U.S. PLANS PROLONGED ROLE IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02792462
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 156
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-00405
• Publication Date: December 20, 1972

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By Rlorested E. Vivira
Despite press 'speculation a 'peace
agreement for Vietnam may soon be con-
cluded, there is concrete evidence indicating
the U.S. is planning to prolong the conflict
.and will attempt to subvert any peace ac-
cords.
U.S. procrastination in - Paris, intensified
bombing and the huge shipments of arms to
Saigon, among other developments, are all
indicators that the ,White House has no
desire for true peace and has not abandoned
its neo-colonial designs in Indochina.
An even more ominous proof of U.S.
intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes
in Indochina, .was the apparent effort by
presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press
Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of
November, which would have virtually
scrapped the agreement reached in October
by Kissinger and Le Due Tho of the DRV:
_
There have been various hypotheses put
forward in the Western press concerning
Kissinger's seeming about-face on behalf of
Saigon, after proclaiming in October before
the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly
every possible explanation has been
proposed by the pundits except the most
plausible one. The U.S stalling in Paris does
not represent any deference to its Saigon
puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of
U.S. policy and the Saigon regime is merely
an instrument. U.S. expressions of "support"
for Saigon's policies, now as in the past, to
the extent they are not fictions for deceiving
American opinion, are fundamentally ex-
pressions of the aims and designs of the U.S.
G nira time
In essence, American procrastination in
Paris has been an effort to gain time for
augmenting Saigon's war machine and
setting up a hype clandestine network of
"civilian advisors" which will attempt to
pitOlorig the iarunnle in Vietnam, as well as in
the rest of Indochina, after formal peace
anretraents have been reached.
"Even as the U.S. military is packing up
for its expected exit ' from Vietnam,
American officials here are secretly plan-
ning a major postwar presence of U.S.
civilians in Vietnam, with many of them
doing jobs formerly done by the military,"
wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from
Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times.
Without' alluding to the delay in Paris,
Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the
process of augmenting its "civilian advisory"
force in Vietnam, from 5000 to 10,000, its
peak level at the stage of maximum U.S.
military presence in Vietnam. But it should
be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus
could not be assembled overnight, anymore
than the enormous flow of 'U.S. arms could
be brought to Saigon in a day. Saigon's air
force was increased , two-fold, from ap-
proximately 1030 to 2030 aircraft during the
pest two montias, to give only one item of
U.S. supply effort.
To place recent developments in their
proper perspective, it must be noted that
there has been a major shift in U.S. strategy
ect in motion last spring in the wake of tine
lone-sustained offensive by the Liberation
Armed Forties in South Vietnam. .
DeEpite administration efforts to play
down the Strength of the offensive, it is
evident that once again the whole. U.S.
strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed.
Only the most drastic U.S. measures of the
war prevented the complete collapse of the
Salp,on regime and its armed forces: the
blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial
escalation against the DRV and liberated
areas of South Vietnam (while heavy
bombing of Laos and Cambodia was
sustained), and unprecedented' aerial tac-
tical and logistics support for the Saigon
forces.
The augmentation of the U.S. air logistics
support .fer� Saigon's forces during the of-
fensive surged from a monthly average of
about nine million pounds of cargo before
the offensive to 60 million pounds in-May.
Auraented U.S. "support" for Saigon after
the offensive began, raised total U.S. ex-
penditures on the war by an annual rate of
approximately 510 billion or nearly double
the rate .prior to the offensive.
� The Nixon administration concealed this
augmentation by requesting additional war
funding only for the period ending Sept. 30.
At about the same time the administration
presented Congress with a request for these
funds in June-, Air America and Continental
Air Services, the CIA contractual "civilian"
airlines, began stepping up recruiting among
Air Force personnel in Indochina, according
to a Dec.1 report of Dispatch News Service,
by John Burgess. He quoted from a con-
fidentinl recruiting brochure which, among
other points, stated;
Cletsdestiaac warfare � �
"The flyina, is non-military; in other words,
civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S.
government, that is government amencjes
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sucn as Li um. uonfu, uoio, etc. vv iile
these agencies may be under CIA direction,
you don't know and you don't care. The
government agencies direct the routings and
schedulings, your company provides the
techinical know-how and you fiy the air.-
The brochure makes it clear that "civilian
flying" is merely a cover for clandestine
military activity: "Although flights mainly
serve U.S. offiical personnel movement and
native officials and civilians, you sometimes
engage in the movement of friendly troops,
on of enemy captives; or in the transport of
care() more potent than rice and beans!
There's a war going . on. Use your
imagination!"
In what Burgess describes as a
"hastily"addcd postreipt, the brochure
states: "Foreign aid situation unclear
pending outcome military situation in Rvil
(Republic. of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll
finish the war (and peace terms favorable for
our side); if so, it is expeeted that a boom
among contract operators will result. ... . "
In other words, here we have the first
.concrete indication that the White House
was jinplicitly admitting defeat of its
"Vietnernitettion" program and reverting to
a less costly program of clandestine warfare:
The U.S. strategy shift was probably equally
dictated by a desire to further diminish the
polltieaiimpeet of the war on American
opieion -and finally by a desire to diminish
tite blow to U.S. prestige in the event of
if:tit-mete failure, that is the collapse of the
peeinet regimes.
.1 U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this
development as long as possible, but it also
wants to avoid the impression of being
engaged in direct and large-scale U.S. in-
tervention at the time, which sooner or later
Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable.
Even if they cannot face this reality, they
are now in deadly earnest about maintaining
support for the puppet regimes, regardless of
any peace -agreement. If the U.S. honestly
adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's
political collapse would quickly follow. That
is why the U.S. is stepping up clandestine
support for the Saigon regime, military aid
disnuised as civilian "contractual" aid,
provided mainly by U.S, private military
contractors.
There is a relationship between the U.S.
arms build-up Indochina and the program
or secret contractual aid. Before the Dc'
tober peace agreement, the U.S. made little
effort to. keep the program ' secret. In
testimony before the Senate Appropriations
Committee on Sept. 13,.Air Force Maj. Gen.
Joseph It. DeLuca explained in detail U.S.
, plans for contracting for personnel to train
Saigon Air Force members. In the area of
maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to
make contracts for $54 million of one to
three years to train Saigon personnel, ac-
cording to DeLuca.
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'THE NATION
18 Dec 1972
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. iirhe Carpet-nags fa2
No doubt some kind . of simulated cease-fire will ix
patched up in Vietnam, and probably before the end
of the year; failure to achieve anything would be too cm-
barrassing for the Administration. It will be a militan
stand-still without a political foundation or, . in propel
bureaucratese, infrastructure. So it is quite natural that,
in an adaptation of Clausewitz's famous saying,. it wil:
be war carried on by other means. A .recent report from
Saigon by George McArthur, headlined in the Los Angelo
Times: "Vietnam Future: U. S. Planners Thinking Big,"
gives .a printout of the future.
McArthur leads off his dispatch with the not veri
surprising news that, while the negotiations proceed by
fits and starts in Paris,. U. S. bureaucrats in Saigon "arc
confidently using the time to blue-print empires in South
Vietnam." Some of them have acquired villas there; they
find the climate congenial, and would like to stay on,
enjoying the good life to which they have grown accus-
tomed. It is impossible to get any accurate estimate
of how many U. S. civilians are hanging out in South
.Vietnam with some kind of official connection with
the American Embassy, or the armed forces, or intelli-
gence, or whatever, else in the way of ."programs" may
be Under way. And if. that is impossible, how can any-
one estimate what number of bodies will be required
to carry on a simulated peace? The only thing certain
is that proliferation is under way; the bureaucrats are
"thinking big." "No single person or headquarters,"
writes McArthur, "seems to be running the show. Things
are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat
microscopic .replay of the great buildup of 1965." Of
course, .microscopic can turn into macroscopic. The
planners, at first stunned by Kissinger's forecast that
"peace" was close at hand, are regaining their vigor and
redoubling their efforts. They intend to stay on.�
Clothes may not make the man, but they can make
him look different, and by all indications such transfor-
mations will be taking place on a large scale. It takes
only a few minutes and some pieces of paper to change
a colonel in uniform into a civilian bureaucrat in color-
ful sport shirt and slacks. Or he may. be nominally a
civilian already, a Central Intelligence Agency type, striv-
ing to win the hearts and minds of the people. In ad-
dition to CIA, AID, CORDS and other organizations
whose full names are rarely used, the United States now
has four consulates in South Vietnam. McArthur pre-
� diets that these peace-loving, offices, complete with mili-
tary attaches, State Department political officers, CIA
operatives, et at., will be installed permanently 'at Can
Tho, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Da. Nang�"by cointi-
dence" the present locations of headquarters for. the four
Army corps of the million-man South Vietnamese Army.
Four consulates may be thought a reasonable number,
since. in France, with 50 million Frenchmen and hordes
of U.S. tourists, we have five consulates in all.
There is also a legal side to this. orgy of preparation
fOr "peace"; it centers in Washington. Having had prac-
tically nothing to say about the start of the war, Con-
gress may want to be in at the finish. Constitutionally,
this is no simple matter. Since we do not recognize North
Vietnam, except for the purposes of killing and bombing;
an agreement with Hanoi would not be a treaty and the
Senate would have nothing to say about it. But we do
recognize South Vietnam, so if they sign, wouldn't that
constitute a treaty? Some lawyers think so, but it is a safe
bet that President Nixon will not. As Commander in Chief
he can order a cease-fire at his pleasure.
Sen. J. William Fulbright thinks an agreement to e.nd
the war should be submitted to the Senate for its scru-
tiny. But the Senate wants a cease-fire and will doubt-
less be reluctant to appear to be meddling in the inter-
minable negotiations. All the same, the time will come
when the Senate must insist on 'a say. "I would assume,"
Senator Fulbright observes, "any agreement would in-
volve obligations to spend several billions of dollars, a
commitment that should be submitted to the' Congress."
And. further, "with these' secret agreements, we find so
often that they, have obligations on our treasury or to
send troops abroad, so it seems only fair that Congress
have a chance to examine them." If Congress hopes to
maintain some degree of control over what happens in
Vietnam after a cease-fire, it should note what is happen-
ing there now. 'The bureaucrats are "thinking big" and
will no doubt set programs in motion without initial
Congressional approval, and then, as in the past, gamble
that they can induce the Senate and House to continue
and even expand them. So the time for vigilance is now.
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.LOS ANGELES IIMES
13 DEC 1972
New LS Buildup in Vietnam�
President Nixon has reduced the American mill=
tary forces in Vietnam from almost 600,000 in the
'.first months of his Presidency to 25,200. The num-
ber now is frozen pending clarification of where the
- -
Paris peace talks are going. But the remaining
troops are organized for withdrawal on a 57-day
.schedule to conform with the 60-day limit written
Into the nine-point peace plan tentatively agreed on
two months ago.
At the same time, the United States is quietly and
� slowly building up its civilian forces in South Viet-
- nam, actively recruiting additional personnel, re-
portedly authorizing the transfer of some soldiers
to civilian status, alerting Indochina experts now in
other posts that they soon may be sent to Vietnam.
� � Unofficial estimates indicate that a civilian force of
as many as 10,000 Americans is being prepared for
� Vietnam.
There is no official explanation because, official-
.)y, there is only a denial of such a buildup. But it is
clear from some of the categories being recruited
.that the new band of Americans in mufti will be
- doing in the future some of the things that Ameri-
cans in uniform are doing now, including such
tasks as operating computers for the Saigon milita-
' ry 'command, advising troops in action, repairing,
.servicing and perhaps flying combat and transport
aircraft, and assisting with espionage and sabo-
'4age.
To put it bluntly, there is evidence. that the
American government has no intention of ending
�American involvement in Indochina, that it is only
_working to convert the involvement to the form..
that prevailed before the massive buildup and di-
-red; battlefield role of 1965 and 1966.
If this is the intention, it is time for Mr. Nixon to
be very clear about it. It must be explained. It must
,be debated. The ultimate decision must represent
the will of Congress, a national consensus.
As matters now stand, we know of no good rea- .
�
son to justify the buildup.
Of course, it can be argued that there are not
enough skilled Vietnamese to operate the sophisti-
cated Weapons and instruments of war that were
given.them by the United States. But the point is
that peace, not war, is to be waged now.
Of course, it can be argued that President Nguy-
en Van Thieu will be weaker without the Ameri-
cans, more vulnerable to overthrow, and it can be
anticipated that there will be cheating on a cease-
fire, and perhaps no absolute peace for years and
years. But it is no more reasonable to propose a ,
prolongation of the American commitment than to
advocate the right of Hanoi to recruit advisers
from Moscow and Peking.
Aid there must be, aid both to the north and the
south, a reconstruction of Vietnam, regardless of
ideology and political commitment, but not aid that
is a screen to preserve American influence and pro- .
long American commitment.
It is not in the American interest to talk, as
American officials now are talking, of enlarging
the number of U.S. consulates in South Vietnam
and placing them just where U.S.- Army corps �
headquarters have been operating. It is a travesty
to suggest that the military attache in the U.S. Em-
bassy requires "hundreds" on his staff. There is no
logic to recruiting a 100-man team of Americans to
monitor the cease-fire unless the United States
would be looking for an excuse to reenter the hos-
tilities. It is follylo leave even a suspicion that the
reconstruction contractors may be operatives of
the CIA.
Mr. Nixon sought office in 1968' and reelection in �
1972 on a commitment to get out of Vietnam. That
is what the American people understand is being
arranged in Paris. That is what the American peo-
ple have shown so clearly that they want.
� They want to get out not just because they are
weary of the war, not just because they now recog-
nize the madness of the war. They want to get out
because they now know that this is not and never
was their business. It is not for the Americans, it is
for the Vietnamese to decide the future of Viet-
nam�the Vietnamese by themselves, not through
the-mask of a new and clandestine army of Ameri-
cans.
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By John P. Roche
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H
Ever since the Supreme Court held
that the relationship between aereporter
and his sources was not privileged (that
is, protected from scrutiny on the model
of the lawyer-client connection), there
has been a great deal of discussion
- about curbs on freedom of the press.
This controversy was intensified when
the Supreme Court held that a Harvard
assistant professor, Samuel Popkin, had
to answer a grand jury's questions on
the Pentagon Papers or go to jail for
contempt. A handcuffed Popkin was
seen en route to prison. (He was sub-
sequently freed.)
There are two aspects of this problem,
one of which has been almost entirely
overlooked. Understandably, emphasis
has been placed on the moral obligatioa
� of a ,newsman to protect a confidential
source.. (Or, in Popkin's case, on the
duty of a...scholar to safeguard his infor-
mants.) But very little has been said
about the inherent dangers � to journal-
ism as to scholarship � of using unveri-
fiable sources.
Let us look first at the legal issue,
which is historically simple. In the
American majoritarian tradition there
Were no inherently privileged relation-
ships. Indeed, the very foundation of a
democratic order is that every citizen is
a cop, that laws are enforced by the citi-
zenry not by the police. This major-
itarianisre, which somewhat resembled
vigilantism, would only tolerate privi-
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leged relationships if they received stat-
utory approval. Given the role of law-
yers in politics, the first privilege to re-
ceive general acceptance was - that be-
tween lawyer and client.
Contrary to supposition, the doctor-pa-
tient and minister-parishioner relation-
ships have largely rested on custom, not
statute. Indeed, a case can be made that
to privide special privilege to the priest
or minister Icould violate the separation
of church and state. In practice it is
hard to conceive of a grand jury throw-
ing a priest in jail for protecting the se-
crets of the confessional. However, not
more than a year or so ago in New York
a psychiatrist was forced to testify, the
state courts holding (correctly) that only �
a statue could'provide immunity.
The answer to the press' (and Dr.
Popidn's) problem then (as the Supreme
Court pointed out) is an act of Congress
stipulating immunity for the reporter or �
the scholar. In the meantime reporters
or professors who choose to protect their
sources just have to take certain risks,
and in the process thank God they are
not dealing with British judges, who
really throw the contempt power around.
But what about the other side of this
matter the growing use of unverifiable
"confidential sources"? Of course, jour-
nalists have done th'is routinely for
years.
It is a practice I try to avoid because,
having been one, I are suspicious of the
motives of "high White House sources,"
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who are normally trying to play the
press like a salmon. However, with: the
advent of "instant history," we now find
whole volumes whick at crucial eviden-
tial points rests on a "confidential
source." Or worse perhaps, on no eitred
source whatsoever
Imagine my interest when, in Herbert
Parmet's "Eisenhower and the Amen-
can Crusadcs," I learned that "one- of
Dulles' closest confidants" had reVealed
that Ngo Dinh Diem was "discovered"
by the CIA and "rammed" into office in
1954 by John Foster Dulles. Later V:T
are told that during President; Eisen-
hower's 1955 heart attack. Dulles was
the "quarterback," that `!nothing, was
done without . his approval." This is in-
teresting because 1) it sounds like Dul-
les' view of his own role, and 2) it is in
contradiction to what others have said.
Good, let's find out check footnote
"Confidential source." Thanks a lot; ;
Parmet, however, is a small-time Op-
erator when it comes to "confidential
- Sources." David Halherstam has just
turned out a 665-page book on the Ken-
nedy-Johnson era in which a number of
people are quoted in extraordinary fash-
ion, and even more non-people (a "John-
son aide," a "Kennedy confidant," etc.)
turn up saying the strangest (but sing-
ularly useful from Halberstam's view-
point) things. There is not a single foot-
note in the book! I suppose if you can't
heat 'em, join 'cm: Did I ever tell yo_u
how Jack Kennedy told me never to-be-
lieve anything ken Galbraith said?
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SP0a-aiNG
ME:. SPOOKS: .
the victor marchetti story
by jams otis
"I'm a scoutmaster" says Victor
Marchetti. He is, in fact, more than a
scoutmaster.
Until 1969 he was executive assis-
tant to the deputy director of Central
Intelligence, Admiral Rufus Taylor.
More 'recently, he has been the subject
of a legal case which could crack open �
the darkest recesses of America's clan-
destine government. "I am the kind
of a guy who manages Little League
teams," he goes on. "Well, my scouts
and ball players began to grow up on
me and they became draft age. They
let their hair grow; they changed. Now
I know these were good boys, and
they started to get to rue. They began
saying, 'I'm not going to go and get
shot in Vietnam, because it's an unjust
war.' " Doubts, gnawing doubts about
Vietnam and the CIA's role in foreign
affairs. He -says that he saw himself
becoming a lifer, an intelligence bu-
reaucrat, and he "didn't want to play
the game any longer." After 14 years
as 'a spy for America, Marchetti quit.
That was 1969. Now, in August,
1972, in Washington, D. C., he sat in a
Chinese restaurant � known as a place
frequented by CIA agents. Far from
the taciturn and glamorous killer, Mar-
chetti looked stolidly middle class, of
conservative mien and � talkative
manner. As he spoke, he furtively
sized up the occupants of the other
tables and mentally chronicled the
comings and going of all patrons, pre-
sumably out of habit. Did he think the
interview was being bugged? "It's not
beyond them," he replied, his face a
mixture of edginess and resignation.
It had not always been like this. He
had left the agency on the best of
terms, his boss assuring him that he
"had a home to come back to." "In
the first year I was away, it was just as
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if I was at the Agency. I was going to
dinner parties ... we'd sit around and
talk. In fact, I saw as much of Agency
people as I did when I was working."
But somewhere along the line he
got the notion that he wanted to blow
the whistle on the CIA: "I would go
down to a shopping center and walk
around. For the first time in 15 years,
I began to look at a check-out clerk as
a human being, instead of a check-out
clerk. I got interested in people and
my ideas about the Agency became
firmer and sharper, and I began to
Marchetti: Blowing the whistle
focus on precisely what was bothering
me."
Victor Marchetti decided to write a
book. While the process of writing can
be a solitary and private experience, he
could scarcely expect to scribble away,
merrily exposing his former em-
ployers, without it coming to their
horrified attention. True, the CIA's
record has been afflicted with tragi-
comic vicissitudes, but it can pre-
sumably keep tabs on its own. �
Within weeks of his book outline
being shown to various New York
publishers, the CIA obtained a copy
through a source within the industry.
It immediately sought, and received, a
court injunction against any further
revelation of the book's contents. The
order additionally restrains Marchetti
from even discussing the as yet un-
written book with his literary agent,
publishers, or wife. It is an injunction
of unprecedented scope�never before
has the government gone to court to
prevent former employees from speak-
ing or writing. At the heart of the case
lies a basic conflict between the First
Amendment guarantees of free speech
and the government's interest in keep-
ing a lid on its various clandestine--and
often illegal�activities. Provoked by
the wave of "whistle-blowing" atten-
dant on Daniel Ellsberg's release of the
Pentagon Papers, the conflict arises
because of official activity which of-
fends the moral sensibilities of rather
ordinary, and very loyal, publio ser-
vants like Victor Marchetti. If the Su-
preme Court backs Marchetti's right to
talk, it could open a floodgate for a
torrent of revelations about the ne-
farious activities of American spy
agencies. If it upholds the CIA, it
could cut down on the trickle of infor-
mation which currently keeps the In-
visible Government on its guard.
Aside . from the broader implica-
tions of the case, the CIA has good
reason to fear what Marchetti himself
might reveal about his erstwhile em-
ployers. He is unquestionably the
highest-ranking intelligence official to
threaten exposure of the Agency's
more questionable endeavors. He
knows where the skeletons are hidden.
Indeed, Marchetti is given credit for
developing the surveillance techniques
which led the CIA to discover Russian
missiles in Cuba and thereby provoked.
the 1962 Missile Crisis.
As Marchetti tells the story, "After
I was with the Agency for five or six
years, I was assigned to the Cuban
problem. This was exciting and per-
sonally very satisfying because another
fellow and I evolved a strange analyti-
cal working tool which we called
crateology. With it we were able to
identify the merchant ships that were
arms carriers.. Over a period of time,
since the Soviets were very methodi-
cal, we began to learn which crate
i-contained a SAM 2 and which crate
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U DEC 1972
L :I
ATI 0 C CIV
-
A profile of Mai. Gen.
By Stanley Karnow
As he walks his poodle along
the shaded street near his split-
level Alexandria home, Maj. Gen.
Edward Geary Lansdale resembles
any number of retired officers
pasturing in the Washington sub-
urbs. He is still lean and erect de-
spite his 64 years, and, like so
many military, pensioners, he
finds life somewhat tame after his
adventurous career.
But in contrast to the .superan-
nuated colonels who reconstruct,
battles at the dinner table, Lans-
dale's experiences Were of a high
order. For he was in times past a
dynamic, , influential and often
controversial figure who single-
handedly managed foreign gov-
ernments and v.vhose behind-
the-scenes counsel helped to
shape U.S. policy and practice at
critical junctures , in recent his-
tory.
In the Philippines during the
early 1950s, for example, Lansdale
Virtually directed the campaign
against the Communist-led Huks
in his capacity as special adviser
to Ramon Magsaysay, then that
country's defense secretary. In
Saigon not long after, he effec-
tively kept South Vietnamese
President Ngo Dinh Diem in of-
fice by conspiring to crush his do-
mestic foes while . persuading
Washington to support him.
Later, as the Vietnam war esca-
lated,Lansdale was instrumental in
convincing President Eisenhower
and Kennedy that the United
States and its Vietnamese clients
could defeat the Vietcong by rely-
ing on counterinsurgency techni-
ques. Some of these techniques,
as disclosed in the secret Penta-
gon Papers, have revealed him to
be considerably less savory than
the public image of him as an ide-
alist.
Little of' the exotic drama that
Characterized LanSclale's career is
apparent in his present man ner.He
�
Edwin' Lansdale, the original "Ugly America
is a gray, unassuming man whose
subdued style borders on self-
effacement. Some of his friends
suggest that he has lost, much of
his verve since his wife's death
last spring, and he himself con-
cedes that her passing has left
him lonely and dispirited. Except
for occasional evenings with old
.cronies, many of them Asia veter-
ans like himself, he leads a rather
secluded existence.
Other friends point out that he
is weary after years of battling
bureaucrats who oppose his un-
conventional ideas; and Lansdale
himself substantiates that view
with bitter humor when he says
that "the knives going in don't
seem to hurt anymore. Yet, as he
Speaks, it is clear that he still
burns with a hard flame that is
nearly religious in fervor. His reli-
gion, he explains, is not formal. It
is his faith that the United States
could have successfully played
world policeman by propagating
its political philosophy.
At the core. of Lansdale's doc-
trine is the conviction that Com-
munist guerrillas can be defeated
in brushfire wars by "winning the
hearts and minds' of people. In
Vietnam, according to this thesis,
the United States should have
exported American democratic
principles along with guns; mon-
ey, machinery and food. ."We
couldn't afford to be just against
the Communists," Lansdale has
written. "We had to be for some-
thing."
Lansdale's proposals often pro-
voked the fury of Establishment
strategists, some powerful
enough to block his advance-
ment. He has also been derided
as a dreamer whose perception of
reality was, at best, blurred. At
the same time, though, he in-
spired a coterie of disciples who
regarded him as nearly infallible.
The debate over him polarized
several years ago in two cele-
. .
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
validity of their arguments, a
least endowed him with a meas
ure of literary immortality.
ham J. Lederer and Eugene Bur-.
dick portrayed him in The Ugly
American as Col. Edwin Barnum
HilJendale, whose sweet harmon-
ica purportedly stimulated rural
Filipinos to oppose Communism.
Graham Greene, on the other
hand, depicted him in The Quiet
American as.AIden Pyle, the naive
U.S. official who believed that he
could mobilize Vietnamese peas-
ants to resist the Communists by
instilling them with the precepts '
of Town Hall democracy.
Although the old soldier has
faded away, the debate lingers
on. Just as Lederer and Burdick
approvingly quote their hero as
saying that "if you use the right
key, you can maneuver any per-
son or nation any way you want,"
so Lansdale's disciples still con-
tend that the United States could
have attained its objectives in Vi-
etnam by developing psychologi-
cal warfare methods more effica-
cious than those employed by the
Communists. This view, which
became popular during the Ken-
nedy Administration, is best artic-
ulated in the articles of Lansdale's
close friend, Robert Shaplen, the
New Yorker correspondent in Sai-
gon, who has long asserted that
the United States and its South Vi-
etnamese proteges could have
beat the Communists by
preempting the revolution. And
just as Graham Greene indirectly
reproved Lansdale by declaring
that Vietnamese "don't want our
white skins around telling them
what they want," so his present-
day critics claim that he never ac-
Stanley Karnow is the former
Washington Post AsianS corre-
spondent and the author of Mao
and China: From Revolution to
Revolution.
bOntinued
(Former Green Beret
Capt. Dobert F. Marasco
and seven other Special
Forces members were in-
volved in one of the major
controversies of the Viet-
nam War in 1969 when ac-
cused of murdering, a triple
agent. Now a civilian in
Bloomfield, he spent many
hours being interviewed hy
Daily Journal reporter
Thomas Michalski, recall-
ing events surrounding the
assassination that lie says
never were made public).
By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer
�The Central Intelligence.
A'7cyi U S Special
TorFEes in an "unsanctioned
,fiidOer�ive. re
GreetiliBerets frommmilitary
Custody in September...1969eby
me anS --ora-ITHIRmeclibl& . es ripe
fii that involved a parachute
diiFInioo- ri-Yen on._,Lesng
tiiihTand a flight lo_Burernae
..according to former_ Cant.
'LTMar a.soo..
Marasco, one of the eight.
charged with the murder of
Vietnamese triple-aeenj Thai
Kbar. Chu en, said the highly
secret, unorthodox and uncoil-
-ventional" escape plan has
never' before been made
public.
In telling the story to The
Daily Journal, Marasco said
the parachutists would have
distracted base personnel
enough to allow the landing of
a twin-engine C-7A Caribou On
a roadway at Long Binh, pick
up the Berets and fly off to
Burma. �
Once in Burma, Marasco
sa itiTiTirno�lierets;r�Willi CI A
....
fli_p_d_would have established
guerrilla forces for counter-
intelligence work in Red China
and other parts or Asia.
We were in the stockade
three weeks," Marasco said.
"We were in maximum
security where they al d
rapists and murderers � . ."
'PT-TV Tr/ ATirprnr.1" iii T TN A TT V -r nrrrvivr T
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auv 1.y IC
"Officers arc never put in
jail. They are usually held in
house arrest."
Such was the case of Col.
Robert B. Rheault, Green
Beret commander. who also
was involved in the Chuyen
incident.
Marasco's cell Was four by
seven. It bad no Leila facili-
ties. A 206-watt bulb burned
continuously, and the average-
temperature, he said, was 120
degrees.
We lay in these cells in
undershorts," Marasco
recalled. "When you had to go
to the latrine you had ts
scream, 'Guard, prisoner in
Cell Two has to go to the bath-
room
Marasco said, "We were, in
fact, prisoners of war. POWs
of the American miltary."
"The jail's commander, a
lieutenant colonel, made our
lives as bearable as possible
with books; cigarettes, things
like that."
While in. the Lone Binh
stockade, the Berets were
"still convinced that
eventually somebody woulft
find out what was going on
and that we would be let out."
In early August an Ameri-
can newspaperman was in an
enlisted man's club when he
heard two military policemen
talking about the case.
"Be went to MACV � Mili-
tary Assistance Command,
Vietnam � and started asking
questions." Marasco said.
On Aug. 15 the Army. after
having- held the Berets for
over three weeks without
officially charging them with
any crime, issued a news
release Mat ,said "right Greco
Berets are loOng held for
murder and conspiracy to
commit murder.-
Murder e,e-ries a minimum
of life sentence anti consiraey
a Ina xi 11111111 of life imprison-
/1'MA.
"Noo that it was all out iit
.the open we said to the CIA
:You'd better get the word
}back to Washington that if you
continue this foolishness you
have to assume the potential
of us compromising every high
mesesseesseeelexeneeeseesse
Fourth of 5 articles
es-,..seeseee.:-..eoss see sec.
level intelligence operation in
Southeast Asia," Marasco
said.
.Me didn't do anything that
wasn't done regularly,"
Marasco said.. "The only
difference is that it was
usually given to t h e
Vietnamese to do for us.
"But, because Project
Gamma . was a unilateral
operation�we couldn't do
that." Marasco Laid, "The
Vietnanfie.se 'ac-tent serineeed
to know Project Gamma
existed."
Military attorneys for .the
Bemets were -joined by a host,
of well - known stateside
lawyers. One of the civilian
attorneys said. "1 have.
evidence to prove that the CIO
117IS f)Fi-irreci ohee_killiensmEent
frectitated_the killing. or over
100 people in _Smith Vietnain,
during the past yEarre '
Coide \V, egor ,
attorney for Major Thomas C.
Middleton Jr.. cabled Defense
Secretary Melvin R. Laird to
charge that the Berets were
heing held under "inhuman
conditions."
Shortly afterward, the men
o ere released from Long Binh
jail and allowed to stay in
regular billets.
The handling or the case
also stirred reaction among
SMIle cOngreSSinco. Sen.
Ernest F. Hollings of South.
Carolina said, "Thc Se men are
soldiers who were doing a job
that-had to be done."
Rep. L. Mendel Rivers,
charman of the I louse Armed
:-.;eis.,ices Committee, said ''this
worse.
Attorneys for some of the
men, meanwhile, contended
that their clients could not get
a fair trial in Vietnam because
Gen. Creighton Abrams.
commander of U.S. Forces in
Vietnam, and Maj. Gen. G .L.
Mabry, commander of support
troops in. Vietnam, were
"prejudiced because they have
prejudged the defendants."
"Abrams caused this whole
thing simply because of
service rivalry between the
regular Army and elite Green
Berets," one attorney told the
Associated Press.
eZlemialijlemtetesehreat by the
Berets to expose othermea.
secret operations gotobacke.to
CIA Chief_ Richard_tio.ims,
"Ivo saCclown_oviaPresident
NiXQ11�.." Marasco _said. .
Marasco said a few days
later Abrams met with
President Nixon at the
Western White House to
discuss troop withdrawals.
"The next day Nixon's
military aide called us and
said. 'Forget it. you're not
coming -home," Marasco said.
"Abrams, the aide said, told
President Nixon that if he
wanted the troop withdrawals
to go smoothly, without
prohlems. he wanted the
Green Berets."
Abrams, Marasco said, .
pointed out to the President
that as military commander in
Vietnam he should be allowed
to handle the case.
The exchange, Marasco
said, occurred in Septemher,
1909, when troop withdrawals
Nvere in their early stages.
Presidcio, Nixon, he said,
agreed to allow Abrams to
handle the Green Beret case.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
:"'
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Tan Deal
L F. Stone
a 4,
�Washington
The pending cease-fire agreement, as so
far disclosed by Hanoi and Washington,
is like a delicate watch, intricately
fabricated to make sure it won't work:
No agreement ever had so many in-
genious provisions calculated to keep it
from Succeeding. If by chance one
spring doesn't break down, there is
another in reserve that almost surely
will, and if by some unforeseen mishap
that one also Should work, there is still
another which will certainly go blooey
sooner or later..
The fragility of the agreement to
.end the second Indochinese war is put
in better focus if one compares..it with
the eease-fire which ended the first, at
Geneva in 1954. The only signed
document that emerged from the
Geneva conference was a cease-fire
agreement between the military com-
mands on both sides. It was accom-
panied by a . final declaration which
nobody signed and to which the
.United States and the separate state
the- French.. had created in the south
objected; theh as now the puppet was
more obdurate than the master.
The first Indochinese war ended, as
the second seems to be doing, with a
cease-fire but no political settlement.
The prime defect, the "conceptual"
flaw, to borrow a favorite word of
Kissinger's, lay in the effort to end a
profoundly political struggle without a
political settlement. A cease-fire then,
.as now, left the political problem
unresolved and thus led inevitably to a
resumption of the conflict, It will be a
miracle if the new cease-fire does not
breed � another, a third, Indochinese
war. �
A political � solution was left to
mailana 'and "free elections." But the
'Geneva cease-fire agreement, . dis-
appointing as its results proved to be,
was far more precise in its promise of
free elections than is the new cease-
fire. It set a firm date�July, I956�for
the balloting; specified that the purpose
of the elections was "to bring about
the unification of Vietnam"; provided
for the release within thirty days not
only of POWs but of "civilian in-
ternees"; and made clear that it meant
political prisoners defining civilian
internees as Approved for 261 -8/61730602-792462
P I;
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-3'0 NOV 1972.
raL7-21.�:77 B7fir#T,6' k.
�
Y
... all persons who, having in any
way contributed- to the political
and armed struggle between the
two parties, have been arrested for
that reason and have been kept in
detention by either party during
the period of hostilities.l _
Nobody knows how many thousands
of political prisoners are in Thicu's
jails. The most famous is.Truong Dinh
Dzu, the peace candidate who came in
crippled. Arrests have been ihtensified
in preparation for a cease-fire.
The fate of the political prisoners
figured prominently in the peace nego-
tiations. The seven-point. program put
forward by the other side in July of
last year called for the dismantling of
Thieu's concentration. camps and the
release of all political prisoners. The
eight-point proposal put forward by
Washington and 'Saigon last -January
left their fate in doubt. It called for
the simultaneous release of all POWs
and "innocent civilians captured
throughout Indochina.'' The ambiguous
phrasing seemed designed to -exclude
politicals since these were neither "cap-
tured" nor, in 'the eyes of the Thieu
regime, "innocent."
The new cease-fire terms do not
bother with such ambiguity. Dr. Kissin-
ger in his press conference of October
26 seemed to take satisfaction in
the fact that the return of US
POWs "is not conditional on the
'disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in
Vietnamese jails." Their future, he
explained, will be determined ."through
negotiations among the South Viet-
namese parties," i.e., between Thieu
and the PRG. So the politicals will
stay in jail until Thieu agrees to let
them out. This may. easily coincide
with the Second Corning..
This is only one of the many built-in
(b)(3)
The new cease-fire agreement gives him .
far more pOwer than he would have '
had under the proposals he and Nixon
made jointly in January. Under Point 3
of those proposals, there was to have
been "a free and deniocratic presi-
dential [my italics] election" in South
Vietnam within six months. One
month before the election, Thieu and
his vice president were to resign. The
president of the senate was to head a
caretaker government which would "as.,
sume administrative responsibilities ex-
second in the 1967 presidential elec-.eept for those pertaining to the elec-
tion, the first and only contested one. lions" (my italics).
