NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02696407
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2020
• Case Number: F-2019-02254
• Publication Date: January 1, 1958

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'TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD 1
CONCLUSIONS 3
RECOMMENDATIONS 6
DISCUSSION 8
I. PROBABLE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WAR 8
Basic Assumption of Nuclear War 8
Likelihood of Surprise Attack
Priority Targets of Soviet Attacks 9
Unlikelihood of Initial Secondary Attacks
Likelihood of Two Phases 10
Calculated Disruption of U.S. Command
Channels 11
Attitude of "Neutrals" 11
II. LIMITATIONS ON CIA ROLE IN A NUCLEAR WAR 12
� Problems of Redeployment 12
Vulnerability of CIA Resources 13
Impact on Agent Personnel 13
Impact of Nuclear War on Communications 14
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ANNIA
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III. CIA OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR WAR 15
A. Distinction Between Military Theaters and
Other Area s 15
B. Intelligence Requirements 16
C. CIA Role in Military Theaters During the
Initial Phase 18
Operational Intelligence 20
Positive Intelligence 20
PW 21
E and E 21
D. Subsequent Phase Operations in Military
Theaters � 22
E. Communications in Military Theaters 24
F. Operations in Neutral Areas and
Strategic Islands 24
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM NUCLEAR WAR . 27
Possible Restrictions on Use of Nuclear
Weapons in Soviet Satellites and
Soviet Minority Areas 27
Timing and Nature of Surrender or Cease Fire 29
Post Hostilities Role of CIA 30
II
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FOREWORD
In this report the Special Reserve Panel has sought to analyze the
likely impact of global nuclear warfare on CIA's wartime role. Principal
emphasis has been placed on the period through 1960, during which U.S.
military planning is based on a concept of unlimited nuclear warfare,
implying the use of nuclear weapons in both strategic and tactical roles
in all areas of the world in which suitable targets are located.
The Panel is cognizant of and has given much attention to the alter-
natives to all-out nuclear war. However, because the official U.S.
concept of the character of a general war resulting from a Soviet attack
through 1960 is based upon massive retaliation utilizing nuclear weapons
and because realistic war planning must in any case be based upon the
most adverse circumstances in which CIA initial wartime actividis would
be carried out, the Panel has considered only CIA's role in a war involving
a11-out use of nuclear weapons by both sides.
The Panel has placed primary emphasis on an analysis of CIA's
overseas role. The impact of an attack on Washington is likely to be
such that the field may have to operate with little Headquarters direc-
tion and support for an indefinite period of time.
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In preparing this report, the Panel has taken into consideration:
(1) U.S. policies, insofar as available, governing the conduct of a
future general war; (2) CIA war plans; and (3) NIEs and other intel-
ligence on the wartime capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union,
the Soviet Satellite national /and neutral countries and our Allies.
H. S. Craig, Chairman
James Critchfield
1 January 1958
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CONCLUSIONS
1. Major war up to 1960 would be an all-out nuclear war.
2. At least the first phase would be one of all-out and possibly
very brief unrestricted exchange of nuclear attacks.
3. There may be a subsequent phase or phases of what has been
termed "broken back" war.
4. The initial phase of all-out nuclear warfare would take place
in limited areas of highest strategic importance while large areas, either
neutral countries or "strategic islands," would be left relatively un-
touched, even by fall-out. Even small areas Within the major combat
zones, i.e., "tactical islands" would be more or less free of nuclear
damage.
5. Since nuclear war would almost certainly begin with a sur-
prise attack, which Soviet advances in nuclear weapons and delivery
systems make increasingly feasible, early warning becomes ever more
vital but increasingly difficult to achieve.
6. CIA's ability to function during the first phase in areas of in-
tensive nuclear exchange would be severly limited. A large proportion
of existing CIA assets and facilities in areas of nuclear destruction
would be neutralized if not destroyed.
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(a) Great difficulties would arise in the redeployment and
reorganization of CIA field stations.
(b) Agent resources in particular would be highly vulnerable
to the effects of nuclear weapons.
(c) Extensive disruption of communications would occur.
Under these circumstances CIA would be capable of only the most
limited first phase operations in combat theaters. CIA's primary
task would be to cope with the problems of survival and redeploy-
ment for subsequent phases of operations and the establishment
of satisfactory relationships with the military commanders.
