CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS-HOUSE, THE SECOND-GUNMAN SYNDROME

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Records Related to the Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00363823
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2025
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2025
• Publication Date: September 27, 1979

10^ 4-10400-101501 September t7, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD�NOUSE is sea - ear amperes re-enduMed Ms BM Ian and gound that St wee not only v.1ldly adMin- Mired, but Intilidly interpretet la geld, It showed deception. In November 11068. Ruby granted a filmed Interview to the preen he was sebeduled for ntrial in Pebruary. Ihr mid: ''Svorything pertaining to what's happened has never mine to the surface. The world will never know the true faces of wbot *mimed: my motive. . . ." He added, ". . .fTJb. people Who [have) . . . so much to gain . . . (will) never iet the true facts. . . come . . to the workL" Unless the Kennedy Investigation Is pursued further, Ruby may turn out to be right; he was for 15 years. Belin's Individual errors could be docu- mented further, but his inapt' charges also require response. Belle complains that the Warren Commission did not have its day in Court; he was not permitted eo testify in public session in the Conunisaion's defense. Bella was given an opportunity to appear in executive session el' by deposition; he could have made his deposition public. Other Warren fthemirsion lawyers, including lie general counsel, followed this procedure. All members of the Commission and the gen- eral counsel, in fact, appeared before the Committee in public samion, something Bella knows, since he appeared with former President Ford. � member of the Commis- sion. Bella was not called as a witness in a public session because a review of his work showed that be had little to oder. He did not play a key role in the work of the Com- mission. His testimony about the facts Of the ateasel!) etion was secondhand. The Committee preferred its facts firsthand. Next. Bella offers � theory as to why the Committee went wrong; be blame e it on the staff and that the Committee's work was conducted in secret. I have been associated with the work of Congressional Committees for almost twenty years. No Committee that / have ever worked with was more democratic, knowledgeable, or more in control of its own processes than the Select Committee. Indeed, the Select Committee was probably more democratic, knowledgeable, and more in control of its processes than was the Warren Commission. Witness the dissents to the work of the Committee, but not the Commission. / make that lodgment hissed on a two-year study of the Warren Commission and personal experi- ence with the Select Committee. When did Belin conduct a similar study of the Com- tnittee? He has,not even read our report. Belle's secrecy comment_ is ironic. The Warren Commission held one day of public hearings. Belin, who was Executive Director of the Rockefeller Commission, was not able to persuade his own Commission to do better. The Select Committee held almost forty days of public hearings on the evidence gathered in Its two-year investigate-1i of the Kennedy and King cases, where the Com- mittee's work was open to public scrutiny. Each of the issues be criticizes were, in fact, raised in public hearings. The Committees investigation was not held entirely in public for obvious reasons. Classified information was involved. Reputa- tions were at stake. The Committee had a /tiny, 'under Rouse Rules, to evaluate its evidence before it was made public. Belt knows the character of the allegations in the Kennedy case. Even though many of the allegations have proven to be irresponsible, they had to be checked out, first tionfiden- -tally. Would he have bad the Committee do otherwise? Last, Delia grumbles that the Committee made up Its mind at the last minute. The Committee had the basic acoustical evidence In July. It knew then what it portended. It all depended on what the final verdict of the scientists was. That eame in November. When should the Committee have Made up Its mind, except at the end When all the eel- dente was tn? When President Ford appeared before the Occomittes be was milked why the work of the Warren Ooszunturbon had fallen on such hard times. First, the former President said that its critics bed "deliberately or negligently Misled the American people by misstating facie and omitting crucial facts...." deoond, be suggested that many people were cynical. Third, he observed that people had not read the report. The Detect Committee Mould be accorded, at least from former Warren Commission staff members, the same they themselves would ?rave wished to have received. I sug- gest that Mr. Bella should heed the advice of his client. Sincerely, 0. ROM= SLAIL22. Professor of Late,Corneil Lew School. � (Former Chief Counsel and Staff Direc- tor, Select Committee on Assassina- tions.) Ties JIM 0021211:11ACT TH2012 Dower � Born Dr (By Elhanki Specter) The Rouse Assassinations Committee was charged with informing the American public, once and for all, of the facts of the murders of John Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Yet, it appears their report will only sewer- bate the very problems the committee sought to eradicate: lingering public concern and doubt over these watershed events of the troubling 1960s and mistrust in the ability of the government to find an answer to the argument over who killed John Kennedy. � The big story of the House report is the conclusion that President Kennedy was "probably sasesetnated as a result of a con- spiracy." What is the evidence for this con- clusion? The Only bard evidence of a second gunman Is the results of a *ample: acoustics study. The study was conducted on a acratchy recording that was made when a ponce motorcycle whose microphone was stuck open tronsmitted the sounds of the assassination to the police radio tape at the Dallas police headquarters. The study concluded that of the dozens of impulses on the tape, four of these impulses represent shots fired at the presidential limousine: the first, second and fourth from Os'aid's lair and the third from the grassy knoll. From this. the conspiracy conclusion was horn. Although the acoustics study Is a scienti- fically-derived body of data, there is little precedence Lualcering how to contertualize this arcane evidqioe in light of the other evidence. That iwtthceft the benefit of the application of ilk- studies in the past, how do we evalus passible defects and judge its relative t afiliong all the evidence? The other eVidence is sharply inconsistent with the domestics study. Neither a second gunman nor his gun was seen by the more than 100 persons in position to see. His Identity or possible involvement with Oswald has never been discovered. No known Impact was made by the bullet upon the presidential limousine, Its occu- pants or anyone or anything else, even though its target was only about 25 yards away. Although this series of non-entitles does not prove there was no second gsmman, It does put into perspective the quantity of evidence of a conspiracy. . It Is Interesting to note that the evidence that Oswald acted alone is so strong that the Rouse Committee's draft finel report, written before the testimony of the acoustics experts, stated that 'there is Insufficient evidence to find there was a conspiracy." While the evidence of a conspiracy is ten- uous. -the evidence that Oswald was the aseaasin is irrefutable. To the committee's audit, they scaducted a Sines et billtiotk, photographic, terstuic ned tralectorr Otte* *at prim Itst Prioslosnt travaay anti Clos- arnor 0011211117 1111122 WHO by amen? two Millets, both fired by Oswald. It Mould be noted that times studies were precisely those sought by clines of the Ione assassin viewpoint. Thus, 'hough the oom- lnittee's oonclusited was "senspirecy," the preponderance of Its findings. including se. Oxman= Of the single-bullet theory, ere Consistent with the Warren Oocarnlasian's findings. Furthermore, the term "conspiracy has unwarranted ominous implications. The Mrin conspiracy has widely varying nasaninp, most of which connote an Institutionally based effort. For this, there is no evidence. While collusion to break the law- is, In legal terms, a conspiracy, the purpose of the Home Assassinations Committee was to inform us on the facts of the assamination. By the use Of the term conspiracy, the committee does a disservice to the understaading of the Amer- ican public. Beyond the need to place the *caustics evidence In proper perspective, there lea real question as to whether the evidence is de- pendable. While the acoustics experts were baked only to isolate which Impulses on the taire were shots and whether their origin was the grassy knoll or the Teem School Book Depository, their conclusions imply a sce- nario of the assassination. That is, the tape provides a timepiece for the assassination. The acoustics analysis holds that the sec- ond shot occurred 1.66 seconds after the first. the third 5.83 seconds after the second and fourth 22 seconds after the third. Because of the Zapruder dim, a motion picture of the assassination, was running at 18.3 frames per second and because President Kennedy was struck In the head by the fourth shot in frame 812, one can count back- ward and closely approximate the moments In the film when the other shots were fired. If the acoustics experts were wrong about which impulses were shots, they stand a good chance of being wrong In stating which Impulses were shots and from where they originated. Thus, if we are to accept this study�and with It, the conspiracy conciu- sion�then we must accept the scenario of the assassination it necessarily Implies. There are Ihree major problems with this scenario. First, the committee has concluded that the second shot was the one that passed through bath President Kennedy and Gov- ernor Connally. Although the evidence is ir- refutable that one bullet did do this. It could not have been fired at this time. According to the iscousties study, the second shot oc- curred 6.65 seconds before the fourth. A little multiplication and subtraction yields the conclusion that the second shot should have impacted at or near frame 191 A look at frame lel and those surrounding it shows that Governor Connallye wrist was well above his chest, Almost to his neckline, at this moment. But, the bullet anted ap- proximately 4 inches below his right nipple and entered his wrist travelling downward. Fifteen or so frame later. Connally's wrist is substantially lower. It Is at this point,, or icenewhat later, When Connally is obliterated from view by a sign, that it IS likely he was !second. the acoustics study concludes that two shots were fired from the area of Os- weld's perch within 1.66 seconds of each -other. Unless there were two gunmen firing from the window (a frighteningly compli- cating concept for which there is no evi- dence) , we mutt conclude that Oswald fired those two shots. l'Eli expert testimony to the Warren Com- mission indicated that Oswald rifle could not be maimed and refired in lees than 22 Seconds. Speaking before the Rouse Asses- CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW-PROGRAM ______RELEASE IN FULL 1998, , 8666 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE September 17, 107 fidnations Clantiolttee on Dec. 29, 19711. Chia? Counsel Matey said: '4'Preliminary tests are MIMI:tent to Must Into MeV= doubt the pee- ?lonely artabliabed time Mad intervals." That evening the oommittee reached its conclu- sion. Blakey believed that tests not yet ODD- ducted would demonstrate that Oswald could have fired twice with a hit co the second shot within 1.66 seconds. however, In an internal memorsndtml to rolicroittat members dated March 22, 1979, Blakey stated that of six test shooters, in- cluding "four expert marksmen," fixing a total of 85 shells, no one achieved this de- gree of proficiency." Thus, not only does It appear unlikely that Oswald fired twice with a hit on the second shot within 1.68 seconds, It may be humanly impossible to do rm. It Oswald did not fire those shots, then the impulses thought to be shots were not abota. This simply negates the credibility of the acoustics study and its conclusions. Third, a reoonstructian in 1984 by the Warren Common showed that between frames 108 and 210 there was an oak tree whose branches and leaves obscurred Os- wald's view of his target, except for a brief opening at frames 185-188. As was noted above, the acoustics study places the second shot at frame 191. Thus, the acoustics study necessarily im- plies that Oswald fired blindly and hit his target. This illogical behavior is magnified when one considers that Oswald bad an un- impeded stretch of approximately 100 yard. and several seconds in which to kill the President. beginning a mere second later. � /t seems clear that the necessary implica- tions of the acoustics study are not con- sistent with a reasonable scenario of the assassination of President Kennedy. Thus, It appears doubtful that the acoustics experts were correct in concluding that a shot origi- nated from the grassy knoll. Why did the committee conclude there was a conspiracy? Congressman Robert Edgar, a