O/NE CONSULTANTS' CONFERENCE, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 9-10 OCTOBER 1957

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02619612
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: October 25, 1957

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 October 1957
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 48-57
SUBJECT: 0/NE Consultantst Conference, Princeton, New Jersey
9-10 October 1957
Participants1
Consultants
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Cyril Black
Calvin Hoover
Klaus Knorr
Harold Linder
Philip Mosely
Joseph strayer
Max Millikan
Robert R. Bowie
2. Agenda:
CIA Representatives
Abbot Smith, Chairman
Sherman Kent
William P. Bundy
Willard C, Matthias
Yhilip J. Halls
Morning Session 9 October
NIE 11-4-571 SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION THROUGH 1962 (Part I - Internal Political
Developments), 3 October 1957, (coordinated draft)
Afternoon Session, 9 October
A. NIE 11-4-57 (Part VI - Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy))
26 September 1957) (Board Draft)
B. NIB 11-4-57 (Part II - Trends in the Soviet Economy))
30 September 1957) (Board Draft)
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DOCUMENT NO. - 5 a--
NO CHANGE IN CLASS, p
11 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (I)
NEXT REVIEW DATE: lino-.
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE; tk
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Nue)
Morning Session, 10 October
A, NIE 30-2-571 NEAR EAST DEVLLOPMtiNTS AFFECTING US
INTERESTS, 8 October 1957
B. NIE 13-2-57: COMMUNIST CHINA'S ROLE IN ASIA AND
AFRICA, 3 October 1957, (Staff Draft)
Afternoon Session, 10 October
A. MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONSULTANTS: ESTIMATIVE QUESTIONS
� ON'THE OUTLOOK FOR GERMANY, 2 October 1957
B. NIE 11-4-57 (Part II - TrendS in the Soviet Economy)
Morning Session, 9 October
Subject: NIE 1174-57: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF
ACTION THROUGH 1962 (Part I - Internal Political Develop-
ments), 3 October 1957, (Draft Coordinated with Repre-
sentatives)
Summary:
The morning session was devoted almost entirely to internal
political developments in the Boviet Union. The question of whether
the Soviet system will evolve in the direction of greater or less
controls dominated the discussion. This led to consideration of
Khrushchev's present degree of control and the manner in which his
present position had been achieved, While the restraining influence
of the military on the secret police and the party was stressed by
several Consultants, the possibilities of a renewal�of a reign of
terror and the emergence of a Stalin-type regime were pointed up by
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the majority, It was also agreed that evolution in Soviet political
and social institutions will not necessarily be in the direction of
those of the West. Instability was believed to exist at the top of
the structure, and a tendency to conflicting loyalties among im-
portant interest groups. For the time being, however, Khrushchev
was regarded as firmly in the saddle. He had probably had the actual
power for some time before the showdown in the Presidium and Central
Committee last June. Although pressures on the regime will probably
increase) a tightening rather than any further loosening of controls
was generally expected. On the other hand, the consensus was that
the situation could change drastically following Khrushchev's death,
At prusent) however, the Communist Party appeared able to retain con-
trol for the foreseeable future, It was further postulated that
quite radical changes could occur internally without marked effect
on Soviet foreign policy.
Highlights of Discussion:
A. SMITH and BUNDY briefed the consultauts on thu Soviet space
satellite and ICBM developments, SMITH then explained the change in
the scheduling of NIE 11-4 from May to November.
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MOSELY opened the substantive discussion by remarking that the
importance of the Soviet military was well put in the paper, although
he would have placed a little more stress on the restraining in-
fluence of the military on the policy makers, and on police-military
rivalry. The military probably enjoy the improved living conditions
in the USSR and would like to see an orderly use of the police power.
Although we cannot be certain) NOSY believed the secret police are
now under Khrushchevis control* ii u reign of terror were revived,
it would be general in nature and not directed solely against the
army, as the NIE draft might seem to imply.
SMITH posed the broad alternatives of a loosening of controls,
which might even ultimately be abandoned, and a return to Stalinism.
