CIA FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02376847
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2021
• Case Number: F-2012-01495
• Publication Date: January 22, 1975

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CIA FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES
HEARING
BEFORE TIIE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTII CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN
FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND IN THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 22, 1975
[Secret Hearing Held January 22, 1975; Sanitized and Made Public on
February 10, 1975]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46-365 WASHINGTON : 1975
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(;02vIMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama, Chairman
114 EKE MANS FIELD, Montana
KRA NK CHURCH, Idaho
ART SYMIN GT ON, Missouri
C LA [BORNE PELT. Rhode Island
GALE W. Mc GEE , Wyoming
GEORGE S. Mc GOY RN, South Dakota
ROBERT If. HUMP 11 REY, Minnesota
DICK CLARK, TOW`,
JOSEPH R. 13 EDEN_ Is., Delaware
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JACOB K. JAVITS, New Yrok
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES IT. PERCY, Illinois
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
.'AT 11. 1LOT.T, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR N. KLATT., Chief Clerk
No-r0'.---',4etions of this hearing have been deleted in the interest of national security. Deleted material
is indicated by the not dma "(Deleted]."
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CONTENTS
Testimony of: Page
Helms, Hon. Richard, Ambassador to Iran, former Director, CIA_ 1
Insertions for the record:
Excerpt from individual views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., to
Senate Report No. 93-981, 93d Congress, 2d session, "The Final
Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities,
U.S. Senate 32
"Helms, the CIA and Public Trust," article by Walter Pincus, The
New York Times, October 2, 1974 36
Letter to Hon. John Sparkman, chairman, Committee on Foreign
Relations, from Richard Helms, dated January 25, 1975, responding
to charges made by Mr. Walter Pincus 37
"Colson Hits CIA on Date," article from the Washington Star-News,
January 22, 1975 38
(m)
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CIA FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE,'
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.O.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room
S-116, the Capitol Building, Senator John Sparkman [the- chairman]
presiding.
Present: Senators Sparkman, Church, Symington, Pell, McGee,
McGovern, Humphrey, Case, Scott, and Biden.
Also present: Mr. Holt of the committee staff.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, if you will take your seat we will
get started.
As I understand it, it has been agreed that we will proceed. in
executive session.
Mr. Ambassador, we are glad to have you with us. Do you have a
statement or do you want to make a statement?
TESTIMONY OF HON. RICHARD HELMS, AMBASSADOR TO IRAN,
FORMER DIRECTOR, CIA
Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I was invited to come before this committee
and I am here and delighted to answer any questions to the best of my
ability
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
We do have a copy of your statement that was made before the
Armed Services Committee. Each member has that before him.
We also have a statement here that Mr. Colby made before the
Appropriations Committee.
MR. HELMS' TENURE AS HEAD OF CIA
How long were you head of the CIA?
Mr. HELMS. Six and a half years, sir, approximately.
The CHAIRMAN. That is a pretty long time.
Mr. HELMS. It looks as though it is turning out to be almost too long.
The CHAIRMAN. Were you there when the building was put up out
there?
Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. I joined. the Central Intelligence Agency in
1947 when it was established by Statute.
The CHAIRMAN. AS a part of the National Security Act?
Mr. HELms. Yes, sir; that is right.
(1)
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rilile CHAIRMAN. My former colleague, Senator Hill, was on the
Armed Services Committee. He was very much interested and took a
leading part in the development of the National Security Act at the
time.
COMMITTEE'S CONCERN
As I conceive it, the Foreign Relations Committee is directly con-
cerned with foreign aspects of the CIA. For my part I do not think
the committee should be especially concerned, except individually,
of course, as ciiizens of the country, with domestic operations.
The Armed Services Committee was given, I believe, oversight
under the Security Act over the CIA. Is that not right?
Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And they have exercised that oversight.
There is a resolution that is to be voted on, I believe, Monday to set
up a select committee to go into the CIA matters. Of course, they
would cover everything, and 1 am quite certain that some such resolu-
tion will be adopted.
COMMITTEE ATTENTION TO CIA OPERATIONS RESULTING FROM CHILEAN
SITUATION
Our attention was brought to CIA operations as a result of our
checking into the situation in Chile several years ago.
Were you head of CIA at that time?
MT. HELMS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Acutally, Senator Church is the one who went
into that more fully than anybody else. He was studying the ITT
operation in Chile at that time and that is when we became involved
with all of this.
At the time that we held the hearings on the ITT operations in
Chile, and the CIA came up, we did not spend a great deal of time on
the CIA side of the picture. We did say at that time, however, that
we would at a future time hold hearings on the CIA. Actually, that
accounts for the present session.
We did not anticipate at that time that there was going to be all of
this hullaballoo that has developed over the last few months with
reference to CIA.
1 men tinned Chile as being the thing that really pinpointed our
att ention.
Sinee that time I have heard that there have been somewhat
similar instances in other countries. I have nothing definite on them.
I have heard the names of some of the countries, but I have no
information with regard to that.
1mw CIA OPERATED IN ITS FOREIGN ACTIVITIES
Would you explain to us just how the CIA operated in its foreign
activities?
Ambassador HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, the Agency as you know
has been put under the National Security Council. In other words, it
reports to the National Security Council which is effectively the
President. The National Security Council in turn, in addition to what
is stated in the National Security Act of 1974, has given the Agency
two additional charters. One makes the Agency responsible for con-
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ducting intelligence collection and counterintelligence collection over-
seas, the other is a charter which gives the Agency responsibility for
various types of what is referred to technically as covert actions,
covert operations overseas. And encompassed in covert operations
are covert political activities, black propaganda, military activities
and paramilitary activities and a variety of things of this kind.
I would like to for a moment digress to say that I understand that
this committee now under the new amendment to the Foreign Assist-
ance Act will be responsible for monitoring various covert actions of
the Agency and it might be helpful in that connection if the present
Director were to show you the actual piece of pa-)er, the National
Security Council directive to which I refer, whica is a top secret
document, but which is the document and the charge under which
these activities are carried out, because I do think that the authority
for these things ought to be made clear, that this isn't something that
certainly when I was Director of the Agency that we just did on our
own, we had a clearance mechanism, we had an approval mechanism
when we were asked to perform one of these actions or originated the
idea ourselves, there was a National Security Council Committee
called the 40 Committee to which we reported and which in turn
either approved or disapproved -Whatever the proposal was. So that
these actions throughout recent years have to the best of my knowledge
been approved by other authorities in the U.S. Government, the
White House, State Department, Defense Department and so forth.
Is that responsive to your question, sir?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
SEPTEMBER 43 19707 CHILEAN RESIDENTIAL ELECTION
I have been reading the part of our transcript of your confirmation
hearing which refers to the Chilean situation. You said that no money
was used under your direction to influence that election.
Ambassador HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I don't recollect exactly- what
the language of Senator Symington's question was. My recollection
of what he asked me at that time was whether we had given money
to the political opponents of President Allende and I believe that I
replied that we had not.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Ambassador HELMS. I want to explain because there seems to have
been some question about this response.
I thought at the time that Senator Symington was asking me a
question to get a certain kind of information and that was this. That
I had assumed that Senator Symington knew that in 1964, at the
request of the White House, the CIA had given money to a political
candidate [deleted] in Chile, in that election, that was [deleted] and
we had given a considerable sum of money, I mean at least $2 or $3
million, as best I recall it. I am not sure whether it is that figure or
slightly larger. Please don't hold me to that. But at least a significant
sum of money was given to him in an effort to help him win the
election against two other opponents who at that time were [deleted]
and a third man, my mind is a little rusty on, [deleted] or something
in 1964.
Mr. HOLT. In 1964 [deleted].
Ambassador HELMS. Does that conform with your recollection?
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r. HoLT. Yes.
The CHAIRAI A N... Here you use the name of Alesandri and another
fellow named Tomic.
Senator (..A.sr. That was in 1970.
Ambassador liEt,ms. What are you reading from?
The CHA IRMA N. I am reading from a committee memorandum
which. covers file questions presented to you when you were up for
con-firma tion.
A in bassador HELMS. Well; sir, I just read the record yesterday when
I was up for confirmation and I don't recall anyone mentioning Nir.
A lessand ri
I have a _primed record here of what I understand were my con-
firmation Ilea rin!?:s.
Am I wrong about this?
The CH A IRMA N. No; the one about Alessandri, I think, came up in a
bearing before Senator (lhurch's multinational subcommittee.
Ambassador HELMS. I see. I have not seen that transcript. Would
you be so kind is to read the portions of it because �
The CHA IRAI A N. At your confirmation hearing, Senator Symington
asked:
Did you try in the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the Government
of Chile?
Your answer was "No, sir."
Senator Symington asked:
Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?
Yon said "No, sir."
So that the stories that you were involved in that are wrong entirely.
That is Senator Symington.
Yon answered -
Yos, sir. I said to Senator Fulbright many months ago, that if the agency had
really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so
.-7:orth, the election mlitht have come out differently.
That: is the extent of what we have in the questioning of Senator
Sy rt tington
1970 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
In order that we get the whole thing tied together, in 1973 before
Senator (lnirch's Multinational Corporations Subcommittee, Senator
(luirch said:
Now, following the election, and up to the time that the Congress of Chile cast
its vote installing Allende as the new President, did the CIA attempt in any way
influence that vote?
Vuu asked, "Which vote?"
"Senator CTIVRCH. 'The vote of the Congress.' "
You answered, "No sir."
A few pages later, in the same transcript, the same subject recurs.
Senator (�;hurelt asked you:
()id the 40 Committee approve the commitment of funds for use in Chile for
the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Chilean Presidential election of
September 4, 1970?
You say, "Which funds are these?"
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"Senator CHURCH. `Any funds.' -1'
You say:
Well, the 40 Committee I know approved some funds for activities in Chile
but that they were directed against the influence of the election, put that way, is
not my recollection of it.
"Senator CHURCH. 'What were the funds used for?' "
You say, "I frankly don't remember very precisely any more."
Then later you said:
. . . there seems to be a feeling that the Agency put money into the political
process, in other words, to back other, the other candidates in this election to
defeat Allende, and this is about the only way I know that you influence elections.
Maybe there are other ways, but I simply wanted to clear up the point that we
did not back Alessandri, I forget the name of the other fellow, Tomic. We put no
money in their campaign whatever and this has been haunting me that there seems
to be a sensation that in saying we had not done this, that 1 have not been leveling.
I mean we did not do it.
That is all I care to read. I thought I would do that in order that
we could get started.
May I call On Senator Symington,
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no ques-
tions at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. Then I will swing to Senator Case.
IMPRESSION WE WERE NOT DOING ANYTHING TO INFLUENCE CHILEAN
POLITICS
Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ambassador, briefly, to follow up
your lead on Chile. 1 must confess I am not now trying to put your
statements against other people's statements made at different times,
but the general impression we got both in your confirmation hearing
and in the, Multinational Subcommittee hearing, and .not only from
you but from Meyer, was that we were not doing anything to influence
Chilean politics. This was obviously not true. Maybe we all should
have known this as a matter of general knowledge.
How come we keep getting this impression in the public record? I
wish you would try and help.
MR. HELM'S FEBRUARY 1, 1973, TESTIMONY CONCERNING CHILE
Mr. HELMS. I would like to go back just a moment, because Senator
Church has come back, to make it a little bit easier.
May I deal first with the testimony when I was up for confirmation;
which was on February 7, I believe, in this printed record?
When Senator Symington asked me that question, or those two
questions, I really thought that he and I were tracking, that he re-
called that in 1964, at the request of the White House, the CIA had
backed [deleted] in the election of 1964. There were two other candi-
dates I believe at that time.
One of them was [deleted] and the other�Mr. Holt has helped me
in my memory�a gentleman named [deleted].
When Senator Symington asked me this question, I thought that
he was anxious to find out whether or not we had put money into
Alessandri to make campaigns against Allende; in other words, the
political opponents of President Allende, and we had not.
46 365 75 2
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He also asked me a question there, and I thought that when I
answered this, perhaps I should have answered it in a much more
extensive way. May I say, right here and now, that I think I made
one mistake in that testimony, maybe it is a serious mistake, but I
should have probably asked either to go off the record or to have
asked to discuss this matter in sonic other forum, because you will
recall at that time Allende's government was in power in Chile and
we did not need any more diplomatic incidents or any more dif-
ficulties than the United. States and Chile already were having by
1973 when I testified.
As far as the earlier statement is concerned, whether the agency
tried to overthrow the Government of Chile I answered "No." I
believe that is true. If it has been alleged differently by someone
else, I would appreciate having it.
1. know that the Nixon administration wanted it overthrown but
there was no way to do it that anybody knew of and any probes that
were made in Chile to ascertain whether there was any force there
that was likely to bring this about produced no 'evidence that there
was any such 'force.
The �Agency, therefore, never tried. I believe that is true.
By the testimony I wish you gentlemen. would help me because I
have a sensation here sometimes T. am walking onto a bog, that maybe
somebody has COMP up and said something else, which makes it seem
as through I am not being forthright.
Now the money, as I understand it, that went into the Chile op-
eration went into civic action groups, supporting newspapers' radios,
and so forth, in order to keep alive the [deleted] and the sort of Nation-
alist side of the Chilean spectrum' social spectrum. I did not realize
that went into political parties, I did not think that it had, at least
it was my understanding at the time. If somebody has said something
else, I am prepared to stand corrected.