dissenter from the conclusion, may have put it best when he said: "We did a great job Up to the last moment, when in our focus on the acoustics we failed to give proper weight to other findings of the investigation." (Shanin Specter assisted Congressman Robert Eager in his work on the House As- sassinations Committee. He Is the son of Arlen Specter, the former Philadelphia Dis- trict Attorney and counsel to the Warren Commission, which investigated the Ken- nedy assassination.) Coax= Lew ScnooL, Ithaca, N.Y. July 30, 1979. Mr. Einem OTITIMAN, Editor, The Philadelphia inquirer, Philadelnhia, Pa. Dna M. CitrrausNi Shanin Spector's piece ("The JIM Conspiracy Theory Does Not Hold up,' (7/23/'19)) does an injustice to the work of the Select Committee on As- -sassinations; it also raises questions about his objectivity and competence. � The continued, almost exclusive concen- tration by Spector and others on the con- spiracy conclusions of the Select Commit- tee ignores other important findings end r---, recommendations. The committee also con- cluded, for example, that no governmental agency, foreign or domestic, was involved in either the President's or Dr. King's mur- der; and it made a variety of valuable rec- ommendations, Including the preparation of a "White Paper" by the Deparizeier* -Tos- tice to settle doubts about the study, and the enactment of chart tion by the Congress to preven harassment campaign by the P.I to that conducted against Dr. KS Specters piece also salartates the Ken- May conspiracy �mated= It did not, In tact, rest on the scoustiasi study aims. The final Report explicitly premises the con- clusion on four factors: 1) an Inadequate 1964 conspiracy investigation that precludes reliance today on Its no conspiracy finding: 2) a finding of associates, who had the me- tire to murder the President, of Oswald and Ruby who were unknown or unappreciated by the Warren Commission* 8) the inability Of the Committee to rule out the complicity of certain individuals; and 4) the scientific fact of two shooters. Reading Spector's piece, I wonder if be read the Final Report, an Indispensable prerequisite to discussing it, much less criticising it. us Contrary to Spector's assertion, no evi- dence is "sharply inconsistent" with the acoustical study. Proving that Oswald shot the President, does not prove that another was not also involved. /n addition, it is a half-truth to say that no one "saw" the second gunman In fact, a policeman, a Secret Service Agent, and a Korean veteran (over whose head the third shot was fired) among others�said they "beard" the shot from the knoll as well as the shots from the Depository. Others "saw" smoke on the knoll. (Modern guns do emit white gases.) Finally, footprints were found behind .the knoll fence, and a policeman accosted a suspicious person behind the fence, who identified himself as a -Secret Service agent, even though no agent acknowledges being in that area. As Spector does not note, these facts, too, put the Kennedy conspiracy finding "In perspective." xv The Committee itself acknowledged that the term "conspiracy" had varying meanings and might be misunderstood, as Specter com- ments. Yet it also observed, rightly / believe, that It had a duty to be candid. If two per- sons acted Ip concert to assassinate the Presi- dent, that was a "conspiracy," no matter how unpleasant the word sounds. To have used some euphemistic variation would have been an unforturutte attempt to sugarcoat the truth. (We have enough of sugnrcoating by government now. That�and not the truth�is the cause of mistrust of govern- ment.) No one who reads the Final Report-- something I recommend to Specter as well as others who seek the truth�will fail to under- stand the proper sense in which the term was nsed. � e Specter is ght in saying that acceptant* of the acousjal study implies the acceptance of its ssssnatIon scenario. But he is egre- giously onAong in describing it. Specter's cal- cu1aUonre, for example, Imprecise: they sppsrettt do not reflect such distinctions as average-running time of the camera, cor- rected time of the tape, and time of trigger pull as opposed to time of impact According to the acoustical study, the first shot, not noted by Specter, occurred around Zapruder frame 158-181. It Is, as such, consistent with Governor Oonnallrs testimony, rejected by the Warren Commission, that he heard the first shot, reacted to it, but was not hit by It Connally can, in fact, be seen In the film to turn to his right at 162-167. (The startled reaction of -a little girl can also be seen in the background), The second shot occurred around 188-191. Contrary to Specter, Connanrs wrist is not In sight during these frames, much less high on his chest; from the configuration of his - --.., the wrist appears to be on - 01-K375) F-5 liven P.11.1. testing In 1684 Isibosted Site could he repeatedly shot at between and Ile mamas, using the telescopic sigh Using the open iron ideas, however, it possible, though difficult, to shoot the weapc at much faster pees. (I did it myelin 1.6) With familiarity with the weapon. ethic Oswald had, &course, man be added to epee( It la hardly "humanly impossible" to Ma the weapon as the acoustical study Milken It was shot. Specter also mislead, his readers In dis cussing the tree. Apparently, be has nevl seen a child run behind a picket fano While the child is "obscured," be can 1: clearly seen as be runs: the mind's eye fill In the details. In any event, the trigger pu: was probably 187, not 191, which is near te If not right at, the break in the foliage. Tb acoustical. study, therefore, hardly Implie "blind firing," as Specter suggests. When former President Ford appeared be fore the Committee, be was asked why tai work of the Warren Commission had falle: on such hard times. (80% of the America: people do not believe Oswald acted alone. The former President said it. critics had "de liberately Cl' negligently misled the America] people by misstating facts and omitting cru cial facts, . . ." He also noted that peopl, had not read the Warren Commission's Re port. Mr. Specter's piece seems to be follow. log in that tradition. /t also seems to be lest an objective study of the work of the Corn. mittee than an effort to vindicate a father, It also calls into question the quality of thf staff work that supported Congressman Ed. gar's dissent to the Committee's c0nsp1rac3 conclusions. Sincerely yours, G. ROSTIT BLLEXY, Professor of Law, (Former Chief Counsel and Staff Direc- tor, HSCA.) 1910 GENERAL LEAVE Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and in- clude extraneous material on the subject of the special order speech today by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Mrs- FEY) . � The SPEASEM. Is -there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mas- sachusetts? There was no objection. CONFERENCE REPORT ON 8. 1/37 - Mr. BINGHAM submitted the follow- ing conference report and statement on the bill (S. 737) to provide authority to regulate exports, to improve the effi- ciencies of export regulation, and to minimize interference with the ability to engage in commerce. Courtraiscx Raroirr (H. REPT. No. 98-482) The committee of conference on the dis- agreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the house to the bill (S. 737) to provide authority to regulate =Porte, to improve the efficiencies of export regula- tion, and to minimize Interference with the ability to engage in commerce, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the Senate recede from its disagree- September �7, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE II 8657 REPORT OP THE SELECT COMMIT- TEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Canada with dangerous nuclear radia- tion. They will honor those who riot in New York but shed not a tear or care a bit for the fireman or policeman's wife who mourns her husband, bet in a riot. They care not a bit for the pilot's wife and family when he is shot by the terrorist but let the terrorist die and they wM march in mourning. The left is the same all over the world and the American left identifies with other leftists time after time, issue after issue, and tech- nique after technique. Let the Soviet anion call for a ban on testing in the atmcephere and the Americari leftists march to the same tune. Now their tune Is antinuclear and watch them toe that line. An Anti-Israel and pro-PLO stance is the Communist line now. Watch the American left line up for Arafat. Of course, there will always be some dis- tinguished and line Americans who are .pro-PLO and pro-Arafat or antinuclear. I am not speaking of them. I am refer- ring to that gaggle of anti-American leftist minority groups which has con- sistently marched to the distant drum- mer from Moscow. - Note how an of these minority grout* adhere to those who propose violence as a solution to problems they perceive to confront us. Violence is being made 1 credible by the left. Conservatives have � &Ivan opposed it and we continue to oppose it. Beware of the traveling � minorities in and out of our country who advance the cause of terrorism and violence. Be even more careful of those who do it under the guise of civil rights or humanitarian concerns.* PERSONAL EXPLANATION (Mr. HANLEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Reccete.) � Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Speaker, / was unavoidably detained from Washington yesterday afternoon, September 26, on official Post Office and Civil Service Com- mittee business. / returned to the Cham- ber too lath to cast my vote on :oilcan No. 509, agreeing to the conference re- port on H.R. 111, the Panama Canal Act of 19191 Had I been present I would have voted "aye." I would have voted "no" on rollcall No. 510, the Rouaselot amendment to the temporary public debt limit bill and "aye" on rollcall No. 511, final passage of that measure. The House voted last week on both the Panama Canal bill and the public debt ceiling MIL At that time I was present In the Chamber and voted for both mesa- urea. I also served as a conferee on the Penal= Canal bill.* permission to extend his remarks at this (Mr. STORES asked and was given point in the Ramose and to include ex- traneous matter.) � Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, as the former chairman of the Select Com- mittee on Assassinatious, I rise to bring to the attention of My colleagues in- formation that they might find of inter- est. The final report of the committee as Well as its hearings with appendices are available from the Government Printing Office. I have received a number of In- quires about them. I include In the RSCORD at the gonclualon of my remarks the address that interested persons should write and the stock numbers and prices for the various volumes. Mr. Speaker. I also want to report to the House on another matter relat- ing to the work at the committee. / have been in touch with the Attorney Gen- eral's office and have arranged to meet with him to discuss what actions the Department of Justice will take in response to the recommendations of the committee. That meeting will take place after the various divisions of the Deport- ment have bad the opportunity to ana- lyze our work. I will report to the House the results of our meeting. Mr. Speaker, turning again to another subject, the work of the committee has not been received without controversy. That is to be expected in a free society. I regret to inform the House. however. that / see a pattern developing of unin- formed criticism. It is to be particularly regretted that some of this criticism stems from individuals associated with the Warren Commission. The commit- tee did not reach a harsh judgment on the work of the Commission. even though the committee concluded that the Com- mission was in error on the question of conspiracy in the President's death. The . committee concluded: MIriticiern leveled at the Commission had often been biased, unfair, and Inaccurate... (T]he Committee believed that the prevail- ing opinion of the Commission's performance was undeserved. (Final 'Report. p. 257) The committee also observed: Contrary to the allegations re some critics. the Commission was not part of a sinister Government cover-up of the truth. The Com- mittee found that the Commission acted in good faith, and %be mistakes it made were those of men doing the best under difficult circumstances. (letnal Report" 17- We) Nevertheless, Pu ...b11: ttee's report eriticii that baa made of reflects such a- found lack of under- standing of � port and its underly- ing evidence I am moved to az to our critics the obvious: First read, then criticise. In this connection, / would like to draw to the attention of my colleagues three recent. attacks on the report and replies made to them by the committee's former chief counseL I Include the follOwIng 111 the RiCORD: A Ilet of the volumes of the committee's report; and a, aeries of articles and let- ters dealing with the report. SUP011117U4DENT OF DOCURK1473, U.S 61)VEROWN7 PleNTING Mee, WASHINWON, Tide Hoek No. Pres hoolicstion et the AesadreSti of Mania lather Kiss. Jr., Ol3-070.04763-2 vaL ........... esomoim .... ------- 4 .1152470-00444 1st Sig &SO 4. le Tele Nee Ile. Prise Vol. 5 162-070-048754 5.75 Vol. 6 152-070-04376-0 LX Vol.? 952-17700.14714 7407s1 &ID Vol. $ 052 57$ Vs. 11 062-070-04491-1 Vol. 10 052-070-048994 t75 50 Vol. II Ma 12 V& 13 Investigation of Acrosiestios el John F. geonedy, hurley: Vail Vol 2 Vol 3 Vol. 4............