BLACK believed it more likely theoSoviets will liberalize somewhat)
but in a different way from Western societies*
HOOVER thought it would be a mistake to believe there will not
be a new terrors Some years may have to pass before Khrushchev can
use the terror in an absolute sense* Khrushchevis age is against him
in building up Stalinls type of terror apparatus, which took the late
dictator some years to achieve. HOOVER did not believe there was
real stability at the top of the Soviet structure, but rather only a
form of stability resulting from terror.
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KNORR asked whether we had any information to the effect that an
elite growing in numbers plays an increasing part in the decision-
making process, SMITH and
aid there was some evidence indi- (b)(3)
cating that economic managers and bureaucrats were showing more re-
sistance to pressures from above. More people now have more money
and economic security in the USSR and we infer from this that they
thereby become interest groups. HOOVER agreed that there was evidence
of an increase in the number of people in a kind of middle class,
though the evidence is pretty unsubstantial, and cannot be pushed too
far. He noted his own observations that top officials lord it over
others much less since Stalin died. We do not know whether the
economic specialists and bureaucrats or the leadership represented
by Khrushchev will win out in the current struggle over increased
food production.
SMITH asked if this justified a conclusion that one cannot con-
sider the upper ranks of Soviet society as stable. BLACK thought one
could stress the elements of internal change and still make the point
that it does not make much difference to the USSRts attitude toward
the outside world.
agreed that the evolution was mainly in- (b)(3)
ternal and would reach the foreign policy field, where Soviet aims
remain the same, last if at all,
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Speaking of Khrushchev's character, ARMSTRONG was not sure all
the sources for judging him had beem employed. In this regard, Tito
and Mao's attitude toward Khrushchev were important factors, Vilfan
of Yugoslavia id talked of Khrushchev's unintellectuality, and
ARMSTRONG wondered if this factor could not be played upon, In other
words, Khrushchev's tendency to action rather than to thought might
become a factor in negotiations with the West, as contrasted with
Molotovls rigid tactics. HOOVER pointed out that Khrushchev was an
outgoing person, while Stalin was sinister, rusurved. Khrushchev
is tough, but at the sametime something of a clown. He is a more
unpredictable figure, more willing to take a chance. SMITH noted
the view that Khrushchev in basically an extremely shrewd man, though
having little knowledge of the outside world, which he interprets in
terms of Marist-Leninism. We think some of his apparent impetuct4ity
is put on and that he is subject to more restraints than was Stalin.
BUNDY pointed out that Khrushchev's impetuosity is topical and is
understandable in such matters as agriculture and Yugoslavia. On the
other hand, his policy toward the Middle East appears shrewd, reserved
and professionally directed. He thought that Khrushchev could weather
an economic crisis at home by drawing on the people's pride in the
regime's performance on such things as the satellite.
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BLACK though an analysis of the events in June 1957 should per-
meate the whole paper. A key point was whether Khrushchev gathis
powers from the Central Committee or whether it was merely a
constitutional facade. SMITH and said the evidence is (b)(3)
contradictory, The assumption is that the police played no part.
Khrushchev was apparently weakest in the Presidium but had built
strong positions in the Central Committee and Secretariat.
HOOVER believed he had in fact won because he had packed the
Central Committee before appealing to it from the Presidium. Khrushchev
had Serov, the secret police and the army on his side, but the Presidiurp
was not convinced that he could cutrol the police and the army. When
it became clear he had these controls, the situation developed as it
did, However, if Khrushchev died, the Central Committee might take over.
pointed out that only when the Presidium is split is the Central
Committee likely to become of key importance.
MOSELY remarked Khrushchev may have pushed for a showdown that
others did not seek and may already have had a dominant position. (On
several other occasions he indicated some belief in the interpretation
of the June events as a coup deliberately staged by Khrushchev.) BLACK
agreed that Khrushchev, who may have controlled the police for several
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years) surrounded his enemies and cut them off. HOOVER was not sure
Khrushchev had the power to stage the June er,-,nts as a fake. Probably
the incongruous elements who combined against him thought it was now
or never. They tried to use the Presidium as a forum and it is likely
that the reports of a momentary majority against him were correct)
although Khrushchev already had achieved real power. MOSLEY felt it
probable that the Central Committee members knew it was already
packed.
