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July 11, 1972
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Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 CONF' ATIAL OLC 72-0786 11 July 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Developments During Your Absence 1, Representative Rangel Request for Reports on Drug Traffic. You will recall that on 13 June I wrote Rangel saying that in view of his continued interest in obtaining copies of certain Agency reports on the illicit drug traffic, we were reexamining the possibility of declassifying at least some of these reports. On 28 June, Rangel wrote Ingersoll of BNDD requesting the same material. Ingersoll has referred the request to us. (Tab A) The whole problem has been taken up with the White House, where Walter Minick, Bud Krogh's deputy, apparently opposes declassification of any material on the illicit drug traffic. The matter is now being reviewed by David Young, Executive Secretary of the Interagency Review Committee on Classification, whose decision is expected momentarily. If Young agrees with Minick that none of the reports can be released, we should be prepared for possible legal action, and OGC has been in touch with Justice in this regard. Rangel seems determined to press for a showdown. On 10 July he issued a public statement charging that CIA's "paranoid quest for secrecy" was keeping vital information about the drug traffic from the American public, and that we were "covering up for the international merchants of death." (Tab B) 2, Representative Aspin's Letter on Opium Smuggling. Aspin's 27 June letter to you which appeared in the Congressional Record on that date was received by the Agency on 3 July. We immediately asked Aspin's office for the "additional information" which he said he had received from Alfred McCoy. Upon examination, this additional information EXEMPT FROM 5ENE1111. CHLASSIFICATIGH OF E. O. VEEP., FEYPT1511 WENN: � 53(1), CEP, 0', k4) (6.11 or. or more) ON cou 0,:nAL Approval of DCI (unless Impassiai, insert dute or event) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Ce�7111"AMil hr L,6:At L appears to be essentially the same as that which McCoy had provided the Proxmire Subcommittee in support of his testimony there several weeks ago. (See Tab C for that portion of the material McCoy provided Aspin which deals with the Agency and Air America.) FE has requested the field to report on the detailed allegations. Attached at Tab D is a copy of Aspin's 27 June letter to you, together with an excerpt from the Congressional Record of 30 June containing Charlie Gubser's comments and a copy of your reply to Aspin. 3. Allegations of Preferential Treatment Being Given to Air America. Scoop Jackson has received a letter (Tab E) from an outfit in Vientiane called Lao Air Development which complains that Air America is overcharging U.S. agencies and which offers comparable services at substantially lower rates. Craig Jarrell, who signed the letter, claims he is in touch with Jack Anderson on the matter. We promised Jackson's office we would check on the facts, which DDS is doing. 4. Legislative Interdepartmental Group Meeting,. At a 7 July LIG meeting serious concern was expressed regarding the Mansfield "end the war" amendment. Apparently the Administration is dismayed to learn that perhaps a dozen senators whose support it had assumed, such as Chuck Percy and Jim Pearson of the Foreign Relations Committee, have turned out to be "fence sitters" despite some active lobbying by Kissinger. It is planned that after Congress reconvenes, Kissinger will entertain the "fence sitters" at a breakfast and try to win them over, hoping that the Democratic disarray following the convention, coupled with expected ARVN military successes, will strengthen his appeal. 5. Armed Services Committee Investigation of LaVelle Case. Stennis has sent Jim Woolsey and Larry Garcia, of the Committee staff, to Saigon to investigate the LaVelle case. The station has been alerted to show them appropriate courtesies but avoid any discussion of the LaVelle matter. 2 CONFIOSITIAL Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002110029 CONFIDE:WIWI 6. Interest in Hersh Articles on "Rainmaking." On 5 July John Goldsmith called to say he had seen Seymour Hersh's New York Times story of 3 July (Tab F) alleging Agency involvement in "rainmaking" in Indochina. He said that in view of the concern the story would probably create on the Hill, he was calling it to Stennis attention, with the suggestion that Stennis get himself briefed on the matter so he could respond to the questions that were likely to come up. In view of Hersh's second story on the same subject on 9 July (Tab G), we should be ready for queries by both friend and foe. 7. Scheduled Congressional Appearance. House Foreign Affairs has you tentatively scheduled to appear on 27 July to discuss Soviet strategic weapons and SALT verification. Presumably the text you used before Senate Foreign Relations with little or no modification would be responsive to their request. John M. Maury V ',,....Legislative Counsel Attachments: Tabs A - G 3 CRY 449.711, fRi. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 TAB Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 7.113 lionorablo 3. RomL,rel 1.�ouso o: Reproccnt Vizz.:tington.� D. C. 20515 JUL 3 1372. VOS roply to your letter a June 2r..*� 1072, 3,*cquosting certain documents. I am senfitinf; you thoze N�ouced by Z;NDD and havo talmn tho abz,rty 'S.orcanz, yO1 2t to tho Contra]. Iatollizence 11,3en.:Jy Cloir cat2cgi in regard to those documents utich f.12c,y c 1lurthor assisZ=co, pleas t mo Lzow. Welid Drug tx Iler;oxt" "Lxt:r; Vjaited i2csarki Drug, ProNom" rtc:r.:1',.'ec,11.1zr.ats l'or OAS= noaalno A aoluat 7.'1; iuenca Worldiivido" . "71,1 YilicIt Ir.rportaloa. lIcrola Into thO united axles', cc: Lc,roin Coorclor Contras!. lateilizencoAery � nT ZIAN/Parker/alzie -30-72/21051 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 CHARLES B. RANGEL arlICONoNTsSIONAL DinTnicT H, PATRICK SWVGRT ADMINISTRATIVS ASSISTANT HOUSG 0001= ClUILDING WASHINGTON. D.C. 20515 Te.idEPHoNit$ 202-22.5.4365 Cortgrez tfie 'Caititeti .,67,:>tatefs K)otuSe1iIlepreZentatit30 ZalazDivillton, 13.C. 20515 June 28, 1972 John E. Ingersoll, Director Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 1405 I Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20537 Dear Mr. Ingersoll: WIRS. VIRGINIA 1.2.CLL. DISTMGT AOMINISTPATOIR 144 WcaT 125TH GrcirgT NEVI Yo0K, Nrim YORK 10027 TSLETNONS1066-84100 As you know, the Select Committee on Crime has been holding hearings in New York and Washington on drug use in our public schools. Each witness makes it more clear that heroin addiction among our youth cannot be wiped out as long as heroin is smuggled into this country. I know that this, too, is your feeling and that of BNDD. In order to make it harder for Congress to ignore this critical problem, it is most imperative that we have as much information as possible on heroin trafficking and the smuggling of other dangerous drugs. "The World Opium Situation," which your office was kind 'enough to provide me last year was-of great assistance in this regard. I would deeply appreciate your providing me with the following reports as'well dealing with international drug traffic: � "Opium Production and Movement in the Near East and South Asia" "The Cocaine Situation in Latin.America" "Chemical Requirements for Opium Refining in Southeast Asia" "The Illicit Production and Movement of Opiates in Latin America" "Opium Poppy Cultivation in Northern Thailand" Opium Production and Movement in Southeast Asia" "Paraguay--Heroin Crossroads of South America" "Recent Trends in the Illicit Narcotics Market in Southeast Asia" "The French-Turkish Connection: The Movement of Opium and Morphine . Base from Turkey to France." Thank you for your attention to this most important request. With best regards, I am, � 4;4 ir L.J2, -mar e . Rangel Member of Congress ,0�7 4cer ly, Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL liNCLASSIFIE PRESS ITEM FOR THE DCI DISTRIBUTION: DDCI ExD DCl/IC DDI DDS DDP(2) DDS/T 0/OCT ONE OSR 051 (2) Ch/OpsCn PDB INDICO CSDO(3) IW STAIPPr- OSD mea UP I 092 (CIA) wh WASHINGTON--REP. CHARESL RANGEL, 1:1N.Y. g SAID TODAY A eur "PARANOID QUEST' FOR SECRECY" IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) THUERMER IS KEEPING INFORMATION ABOUT DRUG TRAFFIC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM THE LEGCO AM1'..R I CAN PUBLIC. RA NGL L A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIME, SA ID THE CIA HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED HIS REQUESTS FOR REPORTS ON OPIUM AND HEROIN TRAFFICKING IN THE AREA ALT HOUGH SOME ARE ALREADY PUBLIC KNOWLEDGL OR ARE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER AGENCIES. "THIS BUREAUCRAT IC BUNGLING AND PARANOID QUEST FOR SECRECY ON THE PART OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS PREVENTED CONGRESS FROM /2..FFi.: CT I VELY DETERMINING WHICH OF OUR SO-CALLED 'ALLIES' ARE PROFITEERING IN HEROIN," HE SAID IN A STATEMENT "EACH CITIZEN HAS THE FUNDAMi'..NTAL RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT IS IN THESE REPORTS ���� WHICH GOVI7..R NMi..NTS ALLOW DRUG PRODUCT ION TO FLOURISH AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR CHILDREN'S LIVES*" RANGv.L SAID NINE REPORTS HE IS SEEKING FROM THE CIA NAME THt INDIVIDUALS, TRIBES, GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND PLACES INVOLVED IN HEROIN TRAFFICKING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA BUT HE SAID THE AGENCY HAS CLASSIFIED THE REPORTS AND HAS REFUSED TO GIVE THEM TO HIM. "IT IS TIME FOR THE CIA TO STOP PLAYING GAMES AND TO STOP COVERING UP FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MERCHANTS OF DEATH p" HE SAID. YM 7-10 DATE: 10 Jul ITEM: NO, 12 REF : NO, Comment: Thuermer and Maury have copies. These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office of Current 4-- "- services. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2-11002929 news Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 IV. CIA AND AIR AMERICA INVOLVEMENT Nelson Gross quoted the Managing Director of Air America, who called my 'charge that Air America aircraft have been transporting opium "utterly and absolutely false." Air America's involvement has been confirmed by Gen. Ouane and by Gen. Thao Ma, former commander of the Laotian Air Force, who refused to carry opium for Gen. Guano. I spent six days in August, 1971 in the opium-growing Mee village of Long Pot, Laos. Ger Su Yang, the District officer, told me: Moo officers with three or four stripes [captain or more] came from Long Tieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters, perhaps two or three men at one time. The helicopter leaves, them here for a few days and they walk to villages over there, then come back here and radioed Long Tieng to send another helicopter for them. They take the opium back to Long Tieng. This .account was verified by everyone I talked with.. Ger Su Yang also reported that the helicopter pilots were always Americans. Flora Lewis, writing in'TheVaShingtenTOSt on July 23, 1971, said: The CIA has changed its rules in an attempt to ,stop the use of its private airline, Air America, for transport of drugs [opium and heroin] in Laos. Although only two months. ago CIA director Richard Helms adamantly denied there had been any agency involvement in this traffic, he is now said to have told a secret Congressional hearing that there was involvement but it has stopped� Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE LES ASP1N 1ST DISTRICT, WISCONSIN HOME OFFICES: 603 MAIN STREET RACINE, WISCONSIN 53403 414-632-8194 210 DODGE STREET JANESVILLE, WISCONSIN 53545 608-752-9074 . Corigre5oftbentitzbatate Ti)otWe of ilepraentatibe3 Ularo'bingtort, .3.(t. 20515 June 27, 1972 Mr. Richard Helms, Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. -Dear Mr. Helms: SUBCOMMITTEE: ABMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE #4 WASHINGTON orriCa: 515 CANNON HoUSE OFFICE BUILDING 202-225-3031 I am publicly releasing today substantial new evidence :that indicates that U.S. pilots flying CIA-operated helicopters have been smugglirig opium inside Laos. These allegations are contained in a letter and additional information that I have received from Mr. Alfred McCoy, author of a forth- coming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. If these allegations are true, then the CIA is implicated in fostering the drug trziffic that ruins the lives of tens of thousands of Americans. I am writing to you today to request that you thoroughly investigate Mr. McCoy's allegations. Since Mr. McCoy obtained his information last summer, it is imperative to determine whether this kind of drug trafficking is still going on. A principal unanswered question which the CIA must resolve is: "At what level in the CIA were officials aware of this illicit drug traffic?". I hope that you will report t� in full he results of your investigation. Thank you for your cooperato Si ji Les: Aspin Merr&er of C ngress LA:bk Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 E662 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Exieasions of Remarks CIA DOES NOT SMUGGLE OPIUM HON. CHARLES S. CUBSER CP CALI:5'011MA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, June 29, 1972 Mr. GUBSER. Mr. elipeaker, once again there has been an upsurge in charges alleging direct CIA Involvement in drug . traffic in Southeast Asia, These allega- tions have proven false in the past. Last ,year I personally looked into similar. . charges and I am satisfied myself that they were without substance. Moreover, in April 1971, Mr. Richard Helms, Di- rector of Central Intelligence, made a public categorical denial of Agency in- volvement in drug traffic before the American gociety of Newspaper Editors.' He has personally reaffirmed this denial to me, What the facts actually dem- onstrated was that the CIA is cooperating closely with other Government agencies in a concerted effort to curb the world � drug traffic. The efforts of these U.S. 'agencies are designed to persuade cbun- tries, which for centuries have accepted the growth or local consumption of illicit drugs, to take stringent steps against such practices. They are also cooperating to eliminate the flow of these drugs into the United States. Most recently, Mr. Alfred McCoy, a graduate student who is about to pub- lish a book on the drug traffic in South- east Asia, has made the same charges . against the CIA. In -early June, he aired , his charges before a Senate subcom- mittee and received considerable pub- licity. Immediately after Mr. McCoy's testimony, Mr. Nelson Gross, senior ad- viser to the Secretary of State and Co- ordinator for International Narcotics Matters, publicly and in detail refuted Mr. McCoy's charges. I regret that these allegations have been given further pub- licity in a State:Merit by a Member of this body when he published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of June 27, a let- ter. he has directed to