Thieu's most notorious instrument for Administrative responsibility for the
these round-ups was Operation Phoe- election, according to those Nixon-
nix, which the CIA ran for him.. A hiett terms, was to be taken out. of
Saigon Ministry of Information pain- the hands of the. Saigon regime and
phlet, Vietnam 1967-71: Toward Peace put in those of a .specially created
and Prosperity, boasts that Operation electoral commission "organized. and
Phoenix killed 40,994 militants and run by .an. independent body repre-
activists during those years.2 These are senting all political forces in South
the opposition's civilian troops, the Vietnam which will assume its re-
cadres without which organizational sponsibilities on the date of the agree-
effort in any free election would be. ment�"3 �
Finally the joint proposals of last
January indicated that the electoral
commission would be free from the
inhibitions of the Thieu constitution,
under which communist and neutralist
candidates can be declared ineligible.
According to those proposals, "All
political forces in South Vietnam can
participate in the election and present
candidates."
How much weaker is the setup
under the new cease-fire agreement:
There is no provision for Thieu's
resignation .before the election. The
existing government is no longer ex-
cluded_ from responsibility in holding
the elections; no clear line is drawn
between what the Thieu government
can do and what an electoral commis-
sion will do: what happens if the latter-
is reduced to observing the irregu-
larities of the former? Thieu will
continue to be in control of the army
and the police, and there is no way to�
keep him from using them to harass
the Opposition and herd the. voters. -
Instead of an electoral commission,
the new .agreement would set up a
tripartite Council of National Recon-
ciliation and Concord .for much the
H
IL
PARIS, LE 1OUVEL OBSERVATEUR
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R'�
Lc
Michel R. Lam berti et. Catherine Lam our ont fait le tour- du monde pour
remonter toutes les fiVres qui m?nent aux vrais patrons de la drogue
c Si nous ne venons pas a bout de
ice fleau, e'est lui qui viendra
_. ,out de nous ), s'exclamait, le
7 juin 1971, le president Nixon devant
des dizaines de millions de telespectateurs.
Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste pri-
vilege de compter le plus grand nombre
d'horoThomanes du monde ! plus d'un
demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent
mine pour la seule ville de New York.
Plus de 50 % des crimes perpetres dans
les grandes villes sprit directement lies a la
drague : on tue pour se procurer l'argent
necessaire a l'achat d'une. dose d'heroine.
Le phenomene.n'est pas seulement ameriL
cain : tous les pays europeens voient croitre
a une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de
- leurs heroThomanes. En France, o�a pe-
netration de la drogue n'a ete sensible qu'a
partir de 1968, on en compte dela vingt
mine. Et le ministere de la Sante estime
que le pays pourrait compter cent mule
heroinomanes en 1976.
COUper Ea source
La drogue !fest plus un simple pro-
bleme de police. Partant du principe evi-
dent, expos�ernierement a un journaliste
americain de c U.S. News and World
Report ) par l'ancien directeur des Doua-
nes amoricaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et scion
lequel c on ne pew pas devour toxico-
inane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupe-
fiants }, Washington a decide de remon-
-foe a la source, c'est-kdire a la produc-
tion merne de l'opium, dont Pherolne est
tut derive.
Couper la source d'approvisionnement
des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les
affaires des pays producteurs : de poli
ciere, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est
devenue politique. Se posant une fois de
Plus en .t gendarmes du monde ) mais,
.cette fois, pour une cause dont personne
ne songe a discuter le bien-fonde, les Etats-
Unis se sont lances dans une croisade que
d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouee a l'echec.
On produit, en effet, chaque armee, dans
le monde, assez d'opium pour approvision-
ner les cinq cent mule heroinomanes arne-
ricains pendant cinquante ans : deux 5
trots mule tonnes, dont In moitie settle-
ment est destinee a l'industrie pharmaceu-
tique. Le reste passe sur le marche entre
les mains des trafiquants qui approvision-
nent les fumeurs d'opium et les heroIno-
manes.
L.es trafiquants peuvent se fournir a deux
sources differentes
O 1) Les pays dans Iesquels la culture du
pavot est legate et contrOlee par l'Etat,
mais oi une partie de la recolte. echappe
aux autorites achninistratives.
� 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture
du pavot est en principe interdite, mais
qui n'ont pas les moyens materiels et poll-
tiques ��ou le desir � de faire respecter
cette loi.
La Turquie, troisierne producteur mon-
dial, entrait clans la premiere . categoric.
Jusqu'a cc que le gouvernement d'Ankara
decide de proscrire la culture du pavot
sur tout le territoire turc ii partir de 1972,
25 % de la production d'opium etait de-
tournee vers le marche elandesiin, alors
qu'elle aurait dii. en principe, etre entiere-.
ment achetee par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas
le seul a connaitre pareil probleme, une
enquete effectuee par le service strategi-
que des renseignements du Bureau des.Nar-
cotiques arnericain (B.N.D.D.) donnai.t,
pour 1971, les chiffres suivants. :
Production
(1) ecoulee
sur
le rnarehe
!tette
Production
ecoulee
sur
le marche
clandestin
Turquie 150
Ind!) 1 200
Pakistan 6
Iran 150
U.R.S.S 115
Republique popu-
laire de Chine 100
Yougosavie 0,83
Japan ' 5
Triangle d' or
(Thailande - Sir-
rnanie - Laos)
Afghanistan
Mexique
(1) En tonnes.
35 a 50
250 . -
175-200
1,7
750
100-150
5-15
Contrairement a cc que l'on pourrait
penser, les C fuitcs ) ne sont pas propor-
tionnelles a l'importance de la produttion
licite ni a celle des superficies cultivees
en pavot. Elles dependent du plus o
mins grand sous-developpement admini:
tratif du pays concerne et de la capacit
des autorites locales a exercer un control
effectif sur les paysans;.au moment cit
rocoltes.
Pourtant, meme des controles rigot
reux ne suffisent pas a eviter les detou:
nements, compte tenu de In difference d(
prix pratiques sur le marche officiel et st
le =retie clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inc
le prouve, oi, en depit dun s:ysteme
controle gouvernemental cite en exemp
par toutes les instances internationales, Ii
fuites s'elevent a 18 c,,19 de la productir
totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait echappi
pres de 70 % de sa production. Le Paki
tan, enfin, qui produit 1L.ralement Six toi
nes d'opium, contribuerait pour pres
deux cents tonnes a l'approvisionnemei
des trafiquants.
Le pavot vartovit
Dans unc cleuxieme categoric de Pa}
. la production de l'opium est illegale.
n'existe evidemment aucun organiSil
d'Etat charg�e controler une Iproducti(
qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestin
la recolte d'opium est entierement ecold
sur le marche parallele. Scion le 13.N.D.J.:
ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent ci
quante a mine tonnes a l'approvisionn
ment du trafic.
D'autres regions, sur lesquelles on I
possede absolument aucune informatic
produisent de l'opium en quantite appt
ciable : le Nepal et, probablement, la Syi
et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale au,
l'apparition de champs de pavots en Are
rique du Sud. Contrairement a cc que
a sonvent affirme, la culture du pavot
requiert pas de conditions geog,raphiqu
ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle reclar
seulement une main-d'carire abondante
bon marche car la recolte demande bea
coup de soins et de minutie.
Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas e
producteurs traditionnels d'opium poi
raient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre a cuitiN
du pavot.. C'est le cas tout recent du
pan. La production d'opium a, de cc
tendance a croitre en fonction de la
rnande et pourrait encore augmenter con
derablement. Des indices nombreux trt,
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2."
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4.2m0-Aa4z1J,
''7
:Vietnam Fu.tur
1U,S, Planners
Thihking, Big
,.Civilian Advisers,Rising;
Bureaucrats See Country
� Taking on American Tone
' BY GEORGE 11IcARTHUR
Times Staff Writer
SAIGON�While cease-fire
ne-
gotiations proceed with questiona-
ble progress in Paris and elsewhere,
the U.S. .bureaucrats of .Saigon are
confidently "using the tie to blue-
print- future. empires in South .Viet-
ham.
� As of .now, their vision is unset-
tling, � �
Although past American exper
ienees-in Laos and Cambodia can
hardly be called successful, the plan-
ners are casually using those coun-
tries as partial models for. the Viet-
narn blueprints.
�
President 'Nixon's senior
wordsmith, H erbert G. Klein,
has denied plans to station "either
civilian or Military advisers" with
South Vietnam's army after a cease-
fire. He was treading a semantic
tightrope, according to all the
evidence in Vietnam. itself.
The American military population
has at least � temporarily levelled off
at about 27,000 men. But the overall
.presence in South Vietnam
once . gain has started .to - slowly
'grow. Civilian technicians have ar-
rived in significant numbers and ci-
vilian* contractors are stepping up
�operations in dozens of areas like
training, maintenance and supply. .
. Impossible to Get Estimate .
; At this Moment' it is imposSible to
"get an accurate estimate of the num-
ber of U.S. civilians in South Viet-
nam with some kind of official con-
nection with the U.S. Embassy, mili-
.4ary, intelligence Or others.
No single person or headquartecs
seems to be running the show.
Things are just growing, strangely
enough, in a somewhat microcopie
replay of the great. buildup of 1965.
No one seems to expect this civilian
�2 9 NOV -,371
,
minibuildnp to get Out of hand. But
nobody has yet said. "stop."
Part of the problem is that. Wash-
ington has not stepped in to nrOvide
answers to some specific bureau-
cratic questions.
� With Saigon's military warehouses
bulging with liquor, PX goods and
other supplies for some 30,000 men,
the supply officials naturally want
to know "how long?." and, more sup-
plies are en route by ship already.
Planners Regain Vigor
Meanwhile, the planners, who
were stunned by the mid-October
revelation that a cease-fire was near,
have regained their vigor. Having
been frozen out of earlier planning
by the secrecy of .the talks, they are
tedoubling their efforts.
"Plans are proliferating prodi-
giously," admitted one staff colonel,
who retained a sense of. humor and
perspective despite a tiring and un;-
ending round of 'committee meet-
ings.
The plans,. -partial plans, contin-
gency plans and perhaps some wish-
ful dreaming on paper now provide
for � a South Vietnam with a pro-
nounced American .govermental
east. While many of the new experts
or technicians (or advisers) will be
wearing civilian sportshirts, the sus-
picion is strong that underneath
they will have dogtags, or at least
retirement papers, And, 'the civili-
ans already here, including many/
Central Intelligence Agen-
cy types, will simply
change titles and continue
what they are doing, and
possibly do more. �
One.staff officer, already
sporting civilian clothes
much of. the time, admits
that the biggest change in
his office will be the remo-
val of some awards and
military knickknacks, in-
cluding a mounted enemy.
AK-47 rifle, which would
not fit his "new" identity..
'He also admits that he
.could get different orders
tomorrow, and he halfway
expect t them,
"To tell you the truth,"
'one colonel admitted, "ho-
body can make flat state-
ments around .heS:e."..* � - �
The new plans seem in
so:me measure to be an
outgrowth of this military
insecurity.
;"When in doubt plan for.
everything," 'joked .an en-
listed clerk soon to depart
Vietnam., ,
the initial days :fel-
loWing Washington's � an-.
nouncement� that it had.
agreed to a 60-day evacua-�
tip. period following 'a
cease-fire, the 'U.S. cm-il-
1-nand was mainly con-
Cerned with the. crash pro-.
gram to bring. in aircraft,
guns and priority military
equipment. �
, Planning Activities
��,
the negotiations be-
canie more and more ex-
tended, so did the plan-
ning activities at. the U.S.
Embassy and MACV
Military Assistance Corn-
nand Vietnam. Recom-
mendations began to load
the coded radio circuits
back to Washington.
In more or less finished
form, a dozen or more ma-
jor plans now exist.
The first is a troop with-
drawal sched u 1 e, with
evacuation starting the
�day after a tease-fire is
signed and extending until
about D-plus-57,.when the
last evacuation- flight will
depart Tan on Nhut Air-
port (probably to be fol-
lowed-on the runway by a
.jet -landing with mail for
..the U.S. military attache's
office).
. Other plans cover setting
up various military at-
tache offices and speci-
fying the troop numbers
-needed, the setting up of
!finance teams (as required
iv U.S. law) to check on
' Vietnamese use of
Ty equipment, provisions
to provide military infor-
mation to international su-
pervisory teams and a new
cloak for an agency known
as CORDS�Civil Opera-
tions and Rural Develop-
ment Support.
. � The CORDS agency is a
scheduled casualty since it
is now largely manned by
7. military officers and is di-
rectly under the U.S. mili-
tary command. � As the
chief "civilian" agency .for
pacification, CORDS al-
ways has included many
young State DepartMent
officers, although it has
, been directed by either a �
L' CIA man or a retired mili-
tary officer.
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cy no Ly
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777 71
Ifear,Ari
77- 7r
sl Next'
(Former Green Beret
Capt. Robert F. Marasco
and seven other Special
Forces members were in-
volved in one of the ma.jor
controversies of the Viet-
nam War in 11;tifi when ac-
cused of murdering a triple
agent. Now a civilian in
Bloomfield, be spent many
hours being interviewed by
Daily Journal reporter
Thomas Michalski, recall-
ing events surrounding the
assassination that he says
never were made public).
By THOMAS NlICHALSKI
.Journal Staff Writer
The murder of a South Viet-
namese triple-agent in June
1969 came to light when one of
the eight Green Berets
involved "blew the whistle"
because he thought "he was
next. on the list."
Former Capt. Robert F.
Marasco said a sergeant,
Alvin L. Smith Jr., started a
chain of events that caused
the commander of the U.S.
.Forces in Vietnam "to lose his
cool."
Marasco earher dinn-,Hlosend.
the order to murder Thai
Khan. Chu\ en can-le directly
frern a hl;i1 Centfal-Inielli-
gence .-\::!enc!-_,nffi,Ti:11.
--C' 1.-57Ty n was "eliminated" --
thrown into the South China
Sea � after being shot twice
in the head, on er about June
- 15, 1969.
"I \ had abort two more
weeks to serve. in Vietnam,"
Marasco recalled. "Smith,
who was in on tile negotiations
and decisions all the time, war.;
very friendly with Chuyen. '
"They were bod1ies,4whieh
was his , first. mistake. MU
never hacome a buddy with
0 yaor vine rd .7.42N-it. 11.4
).-�,.4, i'Tn,':11i.i!�:-!ric, p:3C;IcP,"
Ma:�cis �., sai:i Sini:h ar:--o
wjs ft le n.fly n int 0-an, en's
wife, Pharn NMI ',HI, and her
sister. -
"He was always going to
Sannin with ChuYen for one
thing or another,'' Martisco
'But it didn't seem
wreng. until ai'terwards."
All througn the negotiations
ce7nerning. Chuyen 's fate.
Marasco said. Smith "was net
agreeing that he (Chuyen)
should he eliminated. He was
not disao:recing, either. He had
no alternative, hut be had a
special feeling for Chuyen."
Marasco said Smith
"became very nervous fo'it
number of reasons. [-IF; had
recently buried his mother in
Florida and had become quite
neurotic in Vietnam.
"He had decided that
because he was the only
enlisted man, a noncom-
missioned officer, involved in
the Chuyen thing, that we did
not trust hog and that we
would kill him.
"That was absolutely ridicu-
lous," Marasco said. ''The
thought never entered our
minds."
Atnnisi, p4ia _Thirawa_
soich South a cat to. thenci.A
-751nti0n chiR at Nha
e to a different
agent,. not the one who was
involved in the thing from the
outset," Marasco said, ''This
agent did not know anything
about the Chin en thing,"
,Marasco pointed out that
'everything is celled and
compartmentaiized in the
intelligence communny. Some-
times the right hand doesn't
knaw \\ hat ti1e. left is
The Nha Trang CIA inAn
dna-card Smith to '\.l,.tn_ace...
5-a-rnii�ni,i.-:;-.7.1-7;71-1-it7i-;n11,,f that
tor
iii mm
crio -nt
k71:I 1,1
I! told store to the
militory," Marasco said. "You
6711
must understand that the
Army had no real knowledge
of Project Ga�mma. Although
we were military, we, in fact,
worked for SOG -- Special
Operations Group."
The Chuyen incident, how-
ever. went up Marasco's chain
or command to Col. Rohert B.
Rheatilt, Green Beret com-
mander at the time.
"He made the final decision
on the assassination, based on
our information and that
provided by the CIA,"
Marasco said. "We assumed
that Rheault went up his chain
of command as we \vent ttp
ours. He did not."
Smith, Marasco said, told
his story to an unidentified
Army officer in Saigon who
rala ed it. through channels.
to Gen. Creighton Atli:alias,
commander of the U.S. forces
at the time and now Army
chief of staff.
"Abrams called in an aide, a
brigadier general, who was
supposed to know all about
intelligence operations in
viernam." Marasco said. "He
was .asked about the Chuyen
matter. -
"The aide, having been in
Vietnam only a month. said
'we don't have any cross�
border operations.' said_
there were no CIA agents con-.
Tr-ofli�on pnople and
_
that the Snecial Forces are
i-Tvolved - -advisor;
trim
Ahrains, .1drasr:o said. then
Pheault to Saigon "to
!hiags away.
'We had come up with
Third of .1 'articles
a
('o\ (�1' , hcf(n(�, al)nut
1,,,h it had happened to
Chu \ rasco said, ".lip t
in c.,ise it t�ds nek.'ded. It was
standard procedi
(b)(3)
� The story was that "we had
found out. that Chuyen might
have been a had guy, but that
we didn't know for sure and
that he was sent to Cambodia
, on a mission. We had a heli-
center log and it showed that a
guy went. from Nha Trang at
the specified time to the Cam-
bodian border where he was
dropped off.
"Chuyen was chubby and we
happened to have a heavy-set
Oriental in Project Gamma
who looked like him,
"In the cover report."
'Marasco explained, "we said.
Chuyen went to Cambodia,
had one-way radio trans-
mission, and that he was sup-
posed to contact us arid never
did."
Marasco. who could not
identify Chuyen's double, said
"he wasn't really that
involved in the operation."
"We said in the cover story
that Chuyen was a had guy
and that he just never came
back from Cambodia,"
Marasco said.
One of the military's
unwritten rules, Marasco said,
is "to always cover your com-
mander, no matter what."
'This is why Rheault gave
the general the cover story
but, according to a CIA 'after
action' report, Ahrams
"became very upset because
one of his senior commanders
apparently had lied to him,"
Marasco said.
Abrams. Nlarasco said, was
urtjleti_ .=1 m.!err.d _jLjbemacL
that civilians, in thisneasenthe_
- 'Charge of
Berets.
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26 Nov i972
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(b)(3)
Dloodbuths,
or allegations?
To the Editor:
In his zeal to reassure him-
self and his readers of the
soundness of past literature
on North Vietnam, John S.
Carroll ("After we get out,
will there be a bloodbath in
South Vietnam?", Oct. 15)
violated the first rule of
honest argumentation, which
is to represent with reason-
able accuracy the text which
you wish to refute. Having
-chosen my "revisionist" cri-
tique of past and present alle-
gations ' of a "bloodbath" in
North Vietnam as his target,
,Carroll manages nevertheless
to avoid. reference � with a
single exception--to any of
the specific evidence which
I have offered in the two
publications which he cites.
I object, of course, to his
taking out .of context my re-
mark that I no longer wish to
rest my case against Nixon's
bloodbath allegations on the
International Control Commis-
sion reports alone, and using
it to conclude that "at least
one of the principal assump-
tions on which the revisionist
history rests is not even be-
lieved by its own author." I
made the remark in the con-
text of a long, fully docu-
mented study of the North
Vietnamese land reform
which I was then completing.
As 1 explained to him at that
time, in comparison with the
evidence I had found of a
general distortion of the
North Vietnamese land-reform
qampaign in both primary and
secondary sources available
to Americans, the I.C.C. re-
ports simply receded in
Importance:
As a matter of fact, I did
not and do not "acknowledge
that the original I.C.C. ap-
proach is weak." Carroll has
completely misrepresented the
nature of the evidence to be
found in the International
Control Commission reports�
evidence to which he never
specifically refers. It is nec-
1
essary, therefore, to repeat
it here: From April, 1955, to
February, 1961, during which
time the Diem Government
was actively pressing charges
of Vietminh violations of the
Geneva Agreement with the
I.C.C., the French Government
and Diem submitted only 43
complaints of political re-
prisals in the North alleging
a total of 56 incidents of re-
prisal. However, of the first
12 complaints, three were in-
vestigated and it was found
that there was in fact no
damage to life or property
to the alleged victims. And of
the 18 cases of reprisal by
D.R.V.N. alleged to have oc-
curred in the December, 1955-
y, 1956, period�the height
of the land reform campaign
�only one involved alleged
loss of life.
� Even more important, dur-
ing this same period of time,
the population of the North,
which submitted many thou-
sands of personal petitions to
fixed and mobile teams of the
I.C.C. complaining of viola-
tions of their freedom of
movement, submitted only 41
petitions complaining of po-
litical reprisals. This evidence
thus has nothing to do with
the D.R.V.N. land-reform law
or the I.C.C.'s inability to in-
vestigate airfields. As much
as Mr. Carroll and others
would like to believe that
mass reprisals were carried
out against former French
and puppet Government per-
sonnel. the evidence indicates
that the worst thing to befall
the former civil servants, sol-
diers and policemen of the
French regime in Vietnam
was that they were shamed
into, accepting the same low
salary that Vietminh cadres
received. (See Duong Chau,
"The Seventeenth Parallel,"
Saigon, 1958, p. � 147.) The
former resistance fighters in
South Vietnam did not fare
so well during the same
period.
I am even more disap-
pointed that Mr. Carroll did
not see fit to deal seriously
with my study of the land re-
form. lie cites all the usual
sources alleging a "blood-
bath" in the North (Buttinger,
Fall; Tongas, Honey, Mang
Van Chi) without even
ac-
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odology and conclusions of
these works do not stand up
under careful analysis. An en-
tire 'chapter ,of my 60-page
study is devoted, for exam-
ple, to an analysis of how
Bernard Fall systematically
misunderstood the socio-
economic background of the
land reform in arguing that
. it was economically unjusti-
fied. But Carroll repeats Fall's
argument that there were no
"real" landlords as though it
were unchallenged.
I have also documented
how Mang Van Chi's sup-
posedly "authoritative" ac-
count has been the primary
source for virtually every
secondary .source on the land
reform (including Fall), but
there is . no mention in
Carroll's article of this
dependence. .
But most important, Carroll
ignores the evidence that
Hoang Van Chi's account was
written for the explicit pur-
pose of advancing a propa-
ganda campaign against the
D.R.V.N. behind which were.
the U.S. and the South
Vietnamese Governments: the
repeated instances in which
Chi fabricated evidence where
none existed for a policy of
massive executions of inno-
cent people; Chi's close rela-
tionship with the U.S. and
Saigon propaganda organs
and the C.I.A., all of whom
funded and promoted his
writings; the significant
change between 1958 and
1964 versions of his charge
of "landlord quotas"; and his
lack of qualifications to write
from personal experience
about. the party's policy on
land reform.
Carroll attempts to defend
Hoang Van Chi's "loose"
translation of Vo Nguyen
Giap's statement by citing
the opinions of unnamed ex-
perts that the Communists
normally used the terms in
question as euphemisms for
terror and execution. But re-
gardless of the opinions of
such unnamed experts, the
fact is that the Communists
did not use the word in ques-
tion to mean "execution." �
And if Carroll had bothered
to ask me, I could have cited
numerous usages of the word
in Communist documents in
contexts which � make this
clear beyond any doubt.
Finally, his flippant dismis-
sal of the documentary evi-
dence used in 'my study
indicates that Mr. Carroll is
simply unfamiliar with schole
arship on Communist affairs.
Most of the documents which
I cite, primarily the party
newspaper Nhan Dan, were
intended to communicate with
an audience of party members
and general public in. North
� Vietnam what the general
political line and specific pol-
icies of the party were during
the land-reform period. These
are precisely the documents
with which any serious
scholar would begin in a
study of the land reform cam-
paign. Moreover, the D.R.V.N.
history of the land reform,
which is based on official pol-
icy directives and statistical-
surveys of the land-reform
period, is in no way incon-
sistent with these earlier �
doctiments.
As for the estimate of 800
to 2,500 executions during the
land reform, which I have
suggested on the basis of the
available data, it is entirely
consistent, as I point out in
the study, with statistics on
death sentences in several
provinces in the North dur-
ing the land reform�statis-
9cs published by the South
Vietnamese Government.
.Readers of The Times
Magazine who wish to pur-
sue the subject further may
order. copies of my study,
"The Myth of the Bloodbath:
North Vietnam's Land Re-
form Reconsidered," from the
International Relations of
East Asia Project, Cornell
University.
D. Gareth Porter,.
Research Associate I.R.E.A..,
Cornell University
Ithaca, N. Y.
c crit
DIATIONA.LJ (.11-1ARDIAN
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J. LI � � s." �
Made in U.S.A.
(b)(3)
These "Public Safety Advisors," recruited primarily from the FBI,
0
the CIA and military police units, work closely with the National
Police Directorate and Internal Security Bureau in Saigon, the
u
National Police "Special Branch" (political police), and nit
Operation Phoenix personnel assigned to the hundreds of provincial
and district "interrogation. centers" where political suspects are
routinely beaten and tortured before being shipped to Con � Son
ka
prison island. ..
. These ads isory activities are accompanied by lavish subsidies and
: grants of police materiel, which have turned the Smith Vietnamese
police apparatus into one of the largest and most heavily-armed
paramilitary forces in the %% odd. Under Diem, the National Police
LI By Michael T. Ware force numbered only 19,000 men�a number which at that time was
considered sufficient to justify pinning the label of a "police state"
Under the terms of the peace settlement announced by the on the Saigon gos eminent.
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Presidential advisor Henry Since 1962, how es er, the U.S. has financed a sixfold increase in
Kissinger on Oct. 26, all U.S. military personnel are to be withdrawn NP strength�to 114,000 men on Jan. 1, 1972. U.S. support of the NP
from South Vietnam within 60 days of the signing of the agreernebt, under the AID program amounted to 585 million between /901 and
Although many provisions of the treaty require clarification, the 1971 and additional millions of dollars were provided by the
impression one gets from reading the published text is that the Department of Defense under Vietnam war appropria n tios. l'Ile
entire U.S. warmaking machinery will be rem 0% ed from Indochina. cost of the Phoenix program, estimated at 5732 million, is totally
It is for this reason that document re&ently acquired by the borne by the CIA. �
,
. Guardian on the U.S. "Public Safety" program are cause for special It is clear, from to the Guardian.
m the documents made as�
concern. that U.S. aid to the Saigon police apparatus may well increase in
These documents, the Agency for International Development's future years, if the battle shifts to a political struggle .between TItieu
(AID's) "Program and Project Presentation to the Congress" for and his many opponents. In the preface to the Fiscal Year (I7Y)
., fiscal 1972 and 1973.. ifidicate that 'Washington would like to 1972. AID presentation, it was stated that:
; maintain an elaborate police-support apparatus in Vietnam for: "As one aspect Of Vietnamization, the Vietnamese National
some tune to come. - Police are called upon to carry a progressively greater borstaa. I hal.
� This apparatus. supers ised by AID's Office of Pablic Safety in the must share with the Vietnamese armed forces the burden oi
. State Department, is administered as part of the Foreign aid countering insurgency and provide for daily peace and order�not
program and thus is not identified as a military program. Nes er- only in the cities, but throughout the countryside. It is planned to
theless, the Public Safety program is directly tied to the war effort, increase police strength from about 100,000 at present to 124.00.0
and is considered, a major part of Operation Phoenix�the CIA's during Fiscal 1972. to allow assumption of a greater burden in the
effort to destroy the political structure of the National Liberation future. The U.S. plans to make commensurate assistance as ailable."
Front (in Pentagon parlance. the "Viet Cong Infrastructure," or
'VCD. . Specifically, AID listed these "activity targets" for the Public
Safety program in FY 1972:
� According to the AID documents, which the Vietnamese are no
"Provision of commodity and advisory support for a.police force
doubt aware of. the purpose of the program is to assist "the Viet-
of 122,000 men�by the end of FY 1972, increasing the capability of
namese National Police (NI') to maintain law and order and local
the police to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure in coordination
security in pacified areas. combat smaller VC elements and deny with
other Government of Vietnam 'security agencies (under
resources to the enemy." An added function is to help Saigon
Operation .Phoenix); assisting the National Identity Registration
dictator Nguyen Van Thieu consolidate his control of urban areas
Program (NIRP) to register more than 12,000,000 persons 15 years "
by suppressing dissent and crushing all opposition to the Saigon
of age and oVer by the end of 1971; continuing to pros isle basic and
regime,
specialized training for approximately 20,000 police annually;
"The -development of an effective National Police and the. in-
pros iding technical assistance to t he police detention system,
stitutionalization of law enforcement," AID reports, "ztre importztra including the planning ;Ind supers ision of Ilk construction of 34 jztil -
elements in pacification and longaterm national development." facilities during 1971; and helping to achiese a major inc ease in the
Launched in 1955 number of police presently working at the sillage les el."
The Public Safety program in South Vietnam was launched in The Fiscal 1973 program sets the same �serail objectis es. but
1955,, when 33 American police instructors arrived in Saigon under calls for a vast increase in the number of NP officers assigned to the
the cover of the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) to train vilive police posts�from 11,000 in 1972 to 31,000 by the end of
Ngo Dinh Diem's palace guard and secret police in modern 1973. � .
counterinsurgency techniques. � To finance this massise effort during the FY 1971-1973 period,
In 1962, the program \\ as expanded under President Kennedy's AID asked congress for an appropriation of $17.9 million. of which
orders, and administrative- responsibility shifted to the U.S. 513.0 million would pay the salaries of the nearly 20(1 Public Safety
Operations Mission, In 1967, as the pace of the U.S. war effort was Ads isms. 53.3 million would go for commodities Ill) systems.
accelerated, Public Safety operations were placed under Pentagon radios, patrol cars, tear gas. etc.), and 5013,000 w mild be used for
jurisdiction t hrough the Civil Operations and RCA /flu tionary training several hundred Saigon police officers in the 11.S. and other
Development Support program (CORDS). �� . "third countries."
The resident U.S. police staff was enlarged with each Of these �
administrative changes: beginning with a staff of six men in 1959,
the Public Safety mission in Vietnam -increased to 47 in 1903 and to
19b in VP?.
Cont, i.ITtled
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- 6 NOV 1972
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01.: CONSIDINE .
r
ay That Will Nev6r Come
Question: Do you think there'll be a day
when the U.S. is not bugged by somebody
named Nguyen, or Duong? . . .
.. Answwer: Ngo.
Retired Maj. Gen. Dtiong Van Minh, the CIA
puppet who overthrew the South Vietnamese
government of President Ngo Dinh Diem nine
years ago, has come out against the Kissinger
"peace is at hand" plan. He says a ceasefire at
this time, when the fighting is spread all over
the country in small pockets, would be
impoossible to police by neutral forces and the
U.N. Better to have the estimated 150,000 North
Vietnam invaders retire to large regrouping
areas, where they can be more easily watched.
�- President Nguyen Van Thieu won't budge until
his 'land is completely clear of his enemies
from the North. .
The rule of Big Minh, as he is called, lasted
only from Nov. 1, 1963, to Jan. 30, 1964. He was
pushed out by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. He
retired to Thailand to raise orchids, but sur-
faced again in Saigon several years ago and
briefly opposed Thietes election last year! He
dropped out before Election Day with an an-
nouncement that the election was rigged. Since
*hen, Big Minh has been a quiet rallying point
lor anti-Thieu former generals, colonels and
k.1 fficials. It is a mark of his potential power
that he has not been forced into oblivion, as has
t. ne-time premier Nguyen Cao Ky.
If
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tore- of Vietcong Surviving ar
� By FOX BUTTERFIELD
sinew to The New York 'num '
� SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov.
4�Despite years of fighting
that have largely shattered the
Vietcong guerrillas, the Com-
munists in South Vietnam have
managed to preserve the core
of their political apparatus
with what many well-Informed
Vietnamese and American of-
ficiaIS believe to be a dedicated.
cadre of 40,000 to 60,000.
Those knowledgeable sources
feel that the Vietcong political
organization will pose a fonnici-
able threat to the Saigon Gov-
ernment under a cease-fire. The
organization is spread through-
-eut the country and .includes
local village operatives, secret
agents in Government-control-
led areas and political officers
Some high-ranking American
among the guerrillas, who form military
and intelligence of-
the-Vietcong's military arm.
ficers, however, do not agree
that the Vietcong have main-
tained political strength: This
A '72 Tactic: Restraint
One of the clearest indica-
tiens of the continued strength
of the Communist political ap-
paratus is that despite the in-
tensive fighting this year, the
number of defections from the
Conununist ranks is half that
of last year. There have been
8,237 defectors so far this year,
against nearly 16,000 at this
Unit) 1111971.
. The continued existence of
the Vietcong's political appara-
tus appears to be a major rea- view, which is known to have
son why President Nguyen Van been transmitted authoritatively
Thieu and many other Viet-!to Washington, is that the
narnesc are us about the Communists are badly weak-
peace settlement worked out by ened militarily and politically
Hanoi and Washington. and are practically suing for
settlement and turn the mill.
tary ,struggle into a political
struggle.
The analysts say that Hanoi
this year carefully preserved
its cadre of secret agents in
Government-controlled areas by
not trying to stir popular up-
risings to accompany the of-
fensive. During the Communist
Tet offensive of 1968, thou-
sands of cadremen were killed
when they came out in the
open to lead what they thought
would he mass revolts.
As one intelligence officer
explained Hanoi's 1972 policy:
"The war was a stalemate that
neither side could win. They
figured that if they could get
the United States out, they
stood a better chance � of - win-
ning the peace."
�"The Vietcong have lost peace'
many of their best cadre and Whatever the case, there is
no doubt that the Vietcong, or
they aren't 10 feet tall any National Liberation Front�the
more," said an American with Communists never refer to
a decade of experience inViet- themselves as Vietcong � are
nam. "But their organization". weaker in some ways than they
the American went on, "is built. wet." 3965' when they came
close to taking over the coon-
on the hard bedrock of dis- try without large-scale North
cipline and shared sacrifices. Vietnamese help. The North
The survivors are tough." Vietnamese invasion this spring
indicates that.
Militarily, intelligence sources!
report, the Vietcong now have
to rely on North Vietnamese
troops to keep the traditional
Vietcong guerrilla units up to
strength. In some famous bat-
talions with Vietcong names,
only the guides and a few of
the officers are native south-
erners, the intelligence sources
say.
Moreover, American analysts
say, whatever independence
the southern Vietcong once had
To intelligence analysts, this has been lost over the years
auggesta a high level of disci- as IIanoi has taken control.
plino among the 'Vietcong and Political Links Strong
confidence that they are win-
Some American analysts
now say, in fact, that Hanoi's
,strategy this year was,designed
:to take advantage of the rust party, and reportedly get
!Communist political strength,
, their orders through the agency
With Its vast offensive, employ- known as COSVN. This, nsual-
iing North Vietnamese troops, ly 'spelled out as the Central
I ',
'Hanoi hoped to force a peace Office for South Vietnam,
The Vietcong cadremen are
almost all members of the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary party, the
southern branch of Lao Dong,
the North Vietnamese Commu-
would be better translated as
the Central Committee's Office
for South Vietnam, American
intelligence sources say.
The office is believed to
be located in Kratie Province
in northeastern Cambodia, a
sparsely populated and heavily
forested region long --under
Communist control. . The top
officials, most of whom are-
thought to be North Vietna-
mese, are the leaders of the
People's Revolutionary party I
and also members of -Hanoi's'
elite Politburo or of the larger
Central Committee, according:
to American analyst
�
For example, Phan Hung,
who is believed to be the head
of the office, is also the ruling
secretary of the party and a
member of the Hanoi Politburo.
He is a North Vietnamese. His
second-in-command, who uses
the psueclonym of Muoi Cue,
Is also a northerner and a mem-
ber of the Central Committee.
American officials say that
the Vietcong's titular leaders
;such as Nguyen IIuu Tho
!chairman of the front, or
Itiuynh Tan Phat, the Secre-
tary General of the front, have
ibecome, progressively less pow-
� erful.
Most experts agree that one
reason for the Vietcong's mili-
.tary decline is the enormous'
'shift of South Vietnam's pop-
ulation away from the country-
'side and into safe urban areas
to escape the war. At least a
.third of South Vietnam's vil-
lagers are estimated to have
:left their homes, often depriv-
ing Vietcong units of bases for
recruitment, supplies or taxa-
tion.