SMITH observed that the question is what factors place limits on
Khrushchevls power. He asked whether) in recognizing instability and
change) the paper appeared to paint a picture of difficulty and weak-
ness) and whether we had played down Khrushchevis power too much?
MOEBLY thought this was the case. A new stability had been formirg
around Khrushchev and the party for two years and his control of the
party had been consolidated over the period since 1953. In a later
session) MOS'.XY added some general impressions of the political
section: It implied that things have changed somewhat, but the paper
should consider more closely what the regime can do to make the system
work better and yet retain a single) powerful leadership. The gerural
tone or flavor of the paper should be considered. For example, the
Soviet peoples apparently feel better and more secure about the system
of justice than formerly) a fact which adds stability to the regime.
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BUCK noted the absence of any discussion of who controls the
police. In reply to BLLCKis point that the police-army relationship
should be treated as vital, SMITH outlined the view that the army is
not a separate mucleus of power opposed to the party. The army is
Communist, an arm of the party, and even if Zhokov took charge the
country would still be run by the party. It seemed highly unlikely
that the army would take over completely displacing the party,
BLACK believed that if Khrushchov died, a period of instability would
probably follow in which ono could not predict what would happen.
STRAYER thought the question of various sub-centers of loyalty
in the USSR should be stated more clearly. He had in mind the role
of plant managers and the army. While the party may adjust differences
between such groups, he wondered whether there was a point at which
one works harder for his group than for the partyls interest.
ARMSTRONG wondered whether, as in Yugoslavia, a desire to enjoy
tranquility and well being may edge up into the upper and second rank
of the hierarchy and affect their attitudes.
Illustrating the problem of stating various alternative possibilities
in estimates, SMITH pointed out that on the one hand support for the
regime on economic grounds will probably increase, while on the other,
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Khrushchevls promises may raise puolic expectations and cause
grumbling when they are not fulfilled. The view held by the State
Department was that the Russians did not believe promises and paid
no attention to them, and hence the latter was no true alternative
possibility. MOSEL/. and HOOVER felt it was a matter of impact, and
that such promises had a differing impact on various groups. STRAYER
added that this problem pointed up the fact that the estimates often
were too carefully balanced and too qualified. He buliev44 they should
come out more flat-footedly on crucial points. BLACK interpolated a
remark on thu satellite chapter that economic grievances should be
given greater weight in the discussion of popular discontent. He
cited the UN report on Hungary as support for this view. KNORR agreed�
Afternoon session,. 9 October
Subject: A. NIE 11-4-57: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROB,BLE COURSES
OF ACTION THROUGH 1962 (Part VI - Trends in Soviet
Foreign Policy), 26 September 1957) (Board Draft)
B. NIE 11-4-57: (Part II - Trenez in the Soviet Economy,
30 September 1957, includes pertinent notes on After-
noon discussion, 10 October)
Summarv:
The discussion on foreign policy stressed the viewpoint that the
USSR may adopt a more forward policy in several areas) particularly
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the Middle East, now that it feels it has reduced the gap between
itself and the US in the field of deterrent weapons. There was a
feeling that the Soviets believe the US is increasingly reluctant
to engage in a general war because of the USSR's growing nuclear
capabilities. At the same time, the Consultants generally agreed
the Soviets were 110114 more subtle tactiqs than in the past. These
tactics may differ in various countries or situations. In the Middle
East, which appears to be the next target for major Soviet moves,
the possibility of an Arab-Israeli war may not be displeasing to the
Kremlin leaders. In various other areas from Berlin to Burma the
Sine-Soviet Bloc was regarded as prepared to take greater risks than
in the past. A certain "division of labor" is probable, with the
Ohinese Communists concentrating on Asian targets and the USSR on the
Middle East and Africa. During the next few years, however, the
ConoultantOelieved the Soviets would content themselves with stirring
up troubles rather than attempting to install pro-Soviet regimes in
areas physically remote from the USSR.