_ Vol. 5 Vol. 6 Vol. 7 Ve. 1. ..... --. Vol.! Vol 10 Vol. 11 Vol.12 LeLs _Wks and Administrate, hearloes: ' �VOI..-1 Vol. 2 Radian and esconsroodeboss el hone Auseunatioos Con-. metes (final r�Polt; 11. &IA 98-Ill!, pr.* 052-070443004 6.50 162-070-04197-2 525 1152-070-04976-6 LX 652-070-04933-1 523 062-071-04904-0 4.73 052-070-04905-7 6.50 gil-0711-04906-6 1.00 052-070-049074 6.00 052-070-04977-4 6.50 052-079-04973-2 7. 1452-070-04871-1 7.50 052-070-04910-4 14.00 052-070-04911-2 5.50 062-070-04932-1 LX 052-070449634 11.00 b52-47"4114461 052-4170-049 /..201 052-071-00H04 6.50 Tied_ 172.15 - (The Ken.nedy Assaednation) Tan Smoice-Gurrseas &Imo= (By David W. Bella) On Friday December as, 1979 the BOUM Select Committee on Assassinations pub- lished Its -Summary of Findings and Recom- mendations.' The orchestration was perfect. The release was embargoed "until 12:00 mid- night, Saturday December 30, 1978 or for publication in A.M. editions of newspapers dated Sunday December Ili, I91&" The Committee wanted to make sure every Sunday morning paper In the United States carried a front-page story on the dramatic conclusion it had reached: There was an un- seen second gazunan otandbag In an area known as the grassy knoll who according to the Committee, fired a single shot at Presi- � dent Kennedy. Although the shot was from close 74nge-it missed President Kennedy; It missed Governor Connally and everyone else In the presidential limousine; It even missed the limousine. Neverthelees, a second gun- man automatically meant that there was a conspiracy In the assueinatIon of President Kennedy. To be sure the Committee was forced to conclude, as did the Warren Commission, that it was Lee Harvey Oswald who fired the shots that struck President Kennedy and Governor Connally. This was confirmed in the first section of the findings of the House Select Committee on Assassinations' L Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the Aassesthation of Presi- dent John P. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas. No- vember 22. igg& - A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at President John P. Kennedy. The second and third shots he fired struck the President. The third shot he fired killed the President. 1. President Kennedy was eia-uck by two rifle shots fixed from behind him. L The shots that struck President Ken- nedy from behind were fired from the sixth - floor window of the southeast comer of the Tessa School Book Depadtery Building. S. Lee Haney Oswald owned the rifle that was used to fire the shots from the sixth- floor window at the southeast earner of the Tessa School Book Depositary Bubag. 4. Lee Haney Oswald, alborily before the eassasination lied sexes to end was present on the sixth floor at the Texas School Book Depositary Building. L Les Harvey Oevrald's other actions tend to support the concattalon Cast he assassi- nated Meade= Kennedy. H 8658 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--HOUSE September LI, 1979 But then the Committee went on to state. In the -next division of its summary: B. Scientific acoustical evidence establishes a high probability that two gunmen fired at President John P. Kennedy. . . . When I first read the newspaper reports of the conclusions of the Select Committee. I was shocked at bow readily the Committee had swallowed hook, line, and sinker, the er- roneous testimony of the so-called acoustical experts. They initially claimed there was a 50 per cent possibility that a second gunman fired at President Kennedy. Later, this was changed to a 95 per cent possibility. But re- gardless of whether they say it was a 50 per cent possibility or a 95 per cent possibility, the truth is to the contrary. There was no second gunman. The only gunman seen at the time of the assassination was the gunman whom wit- nesses saw ere from an upper-story window of the Tessa School Book Depository (TSBD) Building. When the police went inside to search the building and came to that window, which was located on the southeast corner of the sixth floor, they found three cartridge cases. As the police continued their search in the TSBD Building, they found a rifle, stuck between cartons of books near the back stair- way on the sixth floor. Irrefutable ballistic evidence proved that the cartridge cases found by the assassination window came from that rifle, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world. Similarly. inside the presidential limousine there were two bent/414%11y identifiable frag- ments of the bullet that struck President Kennedy's head. These bullet fragments came from that rifle. At Parkland Memorial Hospital there was a nearly whole bullet that dropped off Governor Connallrs stretcher. This bullet came from that rifle. Who owned the rifle? Lee Harvey Oswald. It was relatively easy to trace the ownership of the rifle through the serial number. The Warren Commission obtained copies of the order blank used to purchase the rifle through the mail. It was in Oswald's writing. We had copies of the postal money order used to pay for the rifle. This was in Oswald's writing. The rifle was shipped to Oswald's post office box. There was another weapon shipped to that same post office box. This was the pistol used In the murder of Dallas Police Officer J. D. Tippit, which occurred approximately 45 minutes after the assassination of President Kennedy. I have called the Tippit murder the "Rosetta Stone to the solution of President Kennedy's murder." A Dallas citizen. Johnny Calvin Brewer. who worked in a shoestore near the scene of the Tippit murder, was the key witness in the apprehension of Oswald. He heard about the murder on the radio, then heard police sirens coming down the street and a suspicious- looking person duck into his store-front area and stay there until the polipe sirens ebbed. Then the person, who turnQ out to be Co- eval& left the aboestore and sneaked into the Texas Theater, a few doors sway. Brewer followed Oswald into the theater and had the cashier can the police. When the police arrived, the house lights were turned on, and Brewer pointed out Oswald. As policeman approached. Oswald pulled out a revolver. Carrying a concealed gun is s crime. The fact that Oswald had such a weapon on his person and drew it In those circumstances is, in itself, highly suspicious. Irrefutable scientific evidence proved that this revolver, to the exclusion of all other- weapons in the world, was the weapon that discharged the cartridge cases that witnesses saw the murderer of Officer Tippit toes away as he left the scene of the murder. In ad- dition there were six eyewitnesses who saw Oswald either at the Tippit murder scene or running away from it. gun in hand. and Who conclusively Identified Oswald as the gun- man. The combination of Oswald's actions at Brewers shoestore and in the theater, coupled with the scientific ballistics testi- mony linking this gun with the murdea of Tippit, coupled with the positive identifica- tion by six independent eyewitnesses, makes the sollition to the Tippit murder en open- and-shut case. There can be no doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald killed Officer Tippit. After Oswald was apprehended at the Texas Theater, he was taken to the Dallas police station and interrogated. Of the School Book Depository employees who were inside the building at the time of the assassination. Oswald was the only one who fled the build- ing after the assassination. During the course of his interrogation. Oswald claimed that he did not own the rifle found on the sixth floor of the TEIBD Build- ing. As a matter of fact, he claimed he did not own any rifle at all. The Warren Com- mission, in searching Oswald's possessions in a garage in the Dallas suburb of Irving, where Marina Oswald was staying with the Paine faintly, found a picture of Oswald with pistol and a rifle and also found a negative of the picture, as well as Oswald's camera. When Oswald was confronted with the pic- ture showing him holding a rifle, he claimed that it was not a genuine photo, but rather was a composite with his head on someone else's body. Oswald lied, as he lied about other key matters in the course or his interrogation. When one has a photographic negative and a camera, it can be determined whether or not that particular negative calme from that cam- era. Incontrovertible scientific evidence con- firmed the fact that this picture of Oswald -holding the rifle was taken with Oswald's camera, to the exclusion of all other cameras In the world- (Marins, Oswald admitted in testimony before the Warren Commission that she took the picture.) Meanwhile, no one saw a gunman firing from the grassy knoll area�although people were in a position to see the grassy knoll area at the time of the awassination. The area was searched and no cartridge cases were found. Finally, there was the overwhelming medical evidence that all the wounds to Governor Connally and President Kennedy came from bullets fired from behind�not from the right front, where the grassy knoll area was lo- cated. Governor Connally's physicians unani- mously agreed. The physicians performing the autoreit President Kennedy unani- mously a Assassin* sensationalists were not sat- isfied withdtbees conclusions. As a result, in 1968 Attposey General Ramsey Clark ap- pointed 1 pine' of physicians to re-examine the autopsy photogrephs. X-rays of President Kennedy. various moving pictures and other pictures taken at the time of the assassina- tion, and other evidence pertaining to the death of President Kennedy. This panel unanimously =dinned the findings of the Warren Commission that all the shots that struck President Kennedy came from behind. Assassination sensationalists still were not satisfied, and at the time of the Rockefeller ConimissiOn's investigation they asserted that there were C/A agents conspiratorially involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. In.support of this claim, these peo- ple asserted that a gunman bad fired at Pres- ident Kennedy from the front and that at least one shot struck Kennedy from the front. An independent panel of physidlans selected by the Rockefeller Commission reviewed the evidence once again. They unanimously reached the same conclusion: All the shots that struck President Kennedy and Governor Connally came from behind. The first chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations�Congressman ' Henry Gonzalez�fell victim to the misrepre- sentations of assassination sensationalists, asserting, at the outset. that � 0000nd gun- men had fired at President Kennedy. The Home Select Committee obtained yet an- Other set Cl experts to re-examine all the evidence. After months of investigation. the House Committee was forced to conclude that the Warren Oommission was right: all the shots that struck President Kennedy and Governor Connally came from behind and were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald's rifle from the sixth-floor southeast-corner window of the TSBD In the face of this overwhelnling array of evidence, one wonders why it was that at the very end of a multi-million-dollar investiga- tion the Houma Select Committee suddenly adopted the testimony Cl purported acousti- cal experts to reach the erroneous conclusion that a second gunman had fired at President Kennedy. Even if there were not overwhelming evi- dence to the contrary, common sense would question this testimony. /t is based on the single assumption that there was $ police motorcycle at Dealey Plaza whose micro- phone was stuck open and acted as a trans- mitter to the police radio tape at the Dallas police headquarters. Now, if the microphone had in fact beer stuck open, and if the motorcycle had is foot been located at Deeley Plaza,.