Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2019
Publication Date: 
April 28, 1951
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  �kisio U1-' Ultra   28 April 1951  Copy No. ci�--ct  CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN  DOCUMENT NO.  NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  I I DECLASSIFIED  16  if-A",, DATE:  CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS 3  NEXT REV f  AUTI I: ski �  f DATE REVIEWER:  kit  q.11   Office of Current Intelligence  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  Available  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 002003053  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  TC-6? Crtfiga  3.5(c)  GENERAL  1. US Embassy ln Moscow claims Soviet intentions unaffected by yeat's  setbaclts (page 3).  2. UK Foreign Office fears impact of. possible Soviet bpeak at Paris  talks (page 3).  FAR EAST  3.3(h)(2)  7. Coalition cabinet formed in Indonesia (page 6).  NEAR EAST  8. Comment on the fall of the Iraman Government (page 7)o  9. Israeli broadcast calls for army action (page 7).  EASTERN EUROPE  10. Oatis may be used in possible Clementis trial (page 8).  11. Yugoslavia favors regional Peace Observation Committee (page 8).  Fs7177hoE  12. French Communist "peace" policy now tacitly admits inevitability of  war (page 9).  * * * *  �2  3.5(c)  ET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  TCs.FsECRET  3.5(c)  GENERAL  US Embassy in Moscow claims Soviet intentions unaffected by year's  setbacks.   3.3(h)(2)  In its preliminary annual report on Soviet in- tentions, Embassy Moscow notes that the USSR  is employing separately and in combination  political, psychological, economic and military  weapons in the prosecution of a total war against the free world, The  Embassy anticipates that the Soviet Government,. in carrying out its  present policy, is prepared to incur major risks of precipitating global  hostilities. However, probably because the Soviet leaders are presently  uncertain of victory in war, they wish to avoid committing their own armed  forces. Instead, they prefer to apply continued pressures of the types  mentioned, believing this will eventually create a situation more favorable  to "engaging their ultimate weapon. " Nevertheless the Embassy, and  particularly the service attaches, feel that the USSR's present relative  military strength, which will be diminished in the future as a result of  Western defense efforts, could lead the Soviet Government to "cast the  die without delay." The Embassy feels that Korea and the implementation  of the North Atlantic Treaty have been setbacks to the USSR during the  past year, but concludes that maintenance of the present uneasy balance  and eventual improvement of the situation depend on Western determination  and unity in rapidly increasing resistance forces to the extent necessary  to convince the Politburo of the inevitable disaster of a military adventure.  The Embassy is convinced that Western Europe is still the center of  danger for the US, but that threats to Asia and the Middle East are of  "serious import  3.3(h)(2)  11)  \k\J  UK Foreian Office fears impact of possible Soviet break at Paris jal,ks: -L�  A high UK Foreign Office official has expressed  to the US Embassy in London his fears that the  Gromyko propaganda blast in the 25 April meeting  of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris may be  the prelude to the Soviets' breaking off the agenda talks tot he tune of  violent accusations against the intransigence of the West. The official  -3 -  TOP RET  ----Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  3.5(c)  _Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  TG.1 RET  3.5(c)  said that such a development would ptit the UK cabinet in a difficult  position, but that it would ride out the storm. US Embassy London  comments that the official exaggerates the possible impact of a break  in such circumstances upon public opinion.  comment; Expression of these fears, albeit  exaggerated, could foretell new conciliatory moves by the UK at Paris  to protect its propaganda position. In the past week, however, the UK  Paris delegation has been stiffening Its position, at least partly in re- action to increasing evidence of Soviet uncooperativeness.  FAR EAST  3.3(h)(2)  �4  3.5(c)  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  TG.2  ET  �5 -  3.5(c)  3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  pproved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  T -  3.5(c)  3.3(h)(2)  7. Coalition cabin9t formed in Indonesix  3.3(h)(2)  After 37 days of negotiations, a coalition  cabinet based principally upon cooperation  between the Masjumi (Moslem) Party and  the Indonesian Nati nal Party (PNI)--the  two largest parties in Indonesia--was announced on 26 April. The new  government is headed by Sukiman, Chairman of the Masjumi, with Suwirjo  of the PNI as Deputy Prime Minister. Although three outstanding moderate  Masjumi leaders of the old cabinet were excluded from the new cabinet,  US Ambassador Cochran believes that US relations with the Sukiman  government can be as good as, or even better than, with the former  government Chief advantages of the new cabinet are its working majority  in Parliament and the support of President Sukarno.  