I want to be very responsive to Senator Case because I do not want
there to be any miestion here any longer.
TM PORTA NCE OF COMMITTEE'S GOOD OPINION
May I just disgress to say that the good opinion of this committee is
very important to me, it always had been when I was Director and it
is important to me this day.
I have been in the, Government for 32 years. When you have been
in Government that long, you get a pension when you are finished,
and the only thin' you have left is your reputation. If I do not have
my reputation left when I leave the Government, I have lost 32 years
effectively and I really am not a bit interested in seeing that happen.
So if the committee or Senator Case feels that you were deliberately
misled here, I can only plead that I had no intention of lying, I had no
intention of deliberately misleading this committee, and it is altogether
possible that, as I was answering these questions, I was assuming
land of knowledge on the part of you gentlemen which possibly you
did not have.
Senator CASE. Von must never assume that.
Really, that sounds a little bit like saying that we never asked the
right questions.
Mr. HELMS. I am up against that problem.
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Senator CASE. YOU are.
Mr. HELMS. It seems to me something Senator Fulbright once said
to me, and I can only say that when it comes to here today, I will
answer any possible questions in the Department that you want. If I
have been guilty in the past of not having gone the whole way, all
right, but at least
Senator CASE. Since Chile is Senator Church's particular concern, I
would like, Mr. Chairman, to yield to him.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
COMMITTEE'S PURPOSE
Let me interject right here, Mr. Helms, that I d0 not want you to
feel that this committee is trying to get you or trying to embarrass you
or anything like that. I want to say that I have known you throughout
the years. I knew you when you were head of CIA; I never had any
dealings with you, I knew you. I respected your leadership, and I al-
ways felt that you tried to do a good job.
You have read all of these statements in the press?
Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.
The Cifu I nmAN. felt, and I am sure the members of this committee
felt, that so far as covert actions in foreign countries were concerned,
we more or less had an obligation to check into it. That is all we are
trying to do. It is not to prosecute or persecute you.
Of course, you have had a long distinguished service in the Govern-
ment and I think I can assure you that everyone on this committee
wants to see you reach that time of retirement with your honor, and
your reputation, intact and your head high.
Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. As loner as my name has been mentioned in the
testimony, may I make a short statement?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
SUBJECT OF SENATOR SYMINGTON'S FEBRUARY 7, 1973, QUESTIONING
Senator SYMINGTON. When I was asking the question, I was not
thinking about 1964 or any previous situation. That does not surprise
me because I knew little about the CIA.
When I asked the question I was thinking of the Allende govern-
ment, not of something that happened 6, 7, or 8 years ago.
I had been approached by people before about copper interests in
Chile, but had not the faintest idea I was asking whether money had
been given to Chile many years before.
Interest had to do primarily with the copper setup, so I fully
sympathize with the witness when he says he thought my questioning
had to do with what we had done to the Allende government in effort
to bring it down.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?
Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chaii ian.
HARRINGTON LETTER'S ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING CIA ACTIVITY
What I would like to do, Mr. Ambassador, is to set out'first of all,
so that there are no traps or blind alleys in this, what we now have
heard about the CIA activity in Chile, and I would like to refer to
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the letter that the press got hold of, the Harrington letter. It was first
rzwealed in "The New York Times," T think.
Since that, time, we have checked the allegations in this letter
against testimony that, Mr. Colby subsequently gave, that is, sub-
sequent, to your testimony.
Mr. II EL NIS. YOS, sir.
Senator ( 4-TURCTI. And, insofar as I can tell in making the com-
parison, although the Colby testimony was not as specific in all
particulars as the allegations in the letter, the Colby testimony
substantially confirmed these allegations. That is my impression of
I he ( ol})\ testimony.
In general, the letter alleges that the _Nixon administration author-
ized more than $x million for covert activities by the CIA in Chile
between 1970 and 197:1. The purpose of these covert activities was
said to be an effort to make it impossible for President Salvador
Allende Gossens to govern; and second, that all of these activities
were specifically authorized by the Forty Committee, chaired by
Secretary of State Kissinger, which authorizes such clandestine
zte tivities.
Again, according to the letter, the goal of these activities was to
destabilize, which is the term that the letter uses, the Allende govern-
ment; and further. it was considered a test of using heavy cash pay-
ments to bring down the government, viewed as antagonistic to the
Irnited States.
Specifically, the forty Committee, chaired by Kissinger, is charged.
with having authorized the following CIA activities and expenditures.
First. Tn 1969, $500,000 was expended to fund individuals who
could he nurtured to keep the anti-Allende forces active and intact.
Second. During, the 1970 election, $500,000 was given to opposition
party personnel, and, third, that after the September 4, 1970 popular
election, $350,000 was authorized to bribe the Chilean Congress as
part of a scheme to overturn the results of the election in which
Allende gained a plurality, although that plan was later evaluated as
unworkable.
There are some other, specifics. Let's take these first, in order.
11:-;E OF FUNDS AUTHORIZED IN 1969 A ND 1970
tiomg back to your testimony OD February 7, 1973, when Senator
S,�,Jningt on. asked, "Old you have any money passed to the opponents
of Allende?" your answer was, "No, sir."
Now, first, of all, were these sums that I have, referred to authorized
n 1969 for use prior to the election and during the election of 1970?
What, were they used for and how can these, charges in the letter be
'ecoticiled with your answer to the question that Senator Symington
iuiit to you?
Ambassador ITELms. T understood Senator S2,,mington to have asked
toe if we had given money to Mr. Allemle's opponents, which were
t,,,yo, a man -pained Alessandri and a man named Torah!.
Senator XI cORF,. You tnean his actual opponents, not those opposing
him?
Ambassador flEtAt. T understood the question to mean that because
in a previous election I had in mind we had actually given the money
lo the can didat es.
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Senator McGEE-. Senator Church; if you will yield on that, that
seems to me an area where everybody has gotten off on a separate
track.
Ambassador ITELms. I obviously did.
Senator CHURCH. To confirm what did in fact happen, going back to
the specifies, in 1969, was $500,000 expended to fund individuals who
could be nurtured to keep anti-Allende forces active and intact?
Could you tell us what the money was used for whether this
characterization is a fair one?
Ambassador HELMS. I cannot, I am sorry; at this late date, I don't
recall any more; and I didn't realize that this testimony was going to
be before us today, so I have not reviewed it before. I am hearing it
now for the first time, and I am not going to be in the position of mis-
leading you; and whatever the Agency records show as against maybe
Congressman Harrington's record, I am quite prepared to accept, and
they can be put in the record at this time.
Senator CHURCH. May I ask during the 1970 election, maybe part of
this you can recall
Ambassador HELms. I will do my best.
Senator CHURCH [continuing]. During the 1970 election, the charge
is made that $500,000 was given to opposition party personnel. Now,
we have not been told that it was given directly to Alessandri or to the
other opponent.
Ambassador IIELms. Senator Church, my recollection; and that is
only to the best of my recollection, I didn't think this was being given
to political parties, I thought it was being given to civic action groups.
That was my recollection at that time. Whether these civic action or
social groups might, by perfectly normal extrapolations, be tied to
certain political parties, it may well be, but it was not my impression
at the time that these were actually going into people in the political
apparatus, as we would have it in this country in the ,Democratic or
Republican Parties.
ALLEGED PLAN TO BRIBE CHILEAN CONGRESS
Senator CHURCH. The third of these charges is that after the
September 4, 1970, popular election, $350,000 was authorized to bribe
the Chilean Congress, as part of a scheme to overturn the result of the
election in which Allende gained a plurality, although that plan was
later evaluated as unworkable.
Now, what do you know about that proposition?
Ambassador HELMS. Well, as I say again, my recollection is not very
clear. I know that there was a lot of planning going on about various
ways if possible, to upset the result; in other words, to have a vote in
the Assembly when it came down to the two candidates that had won,
that would be against Allende, that there was planning and work and
thought given to how one might upset that, I think there is no doubt.
Senator CHURCH. Do you recall whether or not that planning was
set aside, whether a finding was made that such plans were unworkable?
Ambassador HELms. I think so.
Senator CHURCH. Did it go beyond the planning stage?
Ambassador HELMS. I think so because as I think back to that
period, there was obviously a lot of pressure from th.e Administration
to see if something could be done about this, but I believe when it
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was examined, it was found it was quite unworkable, Allende had
this all wrapped up, it was put in the bag, and there was nothing
that was going to change it.
Senator Citiracti. Do you recall at this time whether or not any
bribes were attempted?
Ambassador ITELms. That I do not remember.
May I say, Senator, I am not trying to mislead you. Maybe there
were.
Senator Cutracti. I understand. I accept the fact that these details
are difficult to remember.
OBTAINT.NTG INFORMATION CONCERNING HARRINGTON CHARGES FROM
CIA SUGGESTED
Ambassador REIMS. May I say, sir, in an effort to put my memory
in perspective at this particular time, there were a lot of other things
going on, and I was not as intimately involved in these things as
perhaps I might, have been at any time in history, but I would like
to invite you, because I realize the Foreign Relations Committee is
going to have a. key role now in all of these covert actions, to actually
get somebody to come up here with the files and tell you very specifi-
cally what happened rather than what Congressman Harrington
thinks happened.
Senator Cimucii. I was just about to make this proposal to the
chairman, that following our hearing here, Mr. Chairman, we do
obtain for our own record the full information from the CIA with
respect to the particulars of these charges, so that we have directly
from the Agency all of the facts concerning the charges, as I recognize
you may not be able to recall particulars.
Senator HumennEv. You want all of the covert activities against
all countries?
Senator CHURcIf. No.
Senator Ifum.PHREv. Let me make it clear we are speaking now only
with regard to the letter and the specific charges that have been made,
a letter that was made public and became really the cause of this
hearing today.
'I7he reason I bring this up is that we do have general authority
over covert activities.
Senator CnuRCH. Yes.
POLICY QUESTION CONCERNING OBTAINING CIA INFORMATION
Senator TiumpuRnv. T have very mixed feelings about this. I just
put a note down here, "Do we want the CIA to tell us what they have
been doing in some other countries?" because I think some of these
things are a good deal cheaper than the Bay of Pigs. There are so
many countries in which these covert activities take place that I
think there is a real general policy question whether we ought to have
them or not. If we do, how much do we want to know about them,
and whom are we going to trust with the information?
went over to the State Department Saturday and sat down with
only the Secretary of State, and I saw it all in the paper the next
morning. There is no way you can talk to anybody about anything
that they won't report it, except perhaps that you love your mother.
The CHAIRMAN. Just the two of you talking?
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Senator HUMPHREY. Just two of us.
The CHAIRMAN. Which one of you leaked it?
Senator HUMPHREY. I do not know which one, but I am telling you
what happened. The memorandum to a lady who had set up the meet-
ing had been given to the New York Times. On the day after I left, the
New York Times editor called me up and said he wanted to read me a
memorandum which precipitated my meeting over there, about which
I knew nothing. I did not even know there was a memo.
I get back again to what is happening in Chile. I have to go now. I
am trying to get jobs for 400 people in Minnesota today. That is a
great deal more important to me right now than Chile.
Senator SCOTT. You better take that back unless you want it in the
Times.
Senator HUMPHREY. I will leave it. I hope it gets printed because I
have two towns out home, one with 300 people laid off and one with
270. That is 570 people with no jobs this morning, and I am really in
trouble.
Let me say that I do think that we have a problem here. I am
interested in getting this Chile question cleared up, but I would be
interested to find out what we have done in other countries.
I have to say these things because to me I think there is a real policy
question here of how far we go and what we do in terms of record.
Senator CHURCH. I agree that is one policy question we have to
resolve in light of the provisions of the new law.
If it is reassuring at all, I had lunch privately with the Secretary
yesterday.
Senator HUMPHREY. I saw you go out.
Senator CHURCH. So far I have not seen anything in the New York
Times about it. [Laughter.]
Senator HUMPHREY. But I do think, if I may say, that we are
fastened on the Chile question because it got to be a part of the general
testimony but, interestingly enough to me, while we are concerned about
Chile, and I am, I have yet to hear anybody really examining what we
did in other places. And do not think we did not do a lot.
I am just worried about the trend we are following.
NEED FOR GUIDELINES IN OBTAINING CIA INFORMATION
Senator CHURCH. I would hope that if a select committee is chosen
and approved by the Senate, some guidelines can be developed for the
future with respect to covert operations because there is, I would
suggest, a difference between an elected government and a government
imposed by force of arms.
Senator HUMPHREY. Absolutely.
Senator Scow. And a difference between invasion, too, and action
short of invasion.
Senator CHURCH. There are all kinds of differences, but this makes
the need for some guidelines all the more important.
May I get back to the question of Chile?
NOT DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN EVENTS QUESTIONED
Senator McGEE. May I inject one thought. These things most of
us went through here, and the testimony that was presented, really
were triggered by two things: Senator Church's very telling ITT
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bearings and the disclosures which began to unfold, and, secondly,
the, overthrow of the Allende. government, the military coup, in
September 1973.