-4.e., � the scene of the assassination�not onk would the microphone have recorded tis shots, but it would have recorded other /ow noises as well Immediately after the shots the motorcade accelerated sharply, and Tolle* sirens started blaring as it sped toward Park lend Memorial Hospital. Yet, on the recorder tape there is no sudden sound of motorcycle revving up shortly lifter the so-called state There is no sudden sound of police siren screeching as the motorcade started to ran toward Parkland Memorial Hospital. Accord ing to Harold S. Sawyer, a member Cl in House Assassinations Committee, polio sirens are not heard on the tape until ap proximately two minutes after the sound which the acoustical experts claim are th shots. Furthermore, when the police siren are heard, they appear to be approachini cresting, and then receding. Congreaman Sawyer, who has filed a dimes to the Committee's "Summary of Pindini and Recommendations," also points out the the tape (which is really a "Dictabelt") ale contains the faint sound of chimes. N chimes have been found that were in In at or near the scene of the assassination c November 22, 1963. On the other hand, the was one set of chimes which was regular used at the time of the assassination In e area between Deeley Piazza and Perkier Memorial Hospital. When this is coupled wil the sequence of the sirens' noise and the la4 of the sound of revving-up motorcycle el gines on the tape. it is consistent with t1 possibility that if there was a raotorcyc with a stuck microphone, it was located I away from the assassination scene. This pc sibility is enhanced because the poll recording of channel 1 shows that there v3 Indeed a motorcycle with a stuck micropho located far away froni Dealey Plaza. However, let us assume that the tape te made from the stuck microphone of a motc cycle at Dealey Plaza. Before jumping to t conclusion that there was a second gunnor one must first examine the assumptions up which the acoustical experts predicated th conclusions. If those assumptions wi wrong, as they were, then the whole accn tical house of cards collapses. For instance, In order for the acousti experts' basic assumptions to be correct, y have to assume that not only was there motorcycle in the motorcade whose mic phone was stuck open, but that *the poll man used the other channel channel I, stead of channel 2, the channel desigzusi for use by the motorcade. Furthermore, 1 acoustical experts, in performing their to September 27,1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD � HOUSE S. 8659 had to assume that the motorcycle was at a certain location at the tine of the shots, and there is no positive corroborating physical evidence for this assumption. Moreover there is a fundamental error un- derlying the entire reconstruction by the acoustical experts. It is demonstrated by the moving-picture film of the assassination taken by amateur photographer Abraham Zapruder. Each frame of this film was num- bered. A reconstruction of the assassination by the Warren Commission moved the presi- dential limousine down the street frame by frame. Not only were pictures retaken of this movement from the Zapruder location, but pictures were also taken through the tele- scopic sight of the assassination weapon from the southeast-corner window of the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository Building. This reconstruction showed that between Zapruder frames 188 and 210 there was a tree whose branches and foliage almost en- tirely obscured the gunman's view of the target. except for a brief opening at frame 188. Other evidence showed that the foliage was virtually the same at the time of the reconstruction sa it bad been at the time of the assassination. After frame 210, there was a clear shot. The camera speed was 18.9 frames per second. � Despite the fact that it was virtually im- possible for Oswald to see his target between frames 188 and 210, the acoustical tests were done on the basic assumption that the shot that passed through President Kennedy's neck and then struck Governor Connally was fired from the sixth floor of the TSIID Building between frames 190 and 200 on the Zapruder Wm. (Eventually frame 195 was used as a benchmark.) In making this as- sumption. the Committee staff ignored the common sense practicalitythat the gunman would not lire when his view was almost en- tirely obstructed by. a large oak tree, and when less than one second later there would be a clear view of the target�a view that would continue without any further ob- struction. Furthermore, the motorcade was moving relatively slowly�only 11 miles an hour�and the presidential limousine was leas than two hundred feet away from the assassination window. In essence, then, the acoustical tests were thus constructed to tin to force a square peg into a round hole by means of highly implausible assumptions.- House Committee members Samuel Drrine and Bob Edgar have, like Congressman Sawyer, indicated that they have great res- ervations about the second-gunman theory. In paicular, Congressman Edgar has con- sulted outside acoustical experts and has raised serious questions concerning the con- spiracy conclusions of the majority of the Committee and Its staff. There is yet additional evidence which refutes the second-gunman fiction of the House Committee. For instance, as I sum- marized during a February 4, 1979, appear- ance on Meet the Press, there were two im- pulses on the tape, approximately a second apart, which the acoustical experts say rep- resented the shot that first struck President Kennedy through the beck of the neck and then passed through to bit Governor Con- nally. The impulse on the tape that is at- tributed to the so-called second gunman� assuming that the tape was made in Dealey Plazs�is less than a second from the fatal shot that struck President Kennedy's head. When one takes into consideration the rever- berations of sound bouncing off the high buildings surrounding Deeley Plaza, the so- called third and fourth shots were really the impulse from the fatal shot that struck the Preeddent and a second impulse from the reverberations, similar to the two Im- pulses from the first shot that struck the President. Since the beginning of the Committee's investigation, I have repeatedly offered to come to Washington to testify before that Committee in an open public hearing. As recently as January 19. I offered to go to Washington at my own expense to testify and stated that I could show that the acoustical experts' testimony was wrong. But the Com- mittee never saw fit to call either one of the two Warren Commission counsel assigned to what we called Area II: the determination of who killed President Kennedy and who killed Dallas Police Meer J. D. Tippit In the course of my work with the Warren Commission, I had more first-hand contact with the key witnesses and the physical evidence than anyone else in the world. Moreover, I had served in 1975 as Executive Director of the Rockefeller Commission investigating the CIA, where one of the issues was whether the CIA was conspiratorially involved in the as- sassination of President Kennedy. I wanted to testify before the Committee In an open public hearing for several reasons. First, I believed I could make a major con- tribution because of my background and ex- perience. Also, I am very much concerned about the credibility of government In gen- eral, including the credibility and standing of Congress in the minds of the American people. / believed I could help to ensure that the investigation and final report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations would stand the test of history. To be sure, some of the conclusions of the House Committee are accurate: Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone gunman who fired the shots that struck President Kennedy and Governor Connally. He also killed Dallas po- lice officer .7. D. Tippit. Neither the CIA) the Secret Service, nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation was in any way conspiratorially Involved in the assassination. However, some of the Committee's conclu- sions are inaccurate�and particularly the conclusion that there was a second gunman firing from the grassy knoll. / am confident that examination of the entire record of the House Committee will not substantiate the theory of a second gunman. Nonetheless. when this inaccuracy is ultimately recog- nized, as I am certain it will be, in no way should the issue be forgotten, because the real import of the hasty adoption of the sec- ond-gunman theory is not just that the Committee was wrong. Rather, the crucial issue Is why the Committee was so wrong. believe there are two major reasons: 1. Almost all the investigation and hear- ings of the Comraintee were conducted be- hind closed dooraneThe press did not have an opportunity terreview and report to the American peopViehat was taking place over the twenty-amen multi-million-dollar in- vestigation, ekeept for some orchestrated public hearings in the fall of 1978. 2. The House Select Committee on Assassi- nation*, like virtually all congressional com- mittees, relied too heavily on its staff. It was the staff that basically led the Committee to reach its erroneous second-gunman conclu- sion. One may ask why the staff was so intent on finding a second gmuunan when the record as a whole did not sustain such a conclusion. One possible hypothesis is that this enabled It to kill three birds with ens stone. From a financial standpoint, this conclusion justi- fied the expenditure of millions of dollars by the Committee. From a psychological stand- point, It enabled the staff, consciously or sub- consciously, to justify its own two years of work. From a political standpoint, It took the heat off the Committee and its staff, because even though they said the FBI and the C/A were not involved, they did find a conspiracy, and they stated that their al- leged second gunman was unknown. This statement left the door open for continued attacks on the CIA and the FBI. In essence, the finding of a second gunman was a sop to the group of assassination sensationalists led by Mark Lane and Robert Groden, who for years have been proclaiming Oswald's inno- cence in books, radio and television programs, and lectures on college campuses across the country. There Is some corroboration for this hypothesis as to. why the Committee came to the second-gunman conclusion. For instance, there was great deference paid to assassina- tion sensationalists during the course of the entire investigation. There have been sug- gestions that some of these people may have been paid as consultants to the Committee, although I do not know this to be the feet However, I do know that one of the leading Warren Consionsion critics. Robert �soden. was given the opportunity to testify in an open public hearing, and that I was denied that same opportunity even though in re- cent years I have been called the leading defender of the Warren Commission report. In addition, we know that in its findings of conspiracy the Committee and its staff made a very important distinction between possible pro-Castro and anti-Castro involve- ment. With reference to the anti-Castro Cuban groups, the Committee's December 29, 1978 "Summary of Findings and Recommen- dations" states: "The Committee betimes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, than anti-Castro Cuban groups, as groups, were not involved In the assassination of President Kennedy. but the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved." (Emphases supplied{ On the other hand, with reference to in- volvement of the Cuban government or pro- Castro groups, the conclusion of the Com- mittee was' merely that: "The Committee believes, on the beats of the evidence available to it, that the Cuban government was not involved in the mutant- nation of President Kennedy." In other words, despite the fact that Oswald was an avowed Marxist and for years had professed great admiration for Castro both orally and in writing, the Committee made no reference to the posibilfty of pro- Castro groups being involved, nor did it even state that "the available evidence does not preclude the poseibility that individual members may have been involved," as It did with anti-Castro groups. The difference is particularly important in light of the de- termination by the Committee that It "Is unable to identify the second gunman or the extent of the conspiracy." However, although some people have ex- pressed to me their belief that all or some portions of this hypothesis may be true, it Is purely a matter of conjecture, and I would not adopt it as my own personal view. Rather I believe that the staff was just plain wrong, and that in its haste to meet various dead- lines it felled to take into consideration the overall record. When, on November 21, 1975, I called upon � Congress to reopen the Warren Commission investigation, I stated that there were two major reasons underlying my request: 1. I was confident them, as I am, now, that a thorough independent investigation would reach exactly the same conclusion reached by the Warren. r-nrrovillintall� the conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt. Lee Harvey Oswald killed both President John P. Ken- nedy and Dallas Police Officer .7. D. Tippit. / believed that a confirmation of this correct conclusion of the Warren Commission would greatly contribute to a rebirth of confidence and trust in government. 