Some allied oficials are con-
cerned that this trend may be
reversed under a cease-fire and
that thousands of villagers may
conic home � providing the
Vietcong with a renewed source
of power.'
But no :natter how badly the
Vietcong have been hurt mili-
tarily, several recent American
studies have shown that their
political organization remains
intact.
The organization withstood
the vaunted Phoenix program,
established by the Central In-
11' , ' 1967
cifically to eliminate the Viet-.
cong cadre. Though more than.
20,000 were' killed under the
Phoenix program and another
40,000 jailed or persuaded to
defect, officials connected with
it admit frankly that it has
been a failure.
A recent study for the Rand
Corporation found that in
Dinntuong Province, in the
nem. or Me populous mown&
'delta, the Vietcong have pre-
served a core of about five
cadremen per village. "Despite I
the decline in military capa-I
bilities," the study said, in!
part, "the N.L.F. in Dinhtuong,
has managed to keep the nu-.
cleus of its movement intact."
The study also found a large
measure of "latent support"
for the Vietcong among vil-
lagers. This continuing sym-
pathy for the Communists, the
study reported, was not in evi-
dence where the Saigon Gov-I
ernment forces were strong,
but it could easily reappear,
should Saigon weaken.
For example, the study noted
that before the 1968 Tet offen-
sive, many Vietnamese and
IAmerican officials thought that
the Vietcong in Dinhttiong
i.were on their way to defeat.
l'But, once the Communists gave
!their sudden order to attack,
lj'almost the entire rural pop-
itilation in the province was
:mobilized and coordinated in
support of the attack," the
study concluded.
� The highest cadre concentra-
tion, according to Vietnamese
and United States intelligence
estimates, is 25.00 in the Me-
kong delta, Militery Region IV.
These sources n-port that the
second largest renter of Viet-
cong, about 15,C0n, are in the
Central Highlands and central
coast 'known as Military Re-
gion II, and most of them are
concentrated in Diiihdinh, Prov-
ince.
, The situation in the north-
lernmost region of South Viet-
nam. Military Region 1, has
,been complicated this year by
Idle invasion across the demili-
tarized zone and by the North
Vietnamese reportedly taking
large numbers of people north
for indoctrination.
The area around Saigon,
Military Region III, has always
had the lowest number of Viet-
cong cadre, analysts say, be-
cause of the numbers and alert-
ness of, the Government police
in the capital. But while there
are fewer than 10,000 Commu-
nist party members and cadre-
men in the Saigon area, they
are said to be the best in the
country.
Over the last few years, the.
Vietcong organization in the
city of Saigon has appeared to.;
e steadily-losing power. De-
spite orders in captured Com-
munist documents calling for
terrorist acts in Saigon this
fail, � in the past month there
were only three very minor in-
cidents. The Saigon city ap-
paratus is also reported to have:
been criticized for failing to
produce its quota of taxes and:
supplies. _
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MASS.
PATRIOT LEDGER
NOV 4l972
E 65,785
NO SECRET WAR
-- An Associated Press report yes-
terday from Saigon that the United
States is planning to keep a mili-
tary advisory group of American
civilians in South Vietnam after
regular military forces are with-
drawn is disturbing�
The � report quoted military
sources as saying that the ad-
visers would be employed by
ci-
vilian firms under contract either
_ to the Defense or State Depart-
ments.
Whether such activities would
be covered by a Vietnam peace
agreement or e.xcluded froth them
remains conjectural. There is as
yet no signed peace agreement.
The. U.S. is insisting upon reach-
ing _certain mutual understandings
concerning the basic accord that iS
being worked out. -
The implication of this report is
quite clear � the continuation of
American clandestine operations
in Vietnam after the uniformed
7egulars are withdrawn, the kind
operations being. conducted in
the "secret wars" in Laos an
Cambodia.
Nobody in the U.S. government,
of course, is going to confirm that
CIA el' taeiL, agents will remain
behind to do what they can secret-
ly to prevent Communist takeovers
in Indochina. Obviously a number
, of American civilian officials will
stay in Laos, Cambodia and South
Vietnam in various capacities.
The New York Times reported
this week, for example, "In conver-
sations in recent days with Prime,
Minister Souvanna Pheuma of
Laos and others, Nixon has
stressed that he would seek to Con-
tinue American economic and other
assistance to Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam because he believed
it was important to maintain non-
Communist governments in South-
east Asia."
It would be all too tempting to
use "civilian" aid officials, for ex-
ample, for _covert operations. It
would be naive to suggest that
the United 'States have no intelli-
gence agents in Indochina after a
peace agreement. But the .U.S.
should not shift its involvement
in Vietnam from an open war to
,.an underground war. waged by
:agents under cover.
� ,
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LIFE
LETTERS
-
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NOV 1972
HEROIN AND THE C
by Flora Lewis
THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA
by Alfred W. McCoy
Harper & Row, $10.95
One fact is beyond dispute: heroin
.is flooding into the United States in
sufficient quantities to support an
ever growing number of addicts. Esti-
mates about the drug traffic are unre-
liable, but trends are painfully clear
in mounting deaths, young zombies
stimbling through city streets, crime
-
to the point of civic terror. There are
� said to be some 560,000 addicts in
America now, twice the number esti-
mated two years. ago and ten times
the level of 1960.
Another fact goes unchallenged:
suddenly, in 1970,- high-grade pure
white heroin, which Americans prefer
to the less refined drug more nor-
mally consumed by Asians, appeared
in plentiful and cheap supply wher-
ever there were GI's in Vietnam. The
epidemic was a vast eruption. It took.
the withdrawal of the troops to douse
it, for the fearful flow could not be
staunched.
Beyond those facts, the sordid story
of drug trafficking has been a shad-
owy, elusive mixture of controversial
elements. It was obvious that there
must be corruption involved. It was
obvious that there must be politics in-
volved, if only because the traffic con-
tinues to flourish on such a scale de-
spite the energetic pronouncements
of powerful governments. It takes a
map of the whole world to trace the
drug net.
Since the United States suddenly
became aware of the sinister dimen-
sions of the plague and President
Nixon bravely declared war on drugs
(unlike the persistently undeclared
war in Indochina), it has been cus-
tomary for U.S. officials to pinpoint
the .poppy fields of Turkey and the
clandestine laboratories of Marseille
as the source of most of the American
curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of
the world's illicit opium (some say 70
percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is
grown in Southeast Asia and partic-
ularly in the "golden triangle" of
mountains where Burma, Thailand,
and Laos meet. But the U.S'. govern-
ment insisted; and continues to insist
in the 111-page report on the world
opium trade published in August,
that this supplies natives and seldom
enters American veins.
Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy,
who spent some two years studying
the trade. And further, it is certain to
become less and less so as measures
which the United States demanded in
Turkey and France take effect in
blocking the old production and
smuggling patterns. This is of crucial
importance for two reasons. One is
that firm establishment of an Asian
pattern to America means that the
crackdown in Turkey and France will
be next to futile so far as availability
of heroin in the United States is con-
cerned. The second is that focusing
attention on Southeast Asia would
bring Americans to understand that
the "war on drugs" is inextricably in-
volved with the Indochina war, and
has to be fought on the same battle-
ground from which President Nixon
assured us he was disengaging "with
honor."
� McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old
Yale graduate student, worked with
immense diligence and considerable
courage�for the opium trade is dan-
gerous business and the combination
of opium, politics, and war can be
murderous�to document the facts of
the Asian pattern.
A good deal of it has been common
gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vien-
tiane, and Bangkok for years. But the
gossip mills of Indochina are a long
way from the streets of Harlem and
the high schools of Westchester
County. The general knowledge that
the rumors reflected is a long way
from preCise, confirmed detail. So the
Asian pattern had *never come
through clearly in the United States.
Now, in his book The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia, McCoy has
set it down. To show how it devel-
oped, he had to backtrack. The use of
opiates in the United States has a
long history. It wasn't until after
World War I that widespread oppro-
brium, added to growing understand-
ing of the dangers, turned the trade
into an underworld monopoly. But
World War II disrupted the supply
routes. Unable to get drugs, Ameri-
can addicts were forced to quit the
hard way. The market diminished,
and, with a modicum of enforcement
effort and international cooperation,
might have been wiped out.
A single U.S. official act, McCoy
believes, turned that chance around
and enabled the creation of a world-
wide octopus of evil almost beyond
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'7/
DAILY WORLD
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_ 19/Z
r
By GENE TOURNOUR and TIM WHEELER '
- NEW YORK. Oct. 31 � Pressure on the Nixon Admin-
. ).
to sign a Vietnam peace agreement mounted vis-
ibly today even as the original Oct. 31 deadline passed in
Paris without the initialing of a treaty.
In New York and Washington, peace' activists warned of NixOn pre-
election trickery and the possible abandonment of the agreement.af ter
Election Day. �
"The next week is the most im- reached in principle on Oct. 8."
portant of the war," Cora Weiss Mrs. Weiss and David Dellinger,
told several hundred anti-war a leader of the Peoples Coalition
activists who crowded into Hunter for Peace and Justice, called on
College Assembly Hall last night. the audience, many of whom were
The meeting was held on strategy veteran peace workers, to help
.to thwart President Nixon's man- mobilize the city for what they
euvers to sabotage accords termed "the supreme test of the
reached on Oct. 8 with the repre- peace movement."
sentatives � of the Vietnamese Telegram forms circulated
people. During the meeting, telegram
"If Nixon is not forced to sign forms were circulated that car-
the nine-point peace accord in the Tied the message: "If this is not
week- before the election, then he an election maneuver, sign the
has four more years to sabotage agreement now." For 25 cents the.
peace and keep up the killing, Mrs. message will be sent to Nixon im7
Weiss warned: mediately, the audience was told.
Seven-day drive � At the- meeting's conclusion at
Reporting on her meeting in 10 p.m., 400 participants, despite
Paris Friday with representatives near-freezing temperatures, mar-
from North and South Vietnam, ched to Nixon campaign head-
Mrs. Weiss said, "It is up to the quarters at Madison Ave. arid 53
U.S. peace movement whether or St., and began a vigil in support
not Nixon manages to turn this of the immediate signing of the
chance for peace into just another peace agreement.
election maneuver which can be � 'Trick or treaty?'
abandoned after Nov. 7. "Is it a trick or is it a treaty?"
"Our job in the next seven days
is to put the U.S. on record in sup-
port of the peace agreement
shouted the marchers to passers-
by as they made their way to the
vigil site.
The vigil was scheduled to con-
tinue until 6 p.m. tonight which is
midnight Paris time, the end of
the day on which the U.S. bad
committed itself to signing the
nine-point peace accord.
In other parts of the country
similar demands are being ex-
pressed that the American people
prevent Nixon from sabotaging
the chance for peace.
Congressman Parren Mitchell
(D-Md.) in a statement to the
Baltimore Afro-American, now
on the newsstands, declared, "If
reports from North Vietnam are
correct, then every person in
this country ought to be apply-
ing pressure on the White house
to achieve at long last an end to
a futile, wasteful war which we
could not win.
'Thies' must go'
"If indeed President Thieu
stands as the only opposition. to
peace in Vietnam then he must go.
His administration has been cor-
(b)(3)
0- tn.4 e kr"
To L., ow_ v
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Contintle
uncm
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29 OCT 1972
0
77�
ci
By Nguyen Tien Hung
The writer was born in Thanhoa,
-North Vietnam, later lived in South
Vietnam, and is currently an associate
professor of economics at Howard
Uni-
versit.y. �
tisAFFICIALLY, it is clear, a settle-
ment of the Vietnam war is about
to be reached. But in the minds of
Hanol's leaders, the cease-fire and
.political accord that now appear im-
minent. will not mean the end of
. the struggle. Rather, to them such de-
velopments will mean only that yet an-
other phase in the war between North
and South has been opened.
. It must be understood that in the
Hanoi politburo there are no "doves"
on the question of unifying Vietnam
under communism; all are "hawks."
' What they differ substantially on is
the method of -accomplishing this aim.
Thus the main key to iinnoi's increas-
ingly accommodating stance at present
and to what may happen after a set-
tlement is signed can be found largely
in the power struggle within the Ha-
noi politburo.
The struggle is between one faction
'headed by he Dunn, a Southerner and
secretary-general of the Communist
Party, and another led by Truong
Chilli], a Northerner and chairman of
the standing committee of the National
Assembly. Their rivalry dates back to
the 10-10s, when they competed for the
,mind and confidence of the late Presi-
dent lio Chi Minh. The rift was greatly
intensified in 395G when President Ho
effectively replaced Truong Chinh
'with- Le Dunn as secretary-general of
the party, a post Chinh had held for lh
-years.. . . .
�
Truong Chinh Emerges �:-
y? ECENTLY THEIR CONFLICT
1.0e has extended to three broad is-
sues: the economic performance in the
North; the ideological direction regard-
ing economic policy, and, above all, the
conduct of the war in the South.
he Duan's faction called for immedi-
ate conquest of the South at all cost,
and he strongly supported Vo Nguyen
Chip's big-battle and total-uprising
strategy. Clap, spoiled by the Dien-
blenphu victory and obsessed with the
thought of becoming a Vietnamese. Na-
poleon, provides Le Duan with protec-
tion against the powerful police force
. Tran Quoc Haan, an ally of Truong,
Chinh. .
J./
As�in all Communist countries, no
leader would dare express himself
openly on so sensitive a question as
party factions. Nevertheless, based on
each politburo member's past record,
position, performance, and on the Viet-
namese pattern of behavior, one can
speculate on the current power align-
ment in Yorth Vetnam fc;lows:
' LE DUAN FACTION
� 'Vo Nguyen Giap, strongman of the
army. Giap is a long-time, bitter enemy
of Truong Chinh. Ills hatred for Chinh
sterns from two sources�Chinh's favor-
able attitude toward Chinese interven-
tion in Vietnamese affairs, and Chinh's
undermining of Giap's authority by ap-
pointing political commissars to share
responsibility side by side with mili-
tary commanders.
� Pham Hung, director of the war
in the South. Like Le Duan, Hung is
a Southerner. Although he remains
director of COSVN, the armed forces
in the South, he was removed as first
deputy on June 10, 1972,- after the Na-
tional Assembly, election.
TRUONG CIlII FACTION
� Le Due Tito, currently adviser to
Hanoi's delegation to the Paris peace
talks. Tlio's hatred of Le Duan dates
back to 1950 when he was sent by Ho
Chi Minh as an inspector to the South.
Be became engaged in a bitter dispute
with Le Duan on the conduct of the '
war. Duan was summoned to North
Vietnam in 1951, while 'rho remained
in the South for some time thereafter.
� Nguyen Duy Trinh, foreign affairs
minister, supports Triton; Chinh be-
cause of their common agreement with
Chinese policies.
� Hoangi Van 'loan, Chinh's right-
hand man in the standing committee,
of the National Assembly.
� Le Thanh Nghi, an economist, fa-
vors industrialization and is close to
Chinh's position on rebuilding North
Vietnam. His point of view is sup-
ported by important technocrats, such
as Vice Premier Do Muoi.
� Tran Quoc Hoan, responsible for
security and internal order. Ile con-
trols all police forces and possesses all
secret information on leading figures
in .North Vietnam, His lining up with
Truong Chinh is explained by his sus-.
'picion of Vo Nguyen Giap's ambition
to dominate the internal security,
domain, His recent appointment to full
membership of the politburo causes
alarm to Giap.
� Van Tien Dung, chairman of the
army's chiefs of staff, appears to be
close to Chinh. A hero of Dienbienpim,
Dung is said to be displeased with
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Truong Chinh, on the other hand,
Wants to pursue a guerrilla strategy;
accompanied by political and diplo-
matic efforts to help the National Lib-
eration Front seize power in the South.
For should the South fall under the
thumb of the NU% unification of the
country under communism would be
Inevitable. Chinh's strategy is sup-
ported by Giap's lieutenant, Gen. Van
Tien Dung.
Recent events in North Vietnam sug-
gest . that the politburo battle had
been greatly intensified and that
Truong Chink has begun to emerge as
the clear leader, capable of filling the
power vacuum left by Ho Chi Minh's
death in 1969. The effect of Chinh's
emergence and the resulting change in
Hanoi's power structure has been a
reversal of Hanoi's policy on the war:�
from intransigence at the negotiating
table to a more concessionary attitude;
fronr conventional warfare to guerrilla
and terror tactics; from an emphasis
OIL decisive military victories to politi-
cal and diplomatic offensives.
It is consistent with Truong Chinh's
policies for Hanoi to agree to a cease-
fire in order to recover from the war,
and. to prepare for new efforts to
achieve final victory.
The-Power Alignment
TN ANALYZING' the Hanoi rivalry, it
I. 'is essential to know the strength
of each faction under the existing
power structure. According to an un-
published study by Saigon educator
Nguyen Ngoe Bich on the North Viet-
namese assembly election in April,
1971, Truong Chinh skillfully used the
occasion to weaken Le Duan's faction
by eliminating the 87 Southern depu-
ties in the National Assembly. These
deputies had been staunch supporters
of he Dunn in the legislative branch.
The power center in Hanoi, though,
Is not the assembly but the politburo.
It Consists of ,nine full members and
two alternates. Recently (about August
or September of this year), the two al-
ternates, Tran Quoc Hoan and Van
Tien Dung, were promoted to full
membership on the pretext that, they
were to fill the seats vacated by IIo
Chi Mirth's death in 1969 and by Ngu-
yen Chi Thanh's death in 1967. Roan is
minister of public security, which is
the -equivalent here to the director
of the FBI, chief of all local police
forces and director of the CIA corn-
binedeDung is army chief of staff and
a Dienbienphu hero. Apparently their
appointments were made as a result of
TrtfOng Chinh's influence.
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(b)(
3)
SAN FRANC.ISCO, CAT,
� EXAMI-I;ER
E � 204,749
EXAMINER 8c CHRONICLE �
� 640,004
OCT 2 6 1972'
Bob Considine
Stibsidies
For.U.S. rpteges
If the. truth were known --- and that's a piety prepos-
terous � thought in these times � we may have offered
President Nguyen Van Thieu a considerable fortune to:
get lost.
There is precedent. To clear the ir.)ath. for President
Diem. we ,must have underwritten some or all of Bao
Dai's departure from Vietnam and his subsequent posh
life oil the French Riviera. Before President Kennedy
reluctantly okayed the CIA's scheme to unseat Diem, we
offered to send Madam NThu and her husband. Diem's,
brother, on a long visit to Paris, all expenses paid, to get
them offstage. - �
(Diem was incensed. In what must have been the laSt
interview he 'gave before � his murder, he said to Bill
Hearst,, Frank Conniff and this reporter, "How would
President Kennedy feel if I suggested that lie send his
brother Robert and Robert's wife away?")
� The U.S. taxpayer was tapped, without his knowledge,
for our buildup of Diem's successor, Big Minh, and money
paid to him and the nine other military officers who took
over the Saigon government, among them one Col. Nguyen
Van Thieu. When Big Minh fled or was pushed to Bang-
kok, where he Jived the life of a country gentleman and
orchid fancier, we unquestionably supported him, If Thicit
gets out alive, good old Sam The Man will be picking up
his tabs. Maybe for life.
The bills for the Vietnam -war will still be coming in
for a long time. As President, LBJ pledged that when the
war ended the U.S. would spend a billion dollars rehabili-
tating both the North and the South. We'll spend a lot
more than that, putting back what we bombed away, and
for the relief of victims on both sides of the DMZ. As for
the pensions of the men who served there, and the pay- ,
ments to the families of those Americans who died, they
� will last well into the 21st Century.
You have to be terribly rich to make war, or engi-
neer -coups d'etat,
* * *
REMEMBER ALL THOSE; nice things the British did
for the gang of American tourists who were stranded at
Gatwick Airport, London, when their U.S. charter plane
company went bust? Happened a couple months ago. The
Americans, 122 of them, were a. pathetic group. Most of
them were broke at this sorry ending of a nice cheap
vacation. 'For three days and -nights they lived in a. cor-
ner of the terminal. Their beds were hard seats or the
floor.
They. were fed by an office of Social Security at near-
by Crawley at a cost of about $750. British travelers,
touched by their plight, gave them money to make phone
calls to their relatives in America, brought drinks, diap-
ers and whatnot. A delegation of the strandees called on '
the U.S. Embassy and asked for help but were told that
there are no funds earmarked to cope with a situation of .
this type.
Wimpy International, the firm that introduced the
hamburger to Britain, put up the money to fly them �
� home. Their fourth and final night in England was a
comfortable one, thanks to Grand Metropolitan Hotels, -
which Put. them up and picked up all their bills.
Many of the Americans were tear-streaked with grat-
itude as they boarded their British Caledonian Airways
jet for the trip to New York. They swore that they would '
return the money that had been spent on them by the
Social Security Department.
That was two months ago. So far, the office at Craw-
ley has received a total repayment of $27.50.
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WISHINGTON POSI
24 OCT 1972
n the Absence of Facts, Saigonese
Intoxicate Selvesmn Rumor
By Jacques Leslie According to one, the recent
Los Angeles Times ners around the city de-.. � -
fighting around Saigon has
.. SAIGON, Oct. 23�"Every- ounce the concept of nail-
: -
not, as commonly thought,
7 one Is intoxicated by ru- involved Vietcong. Rather, x/r. tion government, yet accord-
mors," a Vietnamese ob-. commandos of the U.S. Cen- ing to the rumors this may
server said a few hours be � tral Intelligence Agency cOme about. At. the .same .
, fore Presidential adviser were said to be spearhead- time, warnings of a possible .
Henry Kissinger left Saigon ing the attacks, hoping to
Vietcong attack on Saigon
for Washington Monday.
force Thieu into submission
� are still being made.
Indeed, even if Kissinger's at the negotiating table by
Some people have reacted
six-day visit to Saigon pro- showing him that his mili-
, by buying provisions in ease
duced no known outcome, it tary situation is untenable,
of attack. Others take seri- .
: has generated a remarkable Complexity Breeds Rumors : ously the idea of a cease- '
quantity of rumors, covering
every conceivable turn of The complexity of the ne- fire, and depending on their
the talks. gotiating points has helped point of view are either-
to produce so many rumors. cheered -by the prospect of'
Even in quieter times, Sal- Observers, who Include 'goy- an end to the fighting or de-
gon is a city which thrives ernment officials, intern- pressed by the possibility
on rumors. More often en-
joyed than believed, they gence experts, politicians, that Communists will be in
provide a balance to the journalists and cab drivers, the next government. Most'
had a chance to contemplate go about their business as
bland and sometimes too ob-
._ - the vagaries of cease-fire, usual.
viously facile announce- For people intimately in-
ments of the government, tripartite government, con-
make up for that, going on. . .. agonizing." .
When one journalist sat - On Monday a small �etec-
Rumors Spread . down in a Saigon restaurant .. trical fire broke out in the
- A few weeks ago, a rumor for a late dinner, he was - . Saigon bureau of a French
spread that the wife of apologetically approached . news agency. A reporter-saw
South Vietnamese President by the manager, a French- _ -it .and yelled, "Stop the- fire!
Nguyen Van 'Mien- had left man, who said, "Excuse me. Stop the fire!" Those words
Saigon for Paris with 27 We arc- told nothing. Can -. also mean "cease-fire":',in
pieces of luggage. Now, with you tell us what is happen- . French. The 'people around
the talks under way and ing?" The journalist passed _- him got very excited, If:or-not
on what he had heard and having seen the blaze, they
Thieu's hold on the presi- .- thought he had a scoop.:
dency in doubt, another 'was rewarded with...a free- ...,.....8.44:4_.
rumor circulated: All his glass of cognac. . �
' personal mementoes, such The , only certain -facts
as photographs and plaques, .seemed to be who had met �
had been removed from his with whom, and for how
living quarters. long. This information was
Rumors had both Kissin- given out by the U.S. eipo.
ger and Thieu "winning" the bossy. Just to make sure, a
talks, while just what either few reporters -stood � with
had won was another contin- binoculars. on the route
ual topic of discussion. his from the embassy to the
. singer also was frequently presidential palace to check.
suspected of having taken official cars- as they passed
Loff for a brief, secret trip to
Hanoi. As a result, Amen- - . All this has had an odd im--
can embassy officials were pact on Saigon residents.
often questioned on the They do not have much ac-
exact time they had last cess to news, particularly
seen the elusive negotiator, with local newspapers sonic-
Rumors ranged from plau- what. muzzled by a stiffened
sible to barely imaginable. press code. Government ra-
dio and televisiOn and ban-
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slitutional amendments, the volved in. Kissinger's -Vigit
But, during the last few, days therumors became ob- makeup of neutralist fac- -to Saigon, the six days vffr
tions and predictions by var-
e
sessional, a psychological re- a tense, exhausting thhe.
lease. Here was a time, the ions astrologers. Halfway through his visit,
i h d h Near the en of the six-
think, seemed to . one journalist who .was
think, when the fate of a day period, . journalists
country which has been at seemed to have given up - being tempted by juicy vu-
war for decades was being asking for the latest rumors. mors but had no hard evi-
determined, yet no one Aleanwhile,they found them- deuce of any kind and found
knew for sure the substance
selves constantly being - himself waiting for any offi-
of the talks. They decided to asked to explain what was cial word said, "This is very
, ..
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NATI QNAL GUARDIAN
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.t IAA Oa
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61 r-rf) Fr7
iy11(, �Ito,/
By Richard E. Ward
A congressional subcommittee has
charged the Pentagon with failure to
investigate charges of war crimes
carried'out under the U.S.-sponsored
Phoenix program in South Vietnam.
The criticism of the Pentagon was
made in a report by the House of
Representatives Foreign Operations
and Government Information sub-
committee, which noted that many of
the so-called "Vietcong" killed under
the Phoenix "pacification" program
were innocent civilians. The report
also expressed reservations about
U.S. support for a program that
"allegedly included torture, murder
and inhumane treatment of South
.Vietnamese civilians."
The report, not approved for public
release by the parent Government
Operations Committee, was sum-
marized in an Oct. 3 UPI dispatch.
According to the news agency, the
Department of Defense refused to
investigate the charges when they
were brought to the attention of high
officials.
Public release of the cautiously
worded subcommittee report has
apparently been delayed because
members of the full committee are
. less than enthusiastic about con-
fronting the issue of U.S. war crimes.
In July 1971 at the time of hearings
that constituted the basis for the
report, two subcommittee members,
Rep. Ogden R. Reid (0-N.Y.) and Rep.
Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) charged
' outright that the Phoenix program
had. been. responsible for "in-
discriminate killings" and the illegal
imprisonment of thousands in South
-Vietnam. -
In September of this year, during a
hearing before the Senate Refugee
rrcrrir
�
tmrl
ti-ip)
�-siLl
LJU TJa,
�G'')' �
subcommittee, a top Defense
Department official described the
Phoenix. program as an intelligence
operation. He was challenged by Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in a
surprisingly sharp interchange.
Kennedy asked how the more than
20,000 "Vietcong" were killed and the
witness insisted that the deaths oc-
curred during "military" operations.
'Intelligence operation'?
During the 1971 'hearings the
House subcommittee heard testimony j
� from William E. Colby who headed the /
"pacification" effort from mid-1968 to
mid-1971. Colby stated that under the
Phoenix program 20,587 members of
the "Vietcong" infrastructure" were
killed from 1968 through May 1971.
Colby, who had been a top CIA of-
ficial before serving in Saigon on
assignment from the White House,
insisted that the Phoenix program was
"entirely a South Vietnamese
operation," although he conceded it
had been originated by the CIA.
Colby tried to portray the U.S. role
as primarily an "advisory" one, but he
also admitted that U.S. personnel
participated in the naming of suspects
and the capture of prisoners. Ad-
mitting "occasional" abuses�the
assassination of civilians�had oc-
curred, Colby stated that "we put a
stop to this nonsense" in collaboration
with the Saigon authorities.
With a facade of candor, Colby's
testimony actually was riddled with
lies about the Phoenix program, which
was initiated- under President
Johnson and expanded by the Nixon
administration. Essentially, ' the
Phoenix program attempted to
identify and then assassinate cadres
of the National Liberation Front, the
political leaders on a local level of the
Ea. 0
?") 77117 r7'r �
%19 1LIL.1J1iLL
anti-U.S. resistance in South Vietnam
,The program had access to secret
-CIA :funds as well as large ap
propriations from the U.S. military and
economic assistance -programs.
Assassination teams of mercenaries
and U.S. agents who compiled lists of
persons to be assassinated were
secretly, funded.
These aspects of the Phoenix
program were revealed in testimony
before the same House subcommittee
in August 1971 by K. Barton Osborn,
who served as an intelligence agent
assigned to provide information to the
Marines and who also worked for the
CIA Phoenix program. Based in
Danang, Osborn supervised agent
networks for 15 months beginning in
1967.
Osborn contradicted Colby's
disclaimers of direct U.S. respon-
sibility for the Phoenix program and
made it clear that U.S. personnel
participated in murders and tortures.
He said U.S. "advisors" were really
directing the program.
Osborn also described atrocities he
witnessed, including seeing Viet-
namese pushed from helicopters, a
practice known as "airborne in-
terrogations." He also described how
Marine intelligence offi:ers held a
Vietnamese woman prisoner in a small
cage at their headquarters and
starved her to death, refusing to give
her either food or water.
These and other examples given by
Osborn provide only a small glimpse of
the war crimes committed by the U.S.
in South Vietnam. The atrocities were
an intrinsic part of the Phoenix
program directed by the highest U.S.
authorities on White. House orders.
Obviously the Defense Department is
not going to investigate these war
crimes.
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16 OCT 1972
Why No Peace?
The men most responsible for the continuing carnage
in Indochina are Nixon, Kissinger and Nguyen Van Thieu,
whose role is explored in a just issued 108-page pamphlet,
"Aid to Thiel'," by Le Anh Tti and Marilyn McNabb
of the American Friends Service Committee, 112 South
16 Street, Philadelphia 19102. Backed by 273 references
and notes, the pamphlet is a calm account of tyranny,
oppression and mass murder, carried on with vast
amounts of American money, military aid and the partici-
pation of the CIA. The last paragraph of the text reads:
The demand that the U.S. cease its aid to Thieu
is reasonable from the point of view of Vietnamese
who want peace and national independence. It is im-
perative from the point of view of Americans who
want to bring this country's expensive and bloody
adventure in Indochina to an end.
The Nixon Administration locked itself into an alliance
with Thieu at a time when that seemed the only alterna-
tive to military defeat. With his four "no's," Thieu is
now the principal obstacle to a negotiated peace. Getting
rid of him is the problem of Nixon and Kissinger. If they
persist in keeping Thieu in power no other conclusion can
be drawn than that they are determined to win the war
militarily, regardless of the moral and material conse-
quences,.to the American and Indochinese people.
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DAILY WORLD
14 OCT 1972
orrorrrn �
By JOHN PITTMAN
If the outlawing of strategic
bombing is not on the agenda
of forthcoming conferences on
disarmament, it should be. The
experience of the United States
aerial warfare in Indochina con-
firms the experience of the Ko-
rean War and the Second World
War that strategic bombing is
essentially a means of terror
and genocide, and that its effect
on the military outcome of a
conflict is minor.
During seven and a half years
of bombing Indochina, the U.S.
Air Force dropped three and a
half times more tons of bombs
than were dropped by all the
Allied Powers in all the thea-
ters of the Second World War.
Yet.� a military victory for the
United States and its Saigon pup-
pet regime is not in sight. while
Saigon is now threatened with
encirclement.
In both Korea and Indochina
the U.S. Air Force has had full
command of the air. Neither the
North Koreans nor the Indochi-
nese have been able successfully
to challenge the U.S. control of
their air space. although North
Vietnam's defenses have become
formidable.
In both cases. the U.S. Air
Force slaughtered thousands of
civilians, mainly children, wo-
men and the elderly. In Indo-
china the extensive use of na-
palm, poisonous chemical defo-
liants. and anti-personnel bombs
produced biocidal results. that
is. the extermination of all living
things.
Military analysts draw a dis-
tinction between strategic bomb-
ing and the use of air power as
an auxiliary arm of the army
and navy. The distinction is
pointed up by the contrast be-
tween the U.S. and British use
of air power and that of the So-
viet armed forces in World War
Military historians note that
the Red Army never employed
strategic bombing. but used its
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9..."7 if 6. P-,A
andaaaiisj
air power for purposes of aerial
reconnaissance and as a form of
artillery supporting the troops.
On the other hand, the English
and Americans cold-bloodedly
dropped tons of bombs on heavily
populated cities, as in the case
of Dresden. to terrify the people.
drive the workers out of their
homes, and hopefully bring about
a reduction in the nazi arms
production.
Yet. except for the distorters
of the war's history who falsely
claim that the U.S.-British alli-
ance NV011 the war in Europe. it
is generally known that the nazi
war machine was smashed on
the Eastern Front. And although
the nazis also employed strate-
gic bombing with genocidal ef-
fects against the Soviet Union.
they went down to defeat before
the onrushing might of the Red
A rmy
Strategic bombing fails to dis-
criminate between civilian and
military personnel and installa-
tions. Hospitals, churches, schools
and the homes of workers and
peasants are wantonly destroy-
ed. Civilians who survive are
driven in flight to refugee cen-
ters. Some eight million or more
Indochinese have now been herd-
ed into such centers or pacifica-
tion zones, where they are sub-
jected to CIA supervision and
control by Thieu's police.
What is more, strategic bomb-
ing has been used mainly by
highly industrialized imperialist
powers against underdeveloped
small peoples seeking independ-
ence from colonialism and neo-
colonialism. Nowadays the Por-
tuguese colonialists are using
strategic bombing. along with
napalm. phosphorous bombs. de-
foliants and anti-personnel bombs
pcotected in Indochina and pass-
ed on via NATO. Their victims
are the peoples of Mozambique.
Angola and Guinea-Bissau who
are seeking to throw off the
yoke of colonialism.
Who knows what small �Third
World" country, striving to
strike off chains of imperialism.
will be the next victim of an
imperialist bombing attack? Will
it be South Yemen, Odle, So-
malia, Burma. Syria. Peru?
Clearly, it is in the interest of
the national liberation movements
of "Third World" countries that
the bombing of strategic bomb-
ing should become part of the
struggle for disarmament.
To claim, as the Maoists do,
that '"I� hird World" peoples have
no interest in disarmament. is to
speak nonsense. In view of, the
growing poverty gap between the
developing countries and the de-
veloped industrial countries. what
"Third World" country will be
able to construct effective air
defenses against bombing raids
of which the United States, Bri-
tain. France and even South Afri-
ca are capable?
There should be no illusions
concerning the scruples�now or
as along as imperialism domi-
nates U.S. society�of the gene-
rals and politicians responsible
for the destruction of life in In-
dochina. Typical of Nixon was
his hypocritical call tor an in-
ternational treaty against terror-
ism at the very moment of his
escalation of the 13-52 strategic
bombing raids against Vietnam.
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S 17482
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
cendiary," presumably including napalm-
type weapons which the U.S. hits defined as
being outside the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Then
there is $7.3-million for "Miscellaneous De-
fensive Equipment," a category that received
o�ly $900,000 hi 1970, Obviously, these vague
categories can conceal C multitude of mate-
rials.
(Anyone who doubts the military capa-
city for blatant evasion of Presidential di-
rectives might refer to all official government
history, Science cn:ci. the Air Fc%rce, published
in 1966. At one time, the book points out, the
Bureau of the Budget decreed that the Air
Force ccadd no longer spend money on basic
research. 1;e5earch spending wnS continued
nonetheless�by charging the costs off to de-
velopment of a new bomber. "For all the
� Budget Bureau knew," the book gloats, "the
f.,4.7-million it approved was for research con-
nected with the development of this aircraft,
clearly within the realm of applied re- rclr�
But In reality, this money was handed over
to OSR [Office of Scientific Research] to use,,
as originally planned, for basic research.")
While Mr. Nixon may well be credited
With cautions good intentions concerning
CBW, the military apparently is having
trouble kicking the habit. It is puzzling that
the administration itself chooses to inter-
pret the 1925 Geneva Protocol as exempting
tear gases and herbicides; in this regard
McGeorge Bundy, in the course of his con-
tinuing descent from the hawkish role that
he occupied as President Johnson's national
security adviser, told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in March 1971:
"Useful as herbicides and tear gas have
been In particular situations in Southeast
Asia, I know of no senior military commander
who would claim that in the wide perspective
of the course of the war as a whole their
value has been at all critical, In General
Westmoreland's authoritative book-length
report on his military operations between
January 196.1 and June 1968, there is only the
briefest reference to herbicides and riot con-
trZil agents. Seen in perspective, they are
clearly marginal instruments."