It was generdly agreed that the Soviet economy is making marked,
progress, including increased agricultural production through the
"new lands" program. At the same time, the results of Khrushchev's
plan to decentralize control over industry present problems in the
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degree of central control) and in priorities) which remain to be
worked out.
Highlights of discussions
A. STRAYER opened the discussion by remarking that perhaps the
paragraphs on Soviet policy toward the Middle East were too complacent.
There was a chance for fighting to break out in the area and he wonder-
ed whether the BOicts might not now go further in the area than the
present text implied. HOOVER wondered if the deterrents of last year
would be as effective if a situation resembling that of late 1956 should
recur in the Middle East.
MILLIKAN thought the paragraphs on Soviet objectives left out the
Marxist view of creating conditions for Communist takeover; ss.g.)
strengthening Nasser as a means of creating conditions for bringing
him down and seeing him succeeded by a regime more favorable to them.
He thought it would be easier to accomplish such an objective in the
Middle East than in some other areas.
MOSELY noted that we often assume nationalism is on our side and
opposed to Communism. This is not necessarily true) since the Soviets
seem to be nursing national movements along in certain areas. STRkYER
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thought the Soviets did not want chaos for its own sakeo They try
to pick winners; there is a factor of selectivity present in their
policy. HOOVER and STRAYER pointed out that Soviet tactics may
differ, as in the oases of Saudi Arabia and Syria. In the case of
Indonesia, they are not stirring up trouble, bat are rather using
economic aid as a lever. KNORR stressed that there were not many
pro-Communists in the Middle East., Rather the people are nationalist
and anti-Vestern� but we may have failed to recognize the difference.
MOSELY believed the Soviet objective over the next five years was
for nationalist regimes dependent on them for support in such states
as Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.
SMITH thought the Soviets were using new tactics which do not
alarm the world as much as the invasion of Korea. The discussion
indicated that we may in the draft NIE have underplayed the risks they
are willing to take. On the other hand, was it not true that in areas
such as Africa, which are far from the centers of Soviet power, they
will go slow as in involving themselves in commitments? MILLIKAN
noted various kinds of intervention. In Africa the Soviets were
unlikely to overthrow existing regimes, but would show interest in
such things as the racial issue. HOOVER agreed they had much to gain,
as in South Africa and Ghana, by exploiting and sttrring up the situ-
ation.
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SMITH asked whether--granted their ultimate objectives--we can
pick (1) areas of probable Soviet concentration and (2) identify
probable methods. Noting our past mistakes in these respects, he
wondered if we may have overplayed the peace and respectibility
theme. With regard to the risk of general conflict, the Soviets
must feel the US in increasingly reluctant to engage in general war
because of their growing nuclear capability. .Might they, for example,
stimulate an Arab-Israeli war? MOSELY thought they preferred to
back nationalist regimes and obtain support in the UN for Soviet ob-
jectives. The group generally agreed that any ArabrIsraeli conflict
would indeed place groat strains on the West. HOOVER believed that
the Soviets were not unwilling for Arab-Israel, conflict to break out.
By giving the Arabs arms they are building up the chances of an out-
break. He expects a tougher Soviet line the next time this occurs
and was not so sure we would stop them.
MILLIKAN and LINDER thought the Soviets seem to have awakened to
the idea of a nuclear stalemate as being to their advantage. Although
still weaker than the US, their present capability is an asset. They
may feel that having achieved this minimum) we will be deterred and
that they can, therefore, take more risks. KNORR thought they might
be telling us to be more careful as the gap closes and that the Soviets
may have a better appreciation of the changes in warfare.
