy will not preclude ad hoc
payments should special circum-
stance arise./
* * *
1
/
--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH KOREA:
* * *
2
--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE: The government
is beginning to obtain
military assistance
that was denied it for
several years because
of its poor record in
respecting human rights.
The new weapons will help Chile
to narrow the gap between its ca-
pabilities and those of its more
powerful neighbor, Peru. Presi-
dent Pinochet has been reviewing
requests
for urgent action to upgrade
Chile's forces and accelerate
arms purchases to counter the per-
ceived threat from Peru. He is
inclined, however, to maintain
the present course, at least until
economic conditions permit more
resources to be diverted to major
military purchases.
3
--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONTY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
--continued
4
Fnl? THF PRFSITVNIT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The Syrian chief of
staff has confirmed to
the US ambassador in
Damascus that the So-
viets have been asked
not to use the Syrian
port of Tartus.
Polish officials are
expressing apprehension
over Western media cov-
erage of Polish eco-
nomic difficulties.
NOTES
Although Syria's move may have
been prompted by the severe con-
gestion at the port--where mer-
chant vessels are now waiting up
to three months for a berth--it
may also be a political signal to
Moscow. The congestion problem
has arisen several times in recent
years, without resulting in such
a move; moreover, the Soviets moor
at a naval base at Tartus and not
at the port's commercial section.
Although no concrete steps have
been taken, the Soviets may al-
ready be preparing to pull out of
Tartus. A Soviet ship similar to
one used to aid in the Soviets'
withdrawal from Alexandria, Egypt
last April passed through the
Turkish Straits yesterday and may
be en route to Tartus. At pres-
ent, six Soviet ships are at
Tartus.
A senior member of the party's
central committee secretariat
took this line throughout his con-
versation with a US embassy rep-
resentative on Friday. This of-
ficial could be reflecting irrita-
tion over broadcasts by Radio
Free Europe. An article last
week in the Polish armed forces
newspaper accused the US of at-
tempting to reinvigorate RFE's
propaganda capabilities in the
post-Helsinki era, and a Polish
Foreign Ministry official has
stated bluntly that Poland re-
gards RFE broadcasting as a viola-
tion of the Helsinki Final Act.
5
--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Polish officials have recently
been insisting that they hope to
work with the Carter administra-
tion to continue the progress
achieved over the past few years,
and are concerned that Polish
dissident activity as played up
in the Western press will pose
difficulties.
--continued
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Total US and Soviet Defense Activities, 1966-1976
A Comparison of US Outlays and Estimated Dollar Costs
of the Soviet Activities if Duplicated in the US
Military Forces
Billion 1975 Dollars
120
100
80
60
40
20
60
40
20
60,
40
20 ,
US
USSR
571870 1-77
1966
Pensions
68
70
72
74
76
1111111116.... Man= 111116m =mem Mom Maim IMF.
1966 68 70 72 74 76
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E)
BAN RE Mho 111i MN NM ELIA
1966 68
Cumulative 1-966-76
70 72 74 76
7 1200
1160
Pensions
The dollar cost estimates reflect the cost of producing and manning in the US a military force of the same inventory of weapons
and size as that of the Soviets, and operating that force as the Soviets do The costs for Soviet investment and operating are best
estimates, with possible error margins of 15 percent displayed. The estimated costs of Soviet RDT&E are derived in the aggregate,
using a less certain methodology, and should be viewed only as rough measures For this reason, they have been excluded from the
totals and are shown separately Military pensions which reflect payments for past rather than present defense activities, have also
been excluded from the totals and are shown separately. The US defense costs are in terms of outlays based primarily on Department
of Defense Total Obligational Authority (TOA) in The Five-Year Defense Program, October 1976 The US data are for fiscal years,
and the estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs are for calendar years
+15%
-15%
US and Soviet Forces for Strategic Offense, 1966-1976
A Comparison of US Outlays and Estimated Dollar Costs
of the Soviet Activities if Duplicated in the US.