As far as herbicides are concerned, Bundy's
point is supported by a still-unreleased study
of herbicide usage in Vietnam, conducted by
the Army Corps of Engineers. The three-
volume work, one volume of which is classi-
fied secret while the others are in the "official
use only" category, indicates that com-
manders in Vietnam plate little military
value on the use of herbicides. Although the
battlefield use of tear gas may figure in War
College scenarios, experience in Vietnam has
demonstrated that the enemy can easily
equip his troops with, or train them to
improvise, breathing apparatus that renders
the gas ineffective. Why, then, does the mili-
tary persist fn retaining the option for
herbicides and tear gas, continue to rein-
force its capability for chemical warfare,
and though the matter is uncertain, to
dabble further whit biological agents?
The answer is twofold: As Soviet-American
arms agreements tend toward effective re-
t�trietions on the development of ultimate
weapons, the military value of other weapons
systems rises commensurately, just as the
banning of firearms would elevate the mili-
tary value of bows and arTOWS. And, as is
clear from public. Indifference to the savage
air offensive that has replaced American
ground operations in Vietnam, the problem
is not to avoid war; rather, it is to avoid
shedding any great amount of American
blood. Hence, in the age of the nuclear stand-
off, the Pentagon is looking hard for highly
lethal, non-nuclear, low-manpower systems
that satisfy both military necessity and pub-
lic opinion. And CBW, Presidential protesta-
tions notwithstancliv� fits in nicely with
t hat quest.
Negotiations for arms-control agreements
With the Soviets have freque ntly foundered
on the issue of inspection, with the U.S. in-
ststing that its own inspectors, or perhaps an
international group, have the right to con-
duct on-the-spot cheeks of compliance. Yet
back home, the U.S. government seems un-
concerned about verifying whether its army
is in fact abiding by Prcendential directives
to engage only in "defensive" research. The
Executive's disregard fr-r Congress in mili-
tary and foreign affairs has been so thor-
ouehly demonstrated as to eliminate any
realistic prospect for defective Congreenoe.al
scrutiny. V.'hen Com.ress has questioned the
military use of weather, modification In
Southeast Asia, for example, Defense's long-
standing reply has been, in effect, that it is
none of your business.
If there is ever an inspection agreement
with the Sot-lets on CBW, it will have an -
Ironic benefit: The American public will have
rea.son to believe government accounts of
wlmt is going on in U.S. military laboratories.
.AID TO TRIEU
Mr, GRAVEL. Mr. Preident, there has
been a great deal of controversy over
whether or not the United States should
continue its programs of military and
economic aid to the South Vietnamese
Government of President Nguyen Van
Thicu. It is a question of central impor-
tance to the peace negotiations in Paris,
and the answer finally given will be cru-
cial to the direction U.S. foreign policy
following in the future.
In spite of the great importance the
resolution of this issue one way or the
other will have, very few Americans are
actually aAvare of the extent of this aid
or the purposes it serves. Recognizing
this lack of information. Le Anh Tu and
Marilyn McNabb of National _Action /Re-
search on the Military-Industrial Com-
plex have prepared a special report, en-
titled "Aid to Thieu", which traces the
history of U.S. aid to South Vietnam as
well as the ongoing day-to-day programs
in that country which U.S. dollars fi-
nance. I think members of the Senate
and their constituents will find this re-
port of interest, and I ask unanimous
consent that. it he printed in tbe REcoRD
at this point.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
An) TO Tin su
DEADLOCIi o.N" MD
The Paris peace talks often ridiculed as
"propaganda forums," have actually re-
vealed many areas of agreement. The United
States, the Saigon government, the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government of South
Vietnam' (called the "Vie�teong" in the
American press) and the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam ("Hanoi") ell agree in prin-
ciple to the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the
release of war prisoners, internationally
supervised free elections, antt even to a coali-
tion government.
� Yet the talks are deadlocked. One question
remains unresolved : should the U.S. continue
Its aid to Tilton? The FRG insists that this
aid must be stopped. The U.S. is equally
stubborn. Both parties fc el that their vital
interests are involved on what might appear
to be a minor Issue.
To clarify the dispute over aid to 'mien,
this paper will review U.S. assistance pro-
grams in South Vietnam. Special attention
will be paid to projects that are considered
to be of high priority by the U.S. We will
attempt to describe the effects of these pro-
Footnotes at end of article.
grams on the Vietnamese peopier whom
they are designed, and to dtTermine how
much the U.S. has spent cm these projects.
The U.S.-sponsored programs are well
known to Vietnamese but not so familiar to
American citizens who pay for them,
Our main source of information is the
hearings held each year in Congress to ex-
amine how American taxpayers' dollars are
spent in Vietnam. Supplementary sources
Include U.S. government publications and
news reports from Saigon and Western news-
papers.
2. THE SenING ROUND-UPS
Most news reports on the spring 1972 of-
fensive told of dramatic military clashes.
Less mention was made of certain actions
taken by the Thieu government which were
made possible only by U.S. aid.
While U.S. bombers were pounding the
contested and "enemy"-controlled areas of
Vietnam, Thieu's police, accompanied by
American advisers, = were rounding up thou-
sands_ -of suspected "Communist sympa-
thizers" in the so-called "secure" areas., The
spring offensive increased the regime's fear
of trouble from internal dissenters. On May
26, 1.372 the Buddhist Student Aseociation
In Saigon announced the arrest and im-
prisonment of the entire leadership of many
student organizations and civil rights groups
in South Vietnam. 4 Relatives of known polit-
ical activists have also been taken into CUS-
LOCIY, and held as hostages.'
A former New York Times Saigon corre-
spondent and veteran observer of the war,
Tom Fox, describes the far-reaching effects
of this crackdown:
"Nearly everyone known to have been an
outspoken critic- of the Thieu government�
and not protected by international recog-
nition�has suffered at the hands of the
powerful National Police In recent weeks.
"In Hue alone, more than 1500 have been
arrested and most have been taken to Con
Son prison iSland, an island which for dec-
ades has confined critics of French and
American supported governments. Vs'omen
and children have been rounded up among
the 'political suspicious'�and taken by
police to Con Son.
"We've arrested the entire student body
of Hue," 'loans, -Duo Nha, President Thieu's
press secretary recently stated flatly...
"In many cases people have been arrested
solely because they have relatives in the
ELI' or in North Vietnam
"A louver house Deputy front a Delta prov-
ince said the police have come into villages
and picked up men in their eighties who
have not left their home for years, forcing
them into small prison cells. 'Even village
and hamlet chiefs and officers in the Saigon
army are being arrested and interrogated,'
Ile added."
The ground for these arrests, having "Com-
munist sympathies," are broadly interpreted.
They extend to all political opponents of the
Thieu regime. especially those having credi-
bility anti influence with the general pop-
ulace. Those arrested include student or-
ganizers, religious leaders, and newspaper
editors.
"In Longxuyen Province, an area dominated
by the lies Mao religious sect, seVeral hun-
drecl university students held a rally to pro-
test a decree tinder which most of them
would be drafted. Although anti-American
banners were dieplayed�"The students and
people will not die for the interests of the
imperialists"�the police clict not intervene.
Later, however, leaders of the tally were
reportedly arrested.
"Other arrests of student leaders appear
to have had little to do with public demon-
strations.
"A Roman Catholic priest In Saigon said
he conservatively estimated that nine local
leaders of the Catholic Labor Youth Move-
ment had 'been arrested and that half a
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THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC EEVIEW
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Lon Nol's dilemma
By Edith Lenart
Paris: President Richard Nixon wrote a
personal letter to his Cambodian coun-
terpart, Lon Nol, shortly after last
month's National Assembly elections,
asking the Marshal to nominate a vice-
president and to include Opposition
.members in the new government. What
had already disturbed the White House
was the fact that Lon Nol had not
bothered to take a running mate: the
Cambodian Constitution invests much
power in the president, and Lon Nol is a
.very sick man. The Americans were dis-
turbed further when Sink alatak and In
Tam � leaders of the Republican and
Democratic parties respectively � decid-
ed to boycott the poll because they con-
sidered the electoral law unconstitu-
tional.
if President Nixon's demand for a
multi-party government upset the Lon
Nol-Lon Non duo's plan to consolidate
their position, his request for a vice-pre-
sident doubtless gave them splitting
headaches. Apart from Nixon's need to
see a more efficient and representative
government in Phnom Penh, his demand
for a vice-presidential nominee may in-
dicate a desire to prepare Cambodia for
the possibility of a negotiated settle-
ment to the Indochina War.
The choice of a vice-president and im-
portant Cabinet figures involves per-
sonal, elan and party interests: who can
be useful, who can be trusted and who
can be manipulated. There would ap-
pear to be four candidates for the vice-
:presidency: Son Ngoc Thanh, Sink
Matak, In Tam and Au ChNoe.
If the political scene in fundamental-
ly apolitical Cambodia is highly compli-
cated, Son Ngoc Thanh's position seems
-
Sink Matak; In Tam; ailing Lon No!:
Letter from Washington.
even more so. Born in what is now
South Vietnam, he is remembered for
his anti-French and pro-Japanese posi-
tion; his anti-monarchy stand; his co-
operation with the Vietminh; his long
exile in Saigon; and his connections
with the CIA. Although he is currently
Prime Minister, it is not clear whether
he is working for the Lon Nol-Lon Non
combination Or simply using it for his
own ends. Apparently he has the back-
ing of a group of Phnom Penh republi-
cans and intellectuals who would rather
have an accommodation with the Khmer
Rouge than see Norodom Sihanouk
back in Cambodia; this group has been
encouraged by Soviet promises that, in
the event of a settlement, Moscow will
see to it that North Vietnamese and
NLF forces withdraw and that Sihanouk
does not return to the country.
Sink Matak's position is much clear-
er. Considered an agile politician and a
capable administrator in Cambodian
terms� he has the backing of business in-
terests and some sectors of the military
as well as that of the Americans, the
Japanese and the French. Because he is
a member of the Sisowath branch of the
royal family, the republicans suspect
him of royalist leanings � if not for
Sihanouk, then for himself,
This leaves In Tam and Au Chitloe. In
Tam, a former general, has considerable
popular support � especially in the
countryside � because he is a simple
and honest man who fought side-by-side
with the people instead of directiniathe
�-��:-�"'ef�-.�
war from an armchair in Phnom Penh.
But since he has no political or .clan
backing, he would have to fall in with
one of the other contenders for political
power. Au Chhloe has little to recom-
mend him; an adviser to Lon Nol, he
served Sihanouk in several cabinets.
Should he be chosen as vice-president;
the post would be deprived of every ves-
tige of power.
SOUTH VIETNAM
Strangling the ICC
By Benjamin Cherry - �
Saigon: "We are ready for a ceasefire
[but] to secure against the communists
taking advantage of such a ceasefire,
there must be conditions and the most
important is the setting up of an inter-
national control committee." On the
day President Nguyen Van Thieu made
this remark in a speech to government
officials, professors and students at Sai-
gon University's Faculty of Medicine
last week, the last members of the In-
dian delegation to the existing Interna-
tional Control Commission were leaving
Saigon for their new headquarters �
Hanoi.
Friction between the Indian delega-
tion and the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment came to a head in January when
New Delhi raised its diplomatic mission
in Hanoi to embassy level, while declin-
.,
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11 Sept 1912
(b)(3)
Union, was about to leave on a
similar trip to China. For Kosygin it
must have been an intensely uneasy
ride. News bad already reached him
. of the coup d'etat that had shaken
Cambodia the clay before � a coup
designed specifically to depose
Sihanouk And reverse his politics of
neutrality. It was not until they
actually reached the airport and the i
Russian leader was certain that the
Prince would definitely board the
plane for Peking that he shared his
secret with Sihanouk. The Soviet
Chairman must have been well aware
that the Right-wing, military in-
stigators of the coup, led by General
Lon No!, had let out the bath-water
and he was determined not to be left
holding the baby. Let's see how the
Chinese comrades cope with this one,
he must have thought.
The Chinese have shown a re-
markable ability to embrace the
glaring contradictions raised by the
presence in their midst of the
descendant of Cambodia's God-
kings � the incomparable, irrepres-
sible, unpredictable, laughing and
volcanic prince who for nearly three
decades ruled his country as an
anxious but determinedly individual-
istic mother might guard her off-
spring. The exile of Sihanouk is not
�
rince Norodom Sihanouk, the ruler of Cambodiadeposed in
1970, has not followed othor cx-kings into idle and luxurious exile in
the south of France. J.ns.tead
he is ea( mg an �eilv-c..
Peking, a Prince among the People, rallying his country behind the
guerrilas who are fighting to overthrow the Right-wing regime
at prosent controlling Cambodia. Nio Teitelboxz reports on the
changed life and times of this descendant of Gad-kings who is now
a feted comrade of Chairman Mao
Early in the morning of May 19,
1970, a more than usually sombre
Alexci Kosygin and Cambodia's
jovial Head of State, Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, were in a car heading for
Moscow airport. Sihanouk, Who had on Sihanouk's side. He is still young.
been on a brief visit to the Soviet In spite of the long and sensational
role he has played in political life,
October 22 will be only his 50th
birthday. Besides which, guided by
his stubbornly optimistic nature, he
has chosen not to resign himself, but
to fight.
It looks as if the time is fast
approaching when Sihanouk will be
able to return to his country. He is
convinced of it, and the Chinese tend
to regard his stay with them as akin
to that of de Gaulle in London during
the war. The comparison fits in more
ways than one. Sihanouk's relation-
ship to Cambodia has always had
much of the nationalistic,
paternalistic passion which de Gaulle
fostered for France � both of them
finding it extremely difficult to
separate their identity from that of
the State.
Hardly a month goes by in
Peking without some public tribute
to the prince. Portraits of the veteran
Marxist-Leninist hero, Mao Tse-
tung, hang � beside those of the
descendant of the Lord of the
Universe, Sihanouk. At official
banquets, the rather austere Prime
Minister of the People, Chou En-lai,
is often to be found seated next to
the cheerful, Cambodian comrade.
The former Khmer king who
used to jet around the world now
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that of a Farouk, not the last
desperate pleasure-seeking whirl of
night-club life in Western capitals
with no hope of return to the mother-
country. Time and circumstances are
confines himself to journeys between
Peking, Hanoi and Pyongyang. He
does so, as always, with a smile. His
sense of humour has rot deserted
him, nor has he abandoned his
habitual frankness. The thoughts of
Sihanouk, intensely personal and
often outrageous, make a striking
contrast with the thoughts of Chair-
man Mao. He is no Communist and
the Chinese know this. He admits to
a profound confusion over Marxist
ideology, a tendency to lose himself
in what he sees as the complex maze
of differences between contending
schools of thought. His own Socialism
is compounded of a mixture of
Buddhism, anti-Imperialism and a
totally subjective, fierce love of
Cambodia.
He has, nevertheless, chosen to
act as the unifying symbol of the
revolutionary guerrilla forces which
are, at the moment, literally rocket-
ing ahead in their bid to break the
present regime in Phnom Penh. So
Sihanouk's closest friends and allies
now come not from international
court circles but from the Marxist
International.
The combination of royal deter-
mination and peasant resistance is
wreaking havoc with the already
enfeebled government in
continued
.21 A 0,1,,V.I.e,/,'�� �����"PSISS
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77
ornei _LL r
�
By George C.� Wilson
Washingtonyost Staff Writer
A charge by President
Nixon; and others that ' the
North Vietnamese murdered
up to 500,000 of their own
people when they took over
'the country in the I950s is a
-"myth," according to et study
circulated yesterday by Cor-
nell Universi1y.
The charges are dispatched
in a 59-page essay by D. Gareth
Porter, a 30-year-old research
� associate at Cornell's inter-
Jlational�relations of East Asia
-project. Corne.11's project of-
fice, in sending out the re-
port, said, it deserves "home-
. widi,spread public at-
:IR/Alan' because .of Mr. Nix-
on's frequent references to
-the alleged bloodbath in
North 'Vietnam.
, ThINT Iri: �-tl- 77 , . . - 7
,IL N 0 V tilie Liii Laftne se
'ese after they took over from tively . � "are not the totality" of the
_
we a I thy 'landowner "material the White house r
the South . . .". , e-
Porter claims on the basis of lied upon. Also, said Brewster,
. The President added at that: an interview with Chi. Thus, it is the trend that is most im-
same news conference that "if he argues, Chi could not be Portant, net specific figures.
the united states were to fail expected to give an unbiased in that - sense, he said, the
in Vietnam, if the Communists : .i.ktnCrgtrianntl: such as North Vietnamese as-
of the land reform ' trend of Communist actm i,
were to take over, the blood-
s,
bath that would. follow woulci,j Western authors like- Pall sassinations in nue, shows
,
be a blot on this nation's his-! says Porter, suffered a �criii...
fears of a bleodhath in South.
tory from which we would L cal" shortcoming because they i Vietnam are indeed well
fuud it very difficult to return , could not read Vietnamese. founded, just as President
� . � , I and. thus could not research Nix" has stated'
Asked by Porter to docud the original documents the Porter himself said in an in-
ment the President's "half a I North ! Vietnamese used - to terview that he has filed 'for
. million" figure, the National : communicate with their own conscientious objector status .
Security Council quoted Chi'. cadre. Fall and others, there- and would decline to serve in
as writing the following: "The fore, had to rely on Saigon the military in the Vietnam
guilt complex which haunted
and U.S. government summa- war. He is on a YearlantItI fel-1
- I
!the peasants' minds -ift-er the I ries of the North Vietnamese lowship, S5,000 for the acat-
i massacre of about 5 per cent; material or on Alt�hors like lea,li(* rar'1�,-I'lirs�;;tI of his
I of the! total population , , ," i Chi. (Porter reads Vietnamese, noetorate - e,t Cornet.i's ..c.,ast
:. The National Security Council I and said in an interview that ,Asia research center.
, edded on its own that te5 per this. enabled him to study (lee-
cent of the total population of ! uments that went to North Vi-
North Vietnam at that timeIetnalnese cadre from Pm-1Y
,
"This bloodbath myth is the would be about 700,000." leaders.)
I
result of a deliberate propa-il "Mr. Chi. offers no justifier- .,. In an attempt: to show the
ganda campaign by the South !. non, for tins -allegation" that 5 . danger relying on summaries
Vietnamese and U.S. govern-. per cent -of the North Viet- and /Other secondary sources,
ments to discredit" North namese population wa.s inm._ Porter charges Chi distorted a
(Lao-
Vietnam, Porter says in sum- � demi, ass�erts Porter, "but he ' ,North Vileilliamcse PartY
the, ' Paper he re-.1 suggests at one point that � "rig
marizing Party) .slogan by saying
searched. in South Vietnam most of the deaths were those it included the Phrase; "11(P-ti-
mid . at �Cornell. 'Porter has of ehildren.who starved 'owing d".le the landlords." There was
been a critic of the Vietnam to the isolation policy.' " no such phrase, Porter asserts.
Instead, h ' e alleges the slogan
Charges Porter: "This is yet ' '
said.: "Abolish the feudal re-
another of the many wholly .
, r,f is 1 d ; � / ' fl �
war.
The prime sduree for Presi-
dent Nixon, author Bernard
/it en
c.71
Er7bi
'11
. ----
unsubstantiated charges Put manner that is discriminating,
Fall and others in describing � forth by Mr. .Chi, for there
'the alleged massacre -during methodical and under sound
was no such policy of isolating leadership."
the North Vietnamese land re- farnilles, even of those land- .
form from 1053 to 1966 is a . Ile charges Chi also mistran-
lords sentenced for serious
crimes - during the land i slated Gen. Vo Nguyen Clap's
book guilty. of "g.ross misquo-
tation" and "fraudulent docu- speech of Oct. 29, 1956, on
reform . � . 1
mentation," Porter alleges. 'land reform. Giap, according
"Vet- it is mainly the t on
-- --' 1 the Chi's translation, said. the
, - The book Porter cites is en- basis of Mr. Chi's totally unre-1
.. ,. titled, "From Colonialism to liable account, the intention of party "executed top many lion-
1.;" Communism,". by Illoang Van which was plainly not Ii store 1 es( people" and came to re-
Chi. Chi's book--published in ,gard torture as normal prac-
cal leCLIn C.' hilt )1- ) "' "I !tiee.
1964� /was financed and pro- . � a , ' -
. kruoi.cd by such us. tige_ against North Vietnam, says
i
tica: Porter, "that the President of
as the Central Intelligence the United States himself has
Agency, according to Porter. told the American people that
Chi, now it course chairman' 'a half a million' " people
,
in Southeast Asia orientation were exterminated,
at the . State Department's � In contrast to CIA's descrip-
9
Washingten Training Center, , lin f Chi as a "'former Viet-
waso at Et. Bragg, N.C., leetur- : minh cadiT" ' who could %thus
[lig and could not be reached be cl'Ill'"10- to have firsthand
for 'comment yesterday. knoIwiedge 01 the land reforni
The National Securit:y of Couni program, 'Porter asserts � that
cil cited Chi' a
Chi was never a party member
is book s one �
President Mixon's sources forI ,_l.i,�2u tnam . ftwe Ileaving the North for
�
declaring on April 16, 1971, "I, Nixon's bloodbath .figures with
i
think ef a half a million, by � Mr. (A was himself rela-
. ' Porter. Brewster told. The-
Comparing the Vietnamese
original text Of Giap's.speechi
with the Chi and Porter trans.'
lations -(which Porter said
other scholars and Vietnamese
corroborated), Porter alleges
that "Mn-. Chi's translation is
one of his most flagrant
abuses of documentary evi-
dence."
Donald Brewster is the Na-
tional Security Council staffer
(on loan there from AID) wl,m
discussed the source of Mr.
'Washington Post yesterilay
ihat real and literal meanings
of. Communist statements are
sometimes two different,
things,
Brewster added that the
sources he cited for Porter
b).(3)
conservative estimates, in i
North Vietnam who were mur-
dered or otherwise extermi-
nated by the North Vietnam-I
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(b)(3))
IFLIEK.) Jr. COON
Mr. Cook,. a long-time contributor to The Nation, is the
author of many books, including the iecently published The
Nightmare Decade: The Life and Times of Senator Joe
McCarthy � (Random House).
. �
The, most damning document to come out of the war in �
Vietnam has now struggled into the light in this. election
year It Was indeed a struggle: the disclosures were ,
squelched for years by the highest arms of the American
bureaucracy; the pith of the message was ignored by the
Senate .subcommittee, headed by Abraham RibicofT, which
exposed the PX scandals; the revelations were verified by
one of Life's top journalists-7-and pushed iside in favor
of the incident on the bridge at.Chappaquiddick; the truth
-set forth was too much, for major American .publishing
houses, and in the end was published in Great Britain,
coming to the American market on the rebound through
the David McKay Company.
This bombshell is The Greedy War, 'a 278-page book
Written by the British journalist James Hamilton-Paterson
and detailing the Vietnamese experiences of Cornelius
Hawkridge, a dedicated anti-Communist who spent seven
and a half horrible years in Russian and Hungarian prison
camps before' escaping' to the United States, Hawkridge
and Hamilton-Paterson call the war greedy and' the con-
tents 'of this book fully justify the epithet. Hawkridge
was born in Transylvania, the son of a Hungarian mother
..and a British father, _a . colonel in the Hungarian police
force: His passionate hatred of. communism and the Rus-
sians led him intoprotests and guerrilla actions�and into
those long years in prison. He Came to America believIng
all the dogmas of the cold war and eager to aid as a
security offiper in What he considered a holy crusade.
The Dominican upheaval in 1965, in which Hawkridge
could not find the Communists President Lyndon B. John--
son assured us we were opposing, was the first disillusion-
ment. Then Came Vietnam. Hawkridge's first day in the
field there in 1966 was a shocker. Hehad.his nose rubbed
immediately in the stinking squalor of the refugee camps
of Qui:MI(3n. More than 2,000 refugees were living in pa-
Per shacks built largely of discarded American packing
cases. Three contaminated wells provided the only drinking �
water. There were no -sanitary facilities. "The inmates
defecated between the rows of pa-per homes and the sloW
seep of ordure crept up the pulp walls." Hawkridge asked
,a -Priest what had; happened to all the USAID. "Stolen,"
the priest said simply. "It's taken by the ;Vietnamese Gov-
ernment.�
Hawkridge. soon discovered that virtually everything
was being stolen. Only the smallest trickle of supplies
and war materiel being shipped to Vietnam in such
prodigious, multibillion-dollar amounts ever reached their
intended destinations. The Qui Nhon marketplace, an- area
.of a good-sized block next to the refugee tamp, was ..
stocked with "C-rations, K-rations, drink, clothing, guns,
cannons, shells,. cases of grenades, television sets, washing
machines . . the mounds seemed limitless." So Hamilton-
Paterson writes describing H awkndge s dIscoveria. Won-
&ring. what limits there were he asked a Vietnamese
stallholder whether he could buy a tank, Tanks are a bit
difficult right now,' this man admitted, but how about
some armored personnel carriers? Or helicopters, of course.
, Or how about a heavy-duty truck?" -
'What the hell goes' on?, Hawkridge thought. And he
rushed to' tell American authorities what he had ..found.
They were bland, uninterested. Washington, in .its holy-
crusade delusion, had concluded agreements with the
South Vietnamese that tied the hands of any security
agent who tried to put an end to the- national pastime----
wholesale looting. Two provisions were critical: trucks
could be driven only by South Vietnamese drivers; arid
only .South Vietnamese police could make arrests. Even
if an Anierican security agent 'like Hawkridge trapped
hijackers. in the act, he was forbidden to lay' a finger on
them; he had to call in the South Vietnamese police. Arid
when they arrived, they-simply collaborated in the looting.
Here, in capsule form, are some of the .things Hawk-
ridge learned and some of his experiences:
liSouth Vietnam all �but. sank into the sea under the
of the tons of black-and-white televiSion sets,
radios, spin, driers, untaxed diamonds and odier com-
modities produced by a society of conspicuous consump-
tion and -shipped off to Vietnam to win what must be
one of the most curious wars in history.
-The port of Qui. Nhon was clogged with shipping, a
fleet that spread out to the horizon, Some of the - ships
\\railed for.nionths to unload; meanwhile small boats plied
out to their) in the night and sometimes in the clay; and
so, when they finally reached a pier, some 60 per cent of
their cargoes had vanished.
SiThe United States shipped enough cement into South
Vietnam to pavC the entire nation, but there was a chronic
shortage of cement to extend airfield runways and erect
facilities.. And the Vietcong always had 'a superabundance
with which to build their individual bomb shelters.
�On one occasion a truck containing several hundred
TV sets was hijacked, tracked down in Tu Due and turned
.over to the South Vietnamese police. Rawl:ridge went to
reclaim this .U.S. property, but was told he would have to'
get a .Vietnamese driver to take the truck away. By the
time be had 'found a driver, the truck had been stripped
of its contents right in the police compound.
SOne night Hawkridge was following a hijacked truck,
-mystified because the Vietnamese were ripping open pack-
ages in disgust and tossing them into ditche,s at the rout-
side. Hawkridge kept stopping and picking up the
packages. They were a consignment of aircraft parts for
fighter squadrons at Bien Hoa. When Hawkridge arrived
at the air base, he was hailed almost as a _savior because
.several jets had been grounded for lack of spare parts.
�Another time, Hawkridge chased a hijacked truck
right into a compound belonging to the South Vietnamese
Security Police. The panicked driver sped across the com-
pound,'forgetting there was a river on the other side, and
braked to a. halt at the last second with the front wheels
_
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SLP
(b)(3)
T-DE AMERICAN SOLDIERS who work
� With them inNietnam speak re-
spectfully of the "ROK Marines."
Technically, ROK indicates their
place of origin----the Republic of KO-
. rea (South Korea); But the Amer-
icans utter the term as if it were
"Rock," and as though it referred to
their , physical ,.conditioning and the
state .of their sensibilities: as soldiers
they are brutal, licentious and they get
�results. Militarily, they arc trusted by
the American high command, which�
. in the current fighting�has 'assigned
them the responsibility of keeping the
vital: An Khe Pass !open and preventing
South Vietnam, from being split in half.
Some 37,000, of these troops .are
presently engaged in South Vietnam.
: Referred to pretentiously as "allies,"
their involvement is said to, arise from
ideological commitment to the cause
a freedom, national self-interest, or
some other self-serving platitude. In,
fact, they are latter-day Samurai, hired
guns of the Orient, who have sold their
services to Washington for the dtira-
'lion.
. To be specific, the normal salarY of
� a ROK army private i's $1.60 a month.
But if, that private elects to serve in
Vietnam, he can earn 23 times that
amount, or $37.50 a month. In one
day, he earns almost as much as he
would have made in a whole . month
had he remained in his homeland--
courtesy, to be sure, of the American
taxpayer. The middleman of this op-
eration is the government of South
Koica,� which receives a kickback of
well over $300 million per year for t:.a
service. '
. Such - "allies" are to mercenaries
what a "protective reaction raid'' is to
an unprovoked strike and what an "in-
cursion" is to � an invasion�namely,
the same thing. �
For some time now, persistent' re-
ports have linked these mercenary Ko-
reans to brutalities in Vietnam which
- would make Rusty Calley, blush. In
'June, the Alternative Feature. Servicg
by James Otis
Activities in RAND Interviews," and
thereby made public What the Amer-
ican government has known for at least
six years. The 1966 document is re-
plete with these stories of barbarity
whin Americans have learned how to
take in and ignore:
O "When they Came to the VC-con-
trolled areas ... they raped the women
in those areas. There. were times they
killed the women after they had raped
them. I heard just rec'ently women
were raped and killed. The people Were
so frightened of the Korean troops,
they didn't dare to stay in their hoines
but moved away." (from a 'National
� .� � '
Liberation Front deserter)
* ". . . only 50 villagers still lagged
behind. Most of them .were women,
children and elderlY people. The Ko-
rean soldiers rounded them up in one
place. The people thought: that they
were to be evacuated to the GVN-con-.
trolled areas by helicopters. . . . The
Koreans suddenly pointed their gunS at
the crowd and opened fire. .Only two
babies of two and three survived. They
crawled on their mothers' bellies."
(from a refugee)
". � when the Korean troops
came, they called all the old women
and children down in the trenches to
come up. Then these people were told
to sit in circles. Afterward, the Ko-
rean troops, machine-gunned them."
(from an NLF prisoner)
O "Everybody agreed that the Ko-
reans Were barbarous., They went on
operations without interpreters .going
along. They killed at random without
distinguishing between the rights and
wrongs. Some people said it. was be-
cause the VC mixed themselves with
the villagers, and thus the Koreans
.couldn't help. making a mistake. I don't
think their reasoning was right. I don't
J.
see why the Koreans
children. 'Kids of two, three, or even
five or 'seven years weren't VC. They
also burned the paddy and the people's
houses. They burned the cow-pens and
the animals inside too. Cows are cer-
tainly not VC!" (from a refugee) .
The introduction to the document
notes that "no effort has been made to
ascertain the. veracity of the statements
made by the interviewees." And AFS
quotes former RAND analyst Melvin
Gurtov as saying that the report was
"a draft circulated for comments .
as opposed to a published study." It
would be. a mistake to surmise, how-
ever, that this report outlines the full
extent.of the U.S.. government's infor-
mation about South Korean murders
� in Vietnam. On the contrary, Amer-
ican . officials have received at least
three other major reports on the sub-
ject.
Oh January -10, 1970, A. Terry Ram-
bo, a graduate student at the. Univer-
sity � of. Hawaii, told the New � York
Times that he had reported the exten-
sive killing of civilians by South Ko-
rean troops to U.S. Army officers in
Vietnam in 1966, but the information
had been suppressed. Rambo and two
colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John
D. Lenciir, Were researchers for Hu-
man Sciences Research (1-ISR), Inc.,
McLean, Virginia, on a refugee inter-
view 'project for ' the Pentagon's Ad.:.
vanced Research PrOjects Agency. �
Rambo took the atrocity information
to American officials in Vietnam. He
� briefed a "group of ranking American
officers in . Saigon about the report."
The 'result: Rambo was "ordered by a
general officer of the MACV [Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam] staff
to cease; investigating the Koreans�
and. no mention of it was to be made
in our reports."
� The Rambo team prepared two re-
ports, one without atrocity informa-
tion, one with it. This was done, ac-
cording to. Tinker, because they "knew
that if our report contained anything.
about murders it would be classified
'''') ,
1 I 4 i t
I,.tel -I.. J.241.'k,_
should kill the
(b)(3)
(AFS) of Berkeley, California released.
a heretofore secret study by the RAND
Corporation, entitled �.innocuously
cnough�"Me. ntion of Korean Troop
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POntinued
ts
The'pilbt cheol .�up, flicking on the
"get-ready" light to alert the-Tibetan
.agents who'd be jumping, and .the
plane crew who would kick the supplies
'.� out "Go" he yelled and switched
on the buzzer.- -th
ust ae-the last chute opened, the old
Aane was suddenly rocked by deadly
Communist 37mm.antiaircraft fire and.
the'pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam--
ambush! Somebody talked ....._the
-bastards.were waiting for us:"
� Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
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MAN' c MAGAZINE
September 1972
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THE -OLD WORLD WAR TWO 0-45 bounceo `� But he managed to drop down and
and yawed in the violent turbulence as Contour fly the valley floors, below the
Its tWin cngines strained to maintain 160 Red radar, and just after dawn they
2- knots. its American pilot gripped the landed back at their base. They climbed-
:Controls with every ounce of strength he � .from the plane, their gray uniforms
could muster, and his eyes ached from Soaked through vfith sweat,.and.the pilot
" the strain of searching the darkness-
mu ere d for the thousandth time, "There's gotta
-; to avoid the towering Himalayan be an easier way to make a buck."-
. � mountains on each side. The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished
taken off from a secret base over to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were
three hews ago arid were threading small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." Tha
� only other identitying marks were the fresh
� � � 37mm.holes in the left viing panels.
ThroughoOt Asia, people have come to.recognize
these strange aircraft and their even stranger
American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to�
spot them wherever you are.-They!re the guys
in the grey Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps,
_cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their '
sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy
.Wona-section of Hong Kong or -racing motor
their way east of the Tibetan capital of
Lhasajong occupied by the forces
of.Red China. Their mission: drop
,agerits and supplies to a band of Tibetan
� guerrillas Who were still fighting
the'Communists. .
5:The cppilot,.sweating over the air chart
,:.Lirrhis lap, tried to guide them to the
drop zone that a mysterious American
� ,"civilian"- at their 1..).1se had earlier
-described. "Hold your course," he--
elled:.!'Another two minutes should bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the
yputus right on." �-' � girls at the Vieng-Rattay Club in Vientiane.
. :They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air
America, one.of the world's least known .airlines.
Many. are "old .China -hands"_who first
began flying for the "outirtabk when mainland
China belonged to Chiang Kai,shelc.,They're
last of that breed-known.as soldiers of fortune,.
.and those devil-MaY-care rnerr.,scnarics
continued
Part 1
HANOI, SOFFIT-I ITTRITIMAN TNT q'TIPITCYZI,T1
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(b)(3)
.
the
Editor's note. � The Nixon administration has been striving to foster the Nguyen Van
Thieu regime as a tool for the " Vietnamization " of the war. But no glossy veheer can hide the
hater's nature as a traitorous clique, a gang of robbers trading in prostitutes, drags and war means,
a band of political speculators, blach-marketeers and endlesztcrs who have been plundering "aid
� lands and the salaries and wages of their own civil servants and soldiers -- all this under American.
protection. The following inquiry by Thanh Nam exposes part of this corrupt and rotten US-puppet
-regime.
SAIGO.N, in early 5972.
Tens of thousands of Honda and Suzuki
motorbikes and Mercedes- and Dats-tin sedans
of every colour and hue rush along, belching clouds
of exhaust fumes which ruin the foliage and flowers
'of the trees lining the streets.
The 3.6 milliOn people of Saigon live crowd-d
in eleven districts. High-rise US-style buildings of
nine, ten, eleven storeys tower insolently in Doug
Klianli and Ngayen Hue avenues while along muddy
and refuse-strewn odic!) s in workers' quarters at
Chtiong Duong, Binh Dung and Cholon. whole fami-
lies are crarmned into shanties of thatch, tin and
card-board.