Mr. Helms, re- questing an investigation of the allega- , tions made by Mr. McCoy. Mr, Speaker, Director Helms' denial of charges that CIA has been involved in the drug traffic has been .confirmed by other senior U.S. Government officials. There has been no substance to the charges that have been leveled and it is - most regrettable that the CIA must be the continual target of a tactic which serves to undermine positive efforts that are being taken under difficult circum- stances to curb drug trafficking. Those few who promote false accusations to the contrary undermine the good work that � is being done and the personal integrity of high officials of our Government. I can assure the Members of this body and all American citizens that our Government is committed 100 percent to solving the' &lag problem. June SO, 1972 Mr. Speaker, while it is unfortunate that these old charges have been public- ly aired again, I believe that Mr. Helms' � 'letter of ;June 28 on this subject should also be included in the 'RECORD: CENTRAL INTVLLIOSNCE AGMCY, OFFICZ 05' TNE DIFLP,OT011, June 23, 1972. Hon. Ls s ASPIN, H014,30 of Representatives, .Washington, Dyes Ma. Aseisr: The Congressional Record of June 27, 1972, carries a let or addressed to me by you announcing your release of "substantial new evidence that indicates.U.S. pilots flying CIA operated helicopters have been smuggling opium inside Laos." ' I have yet to receive your letter. Pending its receipt, however, I shall begin a thorough investigation of this alleged "new evidence" and will advise you in due course of the re- sults. In this connection. I call to your at- tention the testimony of Mr. Nelson Gress, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Mat- ters, before the Congressional Inquiry Re- garding International, Narcotics Traffic on June 0, 1972. He there quoted the Air Anaer- Ica Managing Director's statement that Mr. Alfred McCoy's allegation before the For- eign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee that Air America aircraft have been transporting opium in - Northern Laos on a regular basis is "utterly and absolutely false." In the interim, I wish to reiterate strongly what I have said publicly to the America Society of Newspaper Editors: "There ia the arrant nonsense that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow in- volved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are ail of you. As an Agency, in fact, WO are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope-we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem." In addition, you will have no doubt noticed in the Congressional Record of June 2, 1971,, that Congreasmaxx Charles Oubser cited a letter from Mr. John Ingersoll, Director of the . Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, attesting to the fact that this Agency has taken a great number of steps against the narcotics trade. Further, we have is- sued the strongest instructions, and have most vigorously enforced them, to prohibit any inadvertent use of CIA facilities by nar- co'biee smugglers. In the light of these well-establiehed posi- tions, we find it, disappointing to be sub- jected to the typo of public allegation rep- resented by graduate student McCoy's as- sertions of "new evidence," the innuendo in which can only dishearten CIA personnel of - honor and integrity working against this nefarious trade, I. have taken the liberty .of sending a copy of this letter to Congressman Gubser be- cause of his interest irs these matters. ' Sincerely, HIOXYARA HELMS, Director, Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 LAD AXIL D,Tri7 OinfEW 4 bt44 I 4 " n�Vi PO. NOY, 233 V,TATTAY WNW VIENVANE, LAOS - Honorable Senator Henry M. Old Senator Office Uldg, Washington, D. C. .011A . 12 June 1972 � renio.1 Pr�NATOef t �//4 JacksonI. (11-/) Dear Senator Jackson, � Ilm presently in Laos working for 4..00 Air Development. VIV is.a D:iicopter, fixed wing contract company which has-boon in existence for about 16 months and iu in oirect compotition with Air America and Continental. At this point 1 can honestly state that in many area especially Air Support the U.S., tax payer is having his money thrown away. An example Air /'i'i ca . charges upwards of $385.00 per flight hour for 10 place light twin aircraft. Our company has 'proposed operating a similar type of aircraft at $2?)0.00, per flight hour, the probl= in that moat Goverment Agencies out hore continue to oxelwie our proposal duo to the Governmental status of Air Atinmc. We have for the past 12 months boon flying 'Jell Jet Ranger Wilicoptqrs for USAID with a record of flight reliability unequaled in our buwiness. jZoomta.y..."1--yr,Ter-oontaQrAuLly Jock_Anderson the newspaper columnist, who is 'a -Fad friend of, iv uncle, concerning the pricr. ali-U-ItgredMTntu-u0;wma yttriouB aGencios in i,a0v, Prowntly I don't ball(Jve I will forw4rd any information to him a I holiove that notion in WashingL04 will sof/a the touchy situation with mgards to open bidding in this particulvw arca. I m alSo writing a