US
Billion 1975 Dollars
Billion 1975 Dollars
15 15
ICB
??'?Submarine
USSR
Peripheral Attack
ICBM
Submarine
1966 68 70 72 74 76 1966 68 70 72 74 76
Note The strategic offense mission is defined according to the US Defense Planning and Programming Categories of April 1976
Minor adjustments have been made to attain comparability with Soviet data Costs for pensions, nuclear materials for warheads, and
RDT&E are excluded.
57187-4 1-77
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
We present here the 3onclusions and major
points of the unclassified annual review
of the CIA's estimate of the relative
dollar costs of US and Soviet military
activities. The review, A Dollar Cost
Comparison of Soviet and US Defense
Activities 1966-1976, was disseminated
yesterday to the Departments of Defense
and State, the NSC Staff and ACDA. The
following committees of Congress also
received the review yesterday: House
and Senate Armed Services, House and
Senate Appropriations, House and Senate
Foreign Relations, and the Senate Select
Committee. A copy was also provided to
Mr. Brzezinski.
Standard government distribution will
take place this week, and the report
also will be provided to the public
through the document exchange system
administered by the Library of Congress.
The military establishments of the USSR and the US
are difficult to compare because they differ consid-
erably in missions, structure, and characteristics.
The common denominator used to measure the defense
activities of the two countries in this study is
dollar cost, that is, estimating what it would cost
in dollars to reproduce Soviet military activities
in the US.
This estimated dollar cost of Soviet activities is
compared year by year with US outlays for similar
programs, and provides a general appreciation of
the overall magnitude of defense activities in the
two countries. Dollar cost data also provide a
means for aggregating dissimilar elements of each
country's military programs into comparable cate-
gories, showing trends and relationships between
the two defense establishments that are difficult
to discern and measure in other ways.
Because of the problems of comparing such disparate
activities, the uncertainties of the Soviet data,
and the organization of the US data, the comparisons
--continued
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
A
X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
should not be considered precise measurements. Any
conclusions drawn from this dollar cost analysis
must be tempered by an appreciation of its limita-
tions:
--It cannot be used alone to draw inferences
about the relative military effectiveness or
capabilities of US and Soviet forces.
--It does not measure actual Soviet defense
expenditures or their burden on the Soviet
economy.
The data are expressed in 1975 dollars. Constant
dollar figures are used so that trends in the cost
estimates reflect changes in the military activi-
ties rather than the effects of inflation.
Total Defense Costs
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense pro-
grams amounted to about $120 billion for 1976, when
measured in 1975 dollars. This is about one third
higher than US outlays for similar defense activi-
ties. If pensions are excluded from both sides,
the estimated dollar costs of Soviet activities in
1976 exceed those of the US by about 40 percent.
For the 1966 to 1976 period as a whole, the cumula-
tive estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activ-
ities and US defense outlays are about the same,
but the trends of the two countries' defense activ-
ities are quite dissimilar. The dollar cost trend
of Soviet defense activities shows continuous
growth throughout the period, averaging about 3
percent a year. Growth is evident in nearly all
the major elements of the Soviet defense establish-
ment.
The trend of US defense outlays contrasts sharply.
Despite increases in current dollar terms, US out-
lays in constant dollars show a continuous decline
after 1968, and since 1972 they have been below the
1966 level. This decline reflects reductions in
nearly every major component since the Vietnam
buildup of the late 1960s.
As a result, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
defense activities exceed US defense outlays by a
widening margin in every year after 1971.
--continued
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
If all personnel costs are removed from both sides,
US defense outlays exceed the estimated dollar costs
of Soviet defense activities by about 10 percent
over the 1966 to 1976 period as a whole, although
by 1976 the Soviet level is about 30 percent greater
than the US. Alternatively, if research, develop-
ment, testing and evaluation (for which estimates
are considerably less reliable than those for other
activities) and pensions are subtracted from each
side, the estimated Soviet figure in 1976 is about
35 percent higher than that of the US, and the
cumulative totals are about the same.
Military Investment
The trends in the cost of military investment--the
procurement of weapons and equipment (exclusive of
research, development, testing and evaluation costs)
and the construction of facilities--follow closely
those for total defense costs in both countries.
