(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02251018
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-02494
• Publication Date: August 27, 1971

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Direcw'r of Securi
..�
Os - -
All of us in the DDI who have been
�connected with this problem whbleheartedly
endorse the recoMMendation in the attached.
I suggest that you take the bull by the horns
and go ahead.
27 August 1971
(DATE)
FORM O.
1 AUG 54
101 REPLACES FORM 10- 101
WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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OFFICIAL :ROUTING SLIV'
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NAME
. DATE
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PREPARE
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MUT REPLY
APPROVAL
.1 DISPATCH
I RECOMMENDATION
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S/GNATURE
Remarks:
OLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND. PHONE NO.,
UNCLASSIFIED
';'"0�- 237 Use previous editions
DATE
0 AUG17
SECRET
(40)
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OIFFIICAL ROUTIING SUP ._
TO
NAME AND ADDNESS
DATE
INITIALS
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Attached is a
Pforzheimer on the Agency's
to deal retroactively
leaks. Iticoncludes
prepared to undertake
these leaks against
recommends a centralized
1 file, preferably in
Security. I think that
dation is a good one
to believe that we will
long periods .to have
interest and concern
The procedure would
, and demand conscien4ious
all parts of the Agency.
Ur
study by Walter N
capability
with security
that we are poorly
a crash study of
the deadline, and it
Agency leak
the Office of
the recommen-
if there is reason
continue over
very high level
with the subject.
be somewhat costly
compliance by
,
Lif\
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: 0.772t E. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
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27 Aug
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL 1
SECRET
1,00(1 PO. 037 Use previous editions
1-67 L
GPO 1965 0 - 297-942
(40)
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(b)(3)
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IIIt/ �
-1,703'3` -7
�,
20 August 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director Central Reference Service
SUBJECT Intelligence Security Leaks
1. During the week of 9 August 1971, CIA was called upon by the
White House to make a crash study of intelligence security leaks in the
press during the Nixon Administration. The study was to be limited to
two newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post. The
original request required a reading of every page of those two newspapers
from 20 January 1969 to date. Subsequently, Mr, Osborn, Director of
Security, met with David Young, of the White House staff, who agreed to
modify the requirement to allow CIA to use its clipping files rather than
to undertake a page by page reading of the newspapers themselves.
Further, the Indochina war was excluded, and virtually no attention was
focused on leaks involving DDP activities. In essence, the study con-
cerned itself with leaks on the Warsaw Pact nations, China, and the Arab-
Israeli confrontation. Mr. Helms forwarded the resultant study to Mr.
Ehrlichman at the White House on 16/17 August. Approximately 191 leaks
were selected as containing significant disclosures. It is doubtful that
any were inadvertent.
2. Most of the major leaks are in the field of Soviet weaponry,
overhead reconnaissance and communications intelligence, so respon-
sibility for this study was placed on John Paisley, Acting Chief, Office
of Strategic Research. On 11 August, Mr. Young, of Mr. Ehrlichmangs
staff, sent a list of 19 categories to Mr. Paisley "of the kinds of information
we would hope to be able to gather." A copy of this list is attached. The
resultant effort leads me to make certain comments and suggestions which
you may wish to forward to the DDI for further consideration.
3. The first question one must consider is what is a "leak."
Presumably, from our standpoint, a "leak" is any unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence sources and methods, or disclosure of intelligence estimates,
reports, studies, facts or figures which would tend to reveal either intel-
ligence sources or methods or the extent of our information on a given
subject. An added difficulty is determining which are authorized "leaks"
as opposed to unauthorized "leaks." Unfortunately, the majority of
authorized "leaks" are often as damaging as the unauthorized "leaks,"
if not more so, because of the access to classified material by those who
feel they are authorized to leak.
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4. There were several Agency elements in a position to contribute
to this special White House study.
(a) Office of Strategic Research (OSR). For some time now,
OSR has maintained some sort of fib o on security leaks in their
subject area. These have dealt largely with Soviet weaponry and
other military strengths, as well as with the SALT talks. Recently,
OSR has undertaken the quick scanning of The New York Times and
The Washington Post for leaks each morning in order to send the
DDI an evaluation, if possible, prior to the DCI's nine o'clock
meeting. In forwarding their note to the DDI, OSR usually tears
out the article and attaches it to their comment. In many instances,
they do not keep a copy of the article in their own files, but merely
retain an annotated card listing. Therefore, for the present study
they often did not have the original article and had to look at a
copy elsewhere. (The CIA Library reproduced 50-60 articles
for this purpose). - Nor were OSR's own card listings by any means
complete, but were supplemented by HIC and Security in connection
with this study.
The original classified material which formed the basis
of the leak was, or might have been, identified at the time the
leak occurred. Thus, it could be pointed out that a specific leak
originated from a specific issue of the Current Intelligence
Bulletin or a National Intelligence Estimate or a special study.
There have been at least two recent incidents, where members of
the Agency have responded to perfectly legitimate telephone requests
for information from officials outside the Agency who were entitled
to it; but when supplied to these officials, the information has almost
immediately turned up in the press. Nevertheless, OSR has not
maintained many notes of the documentary origins for these leaks,
particularly those originating from CIA material. To go back and
try to reconstruct these origins now would be a major undertaking.
(b) Office of Security (OS). OS maintains some files on leaks.