letter to Sentor grIgnusen in regards to this situatiol. Bill06: he MS a groat deal to do with appropriations. Honestlyil on biddArkr. ww to take place in thlt. area the Covernwent say� millions of tax peyin. dollar:,T. The prices. Air America has h(%:13 is outrageous and a diarrazo to our political system. One can sny that we are also sockinga profit though 11,, certainly arc not making :i0.50 pru- hour au iu Air America and Continental; nometimes the net pr hour in ove4 -- higher. Somothjng should bo done ror the onLe of cosmeticr� Jr ri,e )1.0 oulor roaaon. ���� D. Craig Jarrell Director of Flight Training LAO MR DEVELOPMENT P.O. BOX 233 WATTAY AIRPORT 6 i) VIENTIANE, LAOS 6 Uocere y I .1 - Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 OLC 72-0768 5 July 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Senate Armed Services Committee Interest in Hersh Story re "Rainmaking" 1. This morning John Goldsmith, of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, called to say that the New York Times story by Seymour Hersh of 3 July 1972 (copy attached) was attracting considerable interest and would no doubt be the subject of formal inquiry during upcoming Senate deliberations. He said the subject might be brought up in connection with discussion of the pending "end the war" amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization bill, and almost certainly would come up in connection with the discussion of Indochina when the Defense Procurement bill came up. 2. Goldsmith said he wanted to let us know that for the above reasons he felt he should call the matter to the attention of Chairman Stennis, and was therefore preparing a note for Stennis (now out of town) suggesting that Stennis get himself briefed on the subject and be forearmed with information necessary to respond to the questions which are likely to come up. 3. I told Goldsmith that I knew nothing about the substance of these allegations but appreciated his alerting us. Att. Distribution: Original - Subject 1 - A/DCI 1 - Ex/Dir 1 - DDP 1 - C /FE , 1 SAVA /JOHN M. MAURY Legislative Counsel V GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic dowagadIng and declassification Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 king - rh Use Weapon by � Cloud Seeding in Indochina Coniirmed---- Chemical A 1,s'a Employed to Foil Radar By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Spedr,lb The Nov York Macs � WASHINGTON, July 2�The "What's worse," one official the Air Force more opportun- ity to trigger rainstorms. United States has been secretly 'asked, "dropping bombs on l "We were trying to .areange ' i .1 !seven inches or rain. in two, ;hours. on one olepur Special Forces camps," Despite the professed snepti- cism on the part Of some mom- ' anent, 'Laos and South Viet- nam to increase and control the rainfall for military purposes. Government sources, both ci- vilian and military, said during an extensive series of inter- views that the Air Force cloud- seeding program has been aimed most recently at hinder- � ing movement of. North Viet- namese troops and equipment and suppressing enemy antiair- craft missile fire. The disctosure confirmed growing speculation in Con- gressional and scientific circles about the use-.of weather mod- ification in Southeast Asia, De- spite years of experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, selentists �are not sure they �understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region. � Some Opposed Program The weather manipulation in Indochina, which was first tried in South Vietnam in 1963, is the first confirmed use of meteorological . warfare. Al- though it is not prohibited by any international conventions on warfare, artifice; rainmak- ing has been strenuously op� posed by some -State Depart- ment officials. - It �could ' not be determined whether the operations were being conducted in connection with the current North Viet- namese offensive or the renewed American bombing of the North. Effectiveness Doubted Beginning in 1067, some State Departnient officials pro- tested that the United States, by deliberately altering the nat- ural rainfall in parts of Indo- china, was taking environmen- tal risks of unknown propor- tions. But many advocates of the operation have found little wrong with using weather mod,. innaannan as anilitacy weapon. �r two mom fnonsoon seasons that affect Laos and Vietnam. "It was just trying to add on to something, that you already got," one officer said. � Military sources said that one main goal was to increase the 'duration of the southwest mon- 'soon, which spawns high-rising cumulus clouds � those most susceptible to cloud seeding� over the panhandle areas of Leos and North Vietnam from May to early' October, The long- er rainy, season thus would rive hers of the Johnson Administra- tion, railitary men apindently took the weather modification program much more seriously. According to a document contained in the Pentagon papers, the Defense Depart- ment's secret history of the war, weather modification