DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 7/3 INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATED ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01035142
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2020
• Case Number: F-2014-02257
• Publication Date: June 5, 2003

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 7/3
(U) INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Effective 01 July 1999)
(Administratively updated 5 June 2003)
1. REFERENCES.
a) (U) DCID 5/1, "Espionage and Counterintelligence
Activities Abroad," 19 Dec 1984
b) (U) NSCID 5, "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence
Activities Abroad," 19 Dec 1984
c) (U) NSCID 6, "Signals Intelligence," 17 Feb 1972
d) (U) NSD 42, "National Policy for the Security of
National Security Telecommunications and Information
Systems," 05 Jul 1990
e) (U) Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 (PDD-63),
"Critical Infrastructure Protection," 22 May 1998
f) (u) Memorandum of Agreement on Oversight Board for
Private Sector Relationships, 05 Jun 1998
g) (U) Charter of the National Special Communications
Working Group (NSCWG), 07 Jan 1997
h) (U) Memorandum of Agreement concerning Deconfliction of
Computer Network Operations (CNO), 01 Jul 1999
i) (U) Charter of the Bilateral Information Operations
Steering Group (BIOSG), 14 Apr 1998
j) (U) DCID 5/6, "Intelligence Disclosure Policy,"
30 Jun 1998
k) (U) National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, as amended
1) (U) Title 10, U.S. Code (Armed Forces)
m) (U) MOA Between DoD and the IC Regarding the Information
Operations Technology Center (IOTC),
04 Mar 1997
n) (U) Concept of Operations (CONOP) for the Information
Operations Technology Center (IOTC),
04 Mar 1997
o) (U) Title 50, U.S. Code
2. PURPOSE.
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(U) This directive sets forth the responsibilities of
Intelligence Community (IC) components in the conduct and
coordination of:
� (U) Information Operations (IC)),
� (U) Intelligence and related support to IO, and
� (U/4gettil Deconfliction of specific computer network
operations (CNO) conducted by National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) agencies.
3. AUTHORITIES.
(U4P,ei:Nr) This DCID does not affect the authorities,
responsibilities, and restrictions relating to components of the
IC and the Department of Defense (DoD) that are set out in
existing statutes, executive orders, and policy directives such
as Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), National Security
Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other DCIDs, in
particular the requirements under reference (a) for coordination
of espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad. This
DCID clarifies the DCI authorities under which IC elements may
carry out computer network attack (CNA) and computer network
exploitation (CNE) using NFIP funds.
4. DEFINITIONS.
A. (U) The definition of information operations (I0) is:
"Actions taken to affect adversary information and information
systems while defending one's own information and information
systems."
B. (U/AP&Udr) Information Operations is an integrating strategy.
Although still evolving, the fundamental concept of IO is to
integrate different activities to affect decision making
processes, information systems, and supporting information
infrastructures to achieve specific objectives, as well as to
protect and defend friendly information and information
infrastructures. IC 10-related activities include CNE and other
supporting intelligence activities.
5. DISCUSSION.
A. (U/LF-Gee") The concept of Information Operations (I0) emerged
against the backdrop of the explosive growth of information
technology. IO has made use of electronic warfare (EW),
psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, operational
security (OPSEC), and physical destruction. The rapid spread of
computers and computer networks has led to their inclusion as
instruments for attacking and influencing information
infrastructures.
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B. (U/LE-0W.140) Computer network operations (CNO) comprises
computer network exploitation (CNE) -- denoting a broad range of
intelligence collection activity; computer network attack (CNA) -
- denoting attacks on computer systems and networks; and computer
network defense (CND) -- denoting actions taken to protect U.S.
computer systems and networks and possibly those of allies and
coalition partners. CNE is an intelligence collection activity
and, while not viewed as an integral pillar of DoD IO doctrine,
it is recognized as an 10-related activity that requires
deconfliction with IO. There are interdependencies and
relationships among CNE, CNA, CND, and other IC activities in
support of IO which may require mechanisms to ensure proper
deconfliction or coordination among those NFIP funded IC elements
that engage in these activities.
C. (U//-Fetter) IC IO activities include conducting, with proper
authorization, covert action, including CNA. IC elements
authorized to conduct CNA under DCI authorities in peacetime will
be specified by a Presidential Finding.
D. (U) IC 10-related activities include:
� (U) Collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence on IO.
� (U) Conducting CNE, in accordance with the authorities
described in references (b) and (c).
� (U) Supporting other U.S. government organizations in the
conduct of their IO missions.
� (U) Ensuring effective warning and defense against IO.
� (U) Performing computer network defense (CND) activities
commensurate with established legal statutes or the
technical direction provided by NSA/CSS, as specified in
reference (d), or the National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC), as set forth in reference (e).