2. I knew that a thorough and objective reopening of the Warren Commission investi- gation by Congress would vividly Illustrate the processes by which the American public 118660 , CONGRESSIONAL RECORD�MUSE September 27, 1979 et Ulnas Can be misled by eensationalisin. demagoguery, and deliberate misrepresenta- tion of the overall reoord�techniques that have been used by virtually all of the most Vocal Warren Commission critics. I thought that the exposure of these techniques to the public could be one of the most Important results of the Congressional reopening of the Warren Commission investigation. Now I must conclude that perhaps an even more important problem has been ex- posed�the dangers of secret proceedings coupled with excessive reliance on com- mittee staffs by the Senate and the House. In a recent column James Reston wrote that congressional staffs are like an "unelect- ed hidden legislature": Over the years these staff members have taken on more and more responsibility� so much so that In some cases they not only Deem to assist their masters but to replace them. Staff members not only write speeches but conduct hearings, draft legislation, write committee reports, negotiate conference compromises between the House, mobilize public opinion, and advise lawmakers on bow to vote. In recent years, they have even been con- ducting investigations at home and abroad, sometimes on their own, without the pre genet of their chiefs. And with the rise of subcommittees, each with its own staff, the congressional staff bureaucracy has grown even faster than the Civil Services in many of the Executive departments. When the staff of so important a com- mittee as the House Select Assassinations Committee can allow an investigation of nearly two years to culminate In a hasty and erroneous conclusion, backed up by badly tilted evidence, one wonders what are the unseen consequences for the American people If the dozens of .other committee and subcommittee staffs, preparing studies on national defense, taxes, Inflation, education, health, agriculture, business, foreign policy, etc., are almllarle failing to apply high stand- Ards of objectivity and thoroughness in their Investigations and reports. I would suggest that the issue of the "bid- den legislature" is one which must be given high priority as we head into the last twenty years of this century. The need for examina- tion is particularly great when the staffs operate behind closed doers�without the check and balance of a free press. In reflecting upon my service as counsel to the Warren Commission and Executive Director of the Rockefeller Commission, I have developed a deep conviction that there Is far too Much secrecy in government. It was a mistake for the Warren Commission to hold all of its hearings in secret. When I served as Executive Director of the Rocke- feller Commission, I requested that the Commission hold open meetings whenever classified matters were not subject to dis- cussion. Unfortunately, my request was turned down by a majority of the members of the Commission. � Our Constitution provides for a checks- and-balances system of government. We all know of the inter-relationships among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches. However, during the past two � hundred years of our history, there has developed as an essential part of our free society a fourth check and balance, which Interlaces with and reinforces the tradi- tional Legislative-Executive-Judicial inter- relationships. This fourth check is a free press and the ability of that press to report to the American people the basic facts about the operations of their government. Toward the end of its investigation, the House Committee staff finally contacted me and asked that I testify in a nonpublic hearing when neither members of the Com- mittee nor membees of the press were pres- ent. I refused to appear behind closed doors and explained my position In a letter to the Committee and Its Staff. I concluded my letter with the following statement: ". . . Because I believe so strongly in the need for this fourth check and balance, I frankly do not want to participate in any secret hearing where members of the press are not allowed. I do not necessarily believe that every single one of your bearings should have been open to the public, but I believe there Is much over the past year and a hat that could have been open to the public, that was not. For me to now appear in a secret hearing would be to give support to a course of action that I believe to be un- sound and against the best interests of the people in a free society." The second-gunman syndrome of the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassina- tions is demonstrative evidence of bow a congrwrional staff can go wrong. Let us hope that even if the final report of the House Committee is modified, we will have learnt a lesson from the initial "Summary of Findings and Recommendations." That les- son is that we should curb the continued growth of power of congressional staffs, and we should do everything we can to prevent excessive secrecy in the operation of our government. SELICCT COILIATITI1 ON ASSASSINATIONS, U.S. Horse OP' RSPRZSENTATIVIS, Washington, D.C. May 6,1979. Emma, National Review, New York, N.Y. Dzsa Sre: David Relines piece, "Kennedy Secdnd Assassin, The $8 Million Myth." (Na- tional Review 27 April 1979) is right out of Lewis Carroll. Like the Red Queen, he ap- parently *believes in verdict before evidence. When he read a newspaper report on 29 De- cember 1978 that the House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations had concluded that there was a second gunman in Dealey Plata shooting at the President, he knew "the truth (was) to the contrary. There was no second gunman." find it difficult to understand how Mr. Dellis could be so certain of his facts if he had not reviewed the evidence on which the Com- mittee based its judgment. And be could not have so reviewed it by then, or since, for It will not be finally published until the lat- ter part of June, 1979. An unbiased verdict on the work of the Committee, therefore, Is nol yet possible. When I aoseptixt the position of Chief Counsel to the Select Committee in June of 1977, I restudiethe 1964 Warren Commis- sion Report .sM closely examined its 26 volumes of suptorting documents (the Select 'Committee willepublish, along with its final report, apprcemately 80 volumes of ma- terials on Zennedy and King cases), and I did not reach a personal lodgment about the validity of the Warren Commission's work until the Committee had completed Its investigation. � It is useful to review the Irresponsibility of Belin's piece. First, Belin suggests the acous- tical experts hired by the Committee are "so-called" or "purported" experts. Had he reviewed the Committee's record be would have found that the expertise of our acousti- cal witnesses had been repeatedly accepted In court, including in the Kent State prose- options and the analysis of the Watergate - Second, Belin suggests only one gunman was "seen." Here he misleads his readers with a half truth. A variety of witnesses "heard" the sound of shots from the grassy knoll, Including a Dallas Police Department officer and a Secret Service agent in the motorcade. In addition, a young couple on the knoll dropped to the ground at the time of the third shot from behind them, since they knew they were in the second gunman's line Of Are. Other/witnesses saw traces of smoke rise from the tried area, Where the acoustical experts say the third shot was fired from behind a wooden fences. The Warren Commission was unwilling to Credit this testimony in 1964, since it could not then be corroborated. The Acoustical evidence developed by the Committee in 1978 provides that corroboration; It now cells for a new evaluation of the 1984 evi- dence. Third, Bella points out that no cartridge case was found behind the fence. Why should it be when only one shot was fired? When Oswald fired one shot at General Walker on 10 April, 1969, no cartridge case was found, yet the Warren Commission did not use that tact to doubt the reality of the Walker shooting. Fourth, Belin questions If the tape record- ing records sounds from Dealey�Plaza. Why are crowd noises not audible? The micro- phone was mechanically insensitive to them. Why are not sirens heard immediately after the assassination? H.B. McLain, the officer with the stuck mike, did not leave the Plaza with the motorcade, and the sirens do not appear on the tape until he catches up with It on the Freeway on the way to the hospital. Why are chimes heard on the tape? The officer's mike did not have exclusive control over the police receiver at headquarters. Other mikes, if they had stronger signals, could also record sounds on the tape. Having asked questions about the other sounds on the tape, Bella leaves his readers � with the suggestion that the stuck mike may have been elsewhere, but he does not offer an explanation of bow four shots were recorded over the mike. No one has suggested that someone was ahooting somewhere else In Dallas that day. Moreover, the acoustical "fingerprint" (the echo structure of the supersonic bullet and the muzzle blast of the gun in the urban environment of the Plaza) of the four shots is unique, as "sci- entifically irrefutable" as handwriting anal- ysis and the ballistics- evidence he relies on In incriminating Oswald. For the sound re- corded on the tape to have been recorded from somewhere other than Dealey Plaza, the other place would have to have looked exactly like Dealey Plata. Two people don't have the same handwriting; two guns don't bade the same ballistic characteristics. Two places do not have the same echo structure. � Fifth. Belin says there is no "positive cor- roborating physical evidence" that the motorcycle was in the right place at the right time. Wrong. Photographs of McLain In the right place at the right time appear in our hearings (Vol. V. pp. 704-20). Sixth, Belin suggests that Oswald would not have fired, as he must have according to the acoustical evidence, at Kennedy at Z frame 195, since a large oak tree would have obstructed his view. Several points need to be made. He mis- leads his readers when he speaks of a "tree." (Apparently, also, he has never seen a child run behind a picket fence. While the child Is "obstructed", he can be clearly seen as � he runs; the mind's eye 1111s in the details. Still pictures taken through the -scope of a rifle mislead). In addition, the Committee's ballistics experts suggest the shot would probably have been easy to pull off using the open iron sight, a possibility not con- sidered in 1984. In any event, the acoustical evidence, in fact, points to the area around Z frame 185-88, not 195, as the time of the trigger pull of the second shot. The Warren Commission Report (p. 101) prints a photo of a break in the foliage at Z frame 186. Belin is wrong again. Seventh, Senn suggests that the two shots (numbers three and four) are really one shot and its echo. Here the question of ex- pertise is relevant. When Belin qualifies in . court as an acoustical expert., I will pay at- tention .to his expert opinion. Common sense, however, provides an easy answer to September f7,' 1979 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD�ROUSE 11 8661 his suggestion. What he Is really saying is � that the experts confused an eeho with the primary sound. The only trouble with that suggestion is that shot number throe from the grassy knoll can not be an echo Of shot number four from the Depository, since even a four-year-old child (including my own) knows that primary souoda precede, not follow, their echoes. Eighth, Bello complains that he was not permitted to testify before the Committee in public session. Several points need to be made. Belin was given an opportunity to appear in executive session or by deposition. U be had chosen to do so, he could have made his deposition public. Other Warren Commission counsel, including the general counsel and his principal assistant, saw nothing wrong with this procedure. In addi- tion, all members of the Commission and the general counsel. in fact, appeared before the Committee in public session. something Belin knows full well, since he appeared with former President Ford, who was a member of the Commission. The Committee decided not to call Bella as a witness in a public session because it. felt that he offered little to the Committee. Be had already written a hook, which he had forwarded to the Com- mittee and the staff. (I read it). .He had nothing new to say. Be did not play a par- ticularly key role In the work of the Warren Commission. His testimony about the workings of the Commission would have been cumulative. The Committee had already heard from most of his fellow staff counsel. In addition, his testimony about the basic facts of the Ken- nedy assassination was second hand. The Committee preferred to get its facts first hand. Ninth. Beth offers a theory as to why the Committee went wrong; he blames it on the staff, and says that the Committee's work was conducted in secret. Several points need to be made. I have been associated with the work at Congressional Committees for almost twenty years. No Cointnittee that I have ever worked with was more democratic, knowledgeable, or more in control of its awn processes than the Select Committee on Assassinations. Belin libels able men like Stokes and Devine of Ohio, Preyer of North Carolina. Dodd and McKinney of Connecticut, Plthian of In- diana, Sawyer of Michigan and Fauntroy of the District of Columbia, who labored hard on both cases. Indeed, the -Select Committee � was more democratic, knowledgeable, and more in control of its processes than was the Warren Commission. / make that judgment based on a two year study of the Warren Commission and personal experience with the Select Committee. Belin's suggestione...to the contrary cannot be similarly rooted in fact, since he has not made any -study of the processes of the Select Committee. His theory is like so much of what he complains about on the part of Warren Commission critics; it is not based outset. Bean's secrecy comment is ironic. The War- ren ekymmission held one day of public hear- ings. Benxi, who was Executive Director of the Rockefeller nommassion, was not able to persuade his own Commission to do much better. In fact, the Select Committee held almost forty days of public hearings on the evidence gathered in its two year Investiga- tion of the Kennedy and Ring cams, where the Committee's work was open to public scrutiny. The Committee's investigation was not held in public for reasons that are only too obvious. The reputations of living and dead men were at stake. The Committee had a duty to evaluate its evidence before It was made public. Belin knows the character of many of the allegations in the Kennedy case. Even though they are Irresponsible, they had to be Checked out, at least Confidentially. Would he have had the Committee do other- wise? Finally. It is Ironic that the area that Beim complains about most was, In fact, largely conducted in public. The tape and its preliminary evaluation became public in July 1978 at the time of the Committee's refunding. The acoustical reconstruction in Dallas in August 1978 was done with the media held back, Milt none the less present. The September public hearing that produced the 50-50 testimony was the first cut at analysis of the August scousticeal evidence. The work was finished in October and November and the 95% plus data developed; it was made public in December. The Com- mittee's processes were deliberate and largely public in the crucial area What else could the Committee have done? Lastly. Belin grumbles that the Committee 'suddenly" made up its mind at the last Minute. The Committee had the basic acous- tical evidence in July. It knew then what it portended. It all depended on what the final verdict of the scientists was. That came in November. 