7. In contrast to the severe limitations on CIA's first phase role
in areas of extensive nuclear exchange, greatly expanded opportunities
for useful CIA operations would occur in the subsequent phase of "broken
back" warfare. In this phase extensive requirements for intelligence on
the chaotic post attack situation in key areas and numerous possibilities
for stimulating resistance activities and guerrilla warfare will exist.
8. Moreover, from the very outset of a war CIA could play a
major role in those areas which, bacause they remain neutral or are of
secondary military importance, would not come under intensive nuclear
attack. Indeed CIA operations in these areas could probably make a
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greater contribution to the over-all national effort than could the limited
activities which would be feasible in nuclear combat zones. In many
cases CIA staff personnel and assets might be the only major U.S.
resources available to carry out U.S. policy.
9. The employment of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and its Allies
in satellite areas could decisively affect CIA operations in these areas,
but to date these problems have not been adequately explored.
10. The terms, timing and circumstances of surrender negotia-
tions which might occur after an extremely short period of nuclear ex-
change would critically affect planning for CIA's wartime role as well
as for the key role CIA might have in the immediate post hostilities
period. Here, too however, there does not appear to be any adequate
national planning.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Early warning operations must be given a clear-cut priority
over wartime requirements including those placed by the military upon
CIA.
2. CIA should accept only the most limited requirements in an-
ticipated areas of major nuclear exchange during the first phase of a
war.
3. Instead, CIA war planning for areas of likely nuclear exchange
should emphasize survival, reorganization and the establishment of
proper relationships with military commanders, in order to ensure
adequate CIA support of the military in these areas in the subsequent
phase of the war.
4. CIA war planning for areas likely to remain neutral or i.:,e large
"strategic islands" likely to escape nuclear damage should be premi.:e4
on the concept that CIA can make a major and perhaps its most importa.01,
contribution to the national war effort in and from such areas.
5. An emergency communications system adaptable to the situ-
ation of a nuclear war should be developed. It should include:
(a) Alternate facilities to those presently in use;
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(b) Facilities independent of existing military and civilian
systems;
(c) Equipment which can be operated by untrained CIA person-
nel;
(d) Stored, protected and available equipment in both the
"tactical islands" within the combat areas and in, the "strategic
islands" and neutral areas.
6. CIA should undertake a study to determine where strategic and
tactical islands would be likely to exist in a nuclear war and should under-
take war planning on the basis of this study; and
7. CIA should attempt to influence U.S. national planners to con-
sider the pros and cons of employing nuclear weapons in Satellite areas.
8. CIA should examine the problem of the terms, timing, and
circumstances of possible surrender negotiation to determine the impact
these would have on CIA's wartime and post-hostilities roles.
9. Finally, we recommend that the above principles be adopted
as the guidelines for future CIA war planning.
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DISCUSSION
I. PROBABLE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WAR
1. We have attempted to make the most realistic appraisals as to
the likely nature and scope of nuclear warfare. The following views are
those on which we believe realistic CIA war planning must be based.
2. In the absence of major changes in the foreign and domestic
policies and military potential of either the USSR or the U.S., a global
war over the next several years will almost certainly involve an im-
mediate full-scale nuclear exchange. This is the basic concept on
which this study is predicated. U.S. strength-in-being and ability to
win a war is so heavily dependent on our massive retaliatory capability
that it is almost certain that the U.S. would have to conduct such an'
offensive if it were attacked. The Soviets must have made a similar
conclusion; their own nuclear warfare capabilities are constantly grow-
ing, and available intelligence indicates that they are seeking to develop
and maintain nuclear warfare capabilities comparable with, if not superior
to, those of the U.S. Moreover, even if general war should start with-
out initial resort to nuclear weapons, realistic war planning must assume
that these could subsequently be introduced at any time, particularly if
one side felt itself in danger of military defeat.
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3. If the USSR initiates general war during the period through 1962,
whether as a result of pre-planning or miscalculation, it will most certain-
ly do so by launching a surprise nuclear attack (see NIB 11-4-57) . The
vital importance of achieving surprise and of getting in the first nuclear
blows almost dictate Soviet reliance on an initial surprise nuclear attack,
particularly since success in destroying our retaliatory capability would
be a decisive factor.
4. The priority targets of the initial Soviet nuclear attacks would
probably be: Cl) Allied nuclear retaliatory strengths, wherever located,
(2) key Allied depots and industrial centers, and (3) key Allied forward
bases and forward airfields. It is estimated that most major cities, sea-
ports, and communications centers in Europe and such major military
installations as tactical and strategic airfields would be attacked.