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SMITH raised the general conclusion of the NIE that "insofar
as Soviet courses of action are restrained by fear of the US resort-
ing to general war) these restraints will tend to diminish during
the course of this estimate". The Consultants generally agreed that
as a result of mutual deterrents to general war there was now a pros-
pect that each side can go further without risking general war, In
such cases as Syria) Berlin) Burma it was felt the Soviets might now
take greater risks than formerly. "While STIL.Y141, felt there were now
less military deterrents to a forward policy than before) there axu
nevertheless political deterrents. MILLIKAN felt) however) that the
military and political deterrents do not off set each other and that
the estimate should look for surprise Soviet moves.
SMITH noted that the Soviets were being quite successful with
their "peaceful" approach and that, if they pushed the situation over
the brink in one part of the world) they might thereby do it in a
number of others. MOSELY believed that over the next five years the
Soviets may give up working one area at a time) let the Chinese
Communists make trouble in:Zouth East Asia while they themselves
direct more efforts toward the Middle East. MILLIKAN concluded the
remarks on Soviet foreign policy by nutin,_; that if we cannot retaliate
massively and are unable to meet three or four local military situations
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where the Sino-Soviet Bloc is pursuing a forward policy at �nee) we
face a real dilemma,
B. Portions of the Wednesday and Thursday afternoon sessions
were devoted to Section II - Trends in the Soviet Economy - of NIE
11-4-57:
MILLIKAN thought th6 political and economic consequences of
decentralization 'of authority over the economy should be carefully
studied. HOOVER stated the Soviet press contained a good deal of
useful material on this subject. MILLIKAN also felt the paper needed
clear time charts on the agricultural sectorts progress and on rates
of change in output,
SMITH noted there had been an upturn in agricultural production,
even though the soviets had set higher goals than they can meet.
HOOVER agreed the goals were too high, but pointed out that even if
they only mot them partially) say 50 percent, the net increase in pro-
duction will be significant. LINDER added that the general cormansus
was that the crop yield on the "new lands" had been good this year.
On the subject of labor productivity) HOOVER noted it was still
unbelievably low in the older parts of the country,. although great
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efforts are being made to overcome it. He noted, in response to
MILLIKAN's question, that the causes of low productivity lay both
in technology and in incentives. BLACK and HOOVER pointed out
there was a strong feature of ideology in the employment of agri-
cultural machines. That is, larger machines with larger crews than
necessary were often employed as a matter of pride. There was
agreement that in general the Soviets used more labor than the West,
even though the cost of labor has risen.
SMITH remarked that whatever the Soviet economic difficulties,
we could take no comfort in them from the standpoint of security.
MILLIKAN added that economic potential is less important in a missile
Ware
Nevertheless, when consumer goals are increased, allocations
problems become more difficult. HOOVER and MILLIKgN agreed that in
contrast to the past, the USSR is reasonably well of today in food
supply and there is a certain "surplus" of GNP, which gives the eopnomy
some flexibility.
MILLIKAN asked whether decentralization affects the economy's
ability to shift gears when priorities are changed. Although we do
not have much evidence of the impact, HOOVER thought it inevitable
that there would be some effect. This would be mitigated, however, by
the retention of all-union ministries for the defense industries.
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ware.
added that priorities would tend to be shaped from below and
become less susceptible to central control. HOOVER thought the system
might become more efficient as a result of the removal of bureaucratic
controls. MOSELY pointed out that the system of controls is the real
key to how much decentralization there will be. Controls still exist
in the form of yearly supply contracts, fiscal controls through the
state banks, and controls over investments. He forepaw a continuation
of the loosening up process, while basic controls would still remain in
force. Some price leeway will result, but basic centralization will
remain. MILLILN added that a careful study of this situation should
be made,
KNORR though the decentralization of industry ill planned and that
more bureaucrats would be put over the managers, MILLIKN said there
vas a difference between the formal rules and the operating procedures)
and that the latter have not yet been worked out for the now system.
SMITH said that in giving our estimate of economic priorities
there were no problems as long as a simple classification of defense)
heavy industry, and consumer supply was used. More sophisticated and
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detailed classificantions, however, cause troubles in thu coordination
process. MILLIK,N thought labor shortages may make priorities inter-
dependent, as in the case of food production and defense industries.