'When should the Committee have made up its mind, except at the end when all the evidence was in? When President Ford appeared before the Committee on 21 September, 1978, accom- pealed by Mr. Belin, he was asked by Con- gressman Devine why the work of the War- ren Commission had fallen on such hard times. The President identified three reasons:. First, he said that its critics had "deliber- ately or negligently misled the American people by misstating facts and omitting cru- cial facts. . ." Second, he suggested that many people were cynical. Third, he observed that people had not read the report. I suggest that Mr. Senn should take the advice of his client. The Select Committee should be accorded, at least from former Warren Commission staff members, better 'treatment than they themselves received. Mr. Bolin ought US do better in the future. Sincerely, - G. Rosner 81.�IncY, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, TEX' CASE AGAINST � CONSPIRACY (By David W. Belin) In early December 1978, the members of the House Select Committee on Assassina- tions were reviewing copies of a preliminary draft final report. After nearly two years of work and the expenditure of $5.8 million, they had concluded that Lee Enreey Oswald was the lane gunman who had killed Presi- dent Kennedy, woupded Tess Governor John Connally and kill* Dallas Police Officer J. D. Tippit. There erisigno conspiracy. It was a repsliq based on an investigation conducted inIckothst total secrecy, except for a few weeks nc hearings carefully or- chestrated py121. Robert Blakey, chief coun- sel of the committee staff. Less than three weeks Jitter, one of the biggest/lip-flops in recent Congressional his- tory occurred. The 800-plue-page report was rejected and on Friday, December 29, 1978, the committee approved � mine-page Sum- mary of Findings and Reebmmendations, which concluded that although. Oswald was the assassin, there was a conspiracy involv- ing an unseen second gunman. This invisible penman supposedly fired a single shot from en elevated portion of land known as the grassy knoll. located to the right front of the Presidential limousine. According to the com- mittee summary, this shot missed President Kennedy. Although the location of the claimed sec- ond gunman was barely 100 feet from the Presidential limousine, the invisible shot also missed Governor Connally and everyone else in the Presidential limousine; it even mimed the limousine. Who was this second gunnaan? Why would he fire only once? Why were no cartridge Oases found? The committee reverted to its Cloak of Secrecy, Merely promising � final report around the first of April. That dead- line was not met because Blakey and the remaining members of the staff were having trouble with their second-gunman theory. Three members of the committee did not agree with the second-gunman theory. which was predicated almost solely on the testi- mony of acoustical experts. Muller an expert had asserted a ISO percent degree of certainty in his conclusions. In the middle of Decem- ber. two new exerts came forward and de- clared, along with the original expert, that they were 95 percent certain. Despite the continuing doubts of three members of the Committee. the change in the experts' opinion from 50 percent oertainty to 95 percent was the cause of the flip-flop. Having served as counsel to the Warren Commission, / know that regardless of whether the acoustical ex- perts say they were 50 percent certain or 95 percent certain, they are nevertheless wrong: There was no second gunman. In the first place, all of the physical evi- dence points to a single gunman. Only one gunmen was seen at the time of the assassi- nation, and witnesses saw him fire from the sixth-floor window of the Texas School Book Depository. Three cartridge cases were found by that window; a nearly whole bullet was found at Parkland Memorial Hospital on Gov- ernor Connally's stretcher; and two ballisti- c:ally identifiable portions of the bullet that struck President Kennedy's head were found inside the Presidential limousine. Ballistic evidence proved those cartridge cases, the bullet and the bullet fragments all came from Orwald's rifle, which was found by the back stairway of the sixth floor of the Bobk Depository. His palmprint was on the rifle, his fingerprints were on the paper bag used to carry the rifle into the building, and he matched the physical description given by a witness who had seen the gusunan take aim and fire the last shot. Oswald had ordered the rifle through the Mall and had had it shipped to his post- office box in Dallas�the same place his pistol had been shipped to. He was apprehended with the pistol in his possession. This was the weapon he used to kill Dallas Police Offi- cer J. D. Tippit on November 22, 1083. ap- proximately 45 minutes after the assassina- tion of President Kennedy. Six eye witnesses conclusively identified Oswald as the gun- man at the Tippit murder scene. or-the man rimming away from the Tippit murder scene with gun in hand. In contrast, the acoustical evidence rests on a number of implausiple assumptions. Pot instance, if the Dallas police tape is a genuine tape of the assassination, why did It not pick up the sound of motorcycle en- gines revving up as the motorcade sped to- ward Parkland Hospital? 'Why are police sirens not immediately heard? Why does one hear the faint sound of chimes, although no chimes were found to be in use at or near the scene of the assassination? But even assuming the tape is genuine, the theory of the acoustical experts rests upon false assumptions made when the initial acoustical data were taken, including the location of the motorcycle At the time the first shot was fired. However, I believe there Is fin issue of far greater importance than-the technicalities, Of the acoutical evidence. That issue eon- earns the ramifications of ia secret Congres- sional investigation coupled with excessive delegation of powers to the committee staff. The ilOuse Select Committee on Assassina- tions is a microcosm of this compound prob- -lem. The committee's erroneous conclusion concerning Jack Ruby is the most vivid ex- ample of the pitfalls of this process. In The New York Times of Sunday, June 3, Wendell Rawls Jr. reported that, according to a "committee source,�the final report -"will Contend" that Jack �Ruby 'stalked" R86 ' CONGRESSIONAL RDOORD-110USE September In 1.7.0 " Lee Harvey Omani tram the hours Mate- sontertmos Where Ciewelli ins being tater- &lately after the ameminatioa min be killed viewed. "Rad I eitentled to kill WM." UMW Oseald on the Sunday litOrning following said. "I could be pulled My Niggle Cu the assasetnation. and that both &MY and lbe spot. because the gun was in my pocket" Oswald had contacts among organised crime The mil day. Roby viewed a telecast from Sgures. According to the source. "There is a new York City on which a Rabbi Samos asthstantlal body of evidence, a web of cdr- was present:4 on Kennedy and the mean- cumstantlal evidence. to connect the death 'anon- Ruby found this eery moving�so of the President to elements of organised much ii that be dressed went to his eat and crime" and the efforts of organised crime to drove to the site of the masiainstion, where retaliate against President Kennedy and his he walked by the wreaths that had already brother Robert Kennedy who was Attorney been placed there. General and who was Undertaking substert- Ruby told Rabbi Silverman about reading tial law-enforcement effort, against ergs- In the Sunday newspaper that Jacqueline nteed crime. Kennedy might ban to some beak for the Rawls also reported that "the committee trial of Lee Harvey Oswald. discounts Ruby's statement before his own Shortly before 11 am. on that Sunday death that he had killed Oswald so that the morning. Jack Ruby left his apartment President's widow would be spared � return -building to go to the downtown Western to Dallas, wee she might be forced to relive Union dace to wire some money to me of the shattering moments of the assassination his employees, Mink Lynn," who lived to as a witness at Oswald's trial." The commit- Port Worth. According to Rabbi Silverman, tee asserts that the story was "concocted by Ruby was under the impression that Oswald his lawyer." had already been transferred from the city It seemed the perfect end for the investl- jail to the county jail, but when he saw jxso- sedan. Who would defend organised crime? plc and policemen standing around the And, more particularly, who would defend police station he decided to return after he Jack Ruby. now that he is dead? wired the money at Western Union. If there had been a full series of Public The time stamp at the Western Onion =armee- the allegations of Rohr. involve- �Noe was 11:17 a.m. The ramp from the xnent in a conspiracy could never have been street leerung down to the besement where seriously sustained because of the testimony Oswald was to get into a vehicle for transfer of one person�a rabbi who was living in was barely a hear block away. Dallas at the time of the emaWmation and Ruby test the Western Union eines, . was who is the most Important living witness able to ran aooeee to the ramp when a on the issue of possible involvement of Jack policeman's back was turned, and walked Ruby in a conspiracy. down the ramp into the basement area His MIME is Rabbi Hied Si] Vernlan. Rabbi where members of the press were oongre- Silierman did not know Jack Ruby very well gated muting to see Oswald appear. Within before the assaasiration. but after Ruby shot a minute or two�at 11:91 A.M.�Oswald, Oswald he visited Ruby in the Dallas County tanked by poUce �dicers, stepped out of the :ail on an average of 0006 or twice a Week basement elevator sad walked through the and became extremely close to him- - dark corridor toward the area where Ruby During the investigation of the Warren and members of the press were standing. Commission, while Ruby was alive, Rabbi It all happened eery quickly. Plash bulbs (Silverman could_ not be eidisd uPon to and strobe lights temporarily blinded the t46� tit, becauselas intimate dextverattione police escort. Ruby generally -carried a gun. Detueen a wooever. Priest or rabbi and hie and when he saw Oswald, he took out his congragant are privileged. However, that pro- gun and pulled the trigger. The police bibition did not necessarily bind the Rouse wrestled Ruby to the Boor and he cried out. Select Committee on Assassinations, now ../ ern jack Ruby... that Sul* le dead- Yet�and this is bard te Prom that first triad on Nov. 25. Rabbi believe, but it is nevertheless true�the can- Silverman tried to see Ruby once or twice a =Mee staff, during the entire Innitimillion. week, vete Silverman left Dallas to accept dollar. two-year ineestigation- did' net wen a pulpit in Los Angeles In July Ifiet. When- to Saks Rabbi Silverman's testimony. Re ever Rabbi Silverman discussed with Jack would have testified had he been called. Ruby why he had shot Oswald, the answer Let us go back to Monday. Nov. 25, 1953. In essence was the same: in order to save after a weekened of national bereavement 3iirs. Kennedy from having to come back for . following the areassinatton of President the trial of lee Harvey Oswald. Kennedy. The place was the Dallas County - There were in Dallas�undoubtedly Jail, a relative!y unfamiliar location -for a majority bouseved that the murder Rabbi Mild Silverman to be called upon or oeusid pert of an overall conspiracy a member of his ConservaUve congregation. to " president Kennedy. pronely. The ett bronzed, handsome rabbi of CoCongrega- to when y aims Washington in early tion Shearth Israel in Dallas slid not relish January to serve as assistant counsel to the task. Nevertheless. be felt an obligation the wigren commevvinn s was onsuous to . to mil Won Jack Ruin, who, the daY before. Investigate such a possibeity. It WU not had committed a murder witnessed by mil- very f arf etched to assume that Ruby had lions of Americans on their television killed amid in order to _silence him, par- screens. � tkularly shape Ruby was a person who had The mine of lock Ruby's victim of course, contacts with organized crime. The posed- was Lee Harvey Oswald, who on the previous betty was sdhenced because Robert Ken- 'Friday, Nov. 22, had murdered both Preal- seedy as Attorney General bad declared war dent John P. Kennedy end Dallas Police on the underworld. - Officer J. D. Tippit. Therefore, on one of my Bret tripe to Dal- Pollee had Started to frill Ruby before he isia.