6. DECONFLICTION.
A. (U) While this DCID does not address every contingency, IO
and 10-related activities specified in paragraphs 6.0 and 6.D
shall be deconflicted and mutually supporting. Deconfliction
mechanisms shall be established to guarantee compatibility within
areas of common concern.
B. (U) To support the establishment of deconfliction processes,
it is important to initially identify the
applicable authority for an action so that activities can be
conducted within an appropriate legal context and oversight
requirements can be satisfied. The nature and the context of an
activity will determine the applicable legal authority for the
activity (i.e., the authority under which an activity is
conducted). The following guidelines shall apply:
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1) (U) The criterion for identifying the applicable
authority for a proposed activity shall be the "primary
purpose" of the activity. For example, if the "primary
purpose" of an activity is foreign intelligence (Fl)
collection, Fl collection authorities shall prevail,
notwithstanding the fact that the activity may have other
purposes.
2) (U) The nature and context of the activity, and not the
U.S. Government entity that conducts it, shall determine the
applicable authority.
C. (,%4-7'117) The Oversight Board for Private Sector Relationships
(reference f) and the National Special Communications Working
Group (NSCWG) (reference g) exist to deconflict mission related
industrial relations and special communications, respectively.
They shall be expanded to include new membership as appropriate.
D. (0.4431?) CNA/E Deconfliction process. CIA and NSA will
jointly manage, as an IC service of common concern, an
Interagency Target Register (ITR) to deconflict IC CNA and CNE
operations. IC elements conducting CNA or CNE operations under
DCI authorities shall deconflict their operations within the ITR
structure according to ITR procedures and appropriate access
negotiated with the principal signatories to the MOA cited in
reference (h). The IC recognizes a need to establish procedures
for deconflicting CNE activities with other appropriate U.S.
agencies.
7. IMPLEMENTATION.
(U) Except where covered by existing policies, IC 10-related
responsibilities are listed below.
A. (U) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management (DDCl/CM) shall:
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1) (U) Serve as the IC focal point for IO strategic
planning and policy coordination within the IC and
with the Bilateral Information Operations Steering
Group (BIOSG) (per reference i).
2) (U) Represent IC organizations that are not already
represented on the BIOSG.
3) (U) Provide administrative and staff support to
the Secretariat of the BIOSG (per reference i).
4) (U) Oversee implementation of this DCID.
B. (U) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research (I&R) shall:
1) (U) Support the Chiefs of Mission in their review of
the implications of contemplated IO for foreign
affairs and diplomatic relations pursuant to reference
(a)
2) (U) Pursuant to reference (j), review the
implications of contemplated sharing of intelligence
on foreign IO programs with allies or other foreign
entities.
C. (U) The National Intelligence Officers (NI0s) for Warning
and for Science & Technology shall jointly provide the DCI
and other IC elements with appropriate strategic warning
against IO.
D. (U) Consistent with the National Security Act of 1947
(reference k), the DCI has assigned the following tasks,
which, pursuant to 10 USC 113 (reference 1), the Secretary
of Defense has directed the DoD components listed below to
execute.
1) (U) The Director, National Security Agency/Chief
Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CCSS) shall:
i. (U) Integrate CNA, CNE, and CND tools,
techniques, and technology into the SIGINT and
INFOSEC communities.
(U) Train, equip, and organize the U.S.
Cryptologic System to support the CNE, CNA, and
CND requirements needs of its customers.
iii. (U) Provide 10-related military targeting
support.
iv. (U) Provide intelligence gain/loss assessments in
response to CINC IO targeting.
v. (U) Develop and support analytic modeling
and simulation techniques to support CNA/CNE
efforts.
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2) (U) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
(D/DIA) shall:
i. (U) Ensure that DIA is postured to support
the full range of IO activities, both offensive
and defensive, including psychological operations,
military deception, electronic warfare, computer
network operations, operations security, and
physical destruction.
(U) Train and equip the Defense HUMINT Service
(DHS) to support the IO requirements of its
customers.
iii. (U) Provide 10-related military targeting
support.
iv. (U) Perform all-source analysis, production,
dissemination, and provision of military and
military-related intelligence on foreign
information infrastructures and foreign
information threats for the Secretary of Defense,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, other defense components,
and, as appropriate, non-defense agencies.
v. (U) Pursuant to existing DoD directives,
instructions and other guidance, conduct Human
Factors intelligence support for the full range of
IO.
vi. (U) Pursuant to DoD requirements, provide
strategic indications and warning for IO.
vii.(U) Provide political-military assessments in
response to CINC IO targeting.
3) (U) The Director, National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (D/NIMA) shall:
i. (U) Conduct imagery and geospatial analysis
to identify critical foreign information
infrastructures and assess their
interdependencies.