5. Soviet Bloc forces probably will not conduct initial attacks,
nuclear or otherwise, in areas which are not of highest priority. Soviet
nuclear stockpiles probably will not be sufficient, at least through 1960,
to meet all military requirements. Therefore, the Soviets will reserve
their nuclear weapons for high priority targets. Numerous secondary
targets will not be attacked, at least in the initial period. Similarily,
with respect to ground forces, it is likely that the Soviets will initially
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mount only the highest priority land campaigns, waiting on the others
until the effects of the initial nuclear exchange have become clearer.
Indeed the Soviets might initially mount even the highest priority land
campaigns (such as that in northwest Europe and into the Middle East)
on a reduced scale without prior buildup in order to avoid premature detec-
tion which would compromise achievement of surprise in the initial nuclear
attacks. Thus even in nuclear war, strategic and tactical islands and
neutral areas will exist.
6. A full-scale nuclear war will involve at least an initial phase
of all-out nuclear exchange and possibly a subsequent phase (or phases)
of much reduced nuclear activity. The first phase would end when one or
both sides had lost its capability to continue intense nuclear attacks.
The war could end at this point. In any event, at the end of this phase,
both the civilian population and the military forces within combat theaters
� would be faced with problems of great magnitude and generally chaotic,
circumstances. Communications throughout the world would, because
of nuclear damage, sabotage and overloading with high priority traffics
probably prove inadequate; vast areas of the world would tend to be
separated through failures of communications; TJ.S. governmental au-
thority would of necessity be greatly decentralized to the senior officials
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in these areas.
7. A second phase of so-called "broken back" warfare might follow
the first phase, with both sides employing conventional forces' and remain-
ing atomic and nuclear weapons. This phase, in contrast to the first,
could extend almost indefinitely and gradually be expanded to include
other countries which had initially remained neutral, but which had ter-
ritorial or other ambitions they regarded as attainable by entering the
war at this point.
8. During the initial stages of a nuclear attack, the present Allied
headquarters structure will suffer severe disruption and may be unable
to function effectively. Such large military headquarters and compli-
cated communications systems are considered to be extremely vulner-
able.
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9. An attack on the U.S. may result in an attitude of poised
opportunism among the neutrals who are able to remain so -- particu-
larly the Afro-Asian countries. They will und8ubtedly try to take the
greatest possible advantage of this situation in terms of national inter-
ests and to recognize a winner at the earliest possible time. Even
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Communist China might well choose not to be a beligerent but to stay
neutral and attempt to advance its interests by various means during
this period.
II. LIMITATIONS ON CIA ROLE IN A NUCLEAR WAR
10. Difficulty of redeployment and reorganization of CIA. field
stations durinc a period of initial nuclear exchange. Too little atten-
tion has been given to the development of workable and simple plans to
govern the redeployment of CIA human and material resources in those
areas of the world which would probably be immediately involved in
nuclear combat. In some of these areas planning has, because of the
presence of U.S. military forces, been strongly influenced by the mili-
tary authorities. In general such plans are based upon the assumption
of a period of tension preceding actual military operations and not on
the basic assumption of surprise attack taken by this Panel. These
plans are designed primarily for mass movement of Americans, in-
cluding CIA personnel, from forward areas vulnerable to attack by
conventional Soviet forces, but they involve moving these people back
through and into areas that will almost certainly be major targets of
Soviet nuclear attack. Emergency redeployment plans assuming a
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situation brought about by a surprise Soviet nuclear attack -- probably
initially against targets in the U.S.A., the U.K., Europe and the Middle
East -- have not been given adequate attention.
11. Vulnerability of Q& resources target areas. Any CIA
stations, bases, communications facilities or other assets located in
or near the areas of likely nuclear targets (particularly those against
which high yield thermonuclear weapons would probably be employed)
would be highly vulnerable to destruction or damage.
SAC itself reckons with the likely early denial
of these areas. It is also probable that large areas in and adjacent to
target zones will at least temporarily be denied to CIA because of bomb
damage and contamination produced by fall-out. The disruption of nor-
mal life, including all travel and communications services, would elimi-
nate such areas from consideration for either clandestine activity or as
redeployment areas for CIA..