Things, which happened at quite different, times historically, often
get merged. As I read the testimony again, questions that were pro-
voked by event::: of an earlier time led to answers that were then
directed at the coup which had just occurred. I generally feel now,
more so than before as I reread this, that is where the double tracking
occurred .
When the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee had the CIA,
Ambassador Davis, Mr. Kubisch and the Secretary of State here,
we came back 1.0 this again and again, They laid out very candidly
for us in most, instances what, had transpired in the election of 1964
and how much it must have been toned down by 1970, even though
there. Was still participation. But by the time of the coup, which is
what brought all of this to a very emotional head, there had been
nothing in Harrington's letter Or letters, or his memo or in the subse-
quent memos, that contradicted the Colby assessment. given before
our subcommittee after the coup, in November of 1973, namely:
The CIA was not involved in any direct way with the coup; they had
been warned that it was coming, once a week for several months.
There was money being circulated but not in the dimension as before,
because after the ITT hearings ever.ybody learned a lot of lessons. The
cormuitment was on a very modest scale, which was to keep opposi-
timi voices alive through newspapers or radio stations or individuals
who were doing this sort of thing. But at. no time was money given to
the truckers' strike. No money was given to any group or encourage7
ment to any group to overthrow the government. It was all pitched
towarit the, 1976 election.
That is quite it different policy goal than triggering the defeat of
Allende, or even the, bribing question at the time that Allende and his
ipponent were to be voted on. by the congress, which is very serious.
That is why I think in hindsight it is awfully important, for me at
ieast, to sort out, w hich were the. disastrous things that were undertaken
,i,arlier from which, hopefully, all have learned. Those ought to be
lic.lrided in the, ultimate guidelines as Aya: s not to do it, but we have
oeen guilty of not differentiating between the events and kind of
generalizing on them, particularly Congressman Harrington.
).{1 I TTEE KNOWLEDGE OF COVERT ACTIVITY
The CHAIRMAN. May I interject a thought, at this point?
agree with what Senator McGee has said and I have said time and
again that, we ought to establish guidelines. I think we must be, very
careful to avoid the. idea that covert, activity in foreign countries is
-.unwilling totally unknown to us. We have, known of it.
Senator McGri- Or unwarranted.
The CHAIRMAN. We have been told about, it from time to time.
believe we recognize the necessity still of having covert actions in
foreign countries, lout I think Senator McGee touches it properly when
he says there ought to be guidelines. We ought not to run wild with
lhem, but, nevertheless, I do not, think we can just shake our heads and
say, "Tlie very idea, of covert, action in that country."
Senator ( 11-ITRC14. I appreciate what you have said, and of course,
we have known in the past in a general we of covert activities by the
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CIA. The Chilean incident was not the first revelation of this kind
but we had testimony on it�with apparent discrepancies---and that
is what I am trying to get at.
PLAN TO BRIBE CHILEAN CONGRESS
Now, I just questioned you, to pick up the track again, Mr. Ambas-
sador, about what happened after the popular election in September
of 1970, when, according to our information, $350,000 was authorized
to bribe the Chilean Congress as part of a scheme to overturn the
results of the election, and it was later judged that such a plan was
unworkable, and, you have testified that, as I understand your
answer, that though you can't recall all of the particulars, that some
attention was given to such a scheme, at least.
Isn't that correct?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.
Senator CHURCH. That being the case, let me refer to a question
that I asked you on March 6, 1973, during the executive session of the
Multinational Corporation, Subcommittee. I asked at that time, I
quote from the record, "Now, following the election"�we were
discussing the Chilean election�"and up to the time that the Congress
of Chile cast its vote installing Allende as the new President, did the
CIA attempt in any way to influence that vote?"
And you responded 'Which vote?" And I said "the vote of the
Congress." And you said, "No, sir."
Now do you see any discrepancy in your answer to my question
at that time with what you have just told us?
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, I think that what is involved here is this.
That as best I recall it thought was given to trying to upset this
election but there was no way found to do it. In other words, when
the situation was calculated and observed it was found that this was
in the bag, that the money would certainly not get the votes neces-
sary to overturn the election.
I realize, sir, even in light of that that my answer was narrow, but
I would like to say something here.
I didn't come into the Multinational Committee hearing to mislead
you, but I have had as Director, or did have as Director in 6i years
a lot of problems, and one of the principal problems was who in the
Congress was really to divulge all of the details of covert operations
to, and I must say this has given me a great deal of difficulty over the
years and I just want to say once a real oversight committee is set
up in the Congress it will make a great difference to any future
Director because many times I have wanted to be able to go to
somebody and say what do you think.
Senator CHURCH. I can appreciate that.
Ambassador HELMS. I must say this was very difficult for me.
Senator CHURCH. I can appreciate that. That has been an ambiguity
which must have been difficult for every CIA Director.
Ambassador HELMS. It has been.
Senator CHURCH. And an ambiguity that should be cleared up.
Ambassador HELMS. If I was less than forthcoming it wasn't
because I was being bloody minded, it was simply because I was
trying to stay within what I thought was the congressional guidelines.
Senator CHURCH. I see.
46-365-75 3
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pot-',SMILTTY oF OBLIGATION TO MISLEAD CONGRESSIONAL COMMVT'TFES
';-ietiator MeGovERN. Mr. Helms, one thing that I think bears on
this whole subject, including the line of questioning that Senator
Church has developed, is something that has bothered me. Some years
ago, an administration official was quoted publicly as saying he
thought there are times when Government officials had a patriotic
obligation to lie.
Senator SYMINGTON. I think Sylvester was his name.
Senator CIA T thought it was Allen Dulles.
Senator MeCrovERN. Maybe they both did.
Senator CAsv,, We are not joking at all and I am not saying that
these people don't have the most honorable intentions in everything
they do, including lying.
Senator MeGovERN. What I wanted to ask Ambassador Helms is
this: Is it possible that a person, either the Director of CIA or someone
high in the Agency, would feel that he had either a right, maybe an
obligation, on certain occasions, to mislead congressional committees?
Is there a rationalization that you might go through�"Well, with
the national interest in mind I am going to deliberately give a mis-
leading answer on this, not because I want to be a liar but because I
am concerned about the security of the country and, therefore, I am
not going to give a truthful answer?"
Well, Senator McGovern, I could understand
something like that going through any Director's mind. I would like
to say the way I guided myself during the Wiz years I was Director,
I made up my mind that it wasn't going to lie to any congressional
committees, that 1. was going to he as forthcoming as I thought I
could tinder the circumstances existing at the hearing, whether I
was before an oversight committee or someplace else, and I must
say I always had the alternative of going to the Senator privately and
say please will you pull back on that, we are getting into a very
sensitive area, and I realize against that background that these
discrepancies or misinterpretations and so forth, maybe what I
should have done at the time was to go to Senator Church's office
and sit down with him and go over these things in a much more
extensive way simply so he would know where the pitfalls were. But
at that time the Allende government was still in power. I felt obliged
to keep some of this stuff, in other words, not volunteer a good deal of
information bemuse my oversight committee wanted to hear it. I
would have voltinteered it, but my understanding had been that that
was where 1: was going to give all of the covert information.) don't
want to seek refuge and say I lied in the national security interest.
U didn't run into any situation where I thought that was required.
COVER STORY FOR CIA COVERT OPERATION
Senator CHURCH. I don't know whether there is any basis of truth
in it or not, but have heard, when a covert operation is launched
by the CIA, that, as a part of the planning for the execution of the
operation, a cover story is agreed upon to be used in connection with
any questions that, might arise, and that the cover story is to apply
wherever necessary, including its use in connection with questions
that may be raised by congressional committees.
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Is there any truth to that?
Ambassador HELMS. Well, not that I am aware of, sir, particularly
with respect to congressional committees. Obviously a cover story,
there is the press to take care of, public inquiries in foreign countries
and so forth, but I don't recall any time my coming to a congressional
committee and giving a cover story and hiding what was behind it.
If anybody knows of one I would be glad to have them help me with
my memory. I don't recall any because this was not my intention.
ALLEGED CIA SPYING ON CONGRESSMEN
One of the allegations here recently has been that the CIA spied on
Congressmen. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I think even
if my mind is limited, when I came to be Director after all these years
in Government it would have occurred to me that the last thing in
the world that any agency would need, let alone the CIA, was to
keep files on, keep dossiers on or surveil Congressmen. They are
duly elected representatives of the U.S. public, there is no reason to
do it. It was not the CIA function in any event, and I promise you
that as far as I was aware none were ever kept and I never permitted
anybody to raise a finger.
ALLEGED SURVEILLANCE OF SENATOR GOLDWATER'S CAMPAIGN
There is an allegation that has been made that Senator Goldwater's
campaign, I think it was in 1964, was surveilled by the CIA. I simply
do not believe it. I simply do not believe it. I would want the witness
to come and sit right opposite me and tell me the precise occasions
and dates and so forth of any such event, because if I had ever heard
of such a thing I wouldn't have permitted it for a minute.
I think you have to have a very limited intelligence to think there
was anything to be gained by that kind of activity. I hope I am not
that limited.
POSSIBILITY OF CIA'S BEING TURNED TO AFTER MR. HELMS LEFT
Senator MeGEE. Would it be conceivable that Ehrlichman or
Haldeman turned to the CIA after you left, because they couldn't
get any cooperation from the FBI. Isn't that one of the stories they
are telling us now? Is it conceivable that that could happen, but not
in your day?
Ambassador HELMS. Well, even in my day when this constantly
came up I want to say, sir, I resisted, simply didn't comply. There
are agencies which I will if you like, cover them in a minute, maybe
there are semantical differences, but I would like to explain a little
bit what this turmoil is all about because I think we have got a ques-
tion here of the definition of terms what people are talking about.
MR. HELMS' TESTIMONY OF FEBRUARY 7, 1973
Ever since February 7 there has been hanging in the record the
intimation that I didn't tell the truth to Senator Case. When I came
back on May 21 I thought I was going to get that cleared up. I have
just read the record and it ran out at the end, for some reason we
didn't get back on the thing. I don't know whether Senator Case
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thinks I misled him intentionally and has thought that for 2 years or
not. I hope not. I hope he knows me better than that. But in any event
will be glad to discuss it with you.
Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like it very much. What I
said before in the general colloquy about this Agency and about
covert operations and standards and. honesty, I believe is this: I don't
know how you can have a covert!, operation that is not covert, and
people who go into it, people obviously with the greatest distinction,
you and Allen and others, take this on as part of the responsibility
that, you have. and I accept that. When you say that you lied or didn't
tell the truth-----I have forgotten exactly what the words were�I
meant that in accordance with ordinary standards, you were not as
forthcoming as it seems to me ordinary people would think they should
be. 1 do feel that that is true.
AUGUST 5, 1970, HUSTON MEMORANDUM TO HA LDEMAN
a connection with this business of the Interagency Committee on
Intelligence and the Huston proposal, with which I am sure you are
very familiar, Hoover resisted the suggestion that was made at the
end of that report, saying the FBI is opposed to the creation of a
permanent committee for the purpose of providing evaluations of
domestic intelligence but that the FBI would approve providing peri-
odic domestic intelligence estimates.
Later on Huston. adverted to this matter and in a memorandum,
for example, objected to accepting Hoover's mandate. He said, "All
of us are going to look damn silly" in the minds of several people,
including 'Helms�you are mentioned here exactly�if we lie down and
let Hoover in effect run over us in this matter.
Ambassador l-fraws. Sir, excuse me
Senator CA SE. These are his exact words:
If he gets his way, it is going to look like he is more powerful than the President,
He had his say in the footnotes and RN decided against him.
That should close the matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party in
reopening it. All or us are going to look damn silly in the eyes of Helms, Gayler,
Bennett and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse a Presidential
decision based on a report that many people worked their asses off to prepare and
which, on the men i Is, was a first-rate objective job.
This is a memorandum which Huston gave to Haldeman on August 5,
1970.
Ambassador FIF,i,ms. What are you reading from, I am sorry?
Senator CASE. This is part of the record of the Senate Watergate
Com mittee.
Ann bassad or IIELMS. I see.
Senator CASE This kind of thing indicating that CIA was involved
with the preparation of this report and these proposals which are
contained in it, to which, for whatever reasons, Edgar Hoover objected.
JULY 1970, HUSTON MEMORANDUM TO HALDEMAN
Then there is a comment that came to my attention recently
through an article by Walter Pincus in the New Republic, too, a
statement by Huston in a memorandum in July 1970, to Haldeman,
saying, a "working group of the top domestic intelligence officials of
the FBI, CIA., DIA, NSA, and each of the military services, met
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regularly throughout June to discuss the problems outlined by the
President, and to draft the attached report. The discussions were
frank and the quality of work first rate."
That was the first paragraph of the first section called "Back-
ground." The second section is called, "Mr. Hoover," and it goes on,
this way: "I went into this exercise fearful CIA would refuse to
cooperate. In fact Dick Helms�Director of Central Intelligence�
was most cooperative and helpful, and the only stumbling block was
Mr. Hoover."