�
.The number of Americans in military uniform
has decreased a great deal. More and more snack-
bars, �Turkish-bath establishments and massage
parlors catering to the. American soldiery are
closing down. American military police continue
to stalk about, but in dwindling numbers.
' And yet, while the war is being " Vietnamized,."
the American presence remains intact, overwhelm-
ing, in this city. It seems to have grown even
heavier., more stifling:The scream of American jets
keeps coming from the Tan Son N hut airfield.
Crowds of American civilians and air force officers
continue to throng Tu Do boulevard. The ..Ainerican.
hand, the tricks oi old Bunker, the desperate
moves of President Nixon to avoid checkmate, zis
well as the histlionics of Utica, Ituong, ihiiiss and
Co. are still daily topics of discussion for the
Saigonese. People talk about the fiasco staring
Nixon' in the face, the inevitable departure of
Nguyen Van Thieu, the collapse of " Vietnamiza-
tion. " For the last seven or eight years, the
Saigonese people have had their ears full of the
" lofty mission of the Americans" in this country
and the " stability " of the " Second 'Republic. "
More and more clearly, the truth is appearing to
them.
�
The .fortress in the city
Everyone in Saigon knows about the new Amer-
ican fortress embassy, Bunker's residence. The old
embassy at the corner of Ham Nght and Vo Di
Nguy streets now serves only for the reception of
ordinary visitors and the delivery of passports
and visas. The new embassy is white-painted and
six storeys high, with a helicopter landing strip
on its terrace roof; where a chopper and its pilot
-are standing by. -at all hours of the day
and. night. The box-shaped building is set back
�some distance from the street, surrounded- by a
solid ferro-concrete wall, equipped with air-condi-
tiOners, electronic computers and a hot telephone
line linking it to the White Ifouse in Washington,
� and defended by machinegun nest. it is s'erved.
by a power-house in .the backyard. Military police
stand guard day and night. The Americans boast'
that all building materials catim from the United
States and that plans were drawn and construction
supervised by a renowned American military
engineer, at the cost of 2.25 million dollars. In
early 5975, in an interview with a French journal-
ist, Bunker bragged about the solidity of this
" White Ifouse " on the eastern shore of the
Pacific. The unimpressed Frenchman replied with
a wry smile: " Mr Ambassador, in my opinion,
the fortress style cf the �embassy building suits .
your name rather than ambassadorial. functions. "
Bunker's face showed that he was not amused by
the play on word. In fact, Bunker was no ordin-
ary ambassador and the unusual style of his
residence indeed fits his unusual assignment.
Bunker has been in Saigon for six consecutive
years. His is the most difficult. and dangerous job
ever held by an American diplomat in any period
of American history. Political circles in Saigon are
rife with stories and rumours about the man and
the policies he has been pursuing. in spite of his
76 years, Bunker is very fastidious about his clo-
thes, and the expensive caux de Cologne he uses
vary according to the season-and the occasion. He
has been, before his appointnwnt to Saigon, ambas-
sador to Argentina, Italy, India and Nepal.
The American press considers him as a skilful
trouble-shooter who shows cold toughness not only
to his adversaries but also to his allies. Saigon
politicians nickname him The Old Fridge, while
the Saigon press has dubbed him the Proc msul.
His business is to pull the strings on which Nvyen
Van Thien dances, and he seems to perform it.
well. Even when the ping is 'hard, he knows how .
to smooth away the obstacles. For instance he
would lower his voice and call Thieu by his name �
(instead of Mr President) and tell Inth : " ii he
United States is a great country, but one of her
foibles is to laek patience. So you should realize
that there arc. limits to American forbearance. "
Or he would say bluntly : " This has been decided
in Washington. Once our President has taken a
decision, there is no turning back. " Then the only
thing Thieu can du is to shut his mouth and stay
.quiet. If he doesn't, Bunker will have this clin-
, cher : " You know, Mr Thieu, Congress has become �
rather restive. They might reduce or even- cancel
some of the aid appropriations...'' And that settles it.
� The above are part of what the world press calls
the tactics of pressure-and blackmail, the main-
spring of Anierica a diplomacy. �
In fact, " Fridge " Bunker still has one more
trick reserved for when Thieu is really intractable.
He would smile and give- the latter a gentle tap on
the shoulder and say softly : " Mr Thieu, we happen
to know that you and Mrs Thieu have some person-
al financial- affairs to-settle. We should be glad to
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help." These comforting words arApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
rare circumstances, and,Thien never fails to report
them to San, his wife; with joy in his voice. Con-
crete details are then worked out between a Bunker
aide and General Dang Van Quang, security assist-
ant to " President ' Thieu and his financial
manager. Paltry sums of a few thousand or even a
few score thousand dollars can't be haggled about
by a " president " personally, can they ? When
agreement has been reached, a money tranfer would
be done in favour of one of Thieu's close relatives
by some American under the pretence of settling
some debt, to one of the bank accounts of the
Thieu family in Berne or Rome. In the budget of
the American State Department, nearly three
hundred million dollars are earmarked each year
for such unholy deals. The dollar is a fundamental
tool in Afnerican foreign policy.
This does not mean that Bunker's generosity can
be easily drawn upon. The richer one is, .the more
niggardly one is likely to be : such is a feature of
his society. Besides, Thien himself can drive a
hard bargain. And so, one sometimes sees Bunker's
black Cadillac shuttle back and forth between the
American embassy and " Independence Palace ",
some 700 yards distant. The winner in the end is, of
course, Bunker, but Thicu � never considers himself
a loser when, after the,. old man's departure, he
thrusts a hand into his 'pocket and feels his billfold.
(To be continued)
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Part 2
HANOI. SOUTH VIETNAM IN S1EUGGLE
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The place is .off limits to all. Vietnamese, includ-
2. - THE PENTAGON BY THE lug President Thieu, Defense Minister Nguyen Van
CAU BONG CANAL
� �
� WHEREAS the new US Embassy on Thong
Nhut boulevard employs only a few hundred
� personnel, the buildings of the American
military command in the southeastern part of Tan
Son Nhat airfield hum day and night with the
activity of over three thousand Americans and
Vietnamese of all arms and services. They are the
US Pacific Pentagon and serve as headquarters to
Westmoreland, then to Abrams and Weyand. The
din kicked up by jets and choppers. taking off and
landing day and night makes the chronic pandemo-�
Mum reigning at MACV even worse.
Whenever tipsy Americans lurching along TIT Do
� boulevard clamber aboard blue-painted taxis late
at night and bark out : "Macvee ! " the driver
knows that he is to drive down Cong Ly road,
cross the Cau Bong canal and take his passengers
to the US Pacific Pentagon.
In spi.te of its name,- United States Military Ad-
visory Command in Viet Nara (USMACV), everyone
knows that it is the supreme headquarters of all
military forces under American command in all
battlefields in Viet Nam and tndochina. Once
a colonel of the Operations Department of the
MACV petitioned Defense Secretary Melvin Laird
that olficers in the Pentagon by the Potomac river
should be sent here by turns, for ".here we arc
waging war and living in a war atmosphere and '
. are likely to reap useful experience for the US
armed forces. "
At their clubs here, American officers talk a
great deal about their 'commander, a burly general -
of the US armoured corps, with a square face and
a black cigar sticking out of a. corner of his mouth,
much less talkative and boastful than Westmoreland
but certainly not less ambitious. After Westy's
e` search and destroy " strategy was shelved, Abrams
put
forward his own : to launch gimrilla style
� P _
small-unit attacks on the adversary's rear areas. along what the GIs have been calling " Drunkards
Say '\l \( American c Ti "lie use his forces Alley." 7chey live there under Vietnainese mimes
very sparingly and counts every pound of rice seized � take Vietniunese wives (up to three apiece) who
from the enemy." Some staff officers make light bear them several children, and make a living
of his talents and chiubt his :OA 1 ity �for st b raterdc tha rogh smUggling md hold-up, with a ttenckint
command, especially since the ill-fated Lam Son rape and murder. They. are equipped with sub- �
719 operation in Laos. Once an American official machiliegans and pistols and ally themselves with
told a Vietnamese friend : "Abrams Call command a local toughies in setting up gangs bearing such
tank squadron, or a division, bat net this big war." names as "Skull " and " Zebra, " specializing in
. This big war is besides not limited to south assassination and abduction and threatening the
Viet Nam. lives and security of people in all eleven districts
On the the ground floor of this Asian pentagon, of the city. That is the only, success so far of
next to the General Situation room, where the war " Vietnamizat ion " in Saigon.
in South Viet Nam is being followed, are the Cain- While the Asian Pentagon hums with frantic.
� bodiatt and Lao war rooms, and also the North Viet activity, the Saigon Defence Department building
Nam war room under the supervision of an air on Gia. Long boulevard looks deserted. Once, none
force colonel of the 7th Air Force. sa there are other than Nguyen Van Vy, thc Minister, admitted :
four big wars, which correspond to �vhat. the Amer- " We have no hold on either troops, weapons or
ican press has 'been calling the " four big qnag- money. They (meaning the Americans) take charge
mires of Washington in Southeast Asia. " of every thing !
When one gets to the first Poor and walks down 'According to a Cao.Van Vim aide, each week,
the corridor from Rodin lb to Room 13b, one will the Saigon " chief-of-staff " is invited to come over
realize that there arent's just four wars for the to MACV three times, for " exchange of views on
the situation." It takes a five-minute drive on
Americans. In these rooms painted in light ochre
Vien's grey-painted jeep. Abrams would talk to
and equipped with air-conditioners, rows of duralu-
him about the situation at the fronts and what
min-framed chairs, and all kinds of maps with
should be done to ''win victory.'' Relationships
scales ranging Train 112,000 tO 111,000,000,
a multitude of wi-irs are being followed: the war between the two arc quite good. Vien gladly receives
by B-52 strategic bombers, the electronic war, the all criticisms, even rebukes, from his " ally " and
caemical Wa r, the war on the " pacificttion " front, is ready to act on all the latter 's " suggestions."
the intelligence war and the psycholonical These he considers orders, to be transmitted with-
The left wing houses the No.i oc�ffi,sers' club, out delay to the various corps and tactical regions.
reserved for senior officers, from lieutenant-colonels An Abrams aide once told a friend in the Saigon
up to generals. The bulk of members are colonels army : ''Vour chief-of-staff is the very kind of
belonging to ill iuns and services : air force, in- man we Americans have always wanted. A true
fantry, navy, marine corps, armoured corps, engi_ soldier, with a high sense of discipline and certainly
neers' corps, signal corps, etc.
Vy and Chief-of-Staff Cao Van Vien. The only ones
admitted here on special occasions are either girl-
friends of American generals or Saigon strip-tease
artists.
The conversations overhead in the club amidst
the clouds of cigarette smoke and the fumes of
whisky supply facts that are at odds with those
mentioned in MACV communiques. For instance
the following bits could be recorded on a Saturday
evening of February 1972: " Those s.o.b.'s (meaning
the Saigon troops) at firebases Hotel and Bravo
refused to go on patrol outside the camps." � " That
general Lam of the First Army Corps doesn't give
a damn about military plans. He only seeks to
feather his nest in Da Nang." �"Modern weapons
entrusted to those loafers who prefer gambling to
going to war are wrecked in no time."----"The CLA
is purblind and the war is going down the drain
in face of an adversary who shows miraculous
stamina and resilience before the terrifying fire-
power of the American air forces..."
In spite of all the nasty words uttered by the
Americans concerning the Saigon army, � the Amer-
ican troops can't be said to have outshone it.
Whenever Abrams gets to the fourth floor and
peers. into dossiers kept by the Personnel Depart-
ment, he would feel greatly disheartened. Heroin-
addiction among American Gis has increased to a
horrifying rate. Fragging is rampant, i.e. the kil-
ling by GIs, black and white, of officers they
don't like by means of fragmentiou grenades.
Hundreds of GIs have been disciplined for refusing
to go on patrol. Thousands have been jailed for.
hold-up, theft, rape... There are also the dossiers
of 248 American deserters whom the military police
have failed so far to track down in spite of the
cooperation of the Saigon city police. Bat some
Saigonese know quite a few things about them.
They have gone into hiding in slum quarters along
the Ben Nghe canal, in teeming Cholon, and even
on the northwest fringe of Tan Son Nhut airfield
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not prone to arguing." In the Fretwh rn1onia-1
days, Vien was a sergeant in the " nzApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
and was later promoted to second lieutenant. He
was trained to obey right from his youth. Indeed,
he has had no difficulty at all switching from the
familiar "Oui, Monsieur " of French, trays to the
present "Yes, sir " or "Okay." Once in a meeting
with Abrams, he showed himself to be absolutely
in t14 dark conurning� the whereabouts of two
regiments of the Saigon Fisrt Infantry Division in
the. Tri-Thica area. I.3nt Abrams displays great
leniency on such occasions. He knows that the
Saigon four-star general is primarily concerned with
the promotion of Saigon officers, which he and his
wife look upon as a lucrative business. Abram
doesn't certainly mind. An obedient blockhead at
the top of the Saigon army, that's what he wants
above everything else.
(To be cold hmed)
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Part 3
HANOI. SOLTIH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE
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(cominfied)
3� THE GOVERNMENT:
NEWCOMERS to Saigon could hardly imagine
that even more feverish activity is reigning
elsewhere than at the fortress-embasy and
the MACV headquarters. The seat of this tremen-
dous bustle is a tall building located at No. Ngo
Thoi Nhiem street, next door to the Na Loi pagoda.
It is the headquarters of USAID (US Agency /or
International Development). Outside stand rows
od parked cars � Mercedeses, Triumphs, Datsuns �
from which alight ranking American experts, Sat-
gem ministers, Vice-ministers and provincial chiefs,
" advisers for Saigon ministries and
provinces, inp officials ill " pacification "
niat eairminality aid " rural construction,
agrieultural �tlevelopinent,
stir'.',ii Oil sl!mv,�Y TrTigal-
re inn etc, To gis.e an iha.l,t" the size of the unjer-
ten,.t:a, let us lai�nti,�n in passing tleit there :ire
"t':17k. 0:`,` Vietauir itiV5 .111d th.:,3tItIS of
acennntants, interpret-
ers... ,gthair personnel nate:lin:1- Or2.1,/ A. rank-
in the Saigna.Ecnnornies Ministry onee
USA �1) is the true government of South
Viet Nam, if there is one. .Wnat ,loes our Econom-
ics Ministry do ? The only job of the Minister,
Mr Pharn Kim Ngne, is to go each year to Wash-
ington to beg for nirl aniounting to 500-700 mjiliOn
dollars. After that, USAID will take care of every-
thing concerning the distribution, utilization, regu-
lation, transfer and control of these funds.
The USAID headquarters is divided into innume-
rable "hoards." the 15 essential ones being staffed
with 1,500 ranking American experts. The Ameri-
can heads of those boards assume in fact the func-
tions of Cabinet ministers in charge of economics,
finance, trade, industry, agriculture, communica-
tions and transport, security, administration, labour
organization, planning, culture and - education,
health, information and propaganda, etc. Each
board is again divided into sections staffed with
" experts " of numerous branches. There are two
large documentation departments and a huge library
equipped with electronic computers and crammed
with maps, diagrams,. models and blueprints, as
well as statistics of the most diverse kinds. USAID
has its. own printing-office, the biggest. in Saigon,
which turns out documents and communiques in
English and Vietnamese.
A Saigon official said : " It will hardly make any
difference whether Vietnamization will be complet-
ed or not. This is the American go' ernment-gener-
al for South Viet Nam, many times bigger than the
former French colonial government-general. Viet-
namiza.tion ? One can see that plenty of Americans
are around, and more are coming ! "
The Saigoneae know that the sharp increase in
commodity prices, the cost of living and the
rates of unemployment, inflation, and taxation
springs from plans worked out by USAID.
This super-government, which tops "�Prime
Minister " Khiem's in that way, is thus very active..
But how effective is it ? This is a rather big ques-
tion mark, Saigon politicians have relished a recent
disclosure of their American " friends. �' in Sep-
tember to 7t, Colby, deputy � 0101!,issinler in
charge of the USA ID or four years returned
in the US and revealed that of the two billion
dollars ,stribintes-1ttv USAID in Sin:ill Viet Nam
in Varrens pi-pair:tins only about aio million. he
reached their destination. The Jest, ',Soo million
dollars, had vanished like the morning mist under
the tropical sun into the pockets of Americans and
Vietnamese at various levels in various places.
Finally, to gloss over this eie and ugly story,
and to " avoid putting weanans in the hands of
Americans '\ h' are against the nar in Viet Nam
the blame was put on the war and the attendant
lack seeurity, a situation for which no one held
hinaselt� resp.inaible.
There is Still another government in Saigon, one
which is invisible yet ubiquitous. It is the CIA
(Central Intelligence Agency) whose name the
Saigonese pronounce in a way wnich makes it
sound like the Vietnamese word meaning " excre-
ment. " How many are the CIA men, taking into
account both professionals and collaborators ?
50,000 ? tooanoo ? No one knows for sure. Accord-
ing to some people in the know who become talkative
under the influence of alcohol, the American CIA
men are quite numerous. They may include ambas-
sadors, deputy ambassadors, journalists, tourists,
senators on inspection tours, infantry generals, air
.force colonels, Green Beret sergeants, businessmen
or college professors. .None would' admit to being
CIA men, but any American could be one. They work
for CIA, either Inn or part time, without ceasing
to be members of other military, administrative,
�diplomatic, or political services. What about the
native CIA men? They may comprise Cabinet
-ministers, department heads, parliamentarians,
churchmen, business executives, trade union lead-
ers, members of locarmaffias... Who are the CIA
top men ? They are very :few, and very discreet.
They don't live in ostentatious high-rise buildings
but in cosy villas along Cong Ly, Had L'a Trung
and Truong Ming .Giang boulevards�one - storey
Structures with private gardens, tennis courts
and swimming - pools. These are the resOrts of
such men as Golley American ambassador and the
adviser to yang Pao, both of them top CIA men in
Laos. Saigon is rife with rumours about CIA deals
on drugs and weapons all over Southeast Asia.
There are CIA-run channels linking Saigon to
Bangkok, Singapore, Vientiane, Long Cheng,
Manila, Hong Kong, Tokyo, etc., through which
foreign exchange, gold, diamonds, intelligence, pros-
titutes and what not are travelling. CIA spending
are enormous, and so are its revenues. The CIA men
in Saigon spend a great deal of money. Life behind
the closed doors 0: their discreet villas is a volup-
tuous one. After each series of bloody feats�build-
ing "tiger cages" for political prisoners, penning up
the civilian population in Concentration camps,
making away with Thien's political opponent... �
they withdraw to these cosy retreats and relax with
specialnpality opium in golden tins engraved with
twin dragons. pure heroin. strip - tease . shows
performed by belly-dancers brought in from Hong
Knee, :lie Philippines ant? 1,ep in, or heetie,garetes
of maii.ienn itoh nok�er... �Less,ir CIA men lixe in
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bigger and more crowded villas wherApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
entertainments which are somewhat more modest
but still surpass anything Saigon playboys coUld
'dream of.
CIA professionals are proud of their organiza.
tion, which encompasses the whole "free world"
and has deep roots in aliimst all capitals, anion:,
people of all skin colours. They say : "Our country
is CIA. CIA is a world-wide government." A mem-
ber of the opposition in Saigon scoffs "Their
country is rather money, drugs. and costly pros.
titutes. "
The most noteworthy CIA exploit was the
overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem. Of course they
later denied any role in it, until the publication
of the Pentagon's secret papers made everything
plain enough. It was a Colonel, a CIA man,
who as early as August 1963 hal been personally
entrusted by Kennedy with working out plans for
the toppling of Ngo Dinh Diem. Even now, men
like Nixon and Goldwater still deeply regret the
loss of Ngo Dinh Diem and have harsh word
for CIA on this score. Rumour has it that ever
since he knew the detailed truth about Diem's
liquidation, "President"' Thieu often has had to
resort to heavy doses of tranquilizers to get some
sleep at night.
The NFL's' great offensive of Spring r96S gave
the CIA a slap in the face. It showed that the
latter had been completely in the dark about the
preparations and manpower movements for that
tremendous undertaking. Another hard blow came
in March. this year when Saigon troops suffered
terrible setbacks along Highway 9 and in Quang
Tn. � These. are two bigs stains on CIA records.
Many Americans said at the time that CFA men
had been too busy with sex and drugs. Others
.ascribed the fiasco to antagonisms between the
CIA, MACV and the American embassy on problems
of 'policy in Viet Nan. They recalled that CIA
men hated Westmoreland's search for military vic-
tories over the Viet Cong main force, a dream
which never came true. For the CIA would rather
stake all on the program for "winning hearts and
minds" and "pacification," which they considered
the only fighting-front.
In the. 1964 - 65, the CIA fully approved of the
_bombing of North Viet Nam. But in 1967 it coin-
pletelydissociated itself from the policy of war
escalation. A top CIA man once said to Admiral
Grant Sharp, the commander of US forces in the
Pacific, who was passing through Saigon "When
You start hitting, pull no punch. Don't you know
that, you a militaryman ? Gradual escalation can
only be frustrating."
THANH NAM
(1', be continfeed)
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Part
HANOI, SOUTH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE
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(COI tinted)
:
'RECENTLY, two special experts of the American,
.Congress came to Saigon and set out on an
inspection tour of the provinces. After that
they withdrew to- USAID headquarters and spent
two months assessing the data collected. Finally
they came ' out with a quite .candid admission:
Tlie President's Vietnamization policy is imprac-
ticable, and pacification has reaped but scanty and
nominal results. In one single night the Vietcong
could upset everything ! " The two experts' -report
Caused deep repercussions on Capitol Hill in Wash-
ington. Later, ' the two men were identified as CIA
collaborators...
� . ... �
�
4 � THE LAM SON � � .
� THEATRICAL COMPANY
THE topmost task of-- the proconsul Bunker and
of MACV, CSAID and the CIA in Saigon is to
promote a "model democracy" there.
The "Second Republic," made in the USA, should
have its typical representatives. So let us go to
Lam Son square which faces Le 1,0i boulevard,
and attend a session of the Saigon "Lower -House-
of Parliament. " The building is still called by its
old name of Municipal Theatre and the Lower
House has received the popular nickname of " 159-
member Theatrical Company. "
Indeed- many sessions of the House can stand
comparison with the most hectic scenes ever acted
on the stage, with plenty of ''suspense " worthy of
the mostc'breath-holding. gangster films or crazy
whodunits. The worst abuse keeps streaming from
one parliamentarian to another. Here are a few
specimens recorded by shorthand during-a. session
held in April 1970:-.
" Shut up or ,break your jaw ! "
" Embezzlement and incompetence are limited to
no one individual. Those who denounce others as
dung-eaters are swallowing things that are even
dirtier. " � .
" Go home, Mr Speaker, and wash your wife's
panties rather than stay here and rave ! "-
However there are things that shorthand records
can never adequately describe. On one occasion, one
woman parliamentarian rolled up the legs of her silk
trousers and, picking op one of her stiletto-heeled
shoes, brought it down smack on the head of a
male colleague some twenty years older. On another,
a representative whipped out a pistol and a gre-
nade, which he unpinned and threatened to hurl at
his opponent : all his colleagues were seized with
understandable panic and quickly made themselves
scared.
- The - Saigonese people have all heard about
their " representative" Tran Kim Thoa, who
championed "equality between the sexes.
When called to. account by her colleague
Ho Huu Tuong about the pocketing of 5 out of the
25 million piastres entrusted to her for the print-
ing of documents for a conference of the Asian
Parliamentary Union in Saigon, she choked with
anger and spat out between clenched teeth : "
I'll-
tear you scoundrel to pieces and cheek up your bits
with salt and pepper for seasoning._ -'-' To the House
in uproar she explained : . " knock him dead.
- lie is even dirtier than I ever was!" -
Saigon democracy, the handiwork of the magi.
clan Bunker, also .shines -abroad. One day in early
1971, Dr Nguyen c72uang Luycn, who " represented "
Gia- Dinh-province, -went on a mission to Thailand.
He neld quite important. functions: deputy Speaker
' of the Saigon Lower -'5.-Iouse of Parliament and
, Chairman of the Viet- -Nam- branch of the Asian
Parliamentary Union. Yet, at Bangkok airport, cus-
toms officers of that "friendly country" determin-
edly seized his suitcase and opened it. Their eyes
goggled out of their heads : it contained no less
than fifteen kilograms (more than thirty pounds)
of illegal gold. So, he was whisked off to a police
station in spite- of his twofold immunity -- diplo-
matic and parliamentarian !
- Another case Representative- Phan --Chi Thien
was a priest turned politician. Completely disregard-
ing' his dignified demeanour, the police searched
his bag and found four kilograms (more than eight
pounds) of heroin worth tens of thousands of
dollars. Caught red-handed, he tried to get. aWay
with it by declaring that it was a business under-
taking whose returns were to go to a presidential
'candidate's electoral lunch,� so after all it was no.
dirty drug-smuggling but a political act.. This did not
prevent the police from carting him off to prison..
Innumerable parliamentarian "missions" have been
carried out in the same way. Saigon "representati-
ves" went to South Korea, Taiwan, Paris, Rome,
etc., nominally for "State affairs" but in fact for
fruitful deals in gold, diamonds, heroin- or porno- -
graphic materials. .
Sonic of the House sessions are rather gloomy
affairs. They perfunctorily deal with "the people's
life." Not many representatives attend. Their num-
ber is even surpassed by that of the "public" look- -
jug on froin the upper gallery: police, plainclothes
men, secret agents, and American "friends,"
most of them political advisers to the American-
embassy and journalists:
The jolliest and most important session ever
held was that during which it was decided to increase
the parliamentarians' allowances to more than a
million piastres a year apiece; so that freed from
material cares they could wholeheartedly devote
themselves to working for the welfare of the people
Following the one-man election of Thien in ate
1971, the relationship between the legislative and
executive powers in Saigon has displayed even more
histrionics likely to provide entertainment to the
Saigonese. For - instance, the Saigonese "senators"
were unable to stomach Thieu's one-man race and
voted to cancel his election. For his part, Nixon
didn't bother to wait for the Saigon "Supreme
Court" to decide on the issue, and _immediately se'it
a telegram of congratulation to his flunkey. The
Saigon press wrote that Thiel) was not elected by
the "5,goo,000 ballots east by 9.1.34 per cent of the
electorate" as lloasted by official propaganda or-
gans (after all the magician Bunker could have
. �- -
conjured up any numbers of voters he pleased) but
by a single ballot sent over from the White House
across the Pacific ! The paper -Dart Chit Moi (New
Democracy) likened Nixon's message of greeting to
an imperial edict bestowing investiture upon a vassal.
The new Saigon bower House of Parliament held
its first session in early 1972. The new faces are no �
cleaner than the old ones. Immediately after his
election, Representative Diep Van Hung was caught
in the act of smuggling prohibited goods into the
country by Tan Son N'hut airport police. But no
one any longer . paid any attention to such. trifles
which had become routine business. The new thing
'
c; 4
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tnat nappenect with the Lam Son Theatrical
Company was the heightened tension between the
socalled "opposition" and the valets of the regime.
New scophants replaced Trail thi Kim Thoa and her
ilk in the unending task of "expressing gratitude to
our great ally the USA".
, In the eyes of. the Saigon People, both the Sai-
gon Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament are
but cheap gewgaws for a new kind of "democracy":
one-man rule, Thieu's rule !
Relations between the legislative and executive
� powers in the Saigon regime are not in the hands
of the Speaker, old Nguyen Ba Luong formerly,
Old Nguyen Ha Can at present.
They arc the preserve of Nguyen Cao Thang,
-a � former druggist who has become political
assistant to "President" Thieu and is considered to
be in charge of the President's secret funds, stuffed
with -American greenbacks. Political observers in
Saigon hold that in major votings the parliament-
arians always keep an eye on the ballot box and
the other on Mr Thang's billfold. None other than
Nguyen Cao Timm; himself has admitted that Law
_10-70 was passed at the cost of 15 million piastres
in "gifts" to Messrs Representatives. The rewards
were brought to the homes of the co-operative
voters in fat envelope's accompanici by a letter of
thanks from the Presidential Assistant, signing for
the President.
But money is not the only string linking the leg-
islative to the executive powers in the Saigon regime.
Beware, Messrs Representatives of the "Opposition" !
Remember the fates of such oppositicmists as Truong
:Dinh Zu and Au Truong Thanh. The former is still
in prison. The latter after a few months in police
custody was forced into self-exile abroad. Each time
they look out into the Lam Som square, the "oppo-
sitionists" cannot help feeling uneasy. A monu-
mental sculpture featuring gun-toting "Republican
Combatants" with their weapons trained on the
Parliament building reminds them that the any law
prevailing in their "Republic" is that of the jungle I
(to .be continued)
:MANN NAM
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� Part 5
(Continued)
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5. THE PIMP MAYOR
THE Saigon regime which nestles in the shadow
of the American Embassy is worthily repre-
sented not only by the Lam Son theatrical
troupe but also by the 39,372 officially registered
prostitutes aged 16-45. Indeed the professional
whores number more than 70,000. If one adds to
them the semi-pros�most of them masquerading
as " waitresses " in the more than 300 " snack-
bars " '� the figure will surpass the zoo,000 mark I
A thriving industry of the regime I A figure all the
more eloquent if one recalls that the total number
of college and school teachers, medical doctors,
engineers and pharmacists in Saigon is less than
.one-tenth of it.
US culture has also brought Saigon more than
� one hundred Turkish baths, to which Formosan
culture has contributed 370 young women special-
izing in " scientific " massage. Along Nguyen Van
Thoai and Vo Tanh streets as well as Tran Hung
Dao and Tran Quoc Toati boulevards there have
mushroomed mot.ley signboards carrying suggestive
drawings and inscriptions in English advertising
steam-baths and cabarets with such names as
"Lovely Bath," "Queen Bar," "Moon Bar," etc.
The army of harlots is the product of the war
imposed by foreigners. Its numbers have skyroc-
keted since 1965-66. Following each "sweep, " each
'plan for setting up " strategic hamlets, " each
operation for " special pacification, " " accelerated
pacification " or " complementary pacification, "
each � displacement of civilians, each spraying of
toxic chemicals, population figures in the towns
and cities would shoot up. Carrying their belong-
ings on their backs, the refugees would stream on
foot, or in crowded buses and sampans, into the
towns, where, failing assistance from relatives or
friends, they . would pitch camps on sidewalks,
waterfronts or in bus stations and public squares.
The girls would fall preys to pimps and brothel.
owners, who would give them some money for cos-
metics and dresses and entertain them with special
films and novels aimed at arousing base passions
and desires. Country girls with pure hearts and
simple minds would soon be acquainted with I.ewd
scenes on the streets of Saigon and pressed by
material enticements and soaring prices into selling
their bodies. A lawyer with some concern for social
morals has observed: "In this city of Saigon teem-
ing with Americans, the fact that the men have
become cannon-fodder and the girls have been
compelled to offer the use of their bodies in order
to eke out a living, is only a matter of course. "
But the leaders of the regime look at things from
a quite different angle. Minister for Social Affairs
Tran Ngoc Lien has gleefully declared : " In this
country, prostitution has developed into one of the
best - organized trades ever ! " A representative
blurted out in the Lower House of " Parliament" :
" The Americans need girls ; we need dollars. Why
should we refrain from the exchange? It's an inex-
haustible source of US dollars for the State. " And
so important personages have set up big organiza-
tions dealing in human flesh covering whole districts
and ranging from cheap brothels to the supply of
deluxe .courtesans of various nationalities � Viet-
namese, Japanese, Thai, Formosan � to wealthy
customers : American ambassadors and deputy
.ambassadors, CIA chieftains, as well as Saigon
presidents, vice presidents and Cabinet ministers.
In the 1969-70, Saigon was shaken by anguishing
news: girls of 13 or 14 were kidnapped and taken
to .sinister dens. So-called Okinawa V.D. microbes,
resistant to ordinary anti-biotics, were on the
rampage after being introduced into the country by
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Sept 1972
American soldiery. The city was rife with all sorts
of rumours about the wives of such and such Saigon
civil servants, officers, professors or representatives
catering for the lusts of the Americans and being
paid by the day or by the hour.' Unbelievable
things happened : mothers and sons, brothers and
sisters ran into each other in brothels !
Who stands at the top of this prosperous and
shameful industry? The Saigonese have come to
know the answer to this intriguing question : he is
none other than the Mayor of their city, Do Kien
Nhieu.
Nhicu is a native of Long An province. In French
times, he was a constable and later became 'a cor-
poral in the native auxiliary troops. He was known
as a drunkard and a debauchee. Under Diem, he
made a profitable career for himself by " extermi-
nating Communists" and massacring innocent
people. Later he was promoted chief of Long Xuyen
then An Giang provinces. When Diem and his
brother Nhu were made away With through CIA ma-
chinations, Nhieu bitterly grieved at the bad news.
In June 1968, Thieu appointed Nhieu Mayor in
replacement of Van Van Cua and promoted him to
be a full colonel. He is Thieu's right-hand man and
reigns despotically over the 16o square kilometres
of the city's area. All the pimps and brothel-owners
of the eleven city districts have been put under the
unified control of his own aunt and elder sister.
Other 'relatives of his have been entrusted with
other busincs ses in human flesh. For instance pro-
viding " wives " to GIs; transfering " wives " from
departing GIs to newly-arrived ones, supplying wom-
en seduced by American officers with marriage
certificates and helping ' them acquire American
citizenships, etc.
Nhieu also holds indirect sway over such "cul-
tural activities as cabaret singing, strip-tease danc-
ing, at such " cultural . centres " as Kilby Dance
Hall in Nguyen Hue boulevard, Ritz Restaurant
on Tran Hung Dao street, Maxim's Theatre in Tu
Do avenue, or Melody Dance Hall in Cho Lon.
The owners of these profitable businesses have to
pay him fat kickbacks.
With lioang Thi Tho, who has brought the " art
of presenting decadent, psywar-oriented music and
singing to the level of a profitable industry respon-
sible for the moral ruin of a whole generation of
city youth, Nhieu entertains special relationship,
that between two professional panders..
Owing to the Mayor's solicitude and the effective
assistance of American advisers, Saigon has witnessed
the coming into existence Oi a host of strange
characters calling themselves " local hippies " and
numbering over ro,000 early this year. They are
playing a very efficient role in diffusing the
"culture" of the "free world" in this enslaved part
of our country.
Most of them are children of VIPs � ministers
or generals... � or wealthy families who by fits
grow tired of life only to become crazily pleasure-
seeking at the next moment. The boys grow long
hair while the girls wear it very short ; both sexes
wear drain-pipe trousers and gaudy shirts, make
love in the streets, quarrel noisily in public, dash
along crowded streets on their Honda or Yamaha
motorbikes at breakneck speed, linger in cabarets
and nightclubs where they perform wailing and
syncopated outlandish music, are inveterate mari-
juana and heroin addicts, and indulge in looting
and riots. They set up garbn7S carrying such evoca-
tive names as " Dust of Life, " " Black Star, "
"Bloody Hand, " " Human Skull, " etc. Indeed
they greatly contribute to the moral pollution of
the already heavily-polluted atmosphere of Saigon.
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Recently, owing to the departure of sizeable num-
bers of Gls, the prostitution industry has been on
the downgrade. The massage parlors and opium
dens are facing a dwindling clientele. Nevertheless,
Do Kien Nhieu, the Mayor, after four years in
business, has amassed a great fortune. Once during
a drinking bout, he noisily boasted : " I am richer
than any brigadier or major general in this coun-
try ! I am a millionaire in... US dollars ! " As a
matter of facts, Nhieu holds fat accounts in Hong
Kong banks. He has readjusted his business activi-
ties to fit new nine urgent economic measures
decreed by Thieu. Score of new taxes have been
promulgated aimed at sucking dry the cityfolk.
Do Kien Nhieu, a major public figure in Saigon,
is also a typical representative of the Thieu regime.
This pander-cum-black marketeer is still doing a
thriving business. He will no doubt be promoted
general by his " President " very soon. But together
with the latter, he is heading for inevitable ruin.
(to be continued)
THANH NAM
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- Part 6
Approv-eciTOTReleWs-e7.26-1-87Riiii d0-21-9"27EGLE
sept L9(
(Cont. ilti,ed.)
VICE-PRESIDENT IILJONG'G.