12. Impact on agent personnel. The physical and psychological
impact on CIA. agents in areas of the world immediately affected by
nuclear attacks � whether those of the Bloc or the Western Allies --
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will be so great and dependent on so many imponderable factors, that
it is almost impossible to estimate their behavior and effectiveness
under such circumstances. It can be assumed that even a nuclear war
will produce circumstances in which certain individuals will demonstrate
the same high courage and willingness to take great risks that they have
in past wars. In general it is believed that agents in the West who are
being prepared for commitment into enemy territory after the beginning
of a war should be prepared in every way to survive a nuclear war and
damages therefrom. But except in special circumstances, it does not
appear to be either feasible or desirable that agents already established
in hostile areas be prepared to cope with nuclear attacks.
13. Impact of nuclear war on communications. Major and widely
separated geographical areas will be directly affected; time and space
will be drastically compressed compared to the situation that obtained
in World War II, intensifying the need for rapid and reliable handling
of vital traffic. But at a time when intelligence communications will
be of great importance, it must be assumed that a very large percentage
of the facilities located in areas affected by the initial exchange will
not be usable.
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III. CIA OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR WAR
A. Distinction Between Military Theaters and Neutral Areas.
14. In event of general war parts of Europe, the Far East and the
Middle East and perhaps some areas immediately adjacent to these would
probably immediately become theaters of military operations under the
control of U.S. or Allied commands. However, other areas of the world
probably would not, at least during the initial phase of a nuclear war,
become involved in the conflict. They would remain under the control
of existing civil governments with whom our existing diplomatic relation-
ships would continue. The planning of the CIA wartime roles in each of
these areas must take into account the significant differences that will
exist at all phases of a nuclear war between a CIA effort subordinated
to a theater command and a CIA effort which remains under existing com-
mand arrangements.
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15. Survival, reorganization and the establishment of relation-
ship with the military commanders will pose immediate and overwhelming
problems to CIA stations in the active military theaters. CIA in military
theaters will inevitably be subject primarily to the control, influence and
requirements of the local military commanders. Nevertheless, the global
character of modern war and the role of CIA in the government dictates
that CM. stations within military theaters remain in touch with and re-
sponsive to Headquarters requirements.
16. On the other hand, it is not anticipated that the organization
of CIA stations in the "neutral" areas of the world will be immediately
changed by war; relationships with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission (i.e.,
Ambassadors, Ministers, etc.) and Headquarters will not be initially
effected by war.
B. Intelligence Reauirements
17. The first and priority requirement is, obviously, that CIA
concentrate its efforts on the problem of determining in advance any
Soviet plan to launch an attack. This is far more important than any
tasks CIA could perform during the initial stages of a war which had
already begun.
Je6,
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18. The first phase of nuclear war -- the period of intense nu-
clear exchange -- will be characterized by a tremendous demand from
Washington and from military installations around the world for re-
porting on military events, the physical impact of nuclear attacks,
political reactions and attitudes of "neutral" countries and any other
information that will permit continuing examination of the balance
between the opposing forces.
19. Within the active military theaters, particularly in Europe
and the Middle East, the senior 'U.S. military commanders will have
an immediate and urgent demand for tactical intelligence
On the other hand, it is unlikely
that the military commanders in the field will have, during the first
phase of the war, pressing requirements that can be met by either PW
or GW/Resistance activities. Decisions by the United States to refrain
from making nuclear attacks on selected Soviet Bloc areas could, how-
ever, provide a situation in which pre-planned PW and GW/Resistance
activities would assume immediate importance (see Chapter IV below).
20. There will also be requirements, imposed by Washington, for
political action and PW operations in "neutral" areas. Many of these
,17
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will become significant only after the initial exchange of nuclear attacks
has been completed and political reactions in these areas develop. This
could conceivably be within a period of days or perhaps weeks after the
beginning of the war.
21. But the limitations on CIA operations in areas of intense nu-
clear exchange are so great that the specific requirements placed on CIA
by the military for support of first-phase combat operations must be re-
evaluated to determine which targets are so important as to justify an
extraordinary effort. The CIA effort to satisfy requirements must be meas-
ured against the significance of the contribution which fulfillment would
bring.