HOOVER added that Khrushchev does not see the difficulties in
priorities: he goes ahead with the new lands, defense, and consumer
goods programs simultaneously. LINDER viewed this approach as
good psychology, like setting a "sales quota" in business. SMITH
pointed out, however, that perhaps it merely puts off the day of
judgement and the plin is moved ahead when it is not fulfilled on
schedule.
LINDER concluded by pointing out two dthissious in the draft:
(1) the debt repudiation and elimination of the forced investment
program should be mentioned; and (2) an impression of the quality
of the GNP, in the sense of military potential, including the rela-
tive importance of the statistics quoted, would be useful. MILLIKAN
repeated his earlier pleas for graphs.
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vas,
Morning session 10 October.
Subjects: A. NIE 30-2.57: NEAll EAST DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING
US INTEHESTS� 0 October 1957.
D. 3 October draft of NIE 13.2-57: COMMUNIST
CHINA'S ROLE IN ASIA AND AFRICA
Summary:
The"ir,c�n4-. t" addle East turned on problens of
producing more useful estimates, in the licht of recent
developments in the area. A strong plea was voiced for laying
out the consequences of various nessible courses of action,
even though specific questions were net asked by the policy-
makers. A paper such as NIB 30-2-57 should, it was felt, deal
more specifically with such problems as the internal situation
in Syria and with the rotivations and group alignments of key
government personnel in non-Soviet states.
A number of specific suggestions wore made for iiproving
the draft of NIE 13-2-57. The degree to which various factors
might be affected by US policy, the role of other major stotes
besides the Bloc and the US in affecting Asian-African develop-
ments, and a lioitation of treatment to certain key propositions
were noted as being worth more treatment. As in the discussion
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of the USSR, the Consultants agreed that Communist China was
apt to adopt a more forward policy over the next five years.
It might fool loss compelled to resort to force to achieve its
ends, although this possibility could not be ruled out in
limited local situations.
Hi011igtits of discussiou:
A. The Consultants considered briefly some of the problems
of producing estimates, as illustrated by developments in Syria
and the recently completed Near East estimate. BOWIE opened
the discussion by quoting an export who believed the Syrian
regime was not as Communist as the US Government had proclaimed
and added that the basic issue concerns our objective. In the
case of Syria, we can decide either to try to lino the govern-
ment up on our side or to neutralize the country. Ho believed
the estimates should show that there are 'alternative possibilities
and sketch out consequences of alternative courses of action.
Intelligence, in his view, might well solicit questions from
the policymakors. STRAYER agreed with BOWIE that there should
be more inter-action between US policy formulation and intelli-
gence.
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BLACK saw three alternatives in the case of Syria: (1)
continue present US policy; (2) use pressure on Syria; (3) go
along with the Syrian regime. BOWIE felt that NIE 30-2-57 gives
the impression the US does not have much choice in adopting
a policy toward Syria. Ho and IILLIKAN thought the economic
section failed to show the consequences of foreign aid programs,
as. in the Egyptian section, or of an arms embargo.
AR1ZTR0NG wondered if one could say much more than that
we are trying to help friendly elements in, my, Iraq and
Lebanon. MILLIKAN end HOOVER thought that the motivations of
leadership elements and canqcr government people should be
studied in areas other than the USSR. But BOWIE and ARMSTnONG
felt that, as shown in the case of Lebanese President Chnmoun
and Foreign Minister Nhlik, what these leaders do often depends
on what we offer.
MOSELY thought that in the case of Syria the internal
situation should have been studied in more detail in NIE 30-2-57.
HOOVER added that the estimat.:2s wore often not specific enough.
HULA noted that some of the more specific questions had boon
or wore being treated in a special estimate on Syria and in the
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._-ftEr� emir'
now Egyptian country estimate. KENT pointed out that outside
chances wore considered in at least two places in the Near
East paper.