MR. HELM'S FEBRUARY 7, 1973, TESTIMONY CONCERNING ANTIWAR
MOVEMENT
There are a couple of other things but this I put against the ques-
tions and answers we had in our confirmation hearing, I guess it was
on the 7th of February 1973, in which I said to you:
It has been called to my attention that in 1969 or 1970 the White House asked
that all intelligence agencies join in the effort to learn as much as they could about
the antiwar movement and during this period U.S. Army Intelligence became
involved and kept files on U.S. citizens. Do you know anything about any activity
on the part of CIA in that connection? Was it asked to be involved?
You are recorded as replying:
I don't recall whether we were asked, but we were not involved because it
seems to me that was a clear violation of what our charter was.
I said:
What do you do in a case like that?
You answered:
I would simple go to explain to the President this didn't seem to me to be
advisable.
I commented:
That would end it?
And you said:
Well, I think so, normally.
I said:
OK.
I was turned off on inquiring further about the activity of the CIA.
It does seem to me when you were involved in preparation of a report
and plans, with action suggested, that your answer to me was dis-
ingenuous at least.
Ambassador HELMS. May I reply?
Senator CASE. I wish you would. Really again there is no malice at
all in this.
Senator SCOTT. May I make a request that Mr. Helms be allowed
to reply without a spate of interruption. In all fairness to him, I
want him to have an opportunity to answer.
Senator CASE. I agree with you fully.
Senator SCOTT. I have not said anything yet, but I do want answers
as well as questions.
Mr. HELMS, When I answered your question, I want to point out
first, Senator Case, something else, if I may, and I am going to get
to this, but I want to tell you that I have gone through my thoughts
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about this colloquy because, on the 10th of July 1973, there ap-
peared an article in the Washington Post. This was before the tran-
script of the February 7 hearing had been declassified and made public.
I believe it was made public, it says here, March 5, 1974.
Senator McGEE. This is July you are talking about, 1973?
Mr.litELMS This is July 1973.
There was an article in the Washington Post in which a quotation is
taken from my testimony, leaving out entirely the sentence "and
about U.S.this time Army Intelligence became involved and kept files
on S citizens."
In other words, when this item in the testimony was leaked to the
newspapers that was left out, but the rest of it was left in so that it
looked as though I was answering the first part of the question, not
the second part of the question.
Now I. distinctly remember when I was asked that that I wanted
very much to clear up any impression in your mind that we had done
like Army Intelligence, that I was addressing myself to the part of the
question where you said, "And during this period U.S. Army In-
telligence was involved and kept files on U.S. citizens." I wanted to
correct any impression you might have had that the CIA was doing
the same thing.
And believe me, the first part of the question had simply gone out of
my mind and in my desire to set your mind straight on something
which I thought was very explosive indeed, that we go out and take
photographs of war protestors, dissidents, and things of that kind be-
cause we had not done so.
HUSTON OPERATION
Now, may I say that when you said it was called to my attention in
1969 or 1970 the White House asked the intelligence agencies be joined,
never replied to that, I have to admit to you right now.
Sir, when I testified to this in 1973, I had totally forgotten about the
Huston business. That was a very short episode. There was indeed a
report written. It was aborted; it was not approved. We went back to
doing business as we had always done before and it was not until
Senator Symington later on in the Watergate hearings dug up the
whole Huston thing this all came back in my memory.
T am being as honest as I know how; I simply did not remember it.
But, Senator Case, would it have been too much to ask of you if you
had in mind the Huston report you might have mentioned to me at that
time that, "You had not been responsive to the first part of my ques-
tion. What is this Huston report?"
Senator CASE. I am very happy to answer you, and you are entitled
to an answer.
I knew nothing about the fact. I was relying upon something that
had been alleged, and I was trying to give you a chance to reply.
What never occurred to me was that you were answering a part of the
question, and rather a small part, rather than the whole general ques-
tion, that you were not forthcoming That is what bothered me.
Mr. HELMS. You see, sir, may I say there are certain things that the
Director of CIA gets pretty sensitive about; and one of the things is
that he spies on Americans. When this came into your question, I
totally focused on that because it seemed to me that was very impor-
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tant, and I did not reply about the Huston thing at the time, I promise
on my oath.
Senator CASE. I accept your statement and all I can say
Mr. HELMS. I would like to go back to the Huston report because
would like to go a little farther on that.
The whole Huston operation started one morning in the White
House when President Nixon called a meeting, and he had at the meet-
ing Mr. Hoffer, General Bennett, Admiral Gayler, myself, and I am
not sure who the aides were, but I guess Mr. Huston was there as well.
I know a photograph was taken that morning.
The burden of that meeting, as best I recall it, was an injunction from
the President to Mr. Hoover to organize a committee of the people
there present and to examine the possibilities of getting increased
coverage on Weathermen, Black Panthers; in other words, groups that
were causing trouble and difficulties in the United States, protests of
one sort or another.
I attended the meetings under Mr. Hoover's jurisdiction which led
up to the writing of the report which was then submitted, with all of
the signatures on it.
I want to assure you gentlemen that at no time in any of those
meetings did I undertake on behalf of the Agency to do anything
other than increase our activities in the foreign field in an effort to
see whether there were Communists, Chinese, Russians, Algerians, or
anybody else related to these dissident movements.
I did not agree, and regardless of whether Mr. Huston said I was
cooperative or not, I was cooperative by coming to the meetings and
making people available to help with the project, but I agreed to
nothing, as best I recall it, that put me any farther into the domestic
field than I would have been normally.
I believe it true also that when Mr. Huston testified before the
Armed Services Committee, before Senator Symington during the
Watergate period, that he actually pointed out to the committee at
the time, I believe the record shows this, that he had been concerned
about stories in the press that the White House was trying to tie the
Agency into domestic intelligence work, that in point of fact his
recommendation with respect to the CIA was simply that they in-
crease their coverage of foreign activities, and I believe that is in the
record, Senator Symington, somewhere.
MR. HOOVER'S OBJECTIONS TO HUSTON PLAN
Senator SYMINGTON. At the time Senator Stennis was ill in the
hospital. I was acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee
and called up the Central Intelligence Agency, said we wanted all
pertinent papers. I turned the papers over to the staff of the Armed
Services Committee and they had a good lawyer, who has since left
the committee. He came up with a memorandum from Mr. Helms
which said he�Helms�was astounded or astonished, one of those
two words, to find the Attorney General knew nothing about the
so-called Huston plan. We went to work to find Mr. Huston.
We found him and he talked to us. We have his testimony on the
record.
We have read a lot of criticism of Mr. Hoover, J. Edgar Hoover,
but never any that exceeded what came from Mr. Huston. At one
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point Mr. Huston wrote in his memorandum, "We have heard Mr.
Hoover's objection to this plan and it is a lot of" I won't repeat
the expletives. It gives an idea of the type and character of stuff
going around at that time.
I suggested h., come down and he did.
We just had had an unfortunate experience with a magazine article
making charges against the CIA which proved false. The man who
made the eh arge-; was exposed as a fraud. I could not see any reason for
pursuing it further. The man was stateless, had no passport.
Getting back to Huston, after reading the memorandum which
Helms wrote, it became pretty clear in my mind what happened,
because the big objector to the Huston plan was Hoover. He knew it
was a plan that was against the law.
When this CIA_ statute was written, I knew something about it,
being on the National Security Council. My friend, Clark Clifford,
wrote it up as Legal Counsel to the President.
It originally started, in my opinion as an idea of Secretary Forrestal.
The first Director of the CIA was a personal friend of the President and
mine, Adm. Sidney Souers of St. Louis, Mo. The big problem going
in was to overcome Hoover's objections. I believe Mr. Hoover told
Mr. Mitchell, will not sign this plan unless I have written instruc-
tions from the President." When Mitchell said to him, "What plan?"
the fat was in the fire.
I. would be reasonably confident in my own mind the Attorney
General then wont to the President and said, "Mr. President, you
cannot sign that letter because you are asking the Attorney General,
through the Director of the FBI, to break the law." If you remember,
in a speech or statement by President Nixon, he said the Huston plan
was put into effect for 5 days, then withdrawn at the request of Mr.
Hoover. That is ort the public record.
BYPASSING OF MR. HELMS CONCERNING MEXICO
One other point: In this afternoon's paper, which I happened to see,
Mr. Colson takes a belt at the CIA. Mr. Colson would not appear the
most reliable of all witnesses.
What happened was Mr. Helms was called by Mr. Haldeman and
asked to come over to Mr. Ehrlichman's office, and Haldeman said,
not to Helms, but to General Walters, "I want you to go over and see
Pat Gray and tell him to call this thing off in Mexico."
The record should show they were bypassing Mr. Helms, hoping to
work through General Walters.
MILITARY'S INTEREST IN ESTIMATING THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY
It is important to know there are persons in the military anxious to
et rid of the CIA, people who do not want those outside the Pentagon
to argue with them about the threat.
A General wrote an article, General Graham, in which he said the
Pentagon should decide the nature and degree of the threat. That
was the net of it. So I called up the then Director of CIA, Secretary
Schlesinger, and expressed my apprehension. He asked, "Have you
read the entire article?" I said "No." "Well," he said, "read it, and I
don't think you will feel that way." So I read it.
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Senator CASE. When was this?
Senator SYMINGTON. April 1973. A magazine called "Army." The
title was, "Estimating the Threat, a Soldier's Job."
After I read it I wrote Secretary Schlesinger and told him I was
even more apprehensive, stating: "Specifically, where does this leave
the CIA?"
The second paragraph of General Graham's article reads:
If the military profession loses its role in describing these threats to national
security it surrenders its influence in decisions about military strategy, military
force structure in the nature of its own armaments. We have in the past 10 years
come perilously close to losing this vital role.
He later sums up--
To sum up, I think that the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its
traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security.
This appeared a direct attack on civilian control. This general later
became Assistant Director to the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. After Mr. Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense, the same
general moved back into the Defense Intelligence Agency and he is
now the head of that agency, where he has more money and more
influence in my opinion than anybody in the CIA.
So I think much is at stake here. I have no particular brief for
Helms. If you are a spy you are a spy, and bound to get into situations
where you cannot be fully candid about details, when you are told to
do things some other people might think wrong. But I do question
whether we want to pass over entirely to the military the decision as
to what we do or do not need to defend the United States.
ILLUSTRATION OF DIEGO GARCIA
An illustration is the upcominc, debate on Diego Garcia.
About 6 years ago the Chief of Naval Operations talked to me about
using this island as a little communication center. This has now
developed into plans for a carrier base, with a 12,500-foot airplane
runway.
I went to Director Colby of the CIA and asked for an estimate of
what the Soviets were doing in the Indian Ocean. Colby apparently
has been somewhat massaged down�I use the word 'massaged'
advisedly�from his original position. His original position was
nearly 180 degrees opposite to what the Pentagon said was being
done in that Ocean. So I had Mr. Colby's statement declassified. Some
was taken out, but much left in. I placed the declassified version in
the Congressional Record.
What we are talking about now is whether we are going to have any
real say about the threat if we destroy or seriously cripple the CIA.
MAJOR GENERAL DANIEL GRAHAM
Senator CASE. I want to ask you one question? Was this general,
whatever his name was, who wrote this article, at that time deputy
in the CIA?
Senator SYMINGTON. He was being made a Deputy in the CIA.
Somebody came to me with his article entitled, "Estimating the
Threat, the Soldier's Job." He is Maj. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, a
1946 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, now Deputy Director
for Estimates in the Defense Intelligence Agency.
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General Graham has served in several posts in the Office of Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency
and commanded the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion, U.S.
Army, Pacific.
In Vietnam he was Chief of Current Intelligence, Indications and
Estimates Division.
Ile was Director of Intelligence Production in the Office of U.S.
Military Assistance Command. He is considered an excellent officer.
lie was transferred by Secretary Schlesinger to be his assistant
when he became Director of Central Intelligence. I then wrote a
letter, I would like to read it, it is short, into the record.
Dear Jim, �April 13, 1973�as you can see by the attached I have read the
article in detail and have extracted certain statements, hopefully not out of
context. At the end of the article as presented he states, "There is no longer a
need in my judgment to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies." That article,
plus the fact he is now going to work for you have created comment down here. I
would hope we could get together soon re same. Sincerely.
I added in long hand, "Specifically, where does this leave the CIA?"
This general is now back in the Pentagon as head of DIA. Again I say
it is important, according to Helms' testimony recently, to note that
the CIA today gets 15 cents of the total intelligence tax dollar.
SENATOR CASE'S REASON FOR PRESSING
Senator CASE. I would like to say one thing. The reason I press this,
first of all, is that my name is involved. Second, I am one of those who
has always tried to support the proper activity of the CIA and its
function. I join Senator Symington in wanting it to be the top intel-
ligence estimating body in our Government.
We do find it difficult. We are constantly hit by statements in the
press and other places that make it appear as if we had been not told
the whole truth.
Mr. HELMS. I hope I have been responsive to that point and this was
exactly the way it all happened in my mind.
MR. HELMS' RESPONSE TO HUSTON REPORT QUESTION
Senator CASE. If J can paraphrase it, you thought you were answer-
log only the latter part of the question and not dealing with the general
part, which was in my mind the main thing and
Mr. HELMS. I understood that in retrospect when I read in the paper
you really were referring to the Huston report, this came as a surprise
to me.
Senator CASE. I don't think I knew at that time about the Huston
-eport, but I had heard reports about this kind of agency or this kind
of operation.