was one of seven basic options for step- ping in the-war that were seeding clouds clouds over North Vi- rain?" � the weather pattern to suit our seated on request by the Joint 'Chiefs of Staff � to the While House in late February, 1967. The document described the weather program over Laos� 'officially known as Operation Pop-Eye�as an attempt "to reduce trafficability along infil- tration routes." � Authorization Needed It said that Presidential anthorization was "required to implement operational phase of weather modification process previously successfully tested 'Ind evaluated in same area." The brief summary concluded by stating that "risk of coin- promise is minimal."' � .A similar option was cited in another 1067 working dome. meat published in the Pentagon papers. Neither attracted any immediate public attention, The Laos cloud-seeding op- erations did provoke, however, a lengthy and bitter, albeit, secret, dispute inside the John- son Administration in 1067. A team of State Department at- torneys and officials protested that the use of cloud-seeding was a dangerous precedent � for the 1inited State,i. acidic rainfall capable of feu:- ties to the Ho chi Minh supply tag the operation of North Viet-, trail in Laos sometime in the narnesc radar ecluiPment 1.13e(4 middle nineteen-sixties, a num- for directing surface-to-air Ill iS- her of Government sources silos. said. By 1967, the Air Force In addition to hampering, had become involved although, SAM missiles and delaying 'as one former Government of- North Vietnamese infiltration, !fiend said. "the agency was the rainmaking program had calling ell ! the shots, � , the follwing purposes: "I -alweys assumed the agena (.iProviding rain and cloud cy had a mandate from the cover for mull ration of South white House to do it,� he Vietnamese commando and -in- added. -. telligence teams into North, A number of former CIA, and. Vietnam. , 110.1,1-alining Johnson Adminis- r-Serving as a "sPoilr" for tration .officials .depieted the North Vietnamese attacks told operations along the trail as raids in South Vietnam. experimental. ' c,Alte.ring or tailoring the The state of the art had not rain patter -es over Noth Viet- yet advanced to the point where nam and Laos to aid United it \vas possible to predict the State's bombing missions, � results of a seeding operation added, because of the unknown l' Oiverting North Vietnamene with any degree� of confidence, ecological risks: � 'men and material from military one Government official said. , .. A Nixon Administration of-, operations to keeroads and other lines of cam- � p muriclieci "We used to go out flying 'fiend said that he believed the around and looking for a cer- !first use of weather modifi- munication in operation, lain cloud -formation," the offi- cation over North Vietnam . � Keyed To Monsoon � . (nal said. "And we made a lot of . took place in late 1en5 or early The cloud-seedine operations mistakes, Once we duinPed . annn when rain wee naaan.a.,n,..a, Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 All of the officials 'inter- convenience,' said one former viewed said that the' United Government official who had detailed knowledge of theoper- States did not have the capabil- auon. ity to cause heavy flooding dur-i �According to interviews, the big the summer in the northern! Central Intelligence Agency in- parts of North Vietnam, where' itiateal the use of cloud-seeding serious flooding occurred last! over iinue in the northern part ' of . South Vietnam. "We first year. used that stuff in about August Officially, the White House of 1063:. one former C.I.A. and State Department declined agent said, 'when the Diem comment on the use of mete- reairrie was having all that orological warfare. "This is one trouble with the Buddhists." "They would just stand of those things where no one during demonstrations is going to say anything," one r`mund when the police' threw tear gas official said, them but we noticed that Most officialana.teterviewcd acat.hen tile. rains came' they agreed that. -the seeding had wouldn't stay on," the former accomplished 'one of its main agent said. objectives � muddying roads :The. agency got an Air and flooding lines of communi- t nrlicaroneada up with and dh a cation': � But there were also he 'aid. 