Commea�  The new cabinet includes in  key posts at least two persons known formerly to have had Communist  associations, and the entire cabinet c mposition generally appears less  capable than that of the previous government. However, strong parliamentary  -6  TC.ISECP ET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  3.5(c)  ������  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  TGi � BET    3.5(c)  support should enable the government to take decisive and necesary  steps toward the achievement of law and order, currently the outstanding  problem of the Indonesian Republic.  NEAR EAST  8. Comment on the fall of the Iranian Government:  The resignation of Prime Minister Ala and his  cabinet on 27 April may postpone parliamentary action on the oil  question. The Shah, who will have a difficult time finding a satisfactory  successor, might resort to appointi g Seyyid Zia, the most prominent  candidate. Since Seyyid Zia is popularly viewed as a UK minion, his  appointment would be followed by widespread disapproval and unrest.  Even if the Shah meets the crisis in some other manner, the situation  will remain tense and popular irritation over the oil issue will continue  to contribute to any government's instability.  /  9. israeli broadcast calls for army action:  3.3(h)(2)  Tel Aviv broadcasts on 23 April heard in  Damascus called for decisive action by the  Israeli Army to deal with the "intolerable"  situation in the demilitarized zone. While the  US Legation in Damascus is unable to judge whether the broadcasts were  "authoritative, it notes that there is local concern that the present lull  in the UN Security Council proceedings might permit Israel to present  the world with another fait accompli. UN officials and observers have  expressed disillusionment and frustration to the Legation over lack of  guidance on the basic points at issue and have also let their opinions  be known to the press. The Legation has been informed by a Syrian  Army staff officer that the Syrian Army will open fire if Israeli Army  units "invade" the demilitarized zone.  Comment Despite threatening Israeli broadcasts  and strong statements by the Syrian Army, there is no specific data which  TOP  --"-Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  3.5(c)  pproved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  3.5(c)  would indicate that large-scale hostilities are likely to break out.  EASTERN EUROPE  10. �ad may be used in possible ClementiP  11.  3.3(h)(2)  US Ambassador Briggs cables from Prague  that the arrest of William N. Oatis may be  part of Communist plans for a trial involving  Clexnentis and numerous others, possibly in- cluding the Fields, with important, albeit undisclosed, issues and purposes.  He states that charges against Oatis follow the usual Communist pattern,  that there is practically no chance of obtaining Oats' release prior to the  trial, and that his conviction is virtually assured regardless of his innocence.  Briggs advises that a protest alone would be futile, but he cautions that  the US must recognize the limitations and possible consequences of actions  that it may take, such as a rupture of diplomatic relations.  '3.3(h)(2)  Upon instructions from Tito and Kardelj,  Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler has informed  Ambassador Austin that Belgrade would be  Interested in establishing a regional Peace  Observation Commission (POC) to cover a broad area, including perhaps  Morocco, Berlin, Greece, Turkey and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Bebler  declared, however, that Yugoslavia was resolutely opposed to any military  observer group limited to Yugoslavia since it would appear provocative  and might create panic in Yugoslavia. He added that Yugoslavia would  accept a POC to observe Yugoslav-Satellite borders only if the Satellites  agreed to admit such a team. Bebler also reported that Belgrade was  considering having a POC or some other' UN body send a diplomatic  mission to Belgrade andSatellite capitals with a view to examining the  causes of tension and attempting conciliation.  -8  ""10i,i's SEC rr[''    Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2016/03/14 CO2003053  SCRT   3.5(c)  Comment: A regional POC appears to have little  immediate prospect for success. Neither Turkey nor Greece can see any  necessity for the introduction of such a team within their borders. The  UK has expressed the opinion that a regional team might tend to increase  world tension.  WESTERN EUROPE  YV\j.  3.3(h)(2)  Auguste Lecoeur, , French Communist Party  politburo member, has told the partyrs Central  Committee in a keynote speech that the threat of  war is growing constantly as the balance of power  becomes less favorable to the "imperialist" camp. He reportedly fined  to state that war was not inevitable -fa declaration made on similar occasions  by Thorez in September and Duclos tra February. Lecoeur went on to exhort  French Communists to be prepared to undertake general strikes and even  revolution as a way to "defend peace."  Comment; Lecoeur's statement presents no new  facet of French Otlinmunist policy, but is noteworthy for its confident tone,  particularly in the sharp reminder of what is expected of the party in an  internationarexisis. aome of this militancy, however, may be explainable  as an attertpt on Lecoeur's part to regain the favor of top Communist  leadersi: since he was reportedly admonished on 12 March for "deviationist"  ideas,  TOP  3.5(c)  ....---"Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003053