Mr. HELMS. You see, this is one of those circumstances under which
had no reluctance to discuss any aspect of your question, so I really
was foolhardy.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden has tried several times to raise a
question.
Senator SCOTT. Before we leave this, because I haven't had any at
all, I have two questions but I can wait.
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EXTENT OF CIA PARTICIPATION IN HUSTON PLAN
Senator BIDEN. It is really not a question. It is a clarification in the
response, because I was not privy to all of this.
When you were Director, sir, and I do apologize, I was still in
college. I know little or nothing about this subject and admit it. I
understand in response to Senator Case's question you indicated with
regard to the Huston plan that you did not recall at the time of the
questioning the existence of such a plan. Now that you recall it, you
indicate that you resisted or would have resisted.
I am not sure I understand, whether that is a term of art, what
"resisted" means. I don't know.
Mr. HELMS. Senator, let me be more specific and use plainer lan-
guage. There has been an allegation in the newspapers, which has been
repeated over and over again like a dripping tap, that I was very
cooperative with this effort The effort as identified in the newspapers
is domestic espionage or domestic surveillance of war groups and so
forth.
All I simply wanted to say was that the participation in the Huston
Plan by the CIA had only to do with our giving assurance that we
would increase our effort overseas in the foreign field to find out if
there were connections with these various dissident groups in the
United States. We did not undertake to do anything in the domestic
intelligence field, and I am directing that reply to the newspaper
statement that I was very cooperative, the imputation or implication
which was I had gotten into something I had not been in before or
should have have gotten into, and this is what I am trying to clear up.
Senator B1DEN. That explains a lot to me.
SENSITIVITY TO DOMESTIC SPYING ALLEGATION
I was interested in your statement saying that you can understand,
as former Director of CIA, presently Ambassador, that the CIA
is very sensitive to charges of spying on American citizens. I would
like to add if you are sensitive to that charge, I, as a Senator, who
never even thought of these things before, am supersensitive to the
thought that someone in your agency, whether or not it happened,
or any other agency of this Government would spy on someone who
is a U.S. Senator or Congressman. I say that only for the purposes of
reinforcing what you already know. If you are sensitive, you can
imagine why Senator Case or anyone else around here is sensitive to
the domestic spying allegation.
CIA ACTIVITY IN CHILE DURING POST-ELECTION PERIOD
Senator CHURCH. Let's go back to the Chile matter.
I have one or two questions which will complete the series.
I am going back once more to the specifics of the letter that we
received, the Harrington letter.
We are now in the period in 1970 to 1973, and here are the specific
allegations concerning the CIA activity during that postelection
period.
First, that during the period 1971 to 1973 an additional $5 million
was authorized by the Forty Committee for more destabilization
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elforts, which included support of an unnamed but influential anti-
e newspaper.
Do you recall that?
NIT. HELMS. Yes, sir.
1 don't know about the word "destabilized." I think the first time
1 ever came across that word was when I read it in the Paris Herald
l'rihnne, which gets to Tehran a day late. Congressman Harrington
HkI this. I don't recall that word having been used in the period.
t certainly remember that a decision was made in the Forty Com-
mittee to put money into I believe the newspaper [deleted] and also
into certain radio stations to keep alive some voice, some opinion,
something that was not totally Allende. Whether the sum of money
was what you say it is, I do not recall, but I have no reason to question
th at.
Senator OmRefl. The second charge is that an additional $1-1/2'
million was expended in the municipal elections of 1973, for anti-
AI lende activities.
Mr. Ilmims. This, sir, I simply do not recall. I was leaving the
Agency, as you remember, starting at the end of 1972 and I just
don't remember whether this was done or not. In other words, I am
Simply innocent of it.
S(irtator enution. Then, finally, in the letter again it is alleged that
in August 1973 an additional $1 million was authorized by the Forty
Committee for further political destabilization activities, although
the Agency turned down the request for $50,000 to support a trucker's
strike.
Do you have any recollection of the final $1 million authorized?
Mr. llmais. I ceased to be Director, I think, early in February of
that year. I went off to Tehran and I know nothing whatever about
this.
eio CIA ,ulr To OVERTHROW PRESIDENT ALLENDE?
Senator (Juuneu. Based upon what you did know concerning tire
activities that took place between 1970 and 1973, that is the period
during which the Allende regime was in power, when Senator Syming-
ton asked the question, "Did you try in the CIA to overthrow the
Government of Chile?" you replied "No, sir."
I )o YOU want to make any further comment on that?
Mr. FIELuS. I would like to say what I said a few moments ago. I
think you were out of the room. I would like to repeat myself.
There was no doubt that the Nixon administration would like to
have had President Allende overthrown. In the narrow compass of
the days of the election that you are talking about in 1970, that be-
came a thing that they were interested in having done.
As best I recall, a very secret probe was made to find out whether
there was anything in Chile that looked like a force that would over-
throw Allende.
The Allende government was not even in at the time the probe was
made, just to see if there were any forces there to oppose Allende's
advent as President. It was very quickly established there were not,
and therefore, no further effort was made along those lines, to the best
of ur knowledge, at least I know of none. Even though we had been
charged to try and find out, I believe a report came back that there
was no way to do this.
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Senator CASE. This was between the popular election and the Con-
gressional election?
Mr. Timms. That is my recollection.
If anything of record shows anything different, I am glad to be
corrected, but that was my impression.
Looking back at the various things that certainly were done, I
cannot understand how anyone could interpret them as an attempt
to overthrow the Government or believe that they stood a chance of
doing so. So that is what I meant when I answered Senator Syming-
ton's question there was really HO effort made to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of Chile. And Senator, since we are on this subject, let me
just say something about the Congressman Harrington letter.
in Congressman Harrington's letter the words used in there are the
kind of words that get written into covert action plans. They sound
exotic, tough, all of the rest. I think when you get the entire story
laid out in Chile between 1970 and 1973 you are going to regard that
as a pretty pitiful affair, I mean in terms of actually accomplishing
anything.
Senator CHURCH. I have finished with My questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.
Senator SCOTT. Could I go off record a minute?
[Discussion off the record.]
STORY CONCERNING HOWARD HUNT'S DELIVERY OF PACKAGES TO
RICHARD OBER
Sera:Or SCOTT. Mr. Helms, there is a story, which I think has ap-
peared in the paper, although I have not read it, that Howard Hunt
delivered certain packages to Richard Ober, who delivered them to
you. I'm told that Ober was a CIA man in the White House.
Do you have. any comment on that?
Mr. HELMS. Sir, I don't know what this refers to. In the first place,
I would like to know the year, but I don't believe that Mr. Ober was
serving in the White House during that 1970-1971-1972 time period.
I believe at that time he was out in the Agency building. And if Mr.
limit was passing communications to somebody from the CIA who
was serving in the White House, I'm not familiar with it.
Now, maybe my recollection is bad, maybe there was something
like this, but I don't recall it, sir,
Senator SCOTT. In other words, you have 110 recollection of a Mr..
Ober delivering any packages to you asserted to be from Mr. Hunt?
Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I do not recall- that.
DID MR. HELMS GIVE HOWARD HUNT $20,000?
Senator SCOTT. The second question, I think, also derives from a
news story. That is that Mr. Charles Colson told Senator Weicker that
Howard Hunt had told Colson that he had received $20,000 in cash
from Richard Helms.
have no other information on that except I noticed in the memo-
randum that assistance to Hunt terminated August 27.
Would you comment on that?
Mr. linums. Sir, I have heard that a little before and if I smile it is,
only because my total income over the years I have been in the.
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Government is my salary plus a pittance from my father's estate and
a small amount from about two or three stocks that T own, and that
I would never have been in the position at any time during my tenure
in government to lend anybody $20,000.
Now, what I believe is being confused here is, and I don't have the
details clearly in my mind at all anymore, but there was a time when
Hunt was still employed by the, CIA when he was having a very
difficult time with a daughter who had psychiatric and injury diffi-
culties from an. automobile accident and he had very heavy medical
bills, and I believe that he was permitted to borrow some money from
an Agency fund for the purpose of helping out employees who are in
difficulty, financial difficulty, and my recollection is that he paid the
amount back when he got a settlement from the insurance company.
'Mat is the best I can do, sir, but I am sure if you would like more
detail they mut have it out at the Agency because I know this came
11.1) a couple of years ago in connection with the whole Watergate
busi Ress.
S011atOr SCOTT. In other words, you never gave him $20,000 or any
part thereof?
Mr. HELMS. 11 personally did not.
SCII/LIOT SCOTT. And you had no awareness of any such $20,000
donation?
Mr. HELms. No.
I heard of the loan from the Agency fund much later when this
charge was first made, but it was not something I was familiar with
)1,t the time, as best I recall it.
MR. HELMS' DENIAL OF SIGNIFICANT "RECENT" ROLE IN CHILE
Senator SCOTT. Our memorandum, says before leaving for Iran you
appeared before the full committee in executive session for the benefit
of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations to discuss the
Chile affair, that you denied any significant recent CIA role in Chile.
It is the word "recent" I would like to get clarified.
Mr. HELMS. I hardly think that is a correct characterization of my
testimony and since we have gone over this with Senator Church this
morning I think the record will show what this was all about, sir, if
that is satisfactory to you.
Senator SCOTT. That is all I want to find out. We might want to go
into activities in other places later, but not now.
CONON ESSIONAL SURVEILLANCE IN INTELLIGENCE FIELD
S:qn-ifor ( 1A ST1. I don't know whether the Ambassador is going to be
around for awhile or not.
A in bassador 11ELMS. I am hoping to leave on Sunday.
S/nator (lAsE. I don't press for my rights to raise the matter now
before Senator McGovern or anybody has had his chance, but some-
time 1 would like to get the Ambassador's thoughts on the question of
how any kind of surveillance by Congress can actually operate in the
intelligence field, as I have grave doubts about any of these various
schemes. But I don't want to interrupt until all of the members have
had their round.
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CIA RESISTANCE TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH REQUESTS FOR DOMESTIC
ACTIVITIES
Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, do we have time for a few
more?
In ieply to Senator Case's interrogation awhile ago you said that you
had overlooked part of the question that he had raised. It was simply a
memory lapse, rather than an oversight.
In interrogation on May 21 before the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, Senator Pell asked you this question, on page 99. He said, "Be-
sides Mr. Hunt's activities, have there been any other requests that
you have turned down from the executive branch of Government to
engage in domestic activities?" You replied, "Well, Senator Pell, in
answering that question, I do not recall of any specific requests by an
individual to do such things. There have been at various times, and I
say at various times because I can't specify it, conversations about
whether it would be desirable to have the Agency do certain types of
domestic operations which the FBI were not performing very satis-
factorily. This has been something that has been totally 100 percent
resisted."
Do you stand on that?
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, when I came back this time I got ahold
of two of the officers who had served with me in the Agency and are
now retired from the Agency to ask if I had overlooked anything
here and one of them said that he recalled that U.S. Marshal's office
had once asked for some kind of assistance that we decided was really
not for the Agency to handle and turned it down, but it was a request.
There was also a request at one time I believe from what was then
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for some assistance in
the United States, and I believe this assistance was given rather
briefly and then terminated.
Now, the precise details of it I am frank to say I don't have in my
mind anymore. It was not something that we went out and we were
supporting them in some fashion, and if you want or need any greater
detail, please get the Agency to give it to you because I just don't
recall, but I am trying to as best I can, with the recollection of a
couple of others, to be sure that I am totally responsive to these
questions, so we don't have a lot of hangnails around here that keep
coming up.
Senator MCGOVERN. The Hunt matter is the only thing^ that you
can recall of a specific nature that you were requested to become in-
volved in that had to do with domestic activities?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir. If you want, Senator McGovern, if
the chairman and Senator Church and Senator Case would like, I
could, I think, in the space of about 5 minutes explain where a lot of the
turmoil is in the press about the Agency's activities. Obviously you
are going to have Mr. Colby up and he is going to testify, but I
would like you to hear it from me so you don't feel I was here and say
Helms never said anything about those things. If you would finish,
sir, then I will gladly do this.
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eitoVISION OF u.S. NAMES TO CIA BY MITT
eiiator MCGOVERN. Because of the pressure of time here I would
like to take several quotations from -Mr. Colby's testimony before
the Appropriations Committee this past January 17 and have you
respond to those. These, are quotations. I can supply the page. num-
bers if you wish. Mr. Colby said, "In 1967 the Department of Justice
established the Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit. In May 1970
the Department. of justice provided the CIA with a machine tape
listing of about 10,000 Americans developed by the IDIU."
Do you substantiate that?
Ambassador I hElMs. Sir, I heard this when Mr. Colby was testifying
)out this for t he first time.
av I explain something about the background of all of this?
f hink, sir, it will be helpful in response to some of the things
you are going to ask, I hope. Please go ahead and question me, but
I. want to give a little background here.
When Mr. Schlesinger was Director of the Agency, I believe it was
sometime in March 1973, and, because I gather these documents are.
available, they have been, given to the other Senate committees, I
am sure they are available to you he sent, a memorandum to every
employee of the Central Intelligence Agency inviting them. to come
up with any example of anything that they knew about what had
happened over the years that any of them felt was either outside the
Agency's charter, in excess of the Agency's charter, or anything of
that kind, it was a blanket invitation to have there things brought
forward.