B, BOWIE opened the discussion on Communist China by
stating that the policy maker wants to know what aspects of
the situation are lualcalo and what aspects era unchangeable,
and how to treat them. He thouht more attention was needed
on (1) the role of the overseas Chinese; (2) control of domestic
Communists by South East Asian countries; (3) the problem of
frustrated intellectuals in these areas; (4) the possibility
of a throe way contest involving Communist China,: the West,
and Japan, and India's efforts to pin7 n role in the area.
BOWIE felt we had to make up our minds as to what elements we
can build on in the area; there is a need to stimulate the minds
of the policymakers.
MILLIKAN thought the paper lacked an appraisal of the
effect in Asia generally of Chinese Communist economic develop-
ment, both in itself and as compared with Indian 'efforts. Evidence
might exist in the newspapers and other sources of public
attitudes in Southeast Asia. Tho effect of greater or loss
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US pressures was left out in considering Communist China's
economic development and its 'efect. Ho did not think this
aspect of US policy could be omitted.
STRAYER found the paper too general. Ho felt more
specific examples wore needed. SMITH summarized the Consultants'
views as being that the paper was lacking in a clear account
of the impact of Chinese achievements and failures--the
total image created by Communist China.
MOSELY felt the opportunities for the Chinese Communists
to use force will be greater in the next five years than in
the past three, They may hide behind the Soviet nuclear
capability and employ forceful tactics in local situations,
as on the Burma border. BOWIE added that a key point�the
potential Sine-Soviet clash of interests --is omitted.
ARMSTRONG. thought the Soviets might encourage the Chinese
Communists to do something which would brinr US rotaliation,
and then brand the US as the aggressor. BOWIE then recognized
that all the issues raised could not ho treated in one NIE;
it was necessary to define the important questions to be
analyzed. Mosely thought we should consider (1) how far the
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Chinese Communists can get by open propaganda and (2) by
subversion and limited military action. Perhaps Communist
' China needs tho quick take�over technique- less than the USSR.
The discussion turned to the nature of Communist China's
ultimate objectives in Asia (Para. 1). 1Jhilo there wore some
differences between the status of the European Satellites and
that of North Vietnam, for example, BOWIE wondered what
difference it made in terms of US interest what kind of a
satellite you had. STRAIEA pointed out that in the case of
an indirectly controlled satellite the thing one is fighting
against is less clear cut. BOWIE felt the real point turned
on what the Chinese Communist are doing to exploit tho situation
and what the US can do about it. A really critical look at
the situation was needed, one which would not reinforce the
rigidities of US policy.
_25_
RET
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Afternoon session, 10 October
Subjects: A. IELERANDUM FOR THE CONSULTANTS, "Estimative
Liestions on the Outlook for Germany," 2 October,
B. NIE 11-4-57, Part II--Trends in the Soviet
Economy. (See Afternoon session, 9 October)
Summary:
The discussion was concerned with future political trends
in Germany and with the country's foreign nolicy orientation,
particularly after Adennuer's passing. It was generally agreed
that German labor was now more interested in material well-being
than in ideology or in politics. Nevertheless, the possibility
of labor assuming an active political role could not be excluded.
While economic conditions appear to be sound within Germany,
a depression elsewhere would hurt the country's trading position
and would almost certainly have political repercussions,
Including increased interest in reunification. Tho main foreign
iSSUOQ turn on Germany's attitude toward reunification versus
European integration. Unless elements favoring a den' with
the USSR on reunification achieved -ewer, it seemed more probable
that the Germans would seek on outlet for their energies in
European integration. If this were blocked, the consequences
would be serious. Turning to the doostic scene agnUlt the
Consultants appeared to agree with the ONE view that the chances
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Nopri. Nue
of the ODU holding together for at least two or three years
after Adenauer appeared bettor than oven.
hligjits of discuss ion :
The discussion opened with a CIA statement that we wore
concerned with several key questions: the long�term effects
on German politics of unification; whether there is a tendency
toward a one or two party system in GormanT and2 whether Germany
is being "Swissified." BOWIE thought a paper dealing with more
fundamental problems was needed. It should study the forces
or groups which will come up when Adenauor disappears.
