CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/04/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003053
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: April 28, 1951

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
�kisio U1-' Ultra  
28 April 1951 
Copy No. ci�--ct 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
DOCUMENT NO. 
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 
I I DECLASSIFIED 
16 
if-A",, DATE: 
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS 3 
NEXT REV f 
AUTI I: ski � 
f
DATE REVIEWER: 
kit  q.11  
Office of Current Intelligence 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
3.5(c) 
3.5(c) 
3.5(c) 
3.5(c) 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
Available 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 002003053 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
TC-6? Crtfiga 
3.5(c) 
GENERAL 
1. US Embassy ln Moscow claims Soviet intentions unaffected by yeat's 
setbaclts (page 3). 
2. UK Foreign Office fears impact of. possible Soviet bpeak at Paris 
talks (page 3). 
FAR EAST 
3.3(h)(2) 
7. Coalition cabinet formed in Indonesia (page 6). 
NEAR EAST 
8. Comment on the fall of the Iraman Government (page 7)o 
9. Israeli broadcast calls for army action (page 7). 
EASTERN EUROPE 
10. Oatis may be used in possible Clementis trial (page 8). 
11. Yugoslavia favors regional Peace Observation Committee (page 8). 
Fs7177hoE 
12. French Communist "peace" policy now tacitly admits inevitability of 
war (page 9). 
* * * * 
�2 
3.5(c) 
ET 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
3.5(c) 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
TCs.FsECRET 
3.5(c) 
GENERAL 
US Embassy in Moscow claims Soviet intentions unaffected by year's 
setbacks.  
3.3(h)(2) 
In its preliminary annual report on Soviet in-
tentions, Embassy Moscow notes that the USSR 
is employing separately and in combination 
political, psychological, economic and military 
weapons in the prosecution of a total war against the free world, The 
Embassy anticipates that the Soviet Government,. in carrying out its 
present policy, is prepared to incur major risks of precipitating global 
hostilities. However, probably because the Soviet leaders are presently 
uncertain of victory in war, they wish to avoid committing their own armed 
forces. Instead, they prefer to apply continued pressures of the types 
mentioned, believing this will eventually create a situation more favorable 
to "engaging their ultimate weapon. " Nevertheless the Embassy, and 
particularly the service attaches, feel that the USSR's present relative 
military strength, which will be diminished in the future as a result of 
Western defense efforts, could lead the Soviet Government to "cast the 
die without delay." The Embassy feels that Korea and the implementation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty have been setbacks to the USSR during the 
past year, but concludes that maintenance of the present uneasy balance 
and eventual improvement of the situation depend on Western determination 
and unity in rapidly increasing resistance forces to the extent necessary 
to convince the Politburo of the inevitable disaster of a military adventure. 
The Embassy is convinced that Western Europe is still the center of 
danger for the US, but that threats to Asia and the Middle East are of 
"serious import 
3.3(h)(2) 
11) 
\k\J 
UK Foreian Office fears impact of possible Soviet break at Paris jal,ks: -L� 
A high UK Foreign Office official has expressed 
to the US Embassy in London his fears that the 
Gromyko propaganda blast in the 25 April meeting 
of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris may be 
the prelude to the Soviets' breaking off the agenda talks tot he tune of 
violent accusations against the intransigence of the West. The official 
-3 - 
TOP RET 
----Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
3.5(c) 
_Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
TG.1 RET 
3.5(c) 
said that such a development would ptit the UK cabinet in a difficult 
position, but that it would ride out the storm. US Embassy London 
comments that the official exaggerates the possible impact of a break 
in such circumstances upon public opinion. 
comment; Expression of these fears, albeit 
exaggerated, could foretell new conciliatory moves by the UK at Paris 
to protect its propaganda position. In the past week, however, the UK 
Paris delegation has been stiffening Its position, at least partly in re-
action to increasing evidence of Soviet uncooperativeness. 
FAR EAST 
3.3(h)(2) 
�4 
3.5(c) 
TOP SECRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
TG.2 
ET 
�5 - 
3.5(c) 
3.3(h)(2) 
3.3(h)(2) 
3.5(c) 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
pproved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
T - 
3.5(c) 
3.3(h)(2) 
7. Coalition cabin9t formed in Indonesix 
3.3(h)(2) 
After 37 days of negotiations, a coalition 
cabinet based principally upon cooperation 
between the Masjumi (Moslem) Party and 
the Indonesian Nati nal Party (PNI)--the 
two largest parties in Indonesia--was announced on 26 April. The new 
government is headed by Sukiman, Chairman of the Masjumi, with Suwirjo 
of the PNI as Deputy Prime Minister. Although three outstanding moderate 
Masjumi leaders of the old cabinet were excluded from the new cabinet, 
US Ambassador Cochran believes that US relations with the Sukiman 
government can be as good as, or even better than, with the former 
government Chief advantages of the new cabinet are its working majority 
in Parliament and the support of President Sukarno. 