As a, result of this, a lot of things catne to light that maybe I hadn't
known about or maybe they were under somebody's directorship and
Cori.b. The principal point that I want. to make to help out with this
hearing is that in these items that Mr. Colby mentioned in his report
are a. whole series of activities of the Office of Security of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Now, the Office of Security has nothing to do with foreign opera.-
ions; it is an entity that has been there since the Agency was founded
o protect the security of its installations, to investigate the personnel
and check them out for integrity and so forth, to be sure that employ-
ees remained loyal, to be sure that physical penetrations of Agency
installations didn't take place, and to follow up on activities which
could be put under the rubric that, the Director is involved with to
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Now, that particular sentence is not Only in the National Security
Act, of 1947 but it is reinforced. in the CIA Act. of 1949 plus some
a(Iditional langtuige which appears in Mr. Colby's report.
Office of Security, therefore, in pursuance of this effort engaged
in certain activities which I am glad to describe. Colby is going to
come before von and he, will go over this so we don't need to have two
hearings on this. But they had nothing to do with what in our par-
lance, in. our work, had, to do with domestic activities. Tn other words,
we are located in the United States, that was protection of our instal-
lotion, people, documents from unauthorized disclosure, and so forth.
These things have gotten mixed up and they got mixed up in the public
mind and they have gotten mixed up here because, whether you are
critical of them or not, at least understand what they are.
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CIA'S ROLE CONCERNING SUBVERSION OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS
Senator CASE. Could I ask a question for clarification?
In your understanding, is the activity of foreign governments or
foreign persons in trying to subvert our domestic institutions one of the,.
CIA's functions under its charter?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.
Senator CASE. That question is to 'me still an open one. Why
wouldn't the subversion of domestic institutions, whether done by
foreigners or people at home, be a matter for the FBI?
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, it is. The only role that the Agency has in
that question, and I think the role is clearly identification in foreign
countries of foreign people who might come to the United States, and it
is for this reason we have this vast exchange between the FBI and
CIA over the years a great deal of which has resulted from the so-
called files that you hear about, which are nothing but memorandums
from the FBI with the same name in it which obviously has to be
indexed, and therefore a file was opened.
Senator CASE. This was an area that I haven't been able to clarify.
Ambassador HELMS. It is kind of a tricky area. The way we played
this, I wouldn't say game, obviously it wasn't a game--the way we
did this was when the Agency got information from France, Germany,
or the Soviet Union about someone whom. we thought possibly was a
spy, or a bomber, or a terrorist, or something of this kind, coming to
the United States, we would send a report down to the FBI, and in
some cases the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in some
cases the Secret Service. If the FBI had a man they knew about in
New York and he went to France or something they would send us a
memorandum about him and say this fellow moved from point A to
point B, and I think that I am trying to make a helpful suggestion
here, that I think the Rockefeller Commission will undoubtedly call
the retired FBI man who was liaison between the FBI and CIA for
many, many years, and he is just a fund of information on these
matters and he saw it from both sides because, as you know, the
FBI always liaisoned on our playing field but you didn't liaison on
their playing field, and he is just a fund of information on this kind
of thing_. He can give you chapter and verse as to how this worked.
Th C e HAIRMAN. Anything else?
CONGRESSIONAL SURVEILLANCE OF COVERT ACTIVITIES
Senator CASE. Do y ou have any comment as to how we can have
a congressional or any other kind of surveillance organization dealing
with covert activities, which by their nature have to be kept secret?
Without such congressional surveillance the CIA becomes in effect
just another arm of the National Security Council for covert activity?
I would like to know just how you resolve this dilemma in your mind.
I have been very skeptical of an oversight committee because I can't
sec what good a committee does if it can't tell what it knows. For
example
Ambassador HELMS. Well, sir, I have for years been wondering
about this. You remember that when I testified a couple of years ago
I think Senator Humphrey asked me about it, and I just want to say
this: I find this an enormously difficult legal, moral, and all other
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kinds of a question, and the reason I find it so is that as elected
representatives of the people you have to go before the people from
time to time, and if you had all known about the Bay of Pigs before
it happened, had been told about this, an operation, incidentally,
which two Presidents thought was worthwhile, what would it have
looked like when you were asked to admit did you know about the
Bay of Pigs, were you involved in it, and did you approve it, even
though it had come under your noses and you wanted to ask for
approval, you were asked to say nothing, but you would have to say
obviously: "Yes; I was aware there was such a thing as the Bay of
Pigs."
Now, the Chilean operation is another thing. Would you really want
to go back to the electorate and say: "Yes; I was the fellow who
approved operations which were going to cause trouble in a foreign
country."
Gentlemen, J simply can't go any further. I simply pose the prob-
lem. I suppose that there is some�I don't know whether there is a
way through it, I have to say, to be honest, that I am skeptical. That
is all. I can say.
Senator SCOTT. What you are saying, if I could interrupt, is that
any Member of Congress serving on such a committee once made
aware of these things is liable to be put in the same public dilemma that
the recent controversy has put you in?
Ambassador 1-1mArs. I think this is quite possible, sir. I have had a
remarkably good experience with the Congress of the United States.
I have not been the victim of leaks about CIA. operations when I was
Director. I had every confidence. I have appeared before this com-
mittee, Armed Services, and so forth, and nobody has ever done me in.
As far as I am aware, leaks about me have been in connection with
quite other things, they had nothing to do with the fiduciary relation-
ship I. have established with Congressmen and Senators. I even had a
good relationship with Congressman Harrington when I used to appear
before the House Armed Services Committee. So I am not one of those
people that feel the Congress can't keep secrets. I am simply referring
to the difficulty that you have of your conscience, that is all.
Senator CA 5E And somethimes F suppose, if you are going to say
that a committee has had the right to know all that goes on, you must
carry it one step further and say the committee and its members have
the right to make that so, if they think it is the right thing to do, to
disclose it and they cannot be put under an obligation not to disclose it.
Ambassador HELMS. It makes it pretty tough.
MR. HELMS' KNOWLEDGE OF MR. HUNT'S OPERATIONS
Senator McGovERN. I know we are up against a real time factor
here. I am trying to get this into a couple of minutes here.
There is an article that appeared in the New York Times by Walter
Pincus, on October 2, 1974.
Are you familiar with that?
Ambassador HELMS. No, sir, I am not.
Senator lVIcGovEnN. There are very serious charges made. Among
others, Mr. Pincus says you were apparently covering up information
relevant to a criminal investigation then underway. He is referring to.
your testimony before this committee on May 21, 1973, when you
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were asked about your knowledge of Mr. Hunt's operations, including
the two break-ins at Dr. Fielding's office and the reasons why the
CIA stopped supplying help to Mr. Hunt. You said it had nothing to
do with the photographs that were taken of Dr. Fielding's office, but
rather that he was asking so many things from the Agency that he
had become in your opinion a threat to the Agency. So you cut him
off, but it had nothing to do with your knowledge about the break-in.
Is that your position today?
Ambassador Timms. No, Senator McGovern. I have the greatest
respect for Mr. Pincus. I think he is an extraordinarily able individual
and I have read a lot of pieces by him that I think go to the heart of
a lot of matters. I have great regard for him, but sir, this is simply
not true that I knew about Dr. Fielding, the break-in of Dr. Fielding's
office. I had seen some photographs, but nobody had ever identified
to me what buildings those photographs were of. And as I testified,
I believe on that very day, of May 21, the first I ever heard of Dr.
Fielding was when I was sitting in Shiraz, Iran one day and picked
up the local newspaper and it was said that his ace had been broken
into. I promise you, Senator McGovern.
Senator MCGOVERN. Apparently, members of the CIA knew about
this. They were supplying material to Hunt. They developed the film
apparently, and saw the name Fielding on the part in the parking lot.
Members of the Agency knew about that. The thing that puzzles me
is why as Director of the Agency something that sensitive wouldn't
have been called to your attention.
Senator SYMINGTON. Perhaps I can answer part of that because I
held the hearings on it. Hunt did not go to Helms. He went to General
Cushman through a White House phone.
To the best of my recollection, lie said he wanted a wig and this and
that and he said in effect this is the White House asking.
General Cushman was a fine Marine Commandant. It was my
privilege to see him running the Marines at Danang. Nevertheless, this
was not his field. For a while he began to supply everything Hunt
wanted because he thought that was what Mr. Haldeman or Mr.
Ehrlichman wanted. At one point, however, Hunt's requests he felt
were out of line, so he himself decided not to continue to work with
him. At no time, to the best of my memory, did he ever say he had dis-
cussed this with Mr. Helms.
Am I correct on that?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir, in the early stages. And another
aspect of this Senator McGovern, as best I recall all this, and it is in
hindsight and I have been back and testified many times in connection
with this Watergate business, no one had ever intimated to me until
that date in 1973 when I read in Shiraz that Mr. Ellsberg had a psy-
chiatrist) that it was a man named Dr. Fielding and his office had been
broken into.
I put my hand up, sir.
SENATE WATERGATE REPORT-SENATOR BAKER'S VIEWS
Senator MCGOVERN. In the interests of time would you look at
this article by Mr. Pincus at your convenience, and then also look
at the material that Senator Baker has supplied in the Wateragate
report, between pages 1135 and 1144, which seems to be supportive
of the charges made by Mr. Pincus?
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An bassaditr HELMS. Really?
Senator Met ;OVERN. As T read it, it seems to be supportive.
For example, Senator Baker says, "Thereafter, pursuant to the
lamific approval of both Cushman and then Director of the CIA
Richard Helms, a member of the CIA Technical Services Division was
assigned to provide Hunt with assistance and materials he requested."
Ambassador HELMS. No question about that.
Senator MetiovErtN. You agree with that?
Ambassador HELms. Yes, sir. But I don't quite see what it has to do
with i Di. Fielding.
Senator McGOVERN. Let me continue. 'rho preparation of this
profile," referring to a psychiatric profile on Mr. Ellsberg, "was
specifically approved by then Director Helms in late July of 1971."
Ambassador HEr,ms. Yes; that is correct. I believe I have testified
to that and said this in several records that this is true.
Senator McGovERN. Then Senator Baker goes on to develop the
topeetn. of the psychiatrist that this whole operation was getting into
art area that threatened the good. name of the Agency, and Senator
Baker says:
* j is not without, significance that the time period during which the CIA
psychiatrist was briefing his superiors of his concerns regarding Hunt was erica
August 29, I971--a week prior to the developing of Hunt's film of "intriguing"
photographs of medical offices in southern California, which impressed at least
one CIA official as "casing" photographs.
Ambassador HELMS. I don't know who that official is.
Senator McGovERN. And then it says:
Director Helms took pains to inform the White House that: "I do wish to
underline the point that our involvement in this matter should not be revealed
in any context, formal or informal."
Ambassador HELMS. That quotation has only to do with the call
that. I made to Mr. David Young in connection with the profile on
Daniel Ellsberg. I had nothing to do with anything else. That I re-
member vividly because f have been over this.
Serial or McGovern, may I plead that you will find I am sure that I
have testified to all these things before and testified under oath.
Really l have. sir.
[The Information referred to follows :1
[Excerpt from Individual Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., to Senate
leport No. 93-951,93d Cong., 2 sess., "The Final Report of the Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities, U.S. Senate]
; ti NT�TS D SUPPORT�ELLSBERG PROFILE
The Committee has received much testimony over the past several months
detailing the extensive support of Howard Hunt by CIA personnel with CIA
materials and the CIA's role in the preparation of the psychological profile of
hmicl Ellsberg. !toward Hunt was involved in a wide variety of domestic under-
takings with the use of CIA equipment and the assistance of CIA personnel, e.g.,
the burglaries of Dr. 1,'ie1rling's office and the 1-)NC, the preparation of psychologi-
cal profiles on Daniel Ellsberg and the investigation of the Chappaquidick
incident,. In light, of the facts and circumstances developed through the documents
and conflicting testimony of CIA personnel adduced by this Committee, which are
summarized below, the question arises as to whether the CIA had advance knowl-
edge of i he Fielding break-in. The Fielding burglary Was not Made public until
Nlay of 1073.
While the CIA has previously belatedly acknowledged some of the technical
support, it provided to Hunt and Liddy prior to the Fielding break-in, the CIA has
continually downplayed the extent of that technical support as well as the specific
approval and detailed knowledge of such support by high level CIA officials.' The
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scenario of events culminating in the Fielding break-in caused a wealth of conflict-
ing testimony among CIA officials as referred to hereinafter.