" INTEGRITY"
� � To get a job as a longshoreman on the wharves at
Chuang Duong .or Thuong Cang, one. must offer
the superintendent a bribe ee..uivalent to two months'
wages. A highschool gradui.te who wants to be a
clerk in a government del)artinent will have to
cough up between 100,000 and 500,000 piastres,
depending on what kind of job he is after. lf he
wishes to enter an American agency, he will have
to offer money to a multitude of people.: from the
district police to the personnel chief of the agency
concerned. � . .
. . �
� A father who wishes his Son Or daughter to enter
a general-education school must offer presents to
the head-master and to officials of the City educa-
tional service. man who falls ill and needs some
kind of 'treatment at the- hospital will have to
give the doctor in, charge a shot of Vitamin /It
(A/ for money) before he could hope to get some
care and medicine in return. The military hospi-
tals are so crowded that wounded soldiers who arc
fortunate enough to be brought back to Saigon from,
Say, An LOc, lie on the cement floor in the verandas.
Whether one such soldier wants a glass of water
to quensh his thirst after an operation, or a pill to
soothe his pain, or a new bandage to replace the
.stinking old one, he will have to pay fen. it. If he
.can't afford it, he will. lust lie there and moan
out vain pleas for help. .
�� � �
A bus ticket to Central Trung Bo for instance
generally costs three times its normal price. A trip
to France will cost it stowaway about r,000 US
dollars for a hiding-place on a ship. A regular exit
visa costs 5,000 US dollars : everything can be
bought provided you have the money.
Children of wealthy parents never bether to study
hard for their exams. They spend their time at
seaside resorts with their sweethearts, or go for
pleasure rides on their Honda motorbikes. About a
week before the exams, they can buy the subject
of the tests for between loo,ocio and 200,000 pias-
tres. The only condition, besides the money, is that
they should burn the incriminating papers after
using them. That racket about test papers is in
the hands of Education Minister Ngo Khac Tinh and
his associates. For his talents he has been dubbed
Minister of lin-Education.
�
. Now about the draft. If you want to evade it,
you must of course find a hiding-place, whether it
be a cellar, a cupbcaid, or a dark corner in your
own kitchen. But the point is that you must have
a wad of banknotes in your hand, between 20,000
and 5o,000 piastres just in case military police find
you out. If you want to take a walk in the streets,
you'd better have some money with you, for at
each check-point you'll have to offer some dough
to the officers on duty : in 1966, about 3,000 pias-
tres, now more than io,00b ! As you can see, prices
have skyrocketed, ever since. the proconsul Bunker
rei4ealed his intention to charge the colour of the
corpses on the battlefields.
�-Suppose they get you somehow and you are im-
pressed inti) the " Republican . Army. " If you
don't want to be sent to fanaWay places up in
. Central Trueg Bo or in Cambodia or Laos, if in-
stead of goi.ig to "hot" battlefields you prefer safer
jobs like st,hcling guard before government offices,
your parents will have to pay up to 300,000 piastres
for the favehr, just ask the sentries on duty before
T�HE worries and miseries that beset the people
the City Eall or the Saigon Special Command,
of Saigon are multifarious. Many spring fi'om you'll lean. that most of them are sons of wealthy
the necessity to offer bribes, which inVo'lves Chinese me-chants in Cho Lou who in order to get
many hardships .and much h - them these soft jobs have paid astronomical sums
.�to high-ranking officers: 50o,000 piastres down, and
then 20,00, piastres each month. � �
From f97 I onwards, because of galbring inflation,
the bribe-takers, instead. �of fat env, lopes stuffed
with 5o0�piastre bills, would prefer presents in �
kind : a few ounces of heroin in plasti-: phials, or a
Japanese television set, or a big refr �;erator, or a
Honda motorbike, or a dozen wrist-w,Aches... -
- �
Even those who are not. seek-in e any special
favour must sometimes offer bribes, to district
chiefs or to security officers, if they just .wish to
be left alone to mind their peaceful Ind law�abid-
mg businesses. Otherwise they would e .summoned
from time to time to police head, uarters to be
questioned about distant relatives or childhood
friends who, so they are told, have '')ined the Viet
(long ! 'After greasing the palms of y.rious officials,
they would be allowed to return hopie, only to be
summoned back a few Months later, .'or more ques-
tions and more... palm-greasing !
To be fair, we roust say that the Saigon admin-
istration has promulgated quite Jew Iecrees against
" corruption." Discussions have )een held in
Parliament and the lawcourts. V ritable " cam-
paigns " have been launched with C a 'participation
of police, customs officers, militi ry gendarmes,
etc., and the whole court-and-pr ton machinery
put in motion. Tens of thousand , r arrests were
made, in January 1972 alone. Bu as a Saigon
judge candidly said : " These cam:�tigns only hit
at the small lry. Nobody ever clans to touch the'
big fish !" The small traders com:ilain: " Whom
are the authorities striking at in their drive
against corruption ? They only sinai,h the rice bowl
of the poor people by confiscating smuggled goods
from petty peddlers." The only ins1-.ance of punish-
ment meted out to " big fish" was the execution
of the rich Chinese merchant Ta Vinh. But this
served .only as a smokescreen to cover thousands
of much bigger fish. Sonic people also hold that
the shots that felled Ta Vinh in fact ushered in
a new stage in the history of wealthy circles in
Saigon : the decline of the "old millionaires" and
the rise of new ones, who wear military unifotin
and hold absolute and exclusive control over the
country's economic resources.
The Saigonese know -that the anti-corruption
drives are in fact golden- opportunities for more
corruption : police, customs officers, military
gendarmes, judges, etc., seize upon these occasions
to get fat bribes and kickbacks. Indeed, one can
say that in Saigon, the law-makers, law. enforcers
and lawbreakers are just the. same people, and
that the watchword : ".Fight corruption ! " . in
fact in.eans,: " Long liVe corruption "
c
�
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However, it would be. unjust if we were to
include in that rapacious gang the ordinary rank-
and-file of the Saigon army. Iry the " free world,"
they are indeed the lowest-paid mercenaries. The
salary of a ITC is 3,800 Saigon piastres ; that of
a non-corn ,ranges from 5,00o to.�8,000 piastres. In
comparison, let us ohkerve that a glass of beer
costs 8o piastres ; a bowl of soup, roo ; a kilogram
of pork, 600 ; an egg, 22; and a packet of cigaret-
tes, 80. How could they ever hope to make ends
meet True, the Saigon atlininistration has on a
few rare occasions raised teteir salaries, but while
prices ride away at a gall p, wages and salaries
creep along at a snail's pace. A paratroop NCO
with some education uses this mathematical
parallel: "While prices in-crease by geometrical
progression, salaries are raised only by arithmetical
progression."
It is routine practice for a PFC or NCO back
home after service hours to hastily swallow his
bowl -of ,rice, don civilian clothes and drive a mo-
tor-cycle taxi for some extra earnings to supplement
the family income. The case has been reported of a
sergeant living at Bay Hien crossroads who had
been compelled by financial oecessity to let his wife
provide entertainment to sex-hungry GIs. She caught
VD, the family was ruined by the costs of medical
care, and the neighbours got wind of the matter.
Finally the wife committed suicide by drowning
and the sergeant, left with 6 young children to look
after, was driven to near insanity.
Soldiers arl'd non-corns with some special skill�
signalmen, engineers, mechanics... � try to earn
some extra money by working on evenings and
Sundays repairing typewriters, radio and television
sets, calculators, cars and motorcycles, etc. All
have work very hard indeed if they are to feed their
wives and children.
Among the junior officers, sonic succeed in getting
rich through using their influence and power as
battalion or regiment commanders. They grow up
into wealthy big shots too. For them, their sala:
ries only serve as pocket money. Their main income
is drawn from .elsewhere.
Let's listen to what Major he Van Ng4i,
the commander of a 6cio-man battalion of the
Fifth Infantry Division stationed at Lai Kim, has
to say about his extra earnings : In annual times,
when no operations are under way, the quarter-mas-
ters give him kickbacks of up to loo,000 Saigon
piastres every month, from funds earmarked for
�supplies and maintenance. Theso earninge really
shoot up when things get hotter on the battlefields.
Soldiers die or desert, but their names remain on
the company lists, and their salaries go to their
company commanders, who send half of -that wind-
fall to Major Ngai. The latter's cornucopia also in-
cludes a fat percentage of the operational funs
(combat rations, special expenses, etc.) and the war
booty : pigs and chickens, articles of clothing, gold
and jewels mercilessly stolen from the civilians.
Meanwhile the battalion's rear-base hums with. prol-
Rabic activities :-under the supervision of the Ma-
jor's trusted lieutenants, military lorries are hired
to private traders for the transport of goods, most
often smuggled ones, or are used to ferry "surplus
supplies" : firewood, oil and lubricants, etc., to
confidential middlemen. And so, after a mere two
years as battalion commander, from a penniless
captain, he has risen to be a millionaire-major, a
faithful member of the Khaki Party,
His colleague, Major IInynli Cong Do, v
chief of the 3rd district of Saigon city, has fi hal
his pockets at a still greater speed, thanks to I iree.
ident Thieu's favour. Major Do's bonanza sprinei
from-many sources : one is the damageS paid by tee
American embassy to Vietnamese civilians killed
"by mistake Or accident" by American borito,
shells, bullets, or military trucks. These dam:1-4.�-:
amount to 31. dollars per viethin the prie,. ef 20
kilograms of pork; as bitterly observed by the Sel-
gonese. Forty per cent of that miim-V i it
keted by Sir deputy district-chief for the simple
reason that "were it not for his interveotion the
Americans wouldn't have paid a cent !" Another
Pactolus is the kickback from gambling-den gl�k
who will ipso facto benefit from police proleetion.
Another mint of money : the jUlok ,t ii at Long
Binh, the great Ameriean 11,gisticat base. its the
biggest military refuse dump in Asia, sperwlieg over
tens of hectares, a huge motititruit 1 1i- carded
jeeps, scontoears and trucks, typewiiiers, air-condi-
tioners, reftigerators, radio and guns. tie sheets,
iron and corper wire, articles of eiotl,ing, blankets,
shoes, belts, canteens, and AVIIM- Ilt,l ! Tens, hundreds
of tons of them. On orders from the .% tnerican bri-
gadier commanding the Long Binh base, that enor-
mous mass of junk is handed over to Major Do, to
be sold to the "district people, with prioi-ity to'fam-
ilies with orphans and widows it ho are es,pecially
sympathetic to American and alb( dintuit- " at
prices as low as one-tentli of ii -c on .the
Saigonlilaelf market. But as soon as the goods are
out of the stockade, Sir deputy dieiriet-a hie( hastens
to put the "district people and fainiln-s otth widows
and orphans" out of his miad. The merchandise is
quickly sold out at the most profinilde � prices
thanks to the efficient cooperation of the Major's
henchmen..
Major Do's "extra earnings" Livo �ta-,aight him
several apartment buildings and btxuri,nts villas,
for rent and for use by his attractive yonag concu-
bines, as well as big cars -- Anne-te.m, French and
Jeptinese � for ferrying :Mt children to
seaside resorts on holidays...
In the reign of President Thiele ill(' great friend of
the Americans, a princely liCe is Cie happy lot of
the members of his party, the Party.
TI4ANH NAM
(To be contirmed)
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Part 7
HANOT _ SalTPH ITTRTNAM TN qm-prroxrr.7
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L-� -7/ I
7.7 THE KHAKI PARTY
THANKS to solicitous care from the fortress-
embassy, political parties have mushroomed in
Saigon, like fungi on decaying wood. No less
than 123 political parties and organizations are reg-
istered with the Ministry of the Interior and the
City administration. Proconsul Bunker can Mcleod,
take pride in the fact that, quantitatively at least,
Saigon " democracy " has outstripped American
democracy, which can boast only two contending
parties.
The Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dung has split into
three factions, with three headquarters. One under
the thumb of Vu Hong Khanh, who had moved
south after 1954 ; one controlled by Nguve:i Hoa
Hiep, and one, calling itself the " unified VNQaDD "
and having Nguyen Dinh Luong as its bellwether.
Each faction claims to be the genuine VNODD and
of course disclaims all American subsidies and.
string�pulling.
The Dai Net has also burst asunder : the Bac Ky
(Nort.Vrn) faction is under the sway of Bang Van
Sung, the Trung Ky (Central) faction is led by
Ha Thuc Ky,. and the Nam Ky (Southern) coterie
by Nguyen Ton Tloang. The Saigonese give the party
as a whole the sobriquet of Dai Fit, which means,
Great Hoax.
The Dan Xa is an avatar of the " Labour and
Personalism " organization set up by Ngo Dinh Diem
and his brother Nhu. Its aim is to restore tl:c Ngo
dynasty, and it maintains close relations, pc litical
and financial, with Thieu and other Saigon generals,
-
and also with CIA chieftains responsible fer the
murder Of Diem and Nhu.
The list could be indefinitely prolonged : Phuo Viet,
Cach Mang Nhan Dan, Vitt Nam Ilitng ()two Bang,
Cong Flea Dui Chung, Doan ket, etc., not counting
the Mat Fran CUU Ng u y Dan Toc (Front for Na-
tional Salvation) hastily rigged up by the Amer-
icans in an effort to rally all anti-Communist parties.
behind Thieu.
'Many of those " parties " can boast only a few
dozen- members. - Some are possessed only of an
" Executive Committee " of ten members or less, a
headquarters and an emblem, all serving the sole aim
of getting hand-outs from the Americans. Before
attempting to recruit any follower at all, a "party
leader ' . should first get himself a fashionable
" suit " from Adam, the tailor in vogue
in Saigon, a black Mercedes sedan, and an attach
case which he would stuff with... old 'newspapers.
These accoutrements will allow him to knock at
Bunker's door, hat in hand. ,
�:
- � One party stands out among all those American-
financed organizations. It has neither rules, program,
headquarters, emblem nor any other paraphernalia
normally connected with a political party, yet is
especially pampered by the Americans. The Saigon
-ese dub it the Khaki Party. Tt is made up of the
generals and colonels promoted on the recommenda-
tion of the proconsul Bunker and has had a meteoric
career which is Ei cause of bitter envy and deep re-
- sentment.on the part of the other parties. ..
'IOnce Phan Huy Quat, who served as Prime
Minister under Nguyen Khanh's -military rule, said
with a shrug 01 the shoulders : " Their job is to fight
at the front. Yet they intrude into every field and
grab every post : president, vice-president, prime
minister, ministers, province chiefs, etc. Here in the
South, there is one. only political party left, the
- Khaki Party."
For the last four or five years, the Khaki Party,
the pampered child of the Americans, has driven
all other parties into the background.
"Senator" Dang Van Sung, a Dai Viet chieftain,
who has close ties with the CIA and was once
General Taylor's favourite, is quite spiteful about
the Khaki Party. At a dinner in company with his
close collaborators on the terrace-roof of the Con-
tinental Hotel, he shook his head and complained
with bitterness in his voice: "We are at the end
of our tether. What's the use of founding a party ?
The Army Party is ruling the roost."
On the. Saigon political stage, gun-toting armymen.
play all parts. All power is in their hands. Streets
are controlled by sergeants, precincts by lieute-
nants, districts by majors and the city itself is
headed by a colonel mayor. At the National
Cultural Congress, the tune was also called by
men in khaki uniform : Air Vice Marshal Nguyen
Cao Ky, whose main cultural interest is cock-fight-
ing, gave his " instructions, 7 and psywar officers
delivered lengthy speeches in paaise of "literacy"
works by S. Paratroops Captain Nguyen Vu, and so
on and so forth.
Things are even more obvious in the economic
field. The Khali Party controls all national
resources. Everything is in the hands of generals,
ex-generals, and their wives, concubines, relatives
and friends : chemical' industry (Dosuki and C" in
Bong Klianh boulevard, owned by Generals (ret.)
Don, .Kuan, Kim, Tinian) ; i'mport-export trade
(with yearly imports worth over 500 million US
dollars), banking. (Ex-Defeace Minister Nguyen
Hun Co is now the owner of a big bank)... Every
.source of wealth and profit's is controlled by them :
wood and forest products in the Central Highlands,
cinnamon bark and pine resin in Quang Nam and
Lam Bong, fish, brine and other sea products in
Phan Thiet and Phu Quoc, even thc frozen-shrimp
trade at Vung Tau. The real-estate business is also
quite firmly in the hands of khaki-clad liigwigs:
high-rise buildings in Saigen, Nha Traug, eam
Ranh, . Da Nang, luxurious hotels and villas,
complete with tennis-courts and swimming-pools,
in Cong Ly and Hai Ba Trung boulevards, etc.
Lesser figures in the Khaki Party control such
profitable businesses as snack-bars, brothels,
Turkish-baths, massage parlors, and laundry shops
catering for American Gls.
Time and again, Parliamentarians attempting to
safeguard the interests of civilian traders and
businessmen have vociferously condemned the
brazen - faced encroachments . of the military, but
in vain. The men in uniform rejoin that " free
enterprise " is the supreme, rule of the ,and and
that anyone with enough money and drive can
engage in profit-bringing -activities. It's all very
well, but. how can anyone , compete with the
generals when they wield such power and influence,
have access to military and economic secrets, hold
control over US-aid goods, and, supreme argument,
over the guns ! Many wealthy businessmen who
had gone south after r954. have been driven to
bankruptcy by competition from the khaki-clad
entrepreneurs. One of them,. a notoriously pros-
perous dealer in gold, jewelry and textiles in
Hanoi h st k nlii our f d
, a a en is ov e� u o espa r an
impotent anger.
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There are top-ranking people who lApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
defence of corruption.. Among them is former
president Tran Van Huong, who is now nearly So
and has been connected with the regime for, decades.
In one parliamentary rebate, he had this clincher :
" If we should eliminate all corrupt elements, no
one would be left to work for the States! "
In the electioneering campaign of October ro7r,
when Iluong was Thieu's running mate for the
vice-presidency, he w.Ls praised by his sycephants
for his " integrity Lnd honesty." According to
them, he was "a rigl.teous man who lives close to
the people and stays .way from all temptations."
Then in early 1972, a pretty kettle of fish was
uncovered. It was p-oved by political opponents
that Huong was no irore honest than any other big
fish of the Saigon regime. Immediately after he
agreed to be Thieu's running mate, the American
Embassy presented 'rim with a gift of io,000 US
dollars. Thieu himseli: offered him a luxurious villa
on f'han Thanh Gipri boulevard, and Bang Van
c.juang, Thieu's financial manager, brought him two
million in cash for " the furniture. "
Later, Iluong also pocketed a check for 20,000
US dollars. But what made him most happy was
the " special fund " of the vice-presidency, put at
his disposal by the Saigon Finance Ministry after
approval by Hunker personally and by USA1D
headquarters: from five million, the fund was
increased to thirteen million piastres !
Huong� was indee(1 wholly correct when he said
that a truly effective anti-corruption drive would
drive all Saigon officials from office', and that no
one would be left to work for the "State," neither
civil servants,. police, gendarmes, parliamentarians,
soldiers, senators, nor president, vice-president and
premier : Corruption is the miraculous twee which
keeps the State machinery in motion. It is the
cement that holds together all components of the
� Saigon regime.
No one should worry about the lack of industrial
development in thE US-occupied part of South Viet
Nam. Corruption and prostitution, thanks to the
solicitude of the Americans and their fluiikeN,'
Thieu, have reached a level of development equal to
that of any industry in the world and could indeed
supply the ''free world" with top-notch experts.
(To be continued)
THANH NAM
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Part 8
H ANnT _ R(11 VT-FITN AM TN RTRIThisar
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(Co tinned)
8.-SEA TIGERS AND
BLACK VULTURES
THE "get-rich-quick" methods of the Saigon
generals have brought them new records. The
legendary wealthy figures of French colonial
times fiave now been relegated to the background
the latifundist Tran Trinh Trach, who had enough
rice in his granaries to food hundreds of thousands
of people ; Nguyen Hun Hao, the father-in-law of
ex-Emperor Bao Dai, the doe phic su who owned
immense areas of ricefields in My Tho and ]lac Lieu ;
the rich Chinese merchants of the 1 lui I3on lion
type, who had rows of tenement houses. Even in
their heyday, they could in no way stand in com-
parison with present-day generals. Because, in the
.words of a wealthy Bac Lieu landowner, their for-
tunes are to the generals' what a little knob is to a
whole TV set !
�
�
In these years of r970-71, for the first time in
history, there have appeared Vietnamese millionaires
(if their wealth is counted in US dollars) or bil-
lionaires Of it is reckoned in terms of Saigon pias-
tres). International bankers now show a healthy
repect for Vietnamese moneybags and put them on
an equal footing with American, British, French
and Japanese nabobs. Of course President Nguyen
Van 'Dieu and General ('no Van Vien are counted by
Saigon and international business circles among
�
those Croesuses.
These Men have invented very effective ways for
. filling their pockets.
Take for instance the case of Admiral Trait Van
Chon, the. Commander of the Saigon Navy. He and
��his predecessor, Admiral Chung Tan Cang, now
military governor of Saigon, together with their
subordinates of the Saigon naval forces, have all
got rich " at the speed of PT boats " according to
the colourful simile of their rank-and-file.
Every three months or so, the admiral would
� send groups of officers and men to the United States
to take over warships handed over by the US Navy
to its Saigon ally. These- are golden opportunities
both for those entrusted with the job and their
bosses at home. While living in posh hotels in
'various port cities along the Californian coast, they
have plenty of occasions to familiarize themselves
with American " culture " and market conditions.
Their cargoes of heroin, opium and marijuana
quickly change hands, bringing them wads of green-
backs. Trips to the Philippines and Okinawa (japan)
to fetch military hardware and get their ships
checked are also highly lucrative and entertaining.
No .wonder it happens that ship collisions are
sometimes deliberately provoked by Saigon naval
ofiicers to. provide them with opportunities for
sailing .over to Manila for " repair. '
The coasts of South Viet Nam are uncter close
surveillance by the Navy, whose ships, can cast
anchor � wherever they see fit and' have besides
" special security zones " put at their exclusive dis-
posal. It also owns the multitude of rivercraf t which
ply South Vietnamese canals and rivers. Vice-admiral
Lam Nguon Tank has many friends and relatives
.among the wealthy Chinese merchants of Cho Lon.
And so the trade of sea-products is of course in the
hands of Messrs senior officers of the Saigon Navy
and their clans : fish, lobsters, mine main (fish brine)
of top quality, and swallow's nests, which fetch
high prices on the Hongkong market.
�The holds of Navy vessels are crammed not only
with such valuable merchandNe as cinnamon bark
from the forests of Trung Bo or fresh .fruit and
vegetables from the delta- kitchen gardens .and
orchards, but also with all kinds of drugs and
narcotis for GI customers stationed in Cam Ranh,
Da Nang, Cua Viet and other ports. One must add
of course the " war booty" that has been mercilessly
stolen from the coastal population .and fishing-folk
in frequent raids, incursions and round-ups : gold
and jewelry, clothing and. furniture, watches, radio
sets, motorbikes, even fishing boats and gear. After
each such raid, the lesser items are distributed to
the sniall fry, while the more valuable ones or the
proceeds from their sale are moved up the ladder,
each level of the hierarchy taking its re-deter�minect p
share. All senior commanders of the Saigon Navy,
vice-admirals and admirals, are millionaires ; the
ship captains and commanders of rivercraft groups
are also very wealthy men. The land-lubbers, green
with envy, call the sailors " corsairs who not only
rob the population but also steal from the State',
Indeed in the open-air markets of Saigon, at Th.oi
Binh and Cau Ong Lanh, one can find every item of
Navy equipment put up for sale on the pavement :
buoys, compasses, blankets, hammocks, electric
generators and what not ! �
The airmen, for their part, do business in their
own way, with the speed and efficiency worthy of
the jet era, under the leadership of such men as
" Air Vice Marshal " Nguyen Cao Ky formerly and
General Tran Van Minh at present. They deal in
light-weight, h igh- value merchandise : gold, either
in foil or bars, diamonds, heroin... Missions to
Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, Manila or Taipei
are highly �profitable occasions in which base, wing
and flight, commanders operate in close co-
operation with Southeast Asia-based international
dealers. The goods travel under the protection of air-
force military police and leave the airports in special
air-force vans or even helicopters, which completely
stymie customs officers and economic police. Air-
force officers at the big Tan Son Nina base also
run a transit business catering for private traders
with especially valuable goods to ferry to
various places of the speed and security with
which the precious cargoes travel : 200,000 Saigon
piastres for the transport of a kilogram of heroin
from Saigon to Nha Trang ; 300,000 to Da Nang;
and 350,000 to Phu Bai,further north. The money
is given in advance and no receipt is of course given.
The sender gives the address at which the goods
are to be delivered, usually a public square or a posh
restaurant, and also the sign at which the receiver
is to be recognized.
Big money also comes to the airmen from the
sale of US-supplied equipment : spark-plugs (z,000
piastres apiece), special pilot's watches (40,000),
plane wreckages (50,000 piastres a ton)...
The Marines' worship of Mammon cannot be so
discreet. The Saigon press is replete with unpleas-
ant news and tumours which greatly anger Major-
General Le Nguyen Khang, the burly, green-beret-
ed Marine commander whose headquarters is at
No. 15 Le Tininh Tong Street on the Saigon water-
front. Marine officers, who wear the black-vulture
badge, still speak with nostalgia of the great 1970
bonana. ; the invasion of Cambodia in the Neak-
lueng region. It costs the Marines nearly a thou-
sand lives, but the survivors had a jolly time
�
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plundering the food and textile depots 4�;...ei �
ally Fa 11VCI1 11.M;l1 CLu valice and paid on deliv-
no haggling. The
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Lon Nol and stripping the local population, "refu-
gees " included, of all their property : gold, jewels,
Vespa scooters, Honda motorbikes... which were
piled up on military lorries and whisked to open-
air markets which had mushroomed along the
frontier. A Marine brigade commander, on the
advice of no less a figure than General Le Nguyen
Khang himself, sent his own wife to Neakluong
where she quickly organized, jointly with the
spouse of the Cambodian local commander, Colonel
Tasayat, an efficient channel linking Saigon to
Phi mom Penli t iron gh N eakl uong for prof ii aide
trade in opium and diamonds. Thus was " friend-
ship " built up and consolidated, under the Ameri-
cans' benevolent eyes, between the " States " and
" armies " headed by Nguyen Van Thieu and Lon
Nol. The year [970, in retrospect, proved to be
the apex of the fortune of Le Nguyen Khang, and
of his Black Vultures as well. For according to
wags at the Saigon General Staff, the pitiful show
the Marines performed in Southern Laos in 1971
was due among other things to the absence of
such stinni Ii as gold and opium, which were hard
to come by in the thick jungle of that theatre of
operat ions.
However, in this rat race, the men in the Com-
missariat of the Saigon army are the fastest of
them all. The name of this department in Viet-
namese is Quao Tiep vu (Military Supply Depart-
ment), ()TV for short. It takes care of all the
stores and supplies of the Saigon army, and the
whole. of US military and economic aid to this
army passes through QTV services. The OTV men
have grown sei presperous that the acronym has
been read by Saigon wags to mean Own tim yang,
or Gold Rushers. Indeed they have learnt quite
a few tricks from their American counterparts,
who run the PX stores and engage in thriving black-
market activities.
Let us pay a visit to the PA' on Nguyen Tri
Phuong street, the biggest of them all. In spite of
all the official announcements of American " troop
withdrawals, " it is still crammed with GIs. The
shop assistants, with painted lips and rouged cheeks
and suggestive miniskirts, cast sheep's eyes at
their American customers in the hope of getting
generous tips. The rooms are filled with all kinds
,of goods : motorbikes, refrigerators, television sets,
tape-recorders, cameras, fabrics, the newest gadgets
from the US, Japan, France, Canada.-- soldat
specially low prices.
IN principle the PX's are off limits to the Viet-
' namese. Yet black-marketeers wait in throngs
at the door with wads of 500-piastre bills in
their Pockets, for the kind-hearted GIs arc ready
to help them get any commodities they want, against
hard cash of course. Getting a 9-inch TV set for them
will bring the GI 15,000 piastres' net profit ; a
Honda moped will fetch them ro,000. The whole
deal takes five minutes and twenty steps down the
street. No wonder that many GIs have sung the
praise of Saigon as a new Eldorado.
US commissaries, however, look down on such
paltry deals. Theirs are of a quite different magni-
tnee. Let us follow for instance an American eonvOy
(usually from 5 to zo trucks) carrying military
supplies along one of the main highways leading
from Saigon to Vong Tau, Tay Ninh or even nearby
Bien lloa. At a given place, the convoy would
screech to a sudden stop and some lorries would be
quickly unloaded. The crates are dumped onto the
roadside and quickly taken by waiting men to con-
venient hiding-places, and the convoy would start
rolling again. The whole operation lasts only a few
ery : 10,000 piastres for a big crate, 6,000 for a
smaller one. Their contents are not known in ad-
vance, and that is the spice of the deal, which is
as fascinating as a roulette game. When the crates
are opened, the Vietnamese- _buyers, civilians or
QTV men, hold their breath : if the boxes are fitteu
with blankets of articles of clothing, they will give
a contended nod, for the profits will be quite sizable.
But they are really mad with joy if the goods then
out to be watches, electronic radio valves, or lighter
flints. On the other hand, they will put on a long
face if confronted with heaps of Cl training man-
uals, MP white helmets, rolls of toilet paper, or
some metal or plastic machine parts of uncanny
shapes. These will have to be quickly disposed of.
But don't feel soiry for the gambler-buyers, they
will make up for the losses later, and Nvith a
vengeance.
This original way of doing business lets begun to
be practised by QTV men along such routes as the
Saigon�BariaeSaigon�Lai Khe and Da Nang�Chu
Lai highways.
Recently a big scandal erupted in Saigon about
the theft of 420 tons of copper hardware and elec-
tronic equipment from the giant Long Binh US
logistical base. The stolen goods were loaded on the
cargoOtip Bong Nai bound for Singapore, at a time
when the price of copper was shooting up on the
world market. The deal involved big shots in many
services, both American and Vietnamese: the Econom-
ics Ministry, the port administration, tl.e customs
service, American senior officers, etc. Palingreasing,
as it was later revealed, took as much as 30 million
piastres, but it apparently foiled to satisfy every-.
body, for the beans were eventually spilled by some
malcontent. The goo* according to time exposme,
had been taken to the wharves by American militaey
lorries during fifteen consecutive nights, in curlew
hours of course ! They consisted of brand-new altil-
lery shell-cases (the warheads had been unscrew,d
and sold out to junk-yard dealers in Cholon) and
costly military signal equipment.
Outstanding among the Vietnamese names men-
tioned in connection with this big deal are thmse
of General Bong Van Khuyen, head of the Commis-
sariat, and other ()TV senior officers. Their tort
nes rival those of other top brass of the
Saigon army : Admirals Chung Tan Cang and Tran
Van Chou, Air-force Generals Tran Van Minh and
Vu XUall Lanh, Marine General i.e Nguyen Khang,
Paratroop General Du Quoc Bong, and other hie-
rarchs of the IChahi Party. Small wonder that
they are bemused by the prospect of American
withdrawal and the wobbling posture of their
ringleader Nguyen Van Thieu.
(To be continue d)
THANH NAM
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Part 9
TT 01\TnT SnTrTrff ITTPITIVAM TAT qr111RTTagLE
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2 s."�. J-2
(Continued)
7.� THE NUMBER ONE MAN -
AND HIS PROFESSION OF FAITH
WHEN, in late 1.97o, a number of parliamen-
tarians met in the Dien Hong Conference
hail which stood among the bank buildings
near the -Chuong Duong docks, and kicked up a
row about � corrupt ion among the bigwigs in the
government, the name of Major-general DO Cao Tri
was the subject. of vehement debate.
In the coffee houses . along Tu Do (Freedom)
Boulevard and the posh refreshment stalls along
the Saigon-Bien Iloa. expressway, the name of Do
Cat) Tri, President Thieu's right hand man, became
a byword of plunder and embezzlement.
At the joint General Staff Headquarters, junior
officers doing clerical work amidst the. ,scream of
jets from the Tan Son Nhut airfield agreed that the
major- general was indeed the number one embezzler
and bribe-taker of the Saigon army. Behind him
stood three other�generals in this order : Bang Van
Quo ng, I,n Lan and Dam Van Quang.
Who was Do Can Tri ? His name was a household
word among the paratroopers. He joined the French
cohmial army at the age of 17, was sent to France
for training and made his first parachute jump at
. the age of is, whereupon he was promoted second
lieutenant. It was in 1946. Later Tri liked to remi-
nisce about his French superiors at. the time, Co-
lonels Gilles, Ducourneau, Konal and others, and
about his participation in operations of the French
Soon,, on the highway leading from Chup to the
frontier and on to Saigon, long convoys of Amer-
ican-made military trucks. with QC (Quan Canh :
Military Police) escorts started rolling. Under the
tarpaulins they carried ro-12 fat oxen or buffaloes
apiece. About 4,000 head of cattle ,thus passed the
frontier in one week. But what particularly enraged
the French plantation-owners was the looting of
their rubber stocks. Nearly a thousand tons Of raw
rubber were thus taken away by 20o truck convoys,
this operation being given priority even over the
evacuation of Tr i's wounded soldiers. The bales bore
inscriptions in French "Plantation Chup," or "Plan-
tation Mimot."
After the warehouses were nearly emptied, aircraft
were called in to drop incendiary and napalm bombs.
Called to account by angry Cambodian senior offi-
'curs, 'Fri answered with a shrug of the shoulders :
" The latex is so inflammable ! A few Viet Cong
shells were enough to set it �ablaze. As for the
cattle, well, they just stampeded away when the
battle started and we couldn't do a thing about it,
could wt"
Cao Tri truly deserves the name his parents gave
him, which means The Wily One. A captain of the
18th infantry Division later supplied some details
about the operation, in the course of a carousal:
" Everything went like clockwork. The convoys
were welcomed at the frontier by no less a figure
than Brigadier Lam Quang Tho, commander of the
rSth ID. Under his troops' protection, the goods
were taken to points plotted beforehand on the map,
from which they were later directed to secret
warehouses or confidential middlemen. The security
expeditionary corps along the Sino-Vietnamese men couldn't lift a finger for the escort officers were
. border and, in the North . west, in the years 1950- all their senior in rank, majors or lieutenant-
1952. Ile never forgot to boast that he had been -'colonels, and moreover covered by mission orders
awarded the Legion d'Honneur in 1951. " 1 wzor signed either by General Do Can Tri himself or his
only 23, " he would proudly stress, " yes sir, only chief-of-staff Brigadier An. Such mission orders, as
23. " He never tired 'of repeating to his subord- you can guess, are worth ID i 1 I io n s of piastres apiece. ',
inates : " I made my first jump before General
At the peak of the Cambodian operation, Chinese' '
Nguyen Chanh Thi, and General Cau Van Vien, the
the Chief-of-Staff, did theirs. "_ _ merchants with a great flair for profitable deals
Who was Do Cao Tri ? His name was a household went by night to the open-air markets in Go Dan ha
word among the paratroopers. He joined the French on the frontier and brought back truckloads of the
colonial army at the age of 17, was sent to France plunder seized by General Tits troops : woollen and
for training and Made his first parachute .jump at silk fabrics, medicines, tobacco, watches, radio sets,
the age of 18, whereupon lie was promoted second bicycles, motorbikes, not to mention the innumerable
lieutenant. .It was in 1946. Later Tri liked to remi- household items taken by force from the population,
nisce about his French superiors at the time, Co- down to the poorest strata. On General Tri's orders,
lonels Gilles, Dueourneau, Konal and others, and electric generators were brought in to provide these
about his participation in operations of the French thriving centres of business with all favourable
expeditiontiry corps tilong the Sino-Vietntonese conditions for carrying on their activities at night.
border and in the North. west, in the years 195o. And so, while the soldiers of the Third Paratroop
1952. lie never forgot to boast that he had been Brigade and the 2.58th Marine Brigade were dying by
awarded. the� .Legion d'Honneur in 1.95 r...-." I was the thousand at the foot of rubber trees, hundreds
Only 23, " he would proudly stress, " yes sir, only of thousands of US dollars; in greenbacks as well as
23. " lie never tired of repeating to his subord- in red (military-issue) dollars, kept streaming into
mates : " I made my first jump before General the coffers of their commanding general.