Commea�  The new cabinet includes in 
key posts at least two persons known formerly to have had Communist 
associations, and the entire cabinet c mposition generally appears less 
capable than that of the previous government. However, strong parliamentary 
-6 
TC.ISECP ET 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
3.5(c) 
������ 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
TGi � BET   
3.5(c) 
support should enable the government to take decisive and necesary 
steps toward the achievement of law and order, currently the outstanding 
problem of the Indonesian Republic. 
NEAR EAST 
8. Comment on the fall of the Iranian Government: 
The resignation of Prime Minister Ala and his 
cabinet on 27 April may postpone parliamentary action on the oil 
question. The Shah, who will have a difficult time finding a satisfactory 
successor, might resort to appointi g Seyyid Zia, the most prominent 
candidate. Since Seyyid Zia is popularly viewed as a UK minion, his 
appointment would be followed by widespread disapproval and unrest. 
Even if the Shah meets the crisis in some other manner, the situation 
will remain tense and popular irritation over the oil issue will continue 
to contribute to any government's instability. 
/ 
9. israeli broadcast calls for army action: 
3.3(h)(2) 
Tel Aviv broadcasts on 23 April heard in 
Damascus called for decisive action by the 
Israeli Army to deal with the "intolerable" 
situation in the demilitarized zone. While the 
US Legation in Damascus is unable to judge whether the broadcasts were 
"authoritative, it notes that there is local concern that the present lull 
in the UN Security Council proceedings might permit Israel to present 
the world with another fait accompli. UN officials and observers have 
expressed disillusionment and frustration to the Legation over lack of 
guidance on the basic points at issue and have also let their opinions 
be known to the press. The Legation has been informed by a Syrian 
Army staff officer that the Syrian Army will open fire if Israeli Army 
units "invade" the demilitarized zone. 
Comment Despite threatening Israeli broadcasts 
and strong statements by the Syrian Army, there is no specific data which 
TOP 
--"-Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
3.5(c) 
pproved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
3.5(c) 
would indicate that large-scale hostilities are likely to break out. 
EASTERN EUROPE 
10. �ad may be used in possible ClementiP 
11. 
3.3(h)(2) 
US Ambassador Briggs cables from Prague 
that the arrest of William N. Oatis may be 
part of Communist plans for a trial involving 
Clexnentis and numerous others, possibly in-
cluding the Fields, with important, albeit undisclosed, issues and purposes. 
He states that charges against Oatis follow the usual Communist pattern, 
that there is practically no chance of obtaining Oats' release prior to the 
trial, and that his conviction is virtually assured regardless of his innocence. 
Briggs advises that a protest alone would be futile, but he cautions that 
the US must recognize the limitations and possible consequences of actions 
that it may take, such as a rupture of diplomatic relations. 
'3.3(h)(2) 
Upon instructions from Tito and Kardelj, 
Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler has informed 
Ambassador Austin that Belgrade would be 
Interested in establishing a regional Peace 
Observation Commission (POC) to cover a broad area, including perhaps 
Morocco, Berlin, Greece, Turkey and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Bebler 
declared, however, that Yugoslavia was resolutely opposed to any military 
observer group limited to Yugoslavia since it would appear provocative 
and might create panic in Yugoslavia. He added that Yugoslavia would 
accept a POC to observe Yugoslav-Satellite borders only if the Satellites 
agreed to admit such a team. Bebler also reported that Belgrade was 
considering having a POC or some other' UN body send a diplomatic 
mission to Belgrade andSatellite capitals with a view to examining the 
causes of tension and attempting conciliation. 
-8 
""10i,i's SEC rr[''   
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053 
3.5(c) 
Approved for Release: 2016/03/14 CO2003053 
SCRT  
3.5(c) 
Comment: A regional POC appears to have little 
immediate prospect for success. Neither Turkey nor Greece can see any 
necessity for the introduction of such a team within their borders. The 
UK has expressed the opinion that a regional team might tend to increase 
world tension. 
WESTERN EUROPE 
YV\j. 
3.3(h)(2) 
Auguste Lecoeur, , French Communist Party 
politburo member, has told the partyrs Central 
Committee in a keynote speech that the threat of 
war is growing constantly as the balance of power 
becomes less favorable to the "imperialist" camp. He reportedly fined 
to state that war was not inevitable -fa declaration made on similar occasions 
by Thorez in September and Duclos tra February. Lecoeur went on to exhort 
French Communists to be prepared to undertake general strikes and even 
revolution as a way to "defend peace." 
Comment; Lecoeur's statement presents no new 
facet of French Otlinmunist policy, but is noteworthy for its confident tone, 
particularly in the sharp reminder of what is expected of the party in an 
internationarexisis. aome of this militancy, however, may be explainable 
as an attertpt on Lecoeur's part to regain the favor of top Communist 
leadersi: since he was reportedly admonished on 12 March for "deviationist" 
ideas, 
TOP 
3.5(c) 
....---"Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053