The CIA's assistance to Hunt began on July 22, 1971, when Hunt met with
General Cushman., then Deputy Director of the CIA, in Cushman's office to
request physical disguise and phony identification to effect a "one time operation,
in and out." 2 This meeting was tape recorded by Cushman. Thereafter, pursuant
to the specific approval of both Cushman and then Director of the CIA Richard
Helms, a member of the CIA's Technical Services Division was assigned to provide
Hunt with the assistance and materials he requested.3 During the next thirty
days, the CIA technical staff met with Hunt on four separate occasions. Most
meetings were held at CIA "safe houses" (dwellings owned or leased by the CIA
for clandestine meetings).4 At those meetings Hunt was provided with the CIA
equipment and assistance described in earlier Committee testimony, i.e., a wig,
voice alteration devices, heel lift to cause a limp,3 fake glasses, phony driver's
licenses and identification cards, a Uher 5000 tape mem der disguised in a type-
writer ease, a camera hidden in a tobacco pouch, preliminary steps townid a
phony New York telephone answering device, and the developing of the film of
Hunt and Liddy's reconnaissance trip to Los Angeles to "case" Dr. Fieldin.g's
office.6 This assistance was abruptly terminated on August 27, 1971-one week
before the Fielding burglary of September 3, 1971.7
Recent testimony and documents have developed several matters of consider-
able import with regard to the assistance provided Hunt mid Liddy. The technician
who dealt with Hunt has testified that he received approval for each and every
request of Hunt from his supervisory officials at the CIA.' He also testified that,
contrary to earlier and other CIA testimony, Hunt informed him early in August
that he would be introducing a second man (Liddy) to the technician for the
provision of disguise and false identification.� CIA officials heretofore had claimed
that Hunt introduced Liddy unannounced late in August and that this intro-
duction had been one of the leading causes for the CIA's ultimate termination of
its support for Hunt.15
Testimony and documents have also revealed, again contrary to the testimony
of high CIA officials, that Hunt's request for a New York "backstopped" telephone
(a telephone with a New York number which would in reality be answered by a
Washington CIA switchboard) answering service was well on its way to com-
pletion." A detailed mem( randum of the TSD technician, dated August 27, 1971,
reveals that the backstopp3d telephone request was about to be implemented."
This memorandum includes the actual relay number to be called. Previous CIA
testimony had always been to the effect that this telephone request was so un-
reasonable that it was immediately disapproved and that it was also a leading
cause of the ultimate termination of Hunt's support."
Recent testimony also established that the CIA created a file on Hunt's activi-
ties entitled the "Mr. Edward" file. This file was maintained outside the normal
I See affidavits of Cushman, [Exec. Asst. to DDCI], and [Deputy Chief, TSD], Original CIA Materials ,
Volume II, Tab D.
1 Partial tape transcript of July 22 meeting, Original CIA Materials, Volume IT, Tab K, at 1; see also
Cushman's affidavit, id., and complete unabridged tape transcript of July 22 meeting, CIA Supplemental
Materials, Volume Tab 4.
3 See Executive Session Testimony of General Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 10, 12; contra, Execu-
tive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, March 8, 1974, and Testimony of Richard Helms before the
Senate Committee. on Appropriations, May 16, 1973, at 195-196.
See Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technician #1], February .5 and 6, 1974 at 3-25 (February 5
tr.), and Exhibit 1 to that testimony (notes of [TSD Technician #1] compiled contemporaneously with
the support of Hunt) also found in CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume VII, Tab 8.
3 Staff interview with Howard Hunt, February 4, 1974.
3 Public Testimony of Richard Helms and General Robert E. Cushman, August 2, 1973; affidavits of
[TSD Technician #1, TS I) Technician #2, Deputy Chief, TSD, and Exec. Ant to DDCI], Original CIA
Materials, Volume II, Tab D.
7 Id.
Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technician #1], supra note 4 at 10 (February 6 tr.), at 57 (February
5 tr.).
� Id. at 55-57 (February 5 tr.); see also notes referred to in note 4, supra.
me Affidavits of [Exec. Asst. to DDCI] [Depty Chief, TSD], Cushman, supra note 1; memoranda [of Exec.
Asst. to 0 Del] dated August 23, 26, and 30, Original CIA Materials, Volume If, Tab K; compare Executive
Session Testimony of [TSD Technician #11, supra note 4 at 5.5-56 (February 5 tr.) with Executive Session
Testimony of [Deptuy Chief, TSD], February 5, 1974, at 24.
12
II 1:
Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technical #1], supra note 4 at 8-10, 12 (February 6), and Exhibit
110 [TSD Technician #11's testimony at 5, which details the steps taken by the CIA to implement Stunt's
request.
" Sec affidavits of [Exec. Asst. to DDCI] [Deputy Chief, TSD], Cushman, and memoranda of [Exec. Asst.
to DDCI], supra note 10; Executive Session Testimony of Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 10-21. Moreover,
Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, supra note 3, indicates that it was Hunt's request for a
secretary which caused him to order the cut-off of support. This request, however, occurred on August 18
and was denied the same or next day, sec Executive Session Testimony of [Exec. Asst. to DD C I], March 6,
1974 (transcription not presently available), contra, testimony of Richard Helms before the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations supra note 3, at 197.
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CIA filing system. and this Committee's requests to obtain this file have not been
granted, despite the fact that testimony has established that this file was turned
over to 1)irector Colby after the Watergate break-in." Moreover, recent testimony
also indicates that a I"bigot list" (CIA term for treatment of especially sensitive
case restricting access to a limited number of persons) was created for Hunt's
activities."
Testimony has indicated that the film developed for Hunt and Liddy was, in
fact, of Dr. Fielding's office." Not only was the film developed, however, but it was
reviewed by CIA supervisory officials before it was returned to Hunt." One CIA
offivial who reviewed the film admitted that he found the photographs "intriguing"
and recognized them to be of "southern California." 18 Ile then ordered one of the
photographs to be blown up. The blow-up revealed Dr. Fielding's name in the parking
lot next to his office." Another CIA official has testified that he speculated that they
were "casing" photographs." Recent testimony has shown that the CIA official
who reviewed these photographs immediately reported their content to Cushman and his
assistant in the office of the Deputy Director of the CIA.21 With a degree of incredulity,
however, he denies telling his superiors that he blew up one of the photographs and
that it revealed the name of Dr. Fielding." Moreover, both Cushman and his
assistant denied ever having been told about the content of the photographs by
!Deputy Chief, TSD] or anyone else." In any event, recent testimony shows that it
was only after these photographs were developed and examined that the CIA
technician dealing with Hunt was ordered to cut off all support for Hunt.24 This
decision was made by the Deputy Director of the CIA (Cushman) and/or the
Director of the CIA (Helms) .15
Filially, while previous public CIA testimony claimed that the CIA "had no
contact whatsoever with Mr. Hunt subsequent to 31 August, 1971," 26 recent
testimony and secret documents indicate that Hunt had extensive contact with
the CIA after that date. Not only did Hunt play a large role in the CIA's develop-
ment of psychological profiles on Daniel Ellsberg (not completed until November
of 1971,) but he actually contacted the CIA's External Employment Assistance
Branch (EMAB) and approached active CIA personnel regarding several opera-
tions, including, e.g., Itunt's requests to the CIA for person(s) skilled in lock-
picking, electronic sweeping, and entry operations.27
It is significant, that during the same time period as the ongoing support of
Hunt by the CIA. August of 1971, the CIA was also compiling a psychological
14 Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD], February 5, 1974, at 14-15; Executive Session
Testimony of [Chief, TS DI February 5, 1974, at 29-30.
15 EXeClitiVe Session Testimony of [TSD Technician #11, supra note 4, at 2-4 (February 6 tr.).
ms F,xeculive Session Testimony of [Executive Officer to Director of Security], March 3, 1974 (transcription
not presently available): staff interview of Howard Hunt, supra note 5 (wherein Hunt indicates that the
film i he CIA developed included shots of a "close-up of (Fielding's office) door, a close-up of the directory
of (Fielding's) building. photographs of the ingress and egress of the parking lot . . ." as well as shots of the
inside of Fielding's office, including the top of Fielding's desk.
IT Eximentive Session Testimony of [TSD Technical #1], supra note 4 at 20-24, 52-53 (February 5 tr.);
Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD[, supra note 14 at 43-47.
Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD], supra note 14 at 44.
19 Id. at 45-46.
zo Executive Session Testimony of [Chief, TSD[, February 5, 1974, at 19-20.
21 Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD], supra note 14 at 47-49.
2, Id.
E seentive Session Testimony: of General Robert E. Cushman, March 7,1974, at 22-23; Executive Session
Testimony of [Exec. Asst. to D DOH, March 8, 1974 (transcription not presently available).
2' Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technical #1], supra note 4, at 59-60, and Exhibit 1 to that
I Ogill11011Y.
21 Executive Session Testimony of General Robert E. Cushman, March 7,1974, at 21-22, 18-20; Executive
Session Testimony of Richard Helms, March 8, 1974, contra (transcription not presently available).
25 Lieutenant Lieneral -Vernon A .Walters Memorandum for Record, July 25, 1972, Original CIA Materials,
Volume I, Tab S.
27 Contacts after Aucrust 31, 1971, indicated in the Secret Supplemental CIA Materials, include the
following:
(a) 11 mint was referred In [Former CIA employee] by [Chief. BEAD] of the CIA's FEAB, ([Chief, READ]
retired On June 19, 1972) when Hunt requested a "retired lockpicker" and entry man in the time period of
March-May, 1972. CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume I, Tab 4, Memorandum of June 19, 1973.
(I)) I hint, in late 1971, requested some " 'security types' to check physical security and monitor tele-
phones in Las Vegas," in connection with Hunt's work on the Hughes account with Mullen and Company.
runt was referred by IChief, F.EAB1 to an [Agency proprietary (name deleted at Agency request)] (CIA
Supp)emental Materials, Volume I, Tab 4.)
(e) I hint contacted [deleted at Agency request] (an active CIA employee until November 10, 1972) some-
times in late 1971 regarding a weekend entry operation.
(d) Hunt contacted CIA employee [deleted at Agency request] October of 1971 concerning certain Indo-
China War documents (Original CIA Materials, Volume IT, Tab D).
(e) On December 8, 1971, Hunt requested and received a CIA computer name trace., by CIA employees,
on a person who had allegedly formed the [deleted name of Latin American country at Agency request]
National Independent Party in December of 1971 (Original CIA Materials, Volume IT, Tab 1)).
(f) The CIA acknowledges that the Deputy Director of Plans of the CIA did meet with Hunt on October
II, 1971 to discuss Mullen and Company problems.
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profile on Daniel Ellsberg. Recent testimony has revealed that Hunt was deeply
involved in that project as well.
The preparation of this profile was specifically approved by then Director
Helms in late July of 1971.28 The actual compiling of the profile was done by the
CIA's medical services staff and, in particular, its chief psychiatrist.29 Testimony
has indicated that a meeting was held on August 12, 1971, in which both Howard
Hunt and Gordon Liddy participated. They told the CIA psychiatrist that
Ellsberg had been undergoing psychiatric analysis. Hunt and Liddy discussed
with him their desire to "try Ellsberg in public," render him "the object of pity as
a broken man," and be able to refer to Ellsberg's "Oedipal complex." a o At the
close of the meeting, Hunt asked the psychiatrist not to reveal his presence in the
profile discussions to anyone at the CIA, stating that he already had been in
contact with General Cushman and was on good terms with Director Helms. The
psychiatrist has testified recently that he was extremely concerned about Hunt's
presence and remarks. He so reported this to his CIA superiors, both in memoranda
and in a meeting on August 20, 1971. Access to the memoranda of both the psy-
chiatrist and his superiors has been refused to this Committec.2'
The CIA psychiatrist also was given the name of Dr. Fielding as Ellsberg's
psychiatrist and numerous FBI reports of interviews with Ellsberg's associates,
as well as a memorandum of a reported telephone conversation between Ellsberg
and another party." And recent testimony has revealed that it was reported back to
the psychiatrist that Director Helms was advised of his concerns regarding Hunt's
participation and comments." While Director Helms has denied that he was ever
told that Hunt was involved in the CIA's Ellsberg profile project," it is not without
significance that the time period during which the CIA psychiatrist was briefing
his superiors of his concerns regarding Hunt was circa August 20, 1971�a week
prior to the developing of Hunt's film of "intriguing" photographs of medical
offices in southern California which impressed at least one CIA official as "casing"
photographs.35
With the aforementioned background, we are reminded that when the second
profile on Ellsberg was completed (completion was delayed until November of
1971), Director Helms took pains to inform the White House that:
I do wish to underline the point that our involvement in this matter should
not be revealed in any context, formal or informal (emphasis added)."
In his recent testimony before this Committee, Director Helms stated that the
above quoted language represented his concern only for the professional reputations
of the CIA psychiatrists and not any concern over the possible illegality of the
profile.37 It should be noted, however, that in a memorandum from the psychi-
atrists' CIA supervisor to Helms in November of 1971, which accompanied the
completed profile, their concern is expressed an follows:
[DMSS] and [Chief Psychiatrist] . . . confirmed that their worries did not
. . . involve professional ethics or credibility. Instead, they are concerned lest
the Agency's involvement . � . become known and particularly that it might
come to light during any proceeding. * * * We will be guided by your determi-
nation after you have had an opportunity to read the new paper. (Emphasis
supplied.)88
The facts and circumstances related above, as derived from the recently cur-
tailed investigation of this Committee, would appear to raise many unanswered
questions as to the involvement of the CIA in matters outside its legislative
parameters.
28 Affidavit of [Deputy Director of Support, hereafter referred to as the DDS] and [Director of Medical
Services Staff, hereinafter referred to as the DMSS] and [Chief of Psychiatric Staff on Medical Services
Staff, hereinafter referred to as Chief Psychiatrist], Original CIA Materials, Volume I, Tab U; Volume II
Tab D.