Nguyen Chant' Thi, and General Can Van Vien, ic tl t that was not all. There were even bigger
. . . B Ll
the Chief-of-Staff, did theirs. " windfalls, For instance two suitcases stuffed with
,In 1966, in the course of a ceremony held by the bundles of bank-notes � US dollars, Saigon piastres,
Paratroops Division, Tri was dubbed King of Para- Cambodian riels, Lao hips � taken from the safes of
troopers. But he was better known under the less 'the French rubber plantations and the pockets of
flattering sobriquet of King of Embezzlers, Gam- .the local population, and totalling, according to
blurs and Whore-hoppers. . estimates by intelligence officers of the Third Corps
How did he go about his business ? In 1970, when Area, over four thousand million Saigon piastres. It
be. was commander of the Third Coips Area and - was a great kandal and Saigon parliamentarians
Military Governor of Saigon, he was appointed kicked up a shindy about it. But barely three day,s
commander of the Saigon forces invading Cambodia. later, General Tri sharply upbraided them : " it's
When his in fan try and paratroop unit entered the an unforgivable insult to generals- in the field, and
rubber area of Chimp and Mimot (-0,000 hectares a slanthT aimed at staining .the national prestige. "
�each) Tri lost no time appointing a special Task The rebuke was accompanied by a challenge to Se-
Face for requisitioning all property of the French nator Pliant Nam Sach to come to his headquarters
plantation-owners and Cambodian local population. in Bien Hon to thrash omit the.matter by discussion
While the rest of his forces were being crushed and, if need be, by a pistol duel ! Needless to say,
under the artillery barrages and decimated by the
ambushes of the Liberation forces, Tri's buccaneers
efficiently fulfilled their assignment.
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not such a fool as to risk his life by going to the
tiger's den. It was publiC knowledge that Tri enjoyed
"President " Thieu's Complete confidence and pro-
tection, and his truculence naturally knew no
bounds. Indeed, the mere sight of him would fright-
en the ordinary citizen out of his wits : t burly
figure with fierce features, jumbo-sized dark glasses,
a black beret tipped at a sharp angle, and enormous
pipe pugnaciously sticking out of a corner of his
mouth from which came an unending flow of foul
language, one hand waving a silver-tipped ebony
swagger-stick, the other ready to whip out a caliber Colt Colt pistol at the least displeasure.
Tri's career had been meteoric. His climb from
ordinary paratrooper in the French colonial army to
major-general in Thieu's army had been all smooth
sailing. Made commander of the most important of
the four Corps Areas of the Thieu regime, then
commander-in-chief of the 50,000 Saigon troops
invading Cambodia, he had good reasons to believe
that his star would keep rising. Financially speak-
ing he had made quite a few lucky strikes. In 1955
he had pocketed heaps of money in the operations
ordered by Ngo Dinh Diem, his then in titer, against
the Binh Xuyen. In late 1903, he Was serving
in the First Corps Arc-a when Diem and his brother
Nhu were liquidated at CIA instigation. Tri received
orders from his new masters to arrest Diem's bro-
ther Ngo Dinh Can, the satrap of Central Trung Bo,
whom he used to respectfully address as " Elder
" Among the latter's confiscated property
was a box of diamonds, the most precious item in
the immense fortune of the `` Tiger of Trung Be."
A Tri aide who was present when the box was seized
From r965 onwards, as the war expanded, Tri's
fortune also knew a fantastic rise. One of his
younger brothers was appointed commander of the
Bien Floa sector, the family's native region. Another
was given a lucrative job in le forestry adminis-
tration while a third worked ill the army's security
forces, a good position from which to "protect "
the business deals of the Do Cao clan. The Saigon
press talked a great deal about the Do Cao " war-
lords " who, under the wings of General Tr, planned
to become financial magnates as well. �
In March 1972 General Tri's career came to an
abrupt end when his helicopter, in which had also
taken place his closest American advisers, was shot
down by Tay Ninh guerillas soon after taking off
from the Trang Lon airstrip.
It was reported that 'Chien wept bitterly when
accompanying Tri's remains to the military ceme-
tery at Bien Ifoa. The dollar-scented relationship
between the two was well-known : a sizable part
of the Thieu family's income came from Tri's
contribution, through the channel of the " sisterly "
rapport between San, Thieu's wife, and .Kim Chi,
Tri's third spouse, who incidentally was the
daughter of Nguyen Hue Tri, the governor of
Tonkin in French times.
Soon before his death, Tri had uttered what could
lae considered the profession of faith of the lihrki
Party anti the Saigon generals' guideline for action.
The French journalist Jean Larteguy, who interview-
ed Tri in Tay Ninh town, recounts that after remi-
niscing about his past services to the French and
his former saperiors in the French colonial army --
Colonels Gilles and Vanuxem among. others � Tri
recalls that his eyes goggled out of his head when talked about his philosophy of life. After drawing
Tri emptied it to count his booty no less than 2.12 -la long puff at the French cigarette Larteguy had
diamonds in all, of which 30 were of the first water offered him (the Frenchman gave him four more at
and worth tens of thousands of dollars apiece.. - his request to satisfy his nostalgic yearn for things
� French) Tri confided: " In war there are usually
two kinds of people : Those who make it, and those
who 'get .rich from it. I do both. Yes sir, I make
war and at the same (I inc take fat profits from
it." Ile burst out laughing and added sententiously:
"Life is so short one should make the most of it !"
Four days later, Tay Ninli guerillas put an end
to his life.
(To be contintced)
THAW, NAM
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Part 10
H.ANOI , SOUTH VIETMAN IN STRUGGLE
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(Continued) The- content of the letter somehow leaked out.
Major-general Ngo Dzu was greatly shocked or
10. The Highlands Satrap rather. feigned great shock, and hastily came to
Saigon for an 'explanation' campaign in which he
D OCan Tr died before he could fulfil his dream
went so far as to challenge to a pistol duel anyone
i of commanding the big operation involving
Republic and sully national prestige."
Y'� "dared to drag in the mud the generals of the
40,000 troops in to Illghway 9 and Southern
Laos, in replacement of Major-general Mang Xuan But no one was fooled. Anyone who set foot in
Lam who Was ill-fitted for the job (the Saigon Da Lat, the fashionable resort in the Central
press considered Lam to be at best suited for a Highlands, knew in what kind of business the
regimental command). Almost at the same time a general had been engaging. You could hear it openly
big scandal erupted around the name of General discussed in the lounges of the posh hotels, such as
Ngo Dzu. � the I'alace and the Lang Biang. In Da Lat you can
No Diu was called the highlands Satrap. A easily get things that are rather hard to come by
in Saigon : such costly drugs as "yellow" LSD
major-general since (968, he was :Appointed corn-
pills could be had at to,00ta pjastres a bottle ;
mander of the Second Corps Area, the largest, an
green ones at much lower prices. Tablets that are
immense region stret citing from the mountains to
the sea and containing tremendous wealth. It was a mixture of mescaline and LSD, much sought
populated by many ethnic minorities and :Coked after by wealthy revellers of both sexes, could be
upon as of great strategic value. A Saigon paper obtained in any amount. Prosperous American.
business executives and globetrotters are unani-
.n 1970 : " President Thieu's right hzind,
observed
mous in their praise of Da lat. The air is cool.
General. Tri, holds Saigon, while his left hand,
General Dzu, takes a firm grip of the llighlands." (never more than 16" C. day or night), the streams
and pine groves beautiful. What is more, you can-
NV1137 then did Ngo Dzu fall into disfavour ? The
get things that are hard to obtain even in such
story, as circulated in the posh restaurants of
places as Marseilles (France) and Los Angeles
Cholon, is as follows : all began with an out-
(USA), and at such low prices you couldn't believe
burst of anger from President Nixon in May ro7r.
your ears : Red Rock heroin (95% pure). costs two
Drug-addiction had reached an alarming rate in the
dollars a bottle (moo in the US) ; a packet of 20
US exPpditionary. corps. A special report by the
federal narcotics administration on drug-addict filter-tipped marijuana cigarettes, 50 cents.
among returned GIs as well as among the US expe- All the channels, big and small, were controlled
. -ditionary corps in South Viet Nam struck Nixon by Ngo Dzu and his underlings. Thousands of ton-
and his advisers with understandable anguish. The rists�America.n, French, West German, Japanese,
addiction rate was not a mere 15% as anticipated, Filipino, Indonesian, -- were freely spending their
but as high as 32%, and even to% in the America' dollars in Da Lat. They could drink and dance all
Division. Other reports from American Congress- night, go boating, play tennis, and for their orgies,
men, doctors and lawyers who visited South Viet rent luxurious villas or repair to plush night-clubs.
Nam. in jnne and July contained descriptions of a The lion's share of the dividends from those
wretched state of affairs: depravation and indis- business naturally found its way into Ngo Dzu's
cipline were rampant among the GIs, who pockets. In May 197r; the liberation forces attacked
. refused to go to battle, murdered their mates Da Lat. The Saigon army's military academy and
and even killed their commanders. The rea- staff college fell into their hands. The pleasure-
son for this was their disillusionment with the seeking tourists hastily disbanded. They cursed
war, a murderous and meaningless \var. This moral Ngo Dzu who barely a month before had boasted
decay was spreading to American troops in Western that: " never could the Viet C'ong penetrate into
Europe and the. US itself. Panic-stricken members. Da Lat !"
of Congress suspected a devilish trick of the adver- However busy he was massacring local minority
sary, whose "secret weapon consisted in having the
people (I3.2 Na and E De tribespeople especially)
drugs sold at dirt-cheap prices to the GIs through
and herding Burn into "strategic hamlets, " Ngo
a network of ubiquitous pushers." Saigon newspa-
Dzu always found time to come to Da Lat at least
pers also sounded the alarm : "A heroin war has
once a week to supervise the work of his subordi-
surged in Viet Nam !"
nates and to immerse himself in revelry. A colonel
. Soon, however, a top-secret CIA report, which' OA. r
the 22nd Infantry Division, who had occasion
had been compiled by special agents and brought to to accompany the general to his " headquarters, "
Nixon by CIA chieftain Richard Helms personally, was quite impressed.. The building was a luxurious
leaked hut. The CIA men had come to the region villa which had belonged to Nguyen Hun Hao, the
dubbed Golden Triangle, which lies at the father-in-law of " Emperor " Ban Dai. Built on top
meeting-point- of the frontiers of Viet Nam, Laos of a hill with a fine view on neighbouring land.-
and Burma, where 1,200 tons of opium were being. scapes, it had changed masters several times
produced annually. They took a close look at the Did and his consort, French Governor General
channels of .distribution of the drug (including. Decoux, the Japanese commander-in-chief in Endo-
those run by the CIA itself, which link the place. china, French Marshal De Lattre de Tassigny and
to Long Cheng, Vientiane and Bangkok) and con- most recently, Ngo Dinh Nhu (brother and adviser
eluded "Heroin has been supplied to the GIs
to Ngo Dinh Diem) and his wife. Ngo Dinh Nhu,
through the business undertakings of the Viet- .an opium-addict, had hail a room on the second
narnese (Saigon) generals." An. appended list cited floor specially fitted out for his drug-taking sessions,
42 names with functions and ranks, all pillars . of during which he was able to enjoy a splendid view
Thieu's regime. Ngo Dzu's name topped the list. .,-of pine-covered hills.
After a full debate by the National Security Along the Saigon�Da Lat highway, 'n such towns
Council of the mortal danger .facing the American .as Blao and Tung Linh, Ngo Dzu's men had set up
troops,. President.Nixon wrote a personal letter to -whorehouses and opium and gambling dens, the
Thieu in which he curtly demanded that an end be resorts of playboys, most of them children of VIPs,
put to that systematic poisoning of the GIs and -scions of. wealthy families, smugglers, and prosper.
punishment be meted out to those who for the sake .ous wholesale dealers in vegetables, one of the
of bast material interests were luring hundreds of main products of Da Lat. All benefited from
thousands of their American "allies', to slow but Ceoeral Ngo Dzu's generous, -but by no means disin-
-certain destruction.. . �terested, protection. International smugglers also
�maintained fruitful partnership with the satrap.
�
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Scores of quintals of processed opium vere ferried matter. " Of course both of Ngo Dzu's superiors
by helicopter from a remote region in Burma to were in the know but their mouths were kept tight-
Pleiku, Kontum, Da Lat, Pakse, Long Cheng, ly shut by means of enormous bribes, amounting to
from which they were distributed to the American millions of piastres. Colby, the head of LISA ID,
.clientele through the general's network .of military asked "Premier " Khiem to put an end to that
transport. . . " sabotage " and got this polite, but firm, rejoinder :
In early 1971, while the Lam SOD 719 operation " Once handed over to the Vietnamese side, the
into Southern Laos was rnrming into deep trouble, bases become Vietnamese property and the Viet-
Ngo Dzu, on Abrams's order, twice went by chopper namese know best. what to do with them. " The
to Pakse on the bank of the Mekong, the headquar_ only resort left to the infuriated Colby was to
ters of the Fourth Military Region of the Vientiane curse the " incompetent and venal generals " of
.army. There he met General Phasouk, commander Saigon.
of the Military Region and satrap of Bassac, a rich . It was the only case in which the Saigon top
area of the Country of the Million Elephants, the brass, who as a rule are at the Americans' beck
colourful name by which Laos is often designated. and call, dared to defy them.
The two parties discussed prospects for incursions After the � disaster at Tan Canh and Dak to in
into the Saravan�Attopen highlands in order to late 4, prn :i
L n [972, Ngo Dzu was recalled to Saigon,
hamper the liberation forces' strategic supplies. � ,
pc.nding investigation. " lie was often seen in
But the plan was eventually abandoned for lack of company with General I bang X uan La in, the
troops and fear of annihilation. Vet, Ngo Dzu's general cashiered after the fall of twang Tri, at
time was by no means wasted. fie concluded a the city sportS club. Clad in immaculately white
fruitful deal with Phasouk whereby an opium�and
sports clothes, they were playing a lively game of
heroin�ferrying line was set up between l'akse awl tennis and enjoying it enormously.
Pleiku, and business progressed apace until the fall
Let military disaster follow nrilitary disaster. Let
of Dakto and Tan Canh cost Ngo Dzu his post.
Saigon troops get their noses bloodied ill one place
It was public knowledge that Dzu's father was
� after another. This in no way interfered with the
the owner of an import-export under la king \vita
generals' comfort. The only difference was that they.
branches in many -cities of Trung Bo : Quang Ngai,
now had plenty of time to enjoy the tremendous
Da � Nang, Qui Nhon... and of course had a linger
w6alth they had amassed over the past decade or so
in the heroin pie. thanks to the blood shed by their soldiers. The
Ngo Dzu's greed knew no bounds. In this, be threatened " investigation and trial " did not worry
was a typical representative of the top brass of the them in the least. They knew it was a put-up job
Saigon regime. In 1970, he had thought out a aimed at soothing. public opinion and allaying the
scheme which fitted Very nicely into Mr Nixon's despair and bewilderment in the Saigon .army. The
plan for " Vietnamization." After the transfer by
, worst that could happen to them would be their
the American Fourth Infantry Division of a base appointment to some ambassadorship abroad. A
at Due Co to the Second Corps A rea Command, (2 :
..a[ngon lawyer observed : " In this country the
Ngo Dzu ordered that the base be auctioned Off,. administration of justice 'follows a very .strange
and the proceeds incorporated into the Corps Area's course indeed. It's just beyond the ordinary man's
special fund. Anyone who has had occasion to pass 'grasp. The sentences meted out sometimes cause the
by an American base knows that it is. worth a accused to jump for joy, for they mean no punish-
great deal of money : hundreds of rows of mili� ment at all; but actual reward. " Iloang Xuan Lam
tary huts with pinewood beams and walls and tin and Ngo Dzu could thus wait for their trials with
. roofs, air-conditioners, electric generators, radio tranquil hearts. New favour would no doubt be
and 'television sets, electric fans, safes, filing bestowed upon them by their boss, the leader of
cabinets, costly plumbing, bath-tubs, duralumin- the Khaki Party: Nguyen Van Thieu.
framed furniture, typewriters, mimeograph ma-
The replacement of Ngo Dzu ;is head of the Second
chines, etc. The American troops have lost the war, Corps Area was also carried 4)ut in typical Saigon
all right, but they remain none the less a modern fashion. The new appointed was Brigadier Nguyen
and wealthy army. And the Americans are always Van Toan who, as commander of the Second Infan-
very " generous " - towards their " allies. " On try Division in Quang Ngai, had been brought to
Washington's orders, all American bases in South book on several occasions for such offenses as the
Viet Nam, together with all their equipment and rape of a 12-year-old girl, looting civilian property
installalionS, are to be transferred to the Saigon in broad daylight, accepting several million piastres
army to help it " grow as strong as its big broth- in bribe from a subordinate against the promise,
er. " But Ngo Dzu had his own conception of never fulfilled, to promote him to higher rank,
"Vietnamization. " Within two weeks, everything plundering tons of cinnamon bark, marketing them
at Due Co had disappeared, sold off lock, stock with the complicity of I foang Xuan Lam's wife and
and barrel. To whom ? To the generals of course, sharing the proceeds with her, etc. It was clear
their relatives, and their underlings. At about that he was made Ngo Dza's successor solely by
one-tenth of market prices. The litur's share natu- virtue of his proven ability to run the profitable
rally came to Ngo Dzu, whose million-dollar business set up by the latter on behalf of Thiel],
account in a Hong Kong bank grew noticeably Khiem, Vien and Co.
fatter.
The subsequent " Victnamization " of other (To be continued)
American bases greatly benefited from the e.xpe-
Hence thus acquired. .It no longer took as much as
two weeks, but a mere two days to dismantle each THANH NAM
of the American bases at Dae To, Le Thant), .Iney
Mrong�1.n Khe... Long columns of military lorries
had been assembled, outlets found, prices fixed.
The Americans complained to General Cao Van Vien
and " President " Thieu, but all they got was a-
polite, " Thank you, we'll have a look into the
.
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Pa* 11
HANQT_ Reimm VTPTWAM TM mPiTGGLE
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prime. mover, fuel and lubricant of the State ma-
chinery,'' as admitted by one of its stalwarts, the
four major-generals play indeed a major role.. They
maintain close and effective liaison between the'
satraps in the four Corps Areas, the Presidency and
�the General Staff. 'laving themselves worked in the
various Corps Areas, they are quite conversant' with
. all available opportunities for profitable businesses
there.
how rich are they ? It's difficult tos say. An indi-
cator is Dang Van Quang's boast in the eours.-:-of
drinking bout that his own fortune had grown even
larger than that of Nguyen Hull Co, the :fOrmer
Defence Minister and now a big bank; owner, whose
known wealth is believed to have passed the 6
million US dollars' mark. Each month Co and his
wife draw two -million Saigon piastres' rent' from
.-Diiring their time in power, � Diem, his. brother.
Nhu, �and Nhu's - wife, Le .Xuan,- had their hand in .. (Continued)
just every profitable business in the land. They held_
the Monopoly of the rice.trade in Trung Bo and the..
11. �. The four pillars of -export:of such products as cinnamon bark, white'
� the corrupt regime sand. Vox. glass making); scrap iron, rubber, frozen -
shrimp, duck feathers, .etc. to Japan, Singapore,�
Hongkong', France, .the USA; West Germany....
THE four pillars of the corrupt regime in Saigon
stood in this order : Do Cao 'I'd, Dang Van year in profit. The general manager was Diem's
which- brought them several billion piastres each
'Outing, Lu Lan and Dam Van Quang. All four elder sister, Ca Le. At present this PactoluS flows
Were major-generals (Tri was posthumously promo- into the pockets of Ngo Dzu, Huang Xuan Lam,
- ted to be a ' four-star full general). i Dang Van Quang, and company.
The higher your rank, and the bigger your power, One of Diem's achievements in " industrial deve-
the more mercilessly you rob the people�such is 'opulent " was the setting up of the Tan Mai firm
the law governing the Saigon administration and in Bien Hoa., which hehl the monopoly of timber.
army. Let us take a quick look at the careers of exploitation and wood processing. A government
" President " Thieu's four cronies. decree forbade all trade in. wood in order to " pro-
Dang Van Quang used to be the commander of
teet national wealth ", i.e. this monopoly. Now the
the Fourth Corps Area (the Mekong Delta) where an Mai undertaking has been entrusted to a retired
he had had plenty of opportunity to plunder its general, one of Dang Van Quang's cronies.
rice Lu Lan, formerly head of Quang Ngai province Diem possessed great interests in the textile
then commander of the Second Corps Area, was industry. He held large shares in such undertakings
also notorious for his venality and especially im" as Intertexco, Dofitex, Vinatexco, and Vimitex. �
his looting of relief rice for flood victims. Ile His brother, Bishop Ngo- Dinh Thuc, 'owned the
is now inspector general at the Ministry of .Defence. Cogido paper-mill in. Bien Boa, where he gave his
Darn Van Quang, formerly a staff sergeant in
blessings to 300 workers to compensate. them � for,
the I'''rencli colonial iirmy, was later promoted. their .starvtltion .wages,. the lowest in the trade The
.to be " Emperor " Bao Dai's aide-de-camps mill has been developed into a large plant entrusted
then commander of his personal guard. In the- with "supplying paper for, national defence " and
American-financed regime in Saigon, he was put in� is now firnliy-totittolled �by GeCtierals Ctio,Vail.'Vleii:
comthand of the Special. Forccs a.nd earned a solid and Lu Lan. �
reputation as a dollar trafficker, American aid,
embezzler, and inveterate ga.mbler.. He is now Lu. In the food industry, Madame. Nhu in her tin
had set up the Intraco Company, which owned a
1...an's. deputy.
In the Saigon regime, where " cordiptioni is the' Meat-packing factory in Gia Dinh, a fish-canning
one in Phan Thiet, a zoo-hectare breeding area for
lobsters in Vung ,Tan, a freezing plant for shrimps
in Van Don (Saigon). The major shareholders in
these undertakings are now senior officers in the
Saigon General Staff.
Diem in his time was surrounded by such faithful
servant-managers as ' Nguyen Van Bun, his own
nephew, who ran the M11110.111011 and shrimp businesses
in Trung Bo, or Nguyen Him Khai, who supervised
the vegetable-growing " cooperatives " in Lain Dong
and the marketing of their products in Saigon or
even as far as Singapore. The Saigon generals'
retinue is much more numerous. It is made up of
their brothers, nephews, cousins and of course their .
parents and wives. Not to mention their subor-
dinates --- staff � officers and commissaries � who
will do their utmost to please their bosses and
their real estate alone: a three-storeyed apartment get promoted to higher rttnks. .
house in Da Lat, Go bungalows rented to Aniericans. The official title of Dang Van Quang: security
at the Nita Trang seaside resort, a luxurious villa. adviser to the President, should not be taken too
in Vying- Tau, two modern hotels in Saigon..
etc.. seriously. His job is rather to look -: after the
ng
The real estate. accordi, to the estimate of expc- security of the President's.., purse, and to ensure a
rienced building contractors, is worth billions or'
steady flow of income from his opium and political
piastres. But the cash and bank. accounts-remain, traffic, lie works most of the time with Thieu's
a well-guarded mystery. There are only a few eloquent' wife and manages the Thien family's bank accounts
pointers. For instance this story- about Mrs Co, -iii Rome and Herne. " A real Kissinger," quipped a
whose great passion is gambling. Once, having struck journalist to a parliamentarian, wild quickly replied :
a bad 'streak,. she lost 300,000 piastres in one single " Kissinger can't hold a candle to Quang as far as
evening. Lighting .a cigarette, she saidl casually, financial management for the boss is concerned.'"
With a ...-shrug ,of .� thi,. -:shoulders.:T7: ''� WS .,nota,hinF�, The generals' spouses are at letist as notorious as
nothing- at all. The price of three soldiers: ! - �their husbands. The press often carries reports
What is certain is that the fortunes of the Saigon :about visits paid by the First Lady of the Second
generals far surpass that of - the Ngo, Dinh Diem 'Republic of Saigon (Thieu's wife), accompanied by
family, which in fact had been incorporated into such social luminaries- as the wives of Generals
theirs alter Diem's fall in 1963. The so-called Dang Van Quang and Lu Lan, to wounded soldiers
it. c.onfis;Cation� � of the ' N go clan's property for. the � at the Republican- Hospital. " Charity " activities
�biliefit Of the State "was just eyewash�the throwing are a convenient screen for less. innocent under.-
ulway .Of '.a -Sprat to -Catch a is ii
. Some : of ' the 5f iff � -Of the Saigow Supreme ' Conrk:"
'knOW2every, nook and cranny of the affair; the files.,
rifs�Whith-lie in their.:Safes, but they priulently.keep,
their,' Mouths shut. They rarely...talk about- this;,�1
ticklishs Subject, only in private' conversations- with.
truSta,friends.- � . -- .- � s��� ...�.� -
-cYbrit1:3"*.E.A.
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takings. Thus Mrs Thieu is president of the Women the hundreds cri thousands or GIs who had laid
Serve Society associatimi, while Mesdames (pang,' down their lives would not have died in vain. A
Lan and Quang are members of its central coin- luxurious Esso headquarters rose on Thong Nhat
mittee. The. Saigonese are quick to point out that boulevard opposite the " Independence Palace ". In
'in fact they only serve their own private coffers by late 197o, Thieu had promulgated Decree 11-70
corrupting society. For their 'numerous financial which laid down rules and conditions, very liberal
deals they have an army- of efficient aides and can ones indeed, for foreign companies to conduct sur-
devote most of their" time to American-style orgies. veys and open up oil wells on an area totalling
:...T1u:y arc: numerous enough to form a .special. too,000 square kilometres. " An outright gift to
!privileged .stratum. For although there are only foreign investors,'' estimated a Lybian oil expert.
13'z; :generals: (from brigadier .up).� the, number- of The Saigon press quickly pointed out : " President
their consorts is much larger, perhaps a thousand Thieu is ready to sell out the whole of the country's
.or so. Once a brigadier-general was killed in- battni; wealth for just a few score million dollars in anti-
'No less than eight widows came to his funeral cipation of the day when he will leave the country
was the first time they ever met), from places as for a comfortable exile in Switzerland. "
distant as Da Nang, Hue, Da Lat, Can Tho and one However, in spite of all efforts by Thieu to cajole
from -each of three Saigon districts. Each tried to and entice foreign investors, USAID and the Saigon
express her grief louder than the others, hoping Economics Ministry were unanimous in recognizing
thereby to justify claim to a larger share of the that the undertaking, far from progressing at a
tJoo-mi Ilion -pias tre heritage. " cosmic " speed, was proceeding at a snail's pace.
As said about, charity" is the favourite occiiPai In the early part of 1972, an elderlty
.'. -
seen taking
.tion. of the generals' wives.. Victims of natural: wearing 0d-rimmed speetacleS could b
Calamities, war refugees widows and orphans a-re; a. walk every aft!rnoon along the tree-lined Thong
the object . of their watchful solicitude. Indeed: Nhat boulevard, He looked tired and worried. He
they are watching for the least typhoon that may' was a top-ranking expert of the American Bristol Oil
swoop down on their unfortunate compatriots. Not company:, who had been. in Saigon for s, velal years
that. they are much 'concerned about their fate. But: and had kept in close touch with Thieu and Quane.
they are terribly interested in the share that they Once .he confided-- to a. Vietnamese friend in the
never fail to get from the relief funds collected:: Saigon Economics Ministry
usually no less than 60 per cent. ' 'Safety, absolute safety, that's what we need.
These last few years, Dam Van Quang has been You know what has been happening in the Middle
entrusted by Thieu with the problem of the oilfields;' and Near East. Let trouble erupt and the oil wells
With a -bulging brown leather briefcase under ho ill 'go. up an flarries. Oil 'and bombs stiould be
arm, Quang often conies to meet the American oil: widely separated. Both are inflammable !" He
experts at USAID headquarters. Indeed he is the added with a wry smile : ." There May be an oil
liaison man between Thieu and the big- American' war, but in actual life oil shouldn't be too close to
oil companies. Together with Mien and some of the war!'' A pause,' then he continued : 'r Absolute
Saigon top brass, he dreams of becoming an oil political stability, that's the second thing we need.
magnate in Soutkeast Asia, Oilmen come to Saigon. The nationalizations effected by those new govern-
from all corners of the world. From the Boeing ments in South America have been hard blows to
7175 which land at Tan Son Nhut airport there us. Unfortunately both the things we require, safety
alight prosperous-looking businessmen - from the_ and stability, can't be found here. " He looked at
USA, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, his friend who seemed lost in thought, and explain-
Japan, Australia and even Indonesia. This has cd : " Trading in oil is not like trading in heroin.
become a veritable rush, in contrast to the relative; We have to build big storage tanks and long pipe-
discretion of a. few years ago, when American oil lines. No amount of armed guards could ensure their
executives passed themselves off as mere touristsr absolute safety. ktwo-pound explosive charge could
and went home after a period of three to six months, � cause billions of dollars' worth of oil to 1p-) up in
During their stay, they lived in hotels, in rented smoke. Mr Bunker's bunker itself has been proved
villas or at the headquarters of Shell. Caltex or not to be immune from attack. What about oil tanks ?
Standard Oil Saigon branches.
How could we think of setting up business here ? "
A special . department at USAID studies the He looked discouragingly to the north, where
natural-wealth of South Viet Nam, oil in particular. .according to a recent MACV communiqu�he fuel
In early 1971, sensational news was unofficially and ammunition depots at Cam Ranh had been
" leaked, " from that, department: South Viet Nam burning for several days, then to the west, where
r.'04,U4,-IiterallY -floating on an ;ocear . of oil ...Wherever several million litres of gasoline at an Esso storage
you drill, se it was rumoured, in the Central High- depot near Phnom Penh had vanished into thick
black smoke.
lands, in Trung Bo, in the Mekong Delta, oil gas
The dream harboured by Thieu and his cronies
would gush forth. What is more, the oil was said to become oil magnates has also vanished. Perhaps
to be of the low-sulphure kind, highly valued in tins is the reason why they are more than ever per-
the industrially developed countries, which are par- � suaded that the most fruitful trade they could
ticulatly sensitive to the menace of pollution. in engage in remains the banter of the cannonfodder
the posh restaurants and cabarets, American, Dutch constituted by their soldiers against American
and Japanese politicians and businessmen whispered greenbacks. With " Vietnamization " being pursued
into each other's ears thrilling hints of the fabulous by the Americans, the Saigon � .soldiers' dead bodies
importance of the prospective oilfields : the reserves r
. emai n the principal source of dollar' dividends for
were estimated to be a hundred, nay, a thousand the leaders of the Khaki Pare)).
times bigger than those of the Middle East. A strik-
ing simile was circulated : the Middle East oil I, .i.!.(To be continued),
deposits when compared with the South Vietnamese
ones would look like a stamp stuck on the rump of THANH NAM
an elephant. These rumours were in fact discreet
calls by Bunker and Thieu addressed to American -
business circles, who were urged to invest' in a field
where . nothing concrete had really been found.
In the latter part of 1971, more " men of good
will " came by the hundred, people ready to
" help " the country move away from its economic
backwardness. Their briefcases were stuffed with
maps and blueprints about the sites of future wells,
pipe-lines, storage tanks, refineries and plants pro-
ducing all kinds of goods from oil. For these men
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Part 12
HANOI, SOUTH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE
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(Cutaintred)
12. �Inside the Dragon's
Head Palace
- The Khaki Party- had. no officially proclaimed
leader. But tlw Saigonese know very well who is at
- the top, In fact. they know all ;Llama his past and
present. Bunker has been warmly praised by Nixon
for the acumen he displayed when he put that man
in the Dragon's I lead Palace.
When in late 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem was made
way with at CIA instigation, the Americans found
themselves in a quandary, Coup followed coup at
such a tempo that, as saifi an English newspaper,
" no one knows on waking up each morning what
government has come to pokvor." It was then that
Bunker made his judicious choice of a man worthy
of the confidence of the " free- world. " lie was the
" statesman " Nguyen Van 'Mien. Of course there
were a few snags. For instance the tact that Thieu
had been staff . sergeant in the French colonial
army. It was rattier awkward to put an understrap-
per of the French colonialists at the top of the
government 6f an " independent nation. " But Thieu
knew how to make up for his shortcomings.
Before becoming the bell wet her of t he khaki Part y'
Then had fed on corn from every bin. Ile had been
a member of the Dai Viet Party, then had joined
� the Lab(nir and Personalism Party of Ngo Dinh
Nhu, and called himself a Buddhist before becoming
a fervent Catholic, in order to please the then Pre-
sident Diem as well as his own ( atholic wife. A
.complete and succinct description of Nguyen Van
Thiel] could be found in this conversation he might
have with an imaginary interlocutor: " Are you a
Did V ret ? Su re� :" A rid a Ille,Inher of the' Labour
and Personalism Paily as well ? " " Of course." ;
" A follower of Ngo Dinh Diem ? " " Yes.
." Didn't you oppose Diem ? " � " Why shouldn't
I ? "; " Are you a Catholic ? " � " You lot. " ; " And
a Buddhist too ? "� " Correct. " And so on and so
forth... .
Saigon � politicians have dubbed Thieu " The
- Master Turncoat, �' for his skill in forsaking the
French for the Americans, Diem for Minh,. Minh
for Khanh, etc. and in taking care of number one.
Once he made common cause with Lam Tan Phat
and Duong Ngoc Lain but left them in the .lurch
when the going got- touch. The depaty Ngo..Cong
Due calls him the " Six-faced Die. "
Then has just turned 49. News leaked out from
the " DragOn's I lead Palace " said that as prepara�
tions were under way for a tremendous birthday
party for the " President, " everything was spoilt
by the gloomy reports from Highway 9 where all
the strong points built by the Saigon army had
collapsed. And so, when the festivities were held
on the night of April 5, 1972, to mark the entry
of the " President " into the 5oth year of his life
full of intrigues and plots, the whisky drunk for
the toasts tasted like gall and wormwood. And no
wonder, Said a soothsayer with a political turn of
mind living on Confucius Memel, for this year will
.prove to be one of hoodoo for the " President. "
,�Thien attracted the Americans' attention as. early
as the days when he was attending military training
courses at -Fort Leavenworth in the USA. Ile was
interviewed by .General Taylor persimallY. Ever
since then he has tried hard to groom himself for a
career as a " statesman. " For instance, he avoids
drinking and revelling in public; But his political
machinations are far from innocent-. �
. What Nixon and his proconsul Bunker have been
'seeking has been a Diem government without Diem,
a Diem line without Diem. There are many point.
ers. The role played by 'Fran Kim 'Dwell for
instance.
After Diem and his brother Nhu met their death
in an American-made armoured car, people say that
their evil spirits jointly appeared in -human
form in the person of their former aide
Tran Kim Tuyen. Tuyen had built and con trolled
the whole �network of secret agents of the Ngo
dynasty and was notorious for his machiavellian
schemes. In late 1967, after his entry into the
" Dragon's Ilead Palace, " 1I.iicii got TuYen out .of
prison and had hint installed in a luxurious villa
linked to the Presidential office by a direct tele-
phone line. Tuyen thus became a major, albeit
hidden, Presidential adviser. People see his hand in
c;uch murky affairs as the murder of Professor
Nguyen Van Bong and the ouster of such right-hand
men of Nguyen Cao My as Lt. Nguyen Khang,
governor of Saigon, and Linh Quang Vieni Minister
of the Interior, at a time when Ky himself, as Vice-
President, was having his office in the same palace
as Thiel]. More recently, when Ky and Big Minh
were prevented from competing with Thiel' in the
one-man " presidential " race � that brazen act of
dictatorship in the midst of a show of
democracy " the credit for that cunning scheme
also went partly to Tran Kim Tuyen.
Thiel] lives in the " independence Palace, "
also dubbed by the Saigonese " Dragon's I lead
Palace, " protected by stringent security
measures. The iron fence which had been
partly knocked down in the Spring of 1968 has been
replaced and reinforced. Two heavy M.48 tanks
stand by in a corner of the grounds in the shade of
mango trees, as yell as three grey.painted I
helicopters further to the left. In the backyard, two �
M.I13 armoured personnel carriers point their heavy -
machine guns outward. Both vehicles and pedestrians
are banned from fluyen Tran street, which runs
along the back side of the palace. The nearby Ong
Timing stadium and Tao Dan park have been
turned into a huge camp, where 2 oo paratroopers
in camouflaged uniform and armed with quick-
firing M.16 submachineguns have pitched tents,
together with clusters of jeeps and military lorries.