Tho
estimate should also concern itself with how for the governmental
foreign policy is shored ad accepted as a national policy.
STRAYER asked how long lalDor would put up with low wages
and the absence of other benefits. He thought Germany might
got a labor party other than the SPD after Adenauer. A labor
union type of political campaign might have wide appeal. N o
other issue was in sight; foreign policy had turned out to be
a dud.
HOOVER pointed out that German labor had abandoned idarxism
and even revisionism. KNORR added that t- is was done in order
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to try to capture middle class votes.
tIOWIE recalled that six seven years ago the unions
identified themselves more closely with the Soeial Democrats.
Since then ideology has boon played down and there is more
interest in wages and hours. KNORR agreed that this was true.
The laboring man now wants a car, or at least a motorcycle,
but he wondered what would happen if things went wrong.
SMITH asked iflinstend of a drive for labor's rights and
a larger share of the economy, reunification might become the
key issue after Adenauer. LINDER thought there was new less
pull for reunification than formerly. Vested interests hod
been built up on both sides and most of those who wanted to
leave East Germany have been able to do so. The issue is
dormant, but a demagogue 'might revive it.
MILLIKAN thought it could re-arise if economic conditions
deteriorate. DMIE saw as a tougher problem a free world
set-back which the Germans could not handle psychologically
or practically and which would result in frustrations. -LINDER,
STRAYER, and MILLIKAN saw no reason to assume an economic set-
back in Germany. World reactions, such as a depression in tho
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1 �."c_
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in the US or Western Europe, would nffoct Germany, which is n
tciig nation like the UK and. Japan.
Turning to the recent elections, ARMSTRONG thought
prosperity re-elected Adennuer. Furthermore, the opposition's
lack of ideas on reunification, its criticism of NATO, and
other phone issues wore magnified by the ineptitude of the
SPD. He drew n gloomy picture of the moral and political
outlook. Corruption had increased and ARMSTRONG had a fooling
that Adam:111er had lived for himself and the regime. BOWIE
wondered if the lock of issues made the nolitical situation
serious.
KNORR saw parallels to the US situation in this
respect. ARMSTRONG replied that he foresaw a split in the
SPD; there was not much future in the other parties.
STRAYER believed any p(Ast-Adennuer government will have
to consider the reunification issue. The question will be
whether they look toward NATO for support or go it alone in
seeking reunification. SMITH saw the problems of reunification
and relations with the USSR versus European integration as the
main issues. KNOM said the Gdr..ynns were split on the issue
of NATO as tho answer to this prcThlem. The SPA and the minor
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parties do not want NATO, which they think is blocking
reunification, but favor a deal with the Soviets.
SMITH asked whether the Germans, on security grounds,
could give up NATO. BOWIE said the Germans may ask what
NATO can do for them. MILLIKAN thought the outcome depends
on NATO's strategy in a missile age.'. MATTHIAS asked whether--
once German strength is buiItup-they would be in a position
to bargain or engage in "brinksmanship." BOWIE thought the
security problem, as raised in the British White Paper on
defense, may weaken or disrupt NATO.
SMITH stated the consensus as being that foreign policy
after Adenauor may be pretty passive, at least as long as
economic conditions remain good. BOWIE thought the problem
encompassed (1) Germany's attitude toward European integration
and (2) whether, since the Soviets have slammed the door on
reunification, the Germans have any other options.
STRA7ER was concerned over SMITH Is summary. Germany is
potentially the third strongest country in the world. 11,yo
they lost all ambition? He thought they might take the lend in pushing
European integration. BOWIE could not see them staying bottled
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Nor
WOW, RI'4,U 04,,i �fit@ a
up in West Gernany; European lntegr-tion could be an out for
their energies and ambitions. If this wore blocked by French
ineptitude, he did not know what would happen. KNORR thought
that if Strauss succeeds politically things will be more
lively. BOWIE agreed that noticnalistically-minded -eo)le
like Strauss could score the German integratirnists. However,
it would be more dangerous if the German notknalists scared
others, especially the French, into blocking integration.
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