22 Id.
3rExecutive Session Testimony of [Chief Psychiatrist], March 6, 1974 (transcription not presently avail-
able).
5, Id., see also Colby letter refusing access, infra.
32 Id.
33 Id.
Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, supra note 3; Testimony of Richard Helms before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, May 17, 1973, at 17.
35 See Executive Session Testimony of [Chief, TSD], supra note 20.
so Memorandum from Richard Helms to David Young, November 9, 1971, Original CIA Materials, Volume
II, Tab I.
52 Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, supra note 3.
55 Memorandum from [DDS], CIA Deputy Director of Support, to Richard Helms, Director of Central
Intelligence, November 9, 1971, Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab J.
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ARTICLE BY WALTER PINCT'S
Senator McCiOYERN. I would like to ask you to respond to the
Pincus article. It is a brief article. Could you supply the committee
with a response because it is filled with rather serious reflections.
don't say that it, represents my view because f don't know enough
about the whole setup. I remember reading this article at the time and
being struck with the fact it is a. very damaging article. It is a flat
assertion that :you misled the committee in May of 1973.
;The information referred to follows:]
I From. he New York Times, Oct. 15741
ELAIB, THE C.I.A. AND PUBLIC TRUST
(By Walter Pincus)
ASHINGT( /N�The judgments that led to covert, United States intemvention
in (hilean polities deserve to be criticized, but at least there the Central Intel-
ligence Agency was within its legal authority under its charter. That was not the
ease with C.I.A. complicity in Watergate "extra-agency activities" and the sub-
sequent cover-up.
The law barring the agency from undertaking domestic operations was clearly
violated.
Moreover, when the former Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms,
gave misleading and inaccurate answers to questions posed to him during Congres-
sional committee hearings about C.I.A. assistance to Watergate conspirator
Howard Hunt. while Mr. Hunt worked for the Nixon White House, Mr. Helms
was apparently covering up information relevant, to a criminal investigation then
under way,
(hi May 21, 1973, with the Watergate cover-up beginning to crack. Mr. Ifelnis
was called back from Iran, where he was Ambassador, and questioned under oath
by members of the Senate Foreign. Relations Committee.
The imeak-in at the office of Dr. Daniel Falsberg's former psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis
Fielding, by then had been uncovered, along with information that the C.I.A. had
given equipment and and to Mr. Hunt, who had directed the illegal entry.
Mr. Helms testified that he had never heard of Dr. Fielding until the psychia-
trist': name had ft.opeared in the newspapers. When asked about photographs that
Mr. Hunt had taken of Dr. Fielding's office with a C.I.A. camera and that the.
agency had developed for Mr. Bunt, Mr. Helms swoto, "I do not know what the
contents of the bon were in the latter part of August, 1971."
(foe Senator asked if anyone at the agency who had reviewed the film had
thought Mr. Hunt, might, be contemplating a break-in. "I never heard anybody
at the agency mention such a theory," Mr. Helms responded, adding later that,
"uollori had given us the slightest, indication that anything underhanded was
afoot."
Mr. Helms was asked why then had the C.I.A. halted its assistance to Mr.
Hunt back on Aug. 27, 1971, the day the photographs and been returned to Mr.
Hunt. Twice Mr. Helms said that it was solely because Mr. Hunt's requests had
I ee( 1111e "too extensive."
To support, that., he recollected that Mr. Bunt had asked to have his former
secretary brought back from Paris and that a covert, New York telephone number
and mailing address be established for him. Mr. Tlelnis never mentioned the
pholos and what they appeared to show as the reason for the agency's having
stopped its aid to Mr. Hunt.
Atotes t a year after the Helms testimony, the House Judiciary Committee
1P:ISt'd its material on the Ellsberg break-in and the C.I.A.'s role. Sworn state-
ments from agency personnel along with other testimony indicate that Mr. 'feints
did not give the true story.
(hi Aug. 25, 1971, the new material shows, Mr. Hunt along with G, Gordon
biddy requested and received a high-speed camera, concealed in a tobacco pouch,
designed for indoor clandestine photography.
A few days later, Mr. Hunt called long-distance and asked a C.I.A. technician
fo meet him at Dulles Airport., outside Washington, to pick up the camera and
tilm and get it developed at the agency's laboratory.
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The camera had been used by Mr. Bunt and Mr. Liddy to photograph Dr.
Fielding's Beverly Hills office, inside and out, in order to plan the burglary.
When developed, but before they were delivered to Mr. Hunt at his White
House office, the photos were reviewed by C.I.A. supervisory personnel. They
showed a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. Fielding" visible. They also
showed shots of the doctor's office including his file cabinets and safe.
One C.I.A. official speculated at the.time, according to the House committee's
records, that these were "casing" photographs. Since such "bag jobs" were carried
out by C.I.A. agents abroad, these officials were familiar with the need for the
type of photos Hunt had taken.
The C.T.A. Deputy Director, Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., was informed since
he had made the original arrangements to assist Mr. Hunt.
According to a Cushman aide, C.I.A. technical personnel had determined that
the assistance already given to Mr. Hunt "appeared to involve the agency in
clandestine operations," a finding confirmed, if not initiated, by the C.I.A. general
counsel's office, which also had reviewed the pictures.
The decision was made to end further assistance to Mr. Hunt unless Mr. helms
ordered it continued.
Mr. Hunt was so informed when the photographs were delivered to him the
afternoon of Aug. 27, 1971. That day, Mr. Cushman called John D. Ehrlichman
and told him of the agency's decision. That such steps would have been taken with-
out Mr. Helms's knowledge is unthinkable.
In 1971, Mr. Helms in a public speech asked the American people to recognize
that in the case of autonomous, secret agencies such as the C.I.A. "the nation
must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her
service."
Mr. Helms appears to have broken that faith and in a matter that involves
corrupt activities at the highest Government level.
If he and his former agency are ever to again gain the public trust they need,
they must make a full public accounting of past Watergate-related conduct.
The Congressional committees with responsibility for overseeing the C.I.A. must
now order that accounting to be made.
WASHINGTON, D.C., January 25, 1975.
ROIL JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations;
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Thau Mr. CHAIRMAN: At the close of the hearing on January 22, 1975, at
which I appeared as a witness before your Committee, Senator George McGovern
requested that I provide your Committee with a note responding to certain
charges made by Mr. Walter Pincus in an article in The New I ork Times of Oc--
tober 2, 1974, which is a part of the record of that hearing. In essence, Mr. Pincus
claims I gave false testimony before your Committee in a hearing on May 21, 1973
regarding the Central Intelligence Agency's relations with Mr. Howard Hunt in
:1971 and my knowledge thereof.
The implication of the Pincus article is that since photographs developed
by the Agency for Mr. Hunt in August 1971 showed Dr. Fielding's name on the
wall of a building, I must have had knowledge at that time of Hunt's intended
break-in of Dr. Fielding's office. He states it was because of these photographs
that I terminated further aid to Hunt and contends that in my testimony on
May 21, 1973 I was apparently covering up information relevant to a criminal
investigation then under way.
The facts are these. When an Agency employee developed some film for Mr.
Hunt in August of �1971, I was not aware at that time that this had been done .or
that the Agency had copies. I had no idea of what Mr. Hunt's objective was
except that he told General Robert Cushman that he wanted disguise material
to elicit information .from an individual!' Since I did not know of the existence
of the photographs, they did not have anything to do with cutting off aid to
Hunt. What happened is that General Cushman informed me Hunt was making
additional requests including special telephone service and the return of an
Agency secretary from Paris to be loaned to the White. House to work for him.
I told General Cushman that no more assistance-WaS to be given and that General
Cushman should call Mr. Ehrlichman and have it stopped.
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The officer who developed the pictures is reported to have discussed them with
his immediate superiors at the time, but so far as I know they were not seen by
senior officers in the Agency until about a year later when the Agency, as a result
of the Watergate break-in, was trying to establish all the facts concerning its re-
lations with Mr. Hunt. At that time, even though Dr. Fielding's name was dis-
cernible on a wall that was photographed, no one in the Agency who had seen
the pictures had identified Dr. Fielding or was aware that his office had been
broken into. Even in the latter part of 1972, when Mr. William Colby took copies
of the photographs to the Department of Justice, neither he nor. I knew why Hunt
had taken them. A'tr. Colby, as he has testified, thought they might have some-
thing to do with the Rand Corporation which, as it turned out, they did not.
All the material on this point supplied by the Agency to the various interested
committees of Congress and the Special Prosecutor bear out what I have set forth
above, I believe, and the bits of testimony or comment attributed by Mr. Pincus
to Agency employees to not change the basic facts. I trust that this is an adequate
answer to the assertions of Mr. Pincus and that it is responsive to Senator
Mc(Itove.rn's request.
tespectfull y,
RICHARD HELMS.
Secretary SYMINGTON. The conclusion one could draw is there are
some people in this town who would like to wash, out civilian control
when. it comes to what is necessary to do to protect the United States.
Senator IMeGovERN. I am not one of those.
Senator SYMINGTON. I went through this business of Hunt when
I was acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee. It is all on
the record in Armed Services. I am confident Senator Stennis would
be willing to have you read it.
coLsoN ASSERTION CONCERNING MR. HUNT'S DELIVERIES TO CIA.
Senator Scow, I want to put something in the record because I
have now read the story I referred to in today's Star. Could I ask
Mr. [[elms, quoting from part of it, if he would comment briefly. That
is all I have.
Colson told Sento ors Baker and Weicker that Hunt delivered sealed envelopes
and packages to Richard Ober, a CIA counterintelligence officer, who forwarded
them to the CIA Hirector at that time, Richard Helms, the sources said last
night. Colson said he suspected that the envelope contained tapes and other
materials relating to operations of the White House plumbers, the sources said.
Both sources emphasised that Senators Raker and Weieker, both of whom served
on the Watergate Committee, had not obtained independent confirmation of
Colson 's assertion.
It is really a repetition of what I asked you.
Ambassador Ii tiums. I do not recall any such thing.
Senator SCOTT. May I ask unanimous consent that be put in the
record.?
The CHAIRMAN-. That will be put in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
,vrom the Washington Star-News, Jan. 22, 1975]
COLSON HITS CIA ON DATE
Former White House counsel Charles W. Colson has stated that convicted
Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt frequently passed information to the
Central Intelligence Agency after the time the agency says it severed relations
with Hunt, two sources have said.
Colson told Sens, Howard H. Baker .Jr., R-Tenn., and Lowell P. Weicker,
It-Conn., that Hunt delivered sealed envelopes and packages to Richard Ober, a
CIA counterintelligence officer, who forwarded them to the CIA's director at
that time, Richard Helms, the sources said last night.
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Colson said he suspected that the envelopes contained tapes and other material
relating to operations of the White House plumbers unit, the sources said.
Both sources emphasized that Baker and Weicker, both of whom served on
the Senate Watergate committee, had not obtained independent confirmation of
Colson's assertions.
Spokesmen for the two senators confirmed last night that they had met with
Colson on Monday at their request. Colson was brought from Ft. Holabird, Md.,
to the federal courthouse in Alexandria for the meeting.
Colson is serving one to three years in prison after pleading guilty to one count
of obstruction of justice for attempting to defame Pentagon Papers defendant
Daniel Ellsberg.
Colson said Hunt continued to pass the material to Ober until late May 1972.
The CIA has said it stopped providing Hunt aid for his projects on the plumbers
unit Aug. 27, 1971.
But the CIA has acknowledged providing a psychological assessment of Ellsberg
as late as November 1971. The agency maintained it was unaware of Hunt's role
in requesting the profile.
Ober has been named by the New York Times as manager of a massive, illegal
domestic spying operation undertaken by CIA during the Nixon administration.
SANITIZATION AND RELEASE OF RECORD
Senator CASE. Before we break up, we have the usual problem,
unless I am surprised, of people outside from the press who would like
to catch us on the way out. You and I informally discussed the possi-
bility of having them come in and have the chairman state that the
record will be sanitized and then released in due course. For my part
that is enough.
Senator SYMINGTON. I so move, Mr. Chairman.
ARTICLE CONCERNING MR. COLSON
May I say I just went upstairs and somebody gave me the paper.
I read it and showed it to Senator Scott and suggested it be in the
record. He said he planned, after I showed it to him, to put it in the
record.
Senator SCOTT. That is right, and I thank the Senator. I think it
should be in there.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen; Thank you, Mr. Helms.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to
the call of the Chair.]
0
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sENDLAmovea Tor Keiease:.zuz I /.U.4/UtD UUL.5 /004 hi'm
I UNCLASSIFIED
I CONFIDENTIAL I
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
.1..,
1.
General Walters 13
FEB 1975
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01.... C.,...-
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ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Attached for your information is a copy of the
testimony of Ambassador Helms before the Foreign
Relations Committee on the 22nd of January as
it was subsequently sanitized and released.
FYI Ambassador Helms consulted with
Larry Houston and Tom Karamessines on the
sanitization and although we were not consulted
by the Committee, the Director asked Pat Holt
to delete the references to individuals in
connection with the Chileitqtimon /---)
..--
(Feorge L. uary
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
13 Feb 75
OLC 7D49 Hqs.
I UNCLASSIFIED I CONFIDENTIAL I
SECRET
FORM NO. 237
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