The dollar costs of Soviet investment increase con-
tinuously over the period, driven primarily by
advanced weapons programs, Particularly new air-
craft and succeeding generations of missile pro-
grams. US military investment grew rapidly during
the Vietnam buildup and has declined steadily since
1968. Thus the dollar costs of Soviet investment
exceed US outlays by increasing proportions after
1970, and in 1976 are about twice the US level.
Operating Costs
Operating costs, which include manpower costs, make
up the largest share of the total defense figure
for both countries. US outlays for operating ex-
ceed the dollar cost of Soviet operating activities
until 1973. Since then the Soviet activity level
has been higher in dollar cost terms. For 1976,
the estimated dollar cost of Soviet operating
activities, exclusive of pensions, is about 15 per-
cent above US outlays.
Military Mission Comparison
Another way to compare costs of military activities
is by the mission they are designed to support.
The mission definitions in the report accord with
the guidelines outlined in the Department of Defense's
Defense Planning and Programming Categories.
A3
--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Strategic Forces. Strategic forces include all those
forces assigned to intercontinental and peripheral
attack, strategic defense, and strategic command,
control, and warning. Over the 1966 to 1976 period,
the level of Soviet activity for strategic forces
measured in dollars has been two and one-half times
greater than that of the US. Estimated dollar costs
for Soviet strategic forces have greatly exceeded
US outlays throughout the period, with the differ-
ence growing since 1969. In 1976, the Soviet level
is over three and one-half times that of the US.
Within the strategic force mission, Soviet forces
for intercontinental attack account for about 45
percent of the total for the 1966 to 1976 period.
US outlays for intercontinental attack forces, while
only half of the estimated dollar cost of the Soviet
forces, account for about 70 percent of US strategic
outlays for the period. Soviet peripheral forces,
for which the US has no comparable force, account
for about 15 percent of the total Soviet strategic
mission.
Within the respective intercontinental attack forces,
the differing emphasis on weapons is reflected in
the costs. Over 60 percent of the estimated dollar
costs of Soviet activities are for the ICBM force,
compared to only about 20 percent for the US. On
the other hand, outlays for the US bomber force com-
prise about 40 percent, compared to a Soviet share
of 5 percent. While the Soviets exceed the US level
of activities for ICBMs and submarines in every
year of the period, the US outlay for bombers is
higher every year.
General Purpose Forces. General purpose forces in-
clude all ground, tactical air, naval, and mobility
(airlift and sealift) forces. Over the 1966 to
1976 period, US outlays for general purpose forces
exceed estimated dollar costs of Soviet activities
by about 10 percent. Since 1971, however, the
Soviet level is larger than that of the US--one
third greater in 1976.
Within both the US and Soviet general purpose forces,
land forces take the largest share of the cost.
Outlays for US land forces decrease after 1968,
however, while the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
--continued
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
activity increase steadily. In 1976, the Soviet
level of activity for these forces, measured in
dollar terms, is about 80 percent greater than that
of the US.
The second largest share for both countries, in
terms of dollar costs, is for the naval forces.
The costs of these forces remain relatively con-
stant for both countries over the period. In 1976,
estimated dollar costs of Soviet activities are
about 20 percent higher than US outlays.
The US outlays for tactical air forces (including
naval attack carriers) are greater than the esti-
mated dollar costs of comparable Soviet forces.
Soviet activities are increasing, however, while
US outlays have been decreasing since 1968. US
Outlays in 1976 are about 20 percent greater than
dollar costs of the Soviet force.
Support Forces. The support forces include those
falling within the categories outlined in the
Defense Planning and Programming Categories as
auxiliary forces, mission support forces, and cen-
tral support forces. Included are military space
programs, the US Coast Guard, Soviet border guards,
civil defense, major headquarters, and all logistic
support activity.
Over the 1966 to 1976 period, the US level of sup-
port activities exceeds that of the Soviets by
about 25 percent when measured in dollar terms.
For the US, support activities account for almost
50 percent of total defense outlays during the
period, while for the Soviets the share is about
40 percent.
In absolute terms, the US level of activity for
support has been declining since 1970, while the
Soviet level has been rising throughout the 1966-
1976 period. The Soviet level surpasses that of
the US for the first time in 1974; in 1976 it is
about 10 percent greater.
A5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400040008-1