C. CIA Role in Military Theaters During the Initial Phase.
22. In those areas in which both nuclear and ground force attacks
by the Soviets can be anticipated, staggering problems of survival,
evasion and redeployment will exist. Therefore highest priority during
the first phase must be given to meeting these problems. But, as pointed
out in paragraph 10, present evacuation planning is based on the un-
realistic assumption that some orderly movement to the "rear" utilizing
available transportation facilities will be possible. Instead of present
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plans for such redeployment to areas which will themselves probably�
come under nuclear attack, alternative plans should be prepared for the
movement of Staff members into areas of at least temporary safety. These
areas might include the so-called strategic islands of lesser military
significance or even tactical islands which might exist in theaters of
widespread military operations. For example, even in event of a major
nuclear campaign in Western Europe certain isolated or mountainous
regions such as the Alpine region or Southwest France would remain
relatively free of nuclear damage or contamination. In fact, a number
of our Staff personnel in military theaters may find themselves in situ-
ations not unlike that of the downed aircraft crews in the hands of an
"E and E" organization. The possible useful intelligence exploitation
of individuals who become isolated in such tactical islands has not
been considered in our planning. A trained intelligence officer provided
with instructions and a means of communication could conceivably pro-
vide timely and vital intelligence information during the period that he
remains in this situation.
23. Since a nuclear war extending into a second phase of "broken
back" warfare or mopping up would require a massive and thoroughly re-
organized U.S. intelligence effort, CIA should clearly distinguish which
jegi_,19
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assets being developed for wartime use are intended for use in the first
phase from those that are to remain dormant until the second phase has
been reached. This becomes an especially practical matter with regard
to the instructions being issued to W/T agents. Also, a realistic ap-
praisal of our capabilities in the first phase of a nuclear war will be a
definite consideration in planning the organization of our CIA establish-
ments in the military theaters. It may be that the realistic approach to
this problem would be to limit ourselves to what we can really expect
to accomplish during the brief period of days, or weeks of the initial
nuclear exchange, leaving all other potential assets for our second
phase activities.
24. Operational Intelligence. Determination of the operational
situation in each area of the world including an assessment and report
of the impact of the initial exchange of nuclear attacks on our personnel,
facilities and areas of operational activity will be an immediate and
vital requirement during the initial phase.
25. Positive Intelligence. As reflected in our discussion of
requirements and the general character of the first phase of a nuclear
war, both the U.S. Government and the local U.S./ and allied com-
manders in military theaters will have immediate and urgent demands
for information of the type that could be provided by carefully planned
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Fl operations. It is again emphasized, however, that CIA would have
an extremely limited capability under the circumstances that would
exist.
26. Psychological and Political Operations. Unless U.S. military
planners are prepared to give considerable prior attention to the psycho-
logical significance of granting some immunity from allied nuclear attacks,
it does not appear that there would be any immediate impact of PW oper-
ations within areas directly involved in the earliest military operations.
However, a great deal could be done toward stimulating support for the
U.S. in areas which are not directly involved in the initial nuclear ex-
change if these stations are prior to the outbreak of war, provided with
instructions and the means of carrying out an effective psychological or
political action program. The people of the satellite nations and of Red
China might also be vulnerable to psychological warfare efforts in the
first phase of a war beginning with nuclear weapons.
27. Escape and Evasion Operations. The planning now of E and E
operations in denied areas and the wartime operation of E and E facilities
in areas in which the population is generally hostile to the U.S. are felt
to be so problematical and have such limited prospects of success that
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they must be accorded an extremely low priority. On the other hand,
undenied areas that are likely to be overrun by the Soviet armies will
probably continue to provide circumstances favoring the conduct of E
and E operations -- provided these areas are not subjected to devastat-
ing nuclear attack alienating the population.
D. Subsequent Phase Operations in Military Theaters.
28. Under the circumstances that have been envisaged in this
paper, time factors, communications problems and the difficulties of
conducting operations during the initial phase of a nuclear war will
result in many and probably most of CIA's wartime assets and potential
not being brought into action during the initial phase. For example,
many of our W/T agents today have instructions to report in to a base
station only a month or more after the outbreak of a world war. Such
assets should, in planning, be considered part of our subsequent phase
operations.
29. Moreover, given the type of nuclear war we have envisaged,
it is in the subsequent phase or phases of nuclear war that the Agency
could exert a more worthwhile effort. The chaotic conditions, not only
in actual areas of nuclear conflict but in peripheral areas, will afford
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excellent opportunities for an organized effort such as CIA. would be
able to mount to move in and assert leadership for whatever purpose is
appropriate. These purposes could include assisting in maintenance of
friendly political forces in control or on the other hand, deposing un-
friendly political elements. Organization of Fl collection nets could
be a principal function in certain of the peripheral areas which would
not be vital targets for aerial photographic reconnaissance.