'I'There silver another many military and Government demonstration and WO seeded officials who expressed doubt the area, It rained, that the project had caused any A "'liar cl"d'seecling Was carried out by C.I.A. eircraft in dramatic results. Seinen at least once during the ' The Sources, without pros-id- summer �of 1964, the former ing details, . also said that a agent said. method had been developed for Expanded to Trail treating clouds with a chemical The Intelligence Agency ex-- "I felt that the military and that 'eventually � produced an panded its cloud seeding activi-I agency hadn't analyzed it to determine if it was in our interest,' one official who was involved in the dispute said. He also was concerned over the rigid secrecy of the project, he said, "although it might have been all right to keep it secret if you did it once and didn't want the precedent to become known." The general feeling was sum- marized by one 'former State ,Department official, who said .he was concerned that the rainmaking "might violate what we considered the general rule of. the:thumb for an illegal. ,weapon of war�something that would 'cause unusual suf- fering or disproprlate damage.", There also was concern. hel , Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 01 antiairerait missiles ,to hit American jets in the panhandle region a ear the Laotian border. Over the next two years, this official added, "it seemed to get more important�the re- ports were coming more fre- quently." It could not be learned how many specific missions' were carried out in any year. One well-informed source said that Navy scientists were re- sponsible for developing a new kind of chemical agent effec- tive in the warm stratus clouds many usuany members of the Nixon Admin- istration had been kept in the dark. In the last year, there have . been repeated inquiries and publicly posed questions by members of Congress about the weather modification prop,rains in Southeast Asia, but no cc- curate . in has been provided to them by the De- partment of Defense. "This kind of thing was al bomb, and Henry restricted in- formation about it to those who had to know," said one well- that often shielded many key placed Government official, re- .antiaircraft sites in northern forting to Henry A. Kissinger, parts of North Vietnam. the President's adviser on na- The chemical, he said, "pro- tional security. duced a rain that had an acidic quality to it and it would foul up mechanical equipment�like radars, trucks and tanks." � s wasn't originally in our planning," the of added, "it was a rc'finernent," Apparently, many Air Force cloud-seeding missions were conducted over North Vietnam and Laos simply to confuse or "a Itctuutte"�a word used by many military men�the radar equipment that controls anti- aircraft missiles. The planes used for such operations, d- 130's, must fly at relatively slow speeds and at altitudes no greater than 23,000 feet to dis- perse the rainmaking chemicals A number of officials con- firnied that cloud seeding had Nonethless, the official said, "I understood it to be a spoil- ing action-that this was de- scriptive of what was going on north of the DMZ with the roads and the SAM sites." Another source said that most of the weather modifica� tion activities eventually were conducted with the aid and sup- port of the South Vietnamese. "I think we were trying to teach the South Vietnamese how to fly the cloud-seeding mis- sions," the source said. It 1,vas impwsible to learn where the staffing and research for the secret weather opera-; tion were carried out. Sources1 at the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories at Hans- comb Field in nedford, Mass., and at the Air Weather Service boon widely used in south via. .headquarters, while acknowl, nam, particularly in the north .edging that they had heard of along the Laos border. "We tried to use it in connection with air and ground opera- tions," a military officer ex- plained, One Government official ex- plained more explicitly that "if you were expecting a raid from their side, you would try to control the weather to make it more difficult." This official estimated that more than half of the actual cloud-seeding operations in 1069 and 1970 took place in South Vietnam. Much of the basic research was provided by Navy scien- tists, and the seeding operations were flown by the Air Weather Seri/ice of the Air Force, 13y 1907, or possibly earlier, the Air Force. flights were orig- inating from a special opera- tions group at Udorn' air base in Thailand, No more than four C-130's, and usually only two, were assigned in the highly restricted section of the base. Each plane was capable of ear- lying out more than one mis- sion on one flight. One former hifth-ranking of- ficial said in an interview that by the end of 1971 the pro- gram, which had been given at least three different code names since the middle nineteen-six, ties, was under the direct con. tro.1 of t.ho Wh.ite House. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 .the secret operation, said they ha .dno information about its research center. One Government source did say that a group was "now evaluating the program to see how much additional rain was caused." would not elabo- rate. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029 s NEW YORK TIMES entagola: ea a eacon.' , WASHINGTON�Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, a prominent geophysicist who had just completed a tour as vice r'president of the Defense Department's :Institute of Defense Analysis, pub- lished in 1968 a little-noted but chilling study on the military potential of ,ineterological warfare. He listed a num- ber of options available to those who 'Would choose to tamper with nature. �Among them: c. Altering the world's temperature by rocketing materials into the earth's , upper atmosphere to either absorb light , "(thereby cooling the surface below) or ..absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating .the surface below). This technique .could be targeted at a specific area. o Triggering tidal waves by set- sting off a series .of underground ex- plosions along the edge of the Conti- ,Inental Shelf, or by producing a natural .earthquake. A guided tidal wave could achieved by correctly shaping the energy-releas,e sources. 