(U) In partnership with other IC elements,
provide targeting support to IO. This includes
identifying physical targets, developing targeting
packages and preparing combat assessments.
iii. (U) With approved tasking, help identify
vulnerabilities to key U.S. infrastructures (CONUS
and OCONUS) in order to contribute to more
effective defensive IO practices.
iv. (U) Provide other imagery and geospatial
information support to IC and DoD IO efforts in a
timely and effective manner.
v. (U) Ensure IO requirements are included in any
delineation and assessment of future requirements.
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5) (U) The Director of the Information Operations
Technology Center (D/IOTC) shall execute
responsibilities in accordance with references (m) and
(n).
E. (U) The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (D/FBI)
shall:
1) (U) Provide available, releasable information
and operational support that may assist in the
planning or execution of an IO activity by IC
and DoD.
2) (U) Assist other agencies in assessing the risks of
planned IO activities to the U.S. information
infrastructure.
3) (U) Keep the U.S. private sector and Government at
all levels informed of threats to the U.S. information
infrastructure that may arise from IO activities
without divulging U.S. plans or intentions.
4) (U) Develop and deploy tools to reduce the risk of
penetration, corruption, and disruption of critical
U.S. information systems and networks.
5) (U) Investigate IO intrusions and attacks against
information networks and systems in the United States.
F. (U) All IC Element Heads shall:
1) (U) Provide the DDCl/CM with the information
required to assist the DCI in implementing this
directive.
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2) ,her Cooperate closely with the IOTC to ensure
consistency between the CNA and dual purpose (CNE)
techniques contained in the Toolbox and any other
developing or employed capabilities.
3) (U) Take reasonable steps to protect their own
systems from hostile CNA and CNE.
8. REVIEW.
(U) The DDCl/CM shall coordinate the IC's annual review of this
DCID for currency and completeness.
//s// George J. Tenet July 1, 1999
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATE
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APPENDIX A
Definitions of Terms Used in this Directive
Computer Network Attack (CNA): (U) Operations to manipulate,
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks
themselves.
Computer Network Defense (CND): (U) Efforts to defend against
the CNO of others, especially that directed against U.S. and
allied computers and networks.
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE): (U) Intelligence collection
and enabling operations to gather data from target or adversary
automated information systems (AIS) or networks.
Computer Network Operations (CNO): (U) CNE, CNA, and CND
collectively.
Covert Action: (U) Refer to Section 503 of the National Security
Act of 1947, Title V (50 U.S.C. 413-413b) (references k and o)
and related legislation. [Related legislation includes the 1991
Intelligence Authorization Act and 102d Congress Report SENATE
First Session 102-85 and House Conference Report 102-166.]
Section 503 refers to covert action as, ". . . an activity or
activities of the United States Government to influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is
intended that the role of the United States Government will not
be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--
(U) . . . activities the primary purpose of which is to
acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence
activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain
the security of United States Government programs, or
administrative activities;
. . . traditional diplomatic or military activities or
routine support to such activities; . . . traditional law
enforcement activities conducted by United States Government
law enforcement agencies or routine support to such
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activities; or . . . activities to provide routine support
to the overt activities . . . of other United States
Government agencies abroad." (Special Activities is a
euphemism for covert action; as such it is redundant to
include it here.)
Deception: (U) Those measures designed to mislead an adversary
by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to
induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
Electronic Warfare: (U) The use of electromagnetic and directed
energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an
adversary.
Human Factors: (U) The psychological, cultural, behavioral, and
other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow
of information, and the interpretation of information by
individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization.
Information Operations (I0): (U) Actions taken to affect
adversary information and information systems while defending
one's own information and information systems.
Information System: (U) The organizations, personnel, and
components that collect, process, store, transmit, display,
disseminate and act on information.
Operations Security (OPSEC): (U) A process of identifying
critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions
attendant to military operations and other activities to: a.
Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary
intelligence systems; b. Determine indicators hostile
intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or
pieced together to derive critical information in time to be
useful to adversaries; c. Select and execute measures that
eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of
friendly actions to adversary exploitation.
Physical Destruction: (U) Referred to in Joint military doctrine
as one of the core disciplines of IO. Note: Not all physical
destruction is 10 nor related to it. Physical destruction can be
used to further tactical, operational, and/or strategic 10
objectives. Examples include destroying command and control
facilities, communications links, and components supplying energy
to power communications.
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Psychological Operations: (U) Planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations
or PSY0Ps is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and
behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.
Special Communications: (U//ZWEtP10) The relay of U.S. government
or allied signals from or into areas typically characterized by
an intense counterintelligence or operational security
environment, usually in support of covert or clandestine
intelligence or military operations, or sensitive overseas law
enforcement activities.
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