30. It would also appear that much of the present detailed war
planning that has been done at headquarters and in the field is more
appropriate to the type of operations and the situation which will exist
during the subsequent phase. However, much of this current planning
is in fact directed at the initial phase. Because of the difficulty in
determining the circumstances that will exist in specific parts of the
world following the initial phase of nuclear war, our planning should
be done on a flexible basis to permit deployment of prepared assets to
areas where they can be truly useful. The events which occur in the
initial phase, including devastation of specific areas and political.
events such as whether Communist China remains neutral or whether
Sweden Joins the war, will determine the areas of opportunity for CIA.
and the spe`cific role that it will play.
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E. Communications in Military Theaters.
31. The execution of operations will be dependent upon an Agency-
opetated communications system of great flexibility if problems arising
from an unpredictable situation are to be successfully solved.
As stated earlier, many agent W/T assets will not be em-
ployed during the initial period. Those intended for use will have to be
provided the capability of adapting their operations to prevailing circum-
stances.
32. In neutral or other areas where delays in operational communi-
cations would be detrimental to our efforts, methods of avoiding censor-
ship or other delaying tactics will be required.
F. Operations in Neutral Areas and Strategic Islands.
33. Even in event of full-scale thermonuclear war there will in-
evitably be large areas of the world which will not be immediately
involved. Indeed, as we have already stated, the USSR may forego
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Initial campaigns in any but the most vital areas in order to maximize
surprise and to await the result of the initial nuclear exchange. Thus
large areas may not initially be theaters of active combat. Moreover,
many countries, even U.S. allies, may be influenced by considerations
of self-interest or Soviet "nuclear blackmail" to stand aloof from the
conflict, at least initially. Even Communist China, North Korea, and
North Vietnam might prefer to remain neutral at the outset, to see how
the early stages of the war come out. Most of the uncommitted coun-
tries will certainly seek to remain neutral.
34. Thus there will be large areas in which active nuclear war�
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fare is not taking place and in which allied or enemy forces are not
deployed, at least initially. Even though these areas are not theaters �
of active military operations, they may be highly important from the U.S.
point of view. Both sides will be actively interested in securing their
benevolent neutrality or their entry on one side or the other, and in
forestalling moves of the other side. It may be desirable to overthrow
hostile governments, install regimes favorable to the U.S., lay the
groundwork for future operations in these areas, etc. Since these so-
called strategic island areas will not be theaters of active military
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operations, CIA resources will be among the only assets available for
achieving U.S. objectives, and CIA may be the key arm of U.S. policy
in these areas.
35. Consequently these strategic island areas may be highly
desirable theaters of CIA activity, particularly of an "exceptional
operation" nature. To the extent that CIA operations in areas of major
nuclear warfare may be severely restricted and of marginal value, it
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may even be that CIA should emphasize operations in strategic island
areas as the most profitable field available in event of nuclear war.
It is conceivable that CIA operations in these areas could make a far
greater contribution to the overall national effort than could the limited
activities which will be feasible in major military theaters.
36. The precise nature of the operations which would be most
useful can only be determined by careful area-by-area analysis. Never-
theless a considerable degree of prior, contingency planning and peace-
time earmarking or development of assets should be possible. For
example, assuming most Arab states remain neutral, the U.S. might
find it most desirable to covertly encourage dissident elements to
install friendly governments in such key states as Egypt and Syria,
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where keeping open the oil pipelines and Suez Canal would be so vital
to us. Or again, if certain allied governments, or even certain leaders,
appear unduly susceptible to Soviet blackmail or pressures, the U.S.
may want to forestall unfavorable developments by covert means. In
some cases it may be essential to pave the way for subsequent allied
occupation of certain neutral base areas vital to our war effort. In all
areas there will be a problem of forestalling Communist efforts to stir
up trouble or even revolution, or agent provocateur operations to em-
barrass the U.S.
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM NUCLEAR WAR
37. We have thus far dealt with the wartime impact of unrestricted
use of nuclear weapons, including high yield thermonuclear weapons, on
regular CIA operations. There are other highly important aspects of the
problem which present possible opportunities for the Agency to utilize
its unique facilities and know-how in fulfillment of its responsibilities.