-2 vatted Rabbi sneers:nen on an informal was able to reach a lawyer. Ruby told Rabbi Silverman that he remembered Leanne one of the poll:441Na% on Sunday, "I wee afraid that Mrs. Kennedy would be asked to return to Dalin for the trial." That single state- ment contradicts the dein of the Home committee staff that Ruby's story was "con- cocted" by his lawyer. There are imam other facts which also con- tradict the conductress of the House sem- =Mee. For instance, late on Friday Might liter the assassination. Roby went to the Dallas police station and walked Into a press basis. We had become Mends the previous =MOW on a study Merlon to Reset As one friend to another, I told Rabbi Silverman that I recognised that What was said in the intimacy of his conversations with his eon- sregant was privileged, but I wondered whether or not he had any question about ihe existence of a posdble conspiracy. Silver- man was IMequivocal in his response: 'Jack Ruby is absolutely innocent of any con- spiracy." I asked Rabbi Silverman if be was certain Of this. "Without a doubt," he replied. Al- 'ugh the tow or his Milos we Meet 4IM-;" Wing. and althea.I reallast that IWO envenom bat probably Demme item to Jock Ruby Ohm any other wawa in the world, / nervertheleis wasted some additional corroboration berme the investigation by the Warren OomentedOn. TM Most Obvious possibility was a polygreph. Cs' lie-detector, examinsition. Inside the Warren Commission, we bad already had a major debate about the use of a-polygraph. I had expressed to my colleagues my own suspicions that there might have been a conspiracy. For instance, the "single- bullet theory"--which has been corroborated by the Home Assassination Committee� men out of an attempt on my part to prove that there was more than one gunman. Eventually, after analysing all of the evi- dence, 2 determined that indeed there was only one gi usman and that that gunman was Lee Harvey Oswald. The medical experts of the House Assassination Committee, as well as an Independent panel of medical ex- perts selected by Attorney General Ramsey Clark In nee ;sad an. Independent paned se- lected by the Rockefeller Commission in 1972, corroborated the fact that all of the abate that struck President Kennedy and Governor Connally came from behind. The House committee corroborated the conclu- sion of the Warren Commission that the bullet that struck Governor -Connally first passed through President Kennedy's neck. Another area I was concerned about was possible knowledge of conspiracy or involve- ment in a conspiracy of Marina Oswald, the assassin's widow, and Jack Ruby. I wanted both to undergo polygraph testa, and started with Marina. In a written memorandum, / pointed out some inconsistencies In interviews with Ma- .rins with the PRI. and I also stated that a substantial portion of her testimony ma not subject to ordinary tests of credibtlity be- cause it concerned their life together In Imola. I also said that if under a poly- graph examination tt was to be shown that "Marta& had not been truthful in her tee- it mold Know an entirely new light on expects at the investigation." � snalority of the staff tined up against me. One member undertook research to prove the limitations of the lest and to prove that one could not blindly rely 'upon led results. In rebuttal, I admitted -that the polygraph test had limitations, but / argued that In large part those depended upon the quelifications and competency of the poly- graph examiner. Although a lie-deter test may not be admissible in a court of law, we were not In a legal proceeding but rather we were undertaking m Investigation, and urged that we mse the polygraph as an in' vestal:at/vs aid. Chief Justice Warren sided 'with the =scatty of the staff, and my re- quest was denied. � Onoe the conunlasion bad decided against ming a polygraph for Marina Oswald, / knew there was no possibility that the com- mission would consider asking that Jack Ruby undergo a lie-detector test. Therefore, 2 deckled to take matters into my own hands. Without the 1mo-sr/edge of Chief Justice Warren or anyone else eormeeted with the Warren Commission, I approached Rabbi Silverman directly. I told him that even though he was convinced -that Ruby was not Involved in a conspiracy in the asses- ablation, the weds] would never be con- vinced unless Ruby took a polygraph exaffi- Nation. I also told him that the Warren Commission would never ask Ruby to sub- mit to one and that the only way this could be acomplished would be to have Ruby himself make that request of the Warren Commission. Rabbi Silverman, of course, had a major dilemma. On the one hand, Ruby was rep- resented by legal counsel and It was up to September 17, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD�HOUSE R8663. the lawyers to decide whether or not Jack littzby would submit to the test. The test Could Undermine the level defines of tempo- rary insanity. On the other hand, Rabbi Sil- verman was absolutely convinced that Ruby was innocent of any conspiracy. and he rec- ognised that a polygraph summation would be a major step in convincing the people Of Dallas. In April 1964, Rabbi Silverman discussed his dilemma with me. My position was very simple: Ruby had already been convicted of murder. The situation could not be much worse. Surely, if he was innocent of any con- spiracy, he should come forward and volun- teer to take the test. nosily. Rabbi Silverman agreed to try to persuade Jack Ruby to ask for the test to coincide with his testimony before the War- ren Commission. On June 7, 1964, Earl Warren and Gerald Pord went to the Dallas County Jail to in- terrogate Jack Ruby. At the beginning of Ruby's testimony, he said, 'Without a lie- detector test on my testimony, my verbal statements to you, how do you know if I am telling the truth?" His attorney interrupted him and said, "Don't worry about that. Jack." But Ruby was not to be denied, and he continued, "I would like to be able to get a lie-detector test or truth serum of what motivated me to do what I did at that particular time.... Now, Mr. Warren, I don't know if you got any confidence in the lie-detector test and the truth serum and so on." Chief Justice Warren replied, "/ can't tell you just how much confidence I have in It, because It depends so much on who is taking it, and so forth. But / will say this to you, that if you and your counsel want any kind of test. I will arrange it for you, I would be glad to do that, If you want it. I wouldn't suggest a lie-detector test to testify the truth. We will treat you just the same as we do any other witnees, but if you want such a test, I will arrange for it." And Ruby replied. "I do want it." Ruby then described to Chief Justice War- ren his actions during the weekend of the assassination, Which culrninated In his kill- ing Lee Harvey Oswald. Just as he had told Rabbi Hillel Silverman about watching the eulogy by a rabbi on television on Saturday morning, Nov. 23, Ruby told Chief Justice Warren: "He went ahead and eulogized that here Is a micti that fought in every battle, went to every country, and had to come back to his own country to be shot in the back," and Ruby started crying. After regaining his com- posure, he continued and told about reading a letter to Caroline on Sunday morning in the newspaper. "And alongside that letter on the same sheet of paper was a small com- ment in the newspaper that, I don't know how It was stated, that Mrs. Kennedy may have to come back for the trial of Lee Ear- very Oswald. That caused me to go like I did. I don't know, Chief Justice, but I got BO car- ried away. And I remember prior to that thought that there has never been another thought in my mind; I was never malicious toward this person. No one else requested me to do anything. I never spoke to anyone about attempting to do anything. No =h- eartilye organization gave me any idea. No underworld person made any effort to con- tact me. It all happened that Sunday morn- ing. I'he last thing I read was that Mrs. Ken- nedy may have to come back to Dallas for trial for Lee Harvey Oswald, and / don't know what bug got *hold of me. I don't know what it is. but Pm going to tell the truth word forward," � Ruby then went into some detail about bow he happened to be at the scene. After telling about how he had gone down the ramp into the police station basement. Ruby said. "ion Wouldn't have though time 10 nave any conspiracy. .1 Manse It ha ter- rible thing I have done, and it eras a Stupid thing. but I lust warn carried away emotion- ally, do you follow that?" Chief Justice %wren replied, "Yes; I do Indeed, every word " Ruby then continued, "I had the gun In my right hip pocket, and Impulsively, if that Is a correct word here. I saw him, and that Is all I can say. I didn't care what happened to me. I think I used the words, 'You killed my President, you rat.' The next thing, I was down on the Soar". An the WOMB of Ruby, "I wanted to show my love for our faith, being of Jewish faith, and I never used the term, and I don't want to go into that�suddenly the feeling, the emotional feeling came within me that some- one owed this debt to our beloved President to save her the ordeal of comming back. I don't know why that came through my mind." As a matter of fact, although Ruby told Chief Justice Warren that he didn't "want to go Into that," and although Ruby was not particularly religious, Rabbi Silverman In a conversation with me recently said that when he first asked Ruby to tell him what hap- pened, Ruby replied, "I did it for the Jews of America." In his testimony before Chief Justice War- ren and Gerald P'ord, Ruby added one more facet to his story: "A fellow whom I sort of Idolized -is of the Catholic faith and a gam- bler. Naturally, in my business you meet people of various backgrounds. "And the thought came, we were very close, and I always thought a lot of hi= and I knew that Kennedy, being Catholic, / knew how heartbroken he was, and even his pic- ture�of this Mr. McWillie---dashed across me, because I have a greet fondness for him. "All that blended into the thing that like a screwball, the way it turned out, that I thought / would sacrifice myself for the few momenta of saving Mrs. Kennedy the dia- oomforture of coming back to rial." Warren asked Ruby whether or not he knew Oswald. Ruby replied, "No." Ruby was asked whether or not he knew Dallas Police Officer J. G. Tiptilt, who was murdered 45 minutes after the assassination by Oswald. Ruby said there were three Tip- pits on the force, but the one he knew was not the one who was murdered on Nov. 22. Ruby maintained, "I am as Inecieent regard- ing any conspiracy as any of you gentlemen In the room, and I don't want anything to be run over lightly." Six weeks later, on July 18, 1964, the War- ren Commission wade arrangements to have Ruby's testimoulif taken before a court re- Met porter while .41110 was undergoing a Bo- detector test. 