SUPPLEMENT 5 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01316401
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: May 23, 2025
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2025
• Case Number: F-2013-00646
• Publication Date: October 24, 1962

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SUPPLEMENT 5
TO
JOINT EVALUATION OF
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA
PREPARED BY
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
National Photographic Interpretation Center
2200 HOURS
24 OCTOBER 1962
This report Is based on relatively complete photo inter-
proration of U-2 photography made on:
14 October 1962 Mission 3101
15 October 1%2 Missions 3M 8: 3103
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,
3107, 3108, & 3109
18 October 1962 Mission 3111
19 October 1962 Mission 3113 & 3114-
20 October 1962 Mission 3115, 3116 & 3117
22 October 1962 Mission 3118 & 3119
and on relatively complete photo Interpretation of low-level
photography of Missions 5001 through 5006 of 23 October 1962.
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NOTICE
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This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis
continues to be placed on the READINESS status, or changes therein, of the
offensive missiles in Cuba. This report is based on photographic coverage
through Mission 5005 of Tuesday, 23 October 1962 (see Figure 1).
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SUMMARY
1. As yet there is no evidence of change in the pace of construction
activities.
2. There are no changes in the estimated dates of operational capability
fo the MRBM and IRBM sites (see Figure 2).
3. No additional missiles, missile transporters, or erect nave(b)( been
identified (see Table 1). (b)(3)
(b)(3) 18 USC 798
4. No new missile sites have been identified. (b)(3) 50 USC 3605
5. No IRBMs per se have yet been identified.
� 7. Three of the Soviet ships suspected of being possible ballistic mis-
sile carriers eziroute to Cuba are reportedly altering their course.
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8. We have analyzed the capability of the Soviets to transport nuclear
warheads for these missiles from the USSR to Cuba using submarines and
aircraft. While submarine transport is possible, air transport is more
likely. A TU-114 can fly non-stop from Olenya in the Soviet Union to Cuba
with up to 10 nuclear warheads on an approximate great circle route
which would not pass over any other country.
9.
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