0, Changing the physical Makeup of. the atmosphere by creating, with / ra.! rocket or similar weapon, a "hole" in the important ozone layer between � and 30 miles up that is responsible for absorbing much of the ultra-violet light cast from the sun, Without the .protective layer of ozone, a molecular orris of oxygen, the radiation would fatal to all human, plant and animal life that could not take shelter in the affected area below. s Dr. MacDonald (who is now a '.member of the White House Council on eFrivironmental Quality) made it clear � that his essay was based only on spec- ulation. Last week, however, it became ....known that at least part of his made.- ' � , bre weather arsenal had been secretly ' �in use by the United States since the ., .1960's. � Air Force planes, supported by the ' ' Central Intelligence 'Agency, have been DATE 1JJ 114-r(2-. PAGE waging a systematic war of rain on. the infiltration trails of Laos, Cam- bodia, North Vietnam and South Viet- The intent: suppress enemy anti- missile fire, provide cover for South' Vietnamese commando teams pane- , trating the North and hinder the movement of men and material from � North Vietnam into the South. The first experimental rain-making mission was flown by the C.I.A. in South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not Until 1965 that a group of Air Force scientists officially was ordered to start thinking of ways to turn nature into a military tool. ' "We all sat down in a big brain- ;storming session," said one of the scientists who participated at the Air Force Cambridge Research Labora- tories at Hanscomb Field near Bedford, Mass. "The idea was to increase the !,. rain and reduce the trafficability in all , of Southeast Asia." ' Within a year, the Air Force and ,,. C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-mak- ing project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail � .,fn Laos, known as "Operation Pop- Eye." There were heated protests from , the State Department, and eventually a directive from the Secretary of De.- . fense Robert S. McNamara ordering a ' . halt to the project. Instead, well- . � qualified sources said last week, "it' � Went underground�into the dark." :From 1969 through at least early this year, weather warfare was a covert operation being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House ,'.acquiescence. The fact that the program existed at all came to light only last week in The New York Times. But, despite an extensive investigation, it could not be learned how successful the program had been, how many missions were conducted or whether it was still being used in connection with the heavy bombing of North Vietnam that fol- lowed the enemy offensive last April. Making rain has long been techni- cally feasible. Scientists have learned ithat rain fall can be increased by as much as 40 per cent after seed- I ing clouds by aircraft with silver-io- dide particles. Other chemicals, includ- ing dry ice, also have been used with ; success, both in the United States and : in Southeast Asia. ' Military and Government specialists 'acknowledge that there is little precise scientific knowledge of the short-range � " impact of cloud seeding and practi- none of the long-range ecological '.effect .of changing the amount of . natural rainfall. Some scientists have published data suggesting that weather 'modification, in combination with otlier ecological stresses such as air :pollution and pesticides, may have a , ...synergistic effect�that is, result in collective changes far greater than �. � either abuse would have caused , by , 1�itself. , In Indochina, where heavy bombing . already has robbed much of the land- scape of its natural water-holding ca- pability by destroying foliage and trees, ' artifically induced rains may result in far greater flooding than expectecl.,, ''.along with heavier soil erosion. �:. Technically,: there are no interne- , tional agreements outlawing such war- . fare. But Government officials made .L clear last week that the weather-mak- ing activity of the Air Force was � , shielded from public view because of White House sensitivity to what could be regarded as the impropriety of the ;' action, The issue, one well-informed official said, was .one in which Henry A. Kissinger, the Presisient's national- security adviser, took a personal hand. "This kind of thing was a bomb," the .1 official said, "and Henry restricted information about it to those who had , , t � � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2110029