38. Restrictispns on use of Nuclear Weapons against Soviet
Satellites and USSR Minority Groups. Even in a general war with the
USSR, it is possible that(iless than unrestricted use of nuclear weapons
might be desirable. Thi6 concept could range from the strictly tactical
use of atomic weapons to a broader use just short of unrestricted. Such
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a concept of nuclear war would require much closer coordination of the
appropriate elements of government.
39 . As an illustration, we can look at the revolt in Hungary which
demonstrated the potentialities of the people of the satellite nations to
interfere with organized Russian land forces. It is possible that such
interference could for a short time be of a serious degree. We can
visualize CIA actions in establishing channels of communications to
military and other leaders of the satellite nations as being of enormous
assistance if, upon the outbreak of war, the United States called upon
the people of the satellites to rise up in revolt against the Soviet
forces. However, indiscriminate nuclear attacks on these countries
would not be compatible with such a plan. Of necessity, integrated
war planning would be required for the success of such a concept. There
is no evidence that present vrar plans adequately consider either the
political or military advantaLes which might accrue by declaring certain
satellite areas immune to 13 B. nuclear attack, and thus creating op-
portunities for clandestine x other operations of major potential value.
40. No less worthy f consideration, but probably having less
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chance of complete success, is the possibility of stimulating revolt on
the part of groups within the USSR against their own dictatorship in the
event of general war, or of profiting by a spontaneous uprising. The
national minority groups in Russia could provide a fertile field for study
in this connection.
41. The responsibilities placed on CIA require that we, at the
very least, relate these implications of the matters discussed above to
current war planning, without waiting for specific requirements. The
Agency can initiate some plans and actions to anticipate possible re-
quests or to uncover opportunities.
42. The Question of Timing or Nature of Cease-Fire or Surrender.
At the present time there is no real national or military planrifng on the
question of the possible nature of surrender terms in the event of a
general war. Still unanswered are the questions, "How do we know
when we have won the war?", "What is victory?", and "Under what
circumstances would we offer terms of ceasefire?" Existing national
policy apparently is to develop surrender terms after war has begun.
But the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons and the possibility that a
nuclear war might be over within a few weeks or even days dictate
serious reconsideration of this aspect of such a problem. A difference
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of only a few days in the cessation of nuclear hostilities would alter
the postwar problems by a staggering factor. Not only would the enemy
be involved, but the entire world would be affected by the economic and
social aspects of such widescale destruction. Added to this would be
the genetic damage from which no one would be secure; failure to stop
the release of radio-active elements could be a true world-wide dis-
aster. Governmental considerations of this question would probably -
point to a role for CIA to assume. But the Agency need not wait for a
directive on the subject, and it should assume the initiative in order
to be prepared to fulfill its share of the responsibility for this most
Important question.
43. Post-Hostilities Role of Q. The role of CIA in a nuclear
war must include consideration of its role in the post-hostilities period.
Few would argue the principle that CIA. should not utilize and expose
assets during the war on marginal act..vities if those assets could be
maintained in place to perform more important functions in the post-
war era.
The true difficulties arisE in-determining the relative im-
portance c4 vaxious efforts and ac. vities during hostilities as against
::leir use in the aftermath of a xr..: jor nuclear war. In any event, the
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vastly increased destructiveness of nuclear weapons so compresses the
likely time scale of a future war that post-war planning must be accom-
plished prior to the outbreak of war; it cannot be left until hostilities
are upon us. The basic problems of locating fall-back bases and re-
deployment of staff personnel overseas should be planned with one eye
on CIA's post-hostilities role.
44. The vast physical destruction and huge loss of life to be
expected in a nuclear war make it difficult to grasp the full implica-
tions for the political, social, and economic structure of the entire
world. Even if the United States were the "victor," its pre-eminent
position would, at the very least, be subject to serious challenge.
At the worst, the United States could find itself in the position of a
second rate power on the new scale of world power. These dire pos-
sibilities suggest careful consideration of the role CIk should plan for
in the peace following a nuclear war.
45. A general postwar move toward a measure of world govern-
ment and disarmament, with the resulting relinquishment of a degree of
sovereignty, could well generate the requirement for an intensified Intel-
ligence effort in many countries now low on the list of priorities. While
this Panel cannot determine any new priorities in detail, CIA should
begin now to develop concepts for its potentia). role in a post-nuclear
war environment.
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