While I have not seen these files, I gather they are by no means
complete. I believe that OS' strongest files are those involving
CIA personnel who have been blown in the public media. In
addition, where there has been a major leak calling for investiga-
tion of possible source, OS has often made an analysis of the
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origins of the leak against a particular document or documents,
as well as trying to ascertain the source. I do not believe that
OS was a major source of information for the present study,
although they made some contribution.
(c) Office of the Assistant to the DCI. Mr. Goodwin's office
has the Agency responsibility for the reading of a considerable
number of newspapers (plus the press clippings on CIA which
they receive from a press clipping service). They also cover
a few major periodicals and receive pertinent extracts of radio
and TV interviews from an outside service. In addition, HIC
and the CIA Library cover a few foreign newspapers and peri-
odicals, as well as additional domestic periodicals, for informa-
tion for HIC's files as well as for Mr. Goodwin's files and
dissemination. Unfortunately, Mr. Goodwin's files, by and large,
are not useful for a crash study on security leaks. Except for
articles on CIA personnel which are filed in folders under the
name of the person mentioned, it is usually necessary to have
a specific date in order to retrieve a given article from the
Goodwin files. While there is a certain amount of area or
subject (Green Berets, National Student Association, Pentagon
Papers) breakdown, everything is filed chronologically and in
such bulk as to make a search of these files time consuming in
the absence of a given date. Basically they do not have any
files dealing with leaks as such, and they were able to contribute
hardly anything to the present study.
(d) Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC). HIC maintains
extensive clipping files of an historical nature, both on CIA and
intelligence. (HIC has virtually the only Agency clippings for
the period 1942-50). It places considerable emphasis on the
reporting of major espionage cases. HIC receives the daily
package of xeroxed clippings from Mr. Goodwin's office, incor-
porating pertinent ones into its files. It also covers certain
British language newspapers and some American and foreign
periodicals for material of interest to HIC. Some of these
clippings which would appear to have a wider interest are given
to Mr. Goodwin for his daily dissemination. HIC files its clip-
pings generally on a broad subject base, i.e. , Overhead
Reconnaissance; Comint; Great Britain: Official Secrets Act;
and within these specialized categories they are filed by date.
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HIC also keeps generalized clippings under an area breakdown
such as USSR, China and Cuba. These clippings are on various
aspects of intelligence in those areas and not on pure substan-
tive information. HIC also maintains a broad selection of
clippings in the "General" category dealing with references in
the public media to CIA and intelligence that are more generalized
than those in specific category files. However, it should be noted
that HIC does not file clippings under a "leak" category but
simply has them in the files appropriate to the given subject,
such as Overhead Reconnaissance. Because of the superior
accessibility, content, and breakdown of the HIC clipping
files, the two analysts \ who wrote the
study reviewed appropriate categories of HIC's clippings.
Mr. Paisley advised the DDI that "In particular, the files main-
tained in the Historical Intelligence Collection were heavily
used." One of the analysts told me they had found "about 75"
useful articles here with which they were not familiar; per-
haps this figure is too high, but they did find several dozen
which contributed to the study.
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
5. The reason that I have detailed this background is to illustrate
my view that we are all fairly poorly prepared to undertake a crash study
of intelligence leaks against a tight deadline. The main reason is the
absence of a good, centralized data base. (I had previously found this
true in 1964, when three membersof the DDP and I were locked in a room
for two days to source Wise and Ross' Invisible Government; and,in 1966,
when I edited,and contributed,to the DDI damage assessment comments
on The New York Times series on CIA,for 21 hours straight). The present
study for the White House was comparatively easy because it entailed a
review of only two newspapers - The Times and The Post - and a com-
paratively short time-frame - 20 January 1969 to the present. It also
required no input on the Vietnam war oi Indochina. If the study, even
within the short time-frame, had had to cover all of the published leaks of
which we were aware, it would have taken much more research time to
cover the other newspaper and magazine articles which are included in the
files; at least one other clipping repository, NPIC, would have had to be
consulted.
6. One of the categories (#7) which was requested by the White
House was a comparison of the frequency and gravity of leaks in this
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Administration compared to previous Administrations. Because of the
shortness of time, we did not answer that question in the Agency's initial
reply to the White House. Here again we lack a centralized data base;
it would take a stunning number of manhours to try to work it out, given
the passage of time since the earlier leaks occurred. HIC's files would
carry a major part of that burden, I believe.
7. It would seem to me to be essential that a centralized Agency
"leak" file be created. Whenever an intelligence leak appears in the
public media9 it should be reported to such central repository with a
copy of the article, together with a statement as to the nature of the leak,
any information as to the documentation from which it came, and any
information as to possible source of the leak. It is probably best that
such a file be maintained in the Office of Security, and that all elements
of the Agency, including the DDP, should contribute to it on an all
source basis. (It might be possible to maintain such a file in Mr.
Goodwin's office, but they are not really set up for it.) HIC is an
alternative, but it is highly doubtful that DDP would report sensitive
leak situations here, and at present we are not set up for handling
material higher than COMINT. If such a permanent file is desired, it
will have to have the full backing of the Deputies and the DCI so that
every Office would be responsible for producing an annotated description
and damage assessment of leaks in the field of their particular expertise.
There is hardly anyone in the Agency capable of assessing all the leaks
without expert assistance. In this way, the Agency could keep on top
of the leak situation and evaluate it from time to time.
Walter Pforzhe mer
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection
Attachment
White House Memo
dated 11 August 1971
re Leak Data Assessment
eV:71,7
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