'e man administering the was one of rblest In the field, FBI. poly- graph operaW Bell P. Herndon. At the very last minute, Ruby's chief coun- sel, Clayton Fowler, tried to stop the test. Be told Arlen Specter, the representative from the Warren Commitaion, that Ruby had changed his mind But Specter was not to be denied and had the bourt reporter start transcribing what was taking place. Reluc- tantly, Fowler admitted, "He says he's going to take this test regardless of this lawyers. and be says, 'By God, I'm !going to take the test.'" What did the test show? Accbrding to the test results, Ruby ei testimony before the Warren Commission was the truth. Also, ac- cording to the tan results, Ruby answered the following questions truthfully: Q. Did you know Oswald before Nov. 22, 1993? Q. Did you assist Oswald in the etessizins- tion? A. No. Q. Between the assastination and the shoottng, did anybody you know tell you they knew Oswald? A. Pio. Q. Did you shoot Oswald in Order to silents him? A. No. � Q. Is everything you told the Warren Com- mission the entire truth? A. Yes. Q. Did any foreign influence cause you to shoot Oswald? � A. No. Q. Did you shoot Oswald because of any Influence of the underworld? A. No. Q. Did you shoot Oswald in order to save Mrs. Kennedy the ordeal of a trial? A. Yes. Q. Did you know the TIpplt, that was killed? A. No. In 1975 there was a rebirth of interest in the Whole question of President Kennedy's assassination. A majority of the American people, it appeared, did not believe in the conclusions of the Warren Commission, and in November of that year I called for Con- gress to reopen the investigation of the assas- sination. I said that any thorough, objective Investigation would reach the same conclu- sion as the Warren Commission, that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone gunman who killed President Kennedy and Officer Tippit. I believe that a confirmation of this finding would contribute to renewed confidence and -trust in government, and I also believed that it would Illustrate the processes by which the American public at times can be misled by sensationalism, demagogy and deliberate misrepresentation of the overall record. Vir- tually all of the Warren Commission critics have used such techniques, and I thought exposing them to the public could be one of the most important results of the Con- gressional reopening of the Warren Commis- sion investigation. At that time, I also said that an objective, thorough investigation would disclose that Jack Ruby was innocent of any conspiracy. / believed that became of my discussions with Rabbi Silverman,' coupled with Ruby's testimony, the absence of any direct evidence linking Ruby with a conspiracy, the results of the polygraph examination, and because of one other factor, a happenstance, that changed the course of history. Oswald was scheduled to be transferred from the city jail at the police station to the county jail several blocks down the street at approximately 10 a.m. on Sunday, Nov. 24. Before the scheduled transfer, he was to undergo the third of a series of interrogations by Capt. Will Fritz, the head of the homicide section of the Dallas Police Department, and representatives of the Secret Service and the If no one else had joined the group, Oswald would have been transferred on schedule, long before Jack Ruby ever got downtown. However, another person entered the inter- rogation room Sunday morning. Be was Postal Inspector Barry D. Holmes, and he had helped the RBI, trace the money order that Oswald used to purchase the rifle with Which he killed President Kennedy. Holmes had also helped the P.BI. trace the owner- ship of the poet-office box that the rifle (and the pistol that Oswald used to kill Officer Tippit) was shipped to. When / took Inspector Holmes's testimony, I asked him: "Just what was the �maxim Of Your Joining this interrogation? How did you happen to be there?" Holmes replied: "I had been in and out of Captain 'Pritz's office on numerous oc- casions during this two-and-a-half-day period. "On this morning I had no appointment. I actually started to church with my wife. I got to church and I said, 'Yon get out. I am going down and see if / can do something for Captain Fritz. I imagine he is as sleepy 1118 GM.' U8664 CONGRESSIONAL RBOORD-410t1SE Septeniber f7, 1979 "So I drove directly on down to the police Manta and walked lit'and as I did. Captain Frits motioned to me and mid, We are getting ready to have a last interrogation with Oswald before we teenager him to the county jail. Would no like th join us? I said. 'I would.' After Captain Frits, the representative of the Secret Service, and also an FBI. agent who was present. linter:ad their Interrogation of Oswald, Captain ?rite turned to his friend. Postal Inspector Holmes and asked whether or not Holmes wanted to interrogate Osersid. While the Invitation from Captain Fritz was highly unusual, Holmes jumped at the op- portunity, and the interrogation continued for another half hour or more. Ruby shot Oswald approximately five min- utes after he, Ruby, left the Western Union Mice. Had Inspector Holmes continued on to church with his wife that morning and not at the last minute joined the Interrogation session with Oswald, the length of interroga- tion would have been shortened by more than half an hour. Jack Ruby would never have had the opportunity to kffl Oswald. In early June 1979. when I read for the first time that the House Committee staff Was asserting that Ruby may have been in- volved in a conspiracy and that Ruby's law- yers "concocted" his claim that be ehot Oswald In order to save Mrs. Kennedy the ordeal of coming back to Dallas, I Imme- diately wrote Chairman Louis Stokes of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. As I bad done on previous occasions going back to March 9, 1977, I asked for an oppor- tunity to appear before the House Select Committee in a public session- Chairman Stokes never replied to my initial letter. I wrote him and the other members of the oommittee on Nov. 22, 1977, and I received a reply from Representative Richardson Preyer, *halm= of the subcommittee dealing with the assassination of President Kennedy. Con- gressman Preyer wrote: 'Bob Blakey and I have discussed your appearance before the committee and be =sures me that be plans So Invite you." Finally, in July 1978, a committee itself number requested that I cons to Washing- ton to appear, not before the committee but before members of the staff in a dosed hear- ing. I have bed long experience with closed hearings, going tack to my service as counsel to the Warren Crozombelon in 1964 and in 1976 as executive director of the Rockefeller Commission Investigating the CIA. I felt it was a mistake for the Warren Commission to hold all of its hearings In secret, and I spe- cifically requested that the Rockefeller Com- mission hold open meetings when classed matters were not under discussion. Unfor- tunately, my request was turned down by a majority of the members of that commission. Like the members of the Warren Commission, they wanted everything to be contained In one final report rather than released piece- meal. I reviewed lids by telephone with the fiat of the House committee and then wrote a letter, with copies to each member of the committee, in which I declined to appear in a secret session. 'In that letter. I concluded: "I happen to have a deep philosophical con- viction of the need for more openness in gov- ernment and particularly the opportunity for a free press to report on the activities of government wherever possible. "I do not necessarily believe that every single one of your hearings should have been open to the public, but I believe there is much over the past year and shelf that could have been. For me now to appear in a secret hearing would be to give rapport to a course of action that I believe to be unsound and against the beet interests of the people In a free society. 'Therefore, I must nepectgully doable your request to appear at a secret witheng Where neither the press nee meinbeis ef the mlttss are present. However, I would be way happy to come to Washington to appear 'In an open public bearing before your entire soornOttee. I believe that there is a major contribution that I can make because of my background and experience (although I am naturally d)sappotnted that I was not called earlier when I believe I could have made an even greater impact before your inthetiga- non 14166 substantialy completed)." The committee staff was Mates/it In its position. They said there was not enough time for me to appear before the committee, and they also refused to have any public bearings other than those that were per- sonally orchestrated by the staff . Finally, in an effort to break the logjam, I agreed to appear before the staff, .rather than the committee Itself, as long as it was an open bearing. However, train firsthand experience with the Warren Commission and Rocke- feller Commission, I know (and advised the members of the committee) that the flepod- � hone or testimony of witnesses Where com- mittee members are not present does not have nearly the impact that testimony be- fore the committee Itself does. Blakey re- fused to allow members of the press to be present at a staff meeting; therefore, I did not appear. . _ Assassination sensationalists were permit- ted to testify before the committee and were Included in the limited public hearings, where they made their many false claims. But the oommittee never gave me a cor- responding opportunity, although In recent years I have been called the leading de- fender of the Warren Commission Report. I know that there were many Wes where I could have made a major contribution to the committee if I had bad the opportunity to appear, particularly became of Lar unique position as the only person in the world who served with the Warren Commission who also served with the Rockefeller Commission and saw everything in the files of the CIA. concerning the assaminetion at President Kennedy. Bared upon my experience In two of the most widely publicized commissions at this century, It is my firm conviction that One of the greatest dangers to _oar freedom Is excesstve secrecy and the harm It does to the vital check-and-balance system of a democratic society. The way Congressional staffs work today compounds the problem. These staffs, in the words of James Reston, have beware like "hidden legislatures," op- erating beneath the curfew*, conducting in- vestigations tqThe name of, and on behalf -of, elected reeentativee who themselves do not he enough time to perform the 'lark. Tit Jiaff Members feed questions to the reptellintatives, write reports in the name of 'the representative and lead the etle�cted representatives of the people clown a primrose path until it to too late for the representatives to do anything. The House-Select Committee on AB681;51- zuctions is a microcosm of Capitol H111. I know that the report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations will not stand the -test of history. When people examine itrch failures as the absence of any testimony from Rabbi Silverinan,Ine failure to consider the happenstance of Poised Inspector Holme's missing church that fateful Sunday morning, end an of the- other inadequacies that will come to light, the folly of the Tonatimillion- dollar supersecret Investigation will become dear to all. This report should stared as a 'perpetual monument to the tinderbox combination of excessive powers of Congressional staffs, combined with the excessive deagers of ultrasecrei investigations. Only through a vibrant free pre= can these dangers be overcome. And they must be evercome V Ude wowary Is es We able to deal effeatively With Use naticasi prob- lems facing sew eisalety Deer the am 90 pars and beyond. 41�����=MI Corona. Law &soot. Maas. XS. July ZS, Mt. New York Times Magazine, Pew York, PCT, Dem Ste: David Belin's piece Mlle Case Against Conspiracy," T/16/79) Is out of Carroll's Alice in Wonderland. As the Red Queen, be believes in verdict before evi- dence; he "knew" the Select Committee on Assassinations was wrong about a second gunman shooting at President Kennedy "before he read the Committee's Final Report. These interested In the truth Should read the Report. Mr. Belin's piece reflect. .prej- udice and seriously misleads through half- truths and false 'Wei:ante. Ilret, Mr. Senn suggests that the Commit- tee's finding was based "almost solely" on acoustic testing, yet he does not review the additional evidence. On the other hand. when be observes that the physical evidence (other than the acoustical) points to a sin- gle gunman�It does not negate a second gunman�he sets out additional testimony. Mr. Rein, therefore, presents a distorted picture. In fact, a policeman, a Secret Serv- ice agent, a Korean War veteran (over Whose bead the third shot was fired), among oth- ers, said they beard the knoll shot. Others saw smoke. (Modern guns do emit white gases.) Footprints -were also found behind the knoll fence, and a policeman accosted, but released an individual behind the fence, who identified himself as a Secret Service agent, even though no agent's acknowledged having been there. Second, Mr. Rein initially questions: 'why no cartridge case? If only one shot is fired, aci ease need be ejected. Why only one shot? Oswald's third shot hit the President's head .7 of a second after the second gunman fired. Obviously, the knoll gunman thought be had killed Kennedy. Why fire again? Why no motorcycle sounds on the tape -of the nice to Parkland? They are, in fact, present Why no police sirens heard Immediately? The Meer remained in the Plana for a time. Why a chime? The police headquarters Tecietver could record sounds from more than one mike. The chime was elsewhere. Sir. Bella then suggests the motorcycle itself was elsewhere, even though the Com- mittee published photos of the officer in the Plaza in the right plats at the right time, and the authenticity of the tape is estab- lished by other scientific evidence, as noted tally in the Report. Third, questioning the Committee's rejec- tion of Ruby's supposed motive: to save Maw. Kennedy form having to return for a trial, Mr. Senn suggests Ruby was not part of a conspiracy. Rabbi filiverman's testi- mony tbat Ruby told him he had told a policeman of the motive before he saw his lawyer may be accepted without question. (Special Agent Sorrels so told the Warren Commission.) In tact, Ruby probably lied to his Rabbi and Agent Sorrels about his true motive. But Sliverman's or Sorrel's tes- timony is not determinative of the ultimate Issue. The Committee cedy found that Ruby's 1967 note to his second lawyer 'sug- gests that the =dive was false, not that It was wholly fabricated by the first lawyer. Fourth, to underwrite -the motive story, Belin points to a 1964 polygraph, given by one of the FBI's "airiest". He does not note that Ruby was diagnosed as a "psychotic depressive" and that the PSI. in fact, recom- mended that the Common not rely on the test, � recommendation the Verret' Commission followed- Did Bella fail to read the Warren Report, too? Since Bella did not read our Report, be also did not know that