Policemen, clad ill Nvhite in the daytime and olive
-drab at night, patrol the surrounding streets: They
are armed cap-aTie and number at least two batta-
lions, for surveillance over an area of less than one
square kilometre'. Behind each tree, lurk two or
three uniformed policemen. As for the plainclothes
men, their number is difficult to ascertain.
Quite � memorable were the security measures
taken at Thieu's inauguration on October .3r, r97r.
In front of the " Independence Palace, " along
Thong Nhut boulevard stood no less than 42,000
troops and police .under the direct command of
Brigadier Cao Ilao lion, aSsistant to the I nterior
Minister. They ;were there to ensure safety for the
Less than 10,000 people who attended the ceremony :
high-ranking functionaries, foreign guests and
American officials. As for the 3.5 million Saigonese,
they were ordered to stay behind close doors, the
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best way for them to celebrate the investiture
of the man whom Nixon had just pritistd as " one
of the major leaders in Asia. "
After crossing the lawn and the flower-beds,.
where "Longevity" chrysanthemums are grown, we
enter the main hall. Behind immense doors of
polished wood is the ceremonial room where big
receptions are usually held, attended by such
pillars of the regime as Ambassador Bunker, Gene-
r:ds Abrams and Weyand, the director of USA ID,
Saigon generals with their la-jewelled spouses and
senior officers of " allied " armies: South Korea,
the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand...
sporting Saigon medals awarded them for their
" exploits " in massacring South Vietnamese civil-
ians. In short, the cream of Saigonese society,
viewed from the angle of Thieu and Co. But
intelligent and honest people hold quite different
views. A Saigon lawyer, for instance, has called
the habitues of such gatherings " a refuse heap
that the people �vill sweep away. "
At the far end of the ceremonial room stand a
pair of elephant tusks in a glassease. Next to it is
a.door of polished wood which leads into Thieu's
office. The floor is covered by a red carpet. Thieu
sits behind an immense desk of bulky shape, in an
armchair upholstered in flowered silk, with a cush-
ion to support his aching back. Here Thien discusses
" State affairs " with his close advisers. Topping
the list is Hoang Due Mut, his press secretary and
number-one counsellor. Others are Nguyenl'hu Due,
his-mentor on foreign affairs, Dang Van Onang,
adviser, and Nguyen Ngoc Linh, former
of Viet Tan Xa, the Saigon official news
now a millionaire whose wily schemes are
greatly appreciated. Thieu's son-in-law, Trang Si
Tan, has recently been admitted to those meetings,
where the most notorious frame-ups of the "Second
Rtpublic " have been thought out. They have
resulted in the arrests of Trait Ngoc Chau, secre-
tary general of the Lower house ; Truong Dinh Dzu,
Thieu's runner-up in the presidential race of 1967 ;
Au Truong Than lx ; and the bonze Thich Thien Minh,
later sentenced .to ten years of hard labour and
five of solitary confinement...,all for t hie r anti-war
attitudes. Also in this room have been devised such
cunning schemes as the law winch compellecl all
presidential candidates to produce evidence of sup-
� port by at least .jo members of the "National
Assembly " or too members of provincial councils
-- a hurdle which tripped Nguyen Can Ky evert
before the race began. Ky was so embittered that
even now, in his Nha Trang retreat, he often
clenches his teeth in the midst of a tennis game and
gives the ball a whacking bl(ny accompanied by a
curse addressed to that " s.o.b. Thieu! "
Other decisions, adopted on direct instructions
from the Americans, are taken in another room, on
the second floor of the left wing. It is a big draw-
ing-room with furniture upholstered iii purple
velvet and light-yellow carpeting. Every time he
comes, Brinker would stalk straight down the.
cor.ridor, up the stairs and into the room, followed
by his host, who walks with a bad limp due to
sciatica. Iloang Due Nha �alone s allowed to be
present at such meetings.
Political circles in Saigon have been wondering
whether Homing Due Nha is the roan of Thiel], or
Bunker, or both, While Thiel' puts up a show of
filial respect for Bunker, he is often annoyed at the
latter's peevishness. Thieu is linang Due Nha's
maternal uncle. Nha received thorough training it'
the United States from the age of 25 to 28 (he is
,now 32) at Stanford and Pittsburgh universities,
majoring in history apd economics. A taciturn man
with eyes hidden behind thick -lenses, he is a repu-
tedly ambitious and wily politician. Ile and Thieu
completely agree on this guideline for action : The
end justifies the means. This highly practical motto
perfectly suits the taste of the Americans, but
contributes to time accusation brought against
Tibet] by his political opponents, who consider him
a treacherous and unscrupulous inch% idua/. " After
shaking hands with Thku, " they say, " you'd
better make sure you still have all your fingers
left. "
Even now Thieu's participation in the November
robri coup, which overthrew Ngt� Dinh Diem,
remains �a complete mystery. It is true that at
dawn on November 2, 1963, two battalions of the
5th Infantry Division under Thieu's command did
launch an assault on the " Independence Palace, "
but by that time DitIll and his brother Nhu had
escaped to Cho Lon. At 7 in the morning, when
Big 11linh made a triumphant entry into the palaco
grounds, on the spur of the moment he hugged
Thien and pinned two stars on the collar of his
uniform. Thieu thus became the only Saigon colonel
ever promoted major-general without pasin, through
the rank of brigadier. !however, officers ( the 5th
II.) gave another version of what had happened.
When 'I hien ordered his troops to move to Saigon
front Bien lloa on the afternoon of Noventher.
according to these officers, he had told them :
" Duong Van Minh has staged a rebellion. We nmst
come to Saigon to save the President (i.e. Diem).
Recen'tly, on the occasion of the Sth anniversary
of the death of Diem and Nhir (November 1, 1971),
Thiel.' himself gave this account : " On the morning
of November 2, when I opened the door of .that
M.1 r3 armoured . personnel carrier and saw the
bodies of His Excellencies Diem and NItu lying in
a pool of blood, I stood at attention, took off my.
cap, and clad tears of sorrow. " Could it be that
for once he was telling the truth ? Ir hr had
switched his loyalty from Diem to the putschists
only vhen the former's fate appeared to be sealed.
In December 104, barely a year later, he received
his third star from the hands of Nguyen Iihanh as
a reward for his betrayal of Duong Van Miuili. lint
just at the time when he was fawning upon Nguyen
Khanh, lie was already plott big with General Lain
Van Phat and his friends Doc, Ton and Thao to
overthrow his boss. \\ lien the scheme was discover-
ed, Thieu quickly ctsengaged himself. In answer
to Mat's' revelation about his participation in the
conspiracy, Tibet' flatly said that it was only a
ruse which had allowed him to penetrate the chat:
designs of the " rebels." lie even became a member
of the court-matial whim !omit his former " comra-
des" to face the firing squad.
(7'o lie connoted)
11-1ANH NAM
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Part 13
VT ri ,T1r1.777 trrflm,vr it I i rtt nm,-,r'rr,rr
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Nov L3(
(Cu oh
Thien's financial deals go hand in band with his
political machinations. He is the leader of a new
'Class of men in military uniform who hold sway
over the country's economic and finoncial resources.
The size of bank accounts is of course a %yell-
guarded " State seciet, " But indiscretions from his
entourage give us some rough idea of his Nvealth.
When he was the colonel commanding the 5th
lirfantr' Division stationed north of Saigon in the
years I962-63, Thieu once boasted to. his chief-of-
staff that he had a nest-egg of some zo,000 US
dollars tucked away in a 'Hongkong bank, the equi-
valtnt of eight million Saigon piastres. By the time
he became chairman of the "National Leadership
Committee, " that, hank account had swollen to at
least fifty times that amount, and his wife, in one
of her trips abroad, went to Rome, ostensibly to
visit the Vatican, in fact for financial operations,
.which involved important deposits in Italian banks
and the purchase of a large villa in the western
suburbs of that capital city. In 1066, some, repre�
sentatives back from a foreign tour supplied hints
of the princely life led by Nguyen Von Ilion, Saigon
ambassador to A.ustialia and linen's elder brother-.
In French and Japanese colonial Limes, 1-lieu was a
notoriously cruel and corrupt mandarin in Yen
Dinh, Thieu Floa and Ninh Tinian. Now besides his
" diplomatic " functions, he ma�kes trips by PanAm
jets to Paris, Rome, Geneva, etc. to look after the
oVersea.s financial interests of the Thieu clan,
dropping casual remarks about " my brother the
President " at diplomatic cocktail parties.
Nguyen Van Kieu, Thieu's younger brother, was
at one time bead of the " Relief Funds to Flood.
Victims in Trung, Bo " and is now widely travelling
abroad to prepare for the comfortable " withdrawal "
of the whole Thieu tribe to Taiwan or Switzerland.
A relative newcomer to the "Independence Palace"
(Dila; Doc Lap in Vietnamese, and often read by
Saigon wags as Dinh Co Lap; or Isolation Palace) is
� Trang Si Tan, the lieutenant-colonel commanding
the city police and the right-hand man of the pimp
mayor Do Kien Nhieu (see supra). He is Thien's
son-in-law and has been dubbed " Prince Consort of
the Nguyen Court. " He is a �swarthy, burly fellow,
with slant eyes and a breath reeking of alcohol. His
special skill resides in torturing, which he does
with cold-blooded ingenuity. Besides such routine
business as the ,electricity or water torture, he
relishes such sadistic practices as sticking US-made
needles into the nipples. of girl students suspected
of anti-Thicu feelings. It is due to such beastly
" innovations " that from a police u �
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risen to his pr(ssent position and can look forward
to being promoted a full police colonel pretty soon.
OF all the schemes hatched in the "Dragon's E
�
le ;id Palace " the most hemous is incontes- ach l�lonthiy, Wcdnesdziy, iind Friday morning'
the sentries at " isolation Palace ". would see a
en
� � tablv the invitation extended to the US to ' tbillietck maraedes and a dark-blue Mercury drive past
sd a 00 5,,lo o�str ong expeditionary corps to South
Viet Nam. It accounts for the nickname of "L gate into the grounds of the palace. Theree �,
Chien Thong of the Second Republic " given to,, N(1)1'ild alight from them Pang Van Quang, Do Kien
uslill.eu
Thieu by the Saigonese. he Chien Thong, let and Tiring Si Tan. At these regular meetings,
us
ally chaired by lio:Ing Duc Nha, Thicu's press
recall, is Unit felonious prince ho towitrds the end . .
secretory and closest adviser, they would discuss
of the 18th century called in Tsing troops to help
tie security situation in the city, with special
ldm save his regime in decomposition, and whose
, reference to the stability, or rather instability, of
name has become a byword for cowardice and �
treason. the Presidimtial posture, and how to reined): it. The
agenda is a crowded one, for new headaches crop up
Still alive in the people's memory is that picture every day. Anti-American feeling has run so high
�
of
Thieu and his crony Nguyen Hun Co standing on lately that Bunker ha-s ordered the 30,000 or so
the flight-deck of the aircraft-carrier bidePendente Americans still in the city " to avoid all contacts
in mid-t066. Thieu was putting his signature to a and clashes with the Vietnamese, to beware of
50o-pound bomb which was to be dropped on North linguistic misunderstandings, and to make them-
Viet Nam by . merican aircraft. The American selves scarce whenever some ugly incident involving
generals present nodded approval but eye-witnesses Americans occur. Also on the rise has been open
recount that many of the sailors honied or spat. opposition to Thiel' ever since he scored that walk-
That signature put on an engine of death can never over in the infamous one-roan presidential race.
be forgotten by the Saigonese, and especially by The number of ''recalcitrant and uncooperative "
those who had collie from the North and still "have deputies has shot up while " insolent " editorials
relatives and friends there. 'have been appearing regularly on over 40 daily
publications. Thien's advisers are also preoccupied
with the attitude of the intellectuals -- lawyers,'
doctors, professors... In their retreats in Hoc Mon,
Thu ')uc, or Go Vap, they have suddenly ceased to
devote their time to raising song-birds and wild
orchids, as they have -been doing in recent months
to show their coldness to the regime. Now they
start engaging in heated political debates, in which
such explosive remarks as the following have been
heard " impossible to live with the present
regime I " " This regime is a challenge to human
dignity I " � " To sit with folded arms is to con-
done crime ! " etc. A priest, Truong Ba. Can, writes
in the Dien Tin �: " Mr Thieu is the only obstacle on
the road to peace. " A bonze, the Venerable Clap �
Duc : " Thiel' is the. war president. " Others, like
the Catholic priests Chan Tin, Nguyen Dinh .Tin
and Nguyen Viet Khai, denounce the Saigon regime
as " rootless, "anti-national, " while praising the
achievements of the North. Small wonder that on
orders from Thieu, a veritable war has been started
against the press. Small wonder too that, following
each of the above-mentioned meetings of his tight-
hand men, more people are flung into jail or sent
to the penal island of Con Son (Poulo Condor). The
Khaki Party is fast becoming the 'Cudgel Party,
whose very survival depends solely on apression
� naked, unscrupulous, brazen 'faced repression.
In this veritable war, Thieu has attained new
records: in May alone, he ordered the confiscation
of no less than 165 newspaper issues, the highest
peak in his crackdown on the press so far. Indeed
he had no choice, for the press has been publishing
highly " subversive " stuff. For instance, this item
in �Dcoi Chic Moi (New Democracy) which follows a
scathingly ironical essay on " The GI Problem "
" The children in the North dig their own air-raid
shelters, wear plaited-straw protective helmets, feed
on cassava, and successfully stand up to American
aircraft. They truly spring from a heroic people I "
In .the " war against students," the Thieu
administration has ordered the arrest of such
student leaders as Bnu Chi, secretary general of the
Association of Creative Students, in Hue, and Nguyen
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Duy Hien, head of the students' Social �Vork Team
in the same city, together with over 300 ,other
students. Still another lvar, that " against the Third
Force " has been waged against those tylp, stand
for peace, neutrality, and national concord, -whose
numbers have been increasing among intellectuiliS
and at er strata, including deputies and�religious
leaders. But the. most fiercely waged of them all
has been theewar against the over three trillion
Saigonese with a view to press-ganging ever more
people and grabbing ever more alt Ii for the war
against the patriotic forces, which threatens to
bring about the collapse of the whole regime. More
than 200,000 civilians have been pressed into the
army and inflation has passed the 'zoo hit I ion
piastres mark. These staggering figures are the
topics of heated discussions among the Sai,..:one-ie
for the policies worked out in the " Dragon's !lead
Palace " are depleting their already very lean
pocketbooks, and threatening not only their liveli-
hood but their very lives and those of their dear
ones. This is the thing that is likely to toll the
knell of the Nguyen Van Thiel] dynasty.
While alarming reports have been streaming into
the " Independence Palace '' from every quarter,
rumour has it that the relationship between the
American proconsul and " Pres!dent " Thieu has
become heavily tinged with bitterness. Thien and
his aides, Quang and Nha, have been perusing the
newly-disclosed secret papers of the l'entagon,
particularly the chapters on the decisions taken by
President Kennedy in the wurse of those five
fateful meetings of the National Security Council
held in the period front August to November 1963,
which resulted in a plan to overthrow Diem and
Nhu, an operation which was to be headed by a CIA
chieftain and to involve many generals of the Diem
army itself.
In the light of those documents, the praise
recently bestowed upon Thieu by President Nixon :
" You are a talented leader, equal to your respon-
sibility, etc." took on a sinister meaning when one
recalls a similar c9mmendation given bi Diem by
President Kennedy.
Over the past few years, Thieu has never failed
to order fairly sumptuous commemorative ceremonies
on the occasion of the anniversary of Diem's death.
Requiem masses are as a rule held at the Church
of the Virgin Mary. On October 1, 1971., when a
400-strong procession marched out from the Church
along Hai Trung boulevard to the cemetery on
Mac Dinh Chi street for a wreath-laying ceremony
at Diem's grave, Thieu's wife distinguished herself
by the particular loudness xvith which she vented
her grief. The Saigonese were not surprised, for
they knew that the tears were in fact being shed
over the impending doom of the Thieu regime itself.
The Saigon press has made this observation about
three outstanding sites in the city : the " Inde-
pendence Palace," the American Embassy, and the
Mac Dinh Chi cemetery. These three symbolic
places are all situated in the same district and are
separated by equal distances (about one kilometre),
which causes them to stand at the apexes of an
equilateral triangle. Incidentally, the Mac Dinh
Chi cemetery used to be called the " Cemetery of
the French Ghost."
�
(to be continued)
THANH NAM
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Part 1.4
(Concluded)
13.�TWILIGHT OF A ,REGIME
SAIGON,
May 1972:. �
Long convoys of military trucks are bring-
ing wounded soldiers hack from An Loc through
Lai Kile. They are heading for the Republican
Hospital.
Highway 4, which leads to the provinces, is block-
ed for long hours at a time.
On the morning of the loth, the whole city is
astir. Martial law has been clamped down on the
whole of the territory of South Viet Nam, a mea-
sure without precedent over the past 25 years.
Even in Diem's time, only a state of emergency
was sometimes decreed. At nightfall, the streets
are all deserted.
� The. draft, which hits men from the age of 17 to
43, set the town agog. The press remarks : " It
takes everyone, from striplings to hoary heads."
US Vice-President Spiro Agnew sent to Viet Nam
on an 'inspection tour, thought he could not stay in
Saigon overnight for security reasons. On hand at
the airport to greet a worried and irritable Agnew
.was Thieu, who had suddenly grown old. In late
1070, he had had to dye a mass of his hair at the back
of his head a dignified grey so as to make him
look more like the venerable "father of the Repub-
lic " .he had been trying to set himself up as. But
since then, no dye had- any longer been necessary
to turn part of his head white. �
One FriclaV morning, the Proconsul Bunker flew
by helicopter from his fortress-embassy to the Tan
Son Nhut airfield to welcome General Alexander.
Haig, the security assistant of President Nixon,
who had come on a fact-finding mission. Bunker's
back was hunched up and his cheeks were sagging.
-He didn't even bother to wave a greeting to the
American officials present. Ile is too old, people
'say, nearly So, and too much depressed by the
impending doom of Ids President's policy of ' Viet-
namiza.tion. " it is rumoured that he is about to
retire. His greatest grief has been his failure to
build a viable political party in Saigon, one which
has a broad popular base and might serve as a
" Labour and Personalism " party without its bell-
wether Diem. The Khaki Party, his pampered
child. has been a big flop.
Talking to a friend in a small villa in Thu Due,
a college professor said : " The Old Fridge can't
sleep because of the deterioration in the military
situation, and he has been crying over the political
decomposition that has taken place." The profes-
sor was of course right. The Americans want the
Saigon generals to, fight the patriots, but all they
:care for is their coffers. 01 the four Corps Area
.corrimanders, one, Tri, has been burnt to ashes in
his downed helicopter ; two, Lam and Dzu, have
been dismissed and are awaiting trial. The fourth
arid only one remaining, Truong, has been hastily
sent from the Mekong Delta .to the northernmost
provinces of Tri-Thien. But Truong is only an in-
competent swashbuckler. An American officer at
MACV says : " Truong is a hot-headed bully, whose
only way to get himself obeyed by his men is to '
bawl insults at them, and threaten them with pris-
on and firing squad."
Things are even worse on the political front.
Ever since his " triumph " in the one-man presi-
dential race, Mien has turned practically every
man against him. Most of the 1' Senators" oppose
him and his valets. The press clamours : " The
regime is dying. It has reached the lowest depth
of infamy. We are witnessing the twilight of the
Thiel] regime." And a doctor who has kept abreast
of the situation asserts: " For Thieu the situation
is beyond retrieve. He is but a political corpse
which has started rotting."
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13 Nov 1972
During a Senate session at the Dien Ilong
Stmetor shouted.: " The Americans have brought
Thieu to power. It is DOW Up to them to remove
him frem office. When the roar Of American 13.52s
and the millions of tons of American bombs stops,
then the Vietnamese will be able to hear the.
voices of each other."
But in his Isolation Palace; Thicu is not resign-
ed to his fate. More and more pewls.�,ttalo.,ttwyaz
arrested by his police. In the old imperial city of
Hue, nearly 300 students were rounded up in one
single night and taken Heaven knows where. In
Saigon, a stifling atmosphere prevails in all eleven
districts. Police Chief Tra.ng Si Tan is flinging
himself about. At police headquarters, all detention
rooms are filled to capacity and in the torture
chambers near the Zoo, the lights are 'on all night.
The Saigon government needs zoo billion piastres
to rebuild its badly-battered army. Little is left of
American aid, and so slogans are put out for " self-
reliance " and " Vietnarnization. A hundred new
taxes are decreed. Business slumps. It becomes ever
harder to earn one's bowl of rice.
The nights are still. The streets are empty. A
storm is brewing. In the workers' quarters at Khanh
Hoi and Lo Sieu, the children are singing :
�
To stand on our 07011 feet
And have enough to eat
Let's topple Thieu
And knock down his whole gang.
Saigon under Thieu in 1972 is just like Saigon
under Diem in 1963, sa.y many- people. The same
chaos and tension, the same stifling, unbearable
atmosphere.
There is one difference, though : anti-Americanism,
i.e. the disgust at, scorn for, hatred of and opposi-
tion to the Americans, has become even more open
and widespread.
Over the last five or six years of contact with
" GI civilization, " the Saigonese have come to
realize more fully than ever that nothing can be
more precious than the spiritual values of one's
own nation. Material wealth unaccompanied by a
spirit of independence and self-respect only leads to
moral ruin. Many school and college students, who
formerly liked, believed in, and admired the Amer-
icans, now turn against them and enthusiastically
join movements with such slogans as : " Let's go
back to our nation's roots " and " Let's speak to
our compatriots' and listen to them." They want to
cause the stream of the people's strength to gush
forth even more strongly and to immerse themselves
in it.
Hero is what a patriotic woman teacher said in
the course of a recent meeting : "How fortunate
that after such a long occupation by US troops our
fellow-countrymen still stick to their national baba
silk garments, relish their milk-apples and
mangoes, love their fragrant rice and sweet folk
melodies... How fortunate that neither American
miniskirts, Californian rice, nor GI music have
succeeded in catching their fancy."
continued
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When, following the fall of Qua.ng lApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462ng, announcing the cs
ation troops, Thieu had to go there to try ro 1-mister curfew. Only military vehicles and troops remain t� 4
'up his troops' morale, the conversations in Saigon in the streets. Military and civilian police stalk
tea-houses naturally turned to this topic. People said about. The US embassy is a windoWless fortre.
to each other : " Nixon is asking for more can- The MACV headquarteis is in a bustle. The USAID
nonfodder, and 'Mien has of course to comply. Now building is astir. The " Independence Palace " looks
is the time for him to repay his debt to the Amer- strangely isolated, as the night descends on Saigon.
lean President. Over the past few years, the .G.Is
The men livinr, in those headquarters, build ing
have died by the hundred of thousands for Thieu to
and palace are lumped together by the Se igonese
remain in the Independence Palace. Now, it is the
under one designation : " that gang: " As �the 3 mil-
turn of Thieu's soldiers to die for Nixon to remain lion Saigeinese go to bed, they wish with all their
in the White House." What a penetrating remark !
hearts that in the morning, when they wake up,
It hits the nail on the head : many American and
they will find their city swept clean of " that
Saigon soldiers have indeed paid with their lives
gang " which. have been proliferating in the shadow
for the consolidation of two wobbly presidential
of the American embassy. Saigon�pure, clean and
seats on either side of the Pacific !
happy�will again be a shining Pearl of the Orient.
SOS calls keep coming from Saigon generals in
" That gang are shaking with fear, " the Saigon-
Tr Thien, in the Central Highlands, in An Lee,
ese think, " for they arc now resorting to martial
Binh Dinh and other places. They are so busy fight-
law, round-ups and frantic massacres. They are
Mg for their lives that they have to put a tempo-
heading right for the abyss. "
rary halt to their wheeling and dealing. The whole
�
of that social stratum, which we shall call the Dawn will soon be breaking for the people of
military-compl'ador, bureaucratic clique and which Saigon�rosy, pure and fresh.
Ittsjes all.r.,the infamous members of the Khaki
May 1974
Party, has been thrown into confusion and bewitd- .THANH NAM
erment: For years, they have drawn coin fort and
support from American money and troops. Now,
dollars are coming only- in driblets and many GIs
have left. The backbone of that clique is now made
up of the 13 plippet regular divisions. But seven
or eight vertebrae of that backbone have already
been smashed. The pillars of the Khaki Party turn
'their anxious look to the Independence Palace,
Thieu's residence. They know that if Thieu goes,
nothing can save the. Khaki Party, which has neither
popular roots nor following, from immediate
collapse.
ln the sweltering days of this summer, neither
Thieu nor his henchmen seem to have much confi-
dence left in each other and in their American and
Vietnamese friends. In early May, Thieu's wife
again set out on trips to Italy and Switzerland and
the generals began accelerating the flow of their
money transfers to Hongkong and France. At the
booking office of Air Viet Nam at No. rib, Nguyen
llue strict,- wives and children of VIPs are i peuing
up, lugging heavy suitcases. The Boeings and Cara-
velles flying to Hongkong, Paris and Rome are lull
to capacity. In the Lower House of Parliament,
deputy Do Sinh Tu shouted ' While appealing to
all of us to fight to the bitter end, why should
Mr Thiel' be sending his wife and his money abroad?
Let him stop doing it ! "
It is very difficult indeed for Then and other
members of the Khaki Party to comply. Every
morning, at 4:30 sharp, the people in the whole of
District One of Saigon city can hear the engine of
a chopper revving up : it is the special 1111.i helicop-
ter on standby duty on the grounds of the presi-
dential palace. It is piloted by a captain who is a
nephew of Mrs Thieu's. And here is the message
that the noise of its engine is carrying to all Sai-
gonese : " I, President Thee, am still here. So
beware. And let me tell you this : If it comes to
pinch, I won't rush headlong into a tunnel, like
that fool Diem, and die like a rat. I will just hop
off in that American helicopter ! "
There is enough room in the helicopter for Thien,
his wife, his financial manager Dang Van Quan,,,
his police chief and son-in-law Trang Si Tan, and
his close adviser 1-bang Due Nha, who has sworn
to swhn or sink with him. On the navigation charts
these routes have been carefully plotted : Saigon-
Bangkok (from which PanAm flights could be taken
to Paris, Geneva, etc.) and Saigon-Yankee Station
(where American aircraft carriers are standing by).
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AUG 1972
e'f; -e,/e-c�\ C
�,.;,�,./ 1Y)
A Mennar c
A., BOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST Of CIA head-
quarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the
----\\ BaJtimore-Washington expressway overlooking
1/,,
' IN-- the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large
three story building known informally as the "cookie fac-
tory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, head-
quarters of the National Security Agency.
Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner
and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle
one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses span-
ning' the complex at regular intervals house specially-
trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irri-
descent 1. 1). badges � green for "top secret crypto," red
for "secret cry'rpto" Even the janitors are cleared for secret
codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's
longest "corridor-980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And
all -along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting
the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square
feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000
square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon
and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more
spacious. But the DIRNSA. budding (Director, National
Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the.
headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies
--it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No.
For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most
sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in
the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Ojwa-
lions Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work
to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes
of every nation in the world, amilyze the de-aypted mes-
sages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. in-
telligence community.
Far less widely known than the CIA; whose. Director
(b)(3)
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COnt.
.1,1V�14. ..1,1"C T.r.1�".,� � re,,,,��
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JULY 1(if?
(b)(3)
irpr to Show CIA Proof s of
mu Book on Asilan La'
n--ez
it
tfl 6. fr"
1111 c'ri
1.11.11a-11:0[3,4�41.1,17�LigS.103161.1wer-.94.01..18.1�Bilf0.���:..J.../
Marchetti Book on CIA Still Under Suit
Harper & Row has decided, after
much consideration, to honor a request
from the Central Intelligence Agency to
see page proofs of Alfred 'W. McCoy's
controversial September 13 book, "The
Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,"
and to consider "factual" corrections
that the CIA may offer. The publisher,
however, has made no advance com-
mitment to accept any requested
changes.
In his book, written with Cathleen B.
Read, Mr. McCoy, a 26-year-old student
in .Yale's Ph.D. program in history, al-
leges that French, Vietnamese and U.S.
personnel have used the traffic in opium
� and _heroin in Southeast Asia for their
own ends, and that the CIA and other
U.S. agencies have either accepted or
have responded inadequately to the sit-
uation.. Mr. McCoy told Congressional
committees early in June (including the
foreign olierations subcommittee, headed
by Sen. William Proxmire, D., Wis., of
the Senate Appropriations Committee),
that he had had more than 250 intervic)As
�� , about the drug traffic, including talks
with CIA and South Vietnamese offi-
cials, and that President Thieu and
Premier Khiem were involved: he gave
details of many allegations which appear
also in the book. 13. Brooks Thomas,
Harper vice-president and general coun-
sel, tells PW he and the editors have
worked closely with Mr. McCoy on the
manuscript, have insisted on documen-
tation of all material points, and have
had outside experts read it. As a result,
Harper & Row is convinced that the
book is well-documented, scholarly and
deserves to be published.
A chapter from the book, adapted,
appears in the July Harper's magazine.
The magazine has. received a letter from
the CIA's .executive director, W. E.
V Colby, denying allegations involving the
CIA. Ikrper's reportedly plans to pub-
lish the letter soon. Mr. Colby and an of-
ficer of Air. America (a contract airline
which does Work for CIA in Southeast
Asia) also wrote to the Washington Star,
disputing allegations picked up by a Star
columnist from Mr. McCoy's findings.
In these protests, and in its approach to
��
Harper & Row, the CIA is said to be
departing sharply from its usual policy of
silence concerning criticism.
Harper & Row was approached early
in June, when a representative called
upon Cass Canfield, Sr., former chief
executive, now a senior editor for the
firm, and said the agency understood the
McCoy manuscript contained serious al-
legations about CIA and other agen-
cies�allegations that 1te said might be
libelous to individuals or severely dam-
aging to the national interest. The repre-
sentative spoke also to Ni. S. Wyeth, Jr.,
executive editor of the trade department.
The Harper officials said the manuscript
was not yet ready to be read, but that the
request would be considered.
in weighing their decision, I larper &
Row officials and editors talked among
themselves and with respected publishing
colleagues, including experts in the field
of the freedom to read. On June 30, Mr.
Thomas wrote to the CIA asking the
agency to state its request, with reasons
for it, in writing. The reply, dated July 5, /
came from Lawrence R. Houston,'gen-t/
eral counsel of the CIA. Ile wrote that
the CIA was ip no way questioning
Harper & Row's right. to '.publish the
"book, but said, "We believe we could
demonstrate to you that a considerable
number of Mr. McCoy's claims" about
the CIA were "totally false" or "dis-
torted" or �"based on 'unconvincing evi-
dence." �
Harper & Row then decided to let the
CIA see the book�subject to the au-
thor's approval, without which, Harper
& Row president Winthrop Knowlton
told PH', the CIA's request would not be
accepted. The author finally accepted the
decision, to let the CIA look at page
proofs only, and to give a quick repiy,
with Harper -& Row reserving all its op-
tions and reaffirming its right to publish. �
"As head of the house of Harper &
Row," Mr. Knowlton told PW, "I am
sensitive,. like' all my colleagues in pub-
lishing, to the problem of censorship,
and if I felt this request involved censor-
ship we would not be agreeing to it. In
view of the gravity of the allegations, we
simply think this is the most responsible
way we can publish this book.
Ironically, in view of CIA efforts to
refute the charges by Mr. McCoy and
others; personnel of CIA, State and the
Department of Defense completed in
February a report to the Cabinet Com-
mittee on Narcotics Control which but-
tressed many-of the charges, according to
Seymour Hersh in a � front page New
York Times story, July 24. Mr. Hersh
reviewed the I larper-CIA discussions in
the Times of J uly 22.
The CIA's procedure with respect to
Mr. McCoy's book is in sharp contrast to
government action on an as-yet-
unwritten book, a nOnfiction work about
the CIA, which Victor L. Marchetti is
tinder contract to prepare for Knopf. iii
that case, the Justice Department ob-
tained in April 'a restraining order to
Prevent Mr. Marchetti from .publishing
the proposed book, on the ground that it
would be likely to divulge currently clas-
sified information in violation of a sc-
crecy agreement that N4 r. Nlarchetti had t/
made as a CIA employee. Mr. NI archetti
worked for the CIA for 14 years and
resigned in 1969. 1 le then wrote a novel,
"The Rope Dancer.' (Grosset), based on
his observations.
Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., U.S. Dis-
trict Court, Alexandria, Va., in issuing
the restraining order, ruled that Mr.
Marchetti's agreement with the CIA
"takes the case out of the scope of the
First Amendment." The American Civil
Liberties- Union, representing Mr.
Marchetti, denies this and argues that the
author cannot in fact sign away his First.
Amendment rights. The Association of
American Publishers and the Authors
League have filed an:jells- curiae briefs
supporting Mr. Marchetti in further.
Court proceedings. �(See PHI, April 24,
June 5, June 12.)
(b)(3)
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Approved for 21D0r118701/30 602792462
3 0 JUL 1972
(b)(3)
7Thq
iv115.
in this seemingly endless
war--1 million, 2 million,
3 million?
More important yet, how
many Americans truly care?
� 'That question was asked
of Intelligence Report
.recently by a North Viet-
� namose representative in
Moscow.
The North Vietnamese, at
least many of them, if this
' official is to be believed,
are convinced that if
President Nixon cannot end
the war by negotiation, he
will end it by extermi-
nation. '
With seven U.S. aircraft
carriers discharging
fighter-bombers daily, with
more than 200 B-52's drop-
ping-tons of bombs, with
the new "smart" laser bombs
in action and the even
smarter "Maverick" TV bombs
forthcoming, U.S. air and
naval forces can extermi-
nate most of the North
Vietnamese population
within 60 days.
It is a long-held Kissin-
ger belief that extermi-
nation will not be neces-
sary, that the North
Vietnamese can stand only
so much destruction and
devastation before they
accede to ending the war by
negotiation.
The North Vietnamese told
US that they prefer ex-
termination to negotiatibn
under duress.
Many of them are con-
vinced that they will soon
die by drowning. They point
out that U.S. planes have
been systematically bombing .
the areas around the Red
River dikes which protect
the Plain of Tonkin from
flooding. By weakening the
dike foundations, they
contend, the Americans are
making certain that the
monsoon rains will collar's-
No one
knows how
many:Viet-
namese
lives have
been lost
_
the dikes, causing the
death by drowning of a
large portion of the 14
million North Vietnamese
who livo on the Plain of
Tonkin.
President Nixon was asked
on April 30th, this year,
at the John Connally bar-
beque in Floresville, Tex.,
if he intended to order the
bombing of the Red River
dikes.
"That is something," he
answered, "that we want to
avoid. It is also something
..we believe is not needed."
He also Said that "with
regard to dams or dikes...
while it is a strategic
target and indirectly a
military target, it would
result in an enormous number
of civilian casualties."
Nixon, however, did not
foreclose on his option to
bomb the dikes, which the
North Vietnamese claim our
Air Forca.is already doing
That the American public
will support a continued
air war so long as it
results in relatively few
American deaths is a Nixon
tenet which has been proved
correct.
Nixon and Kissinger, as
well as countless military
men, are convinced that
under continued bombing,
the Communists must eventu-
ally cry "uncle."
The North Vietnamese
maintain that their ulti-
mate pain threshold isdeath.
The Soviets, on the other
hand, believe that the war
could end tomorrow if only
we would order the C.I.A.
to assassinate Nguyen Van
Thieu, President of South
Vietnam. :
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"You people arranged to
have Diem assassinated in
1963," one Soviet journal-
ist explained. "Why can'
the C.I.A. do the same
thing with Thieu? Or at
least arrange his abdica-
tion to Singapore where we
understand he has already
bought a home? Once Thieu
is out of the picture,
really out of the picture,
a coalition government can
be formed in South Vietnam,
a cease-fire can take
place, the war is over, and
you can get your prisoners
back. It is all really
quite simple."
The Soviets, of course,
are cynical.
3
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0AbhiNUTUB. YUbT
26 JUL 1972
(b)(3)
Herobi, and tke Tar
� Alfred McCoy, a Yale graduate student who inter-
lyiewed 250 people, charges that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency has known of Thai and South Viet-
namese official involvement in heroin traffic, has
� covered up their involvement and has participated
-In aspects of the traffic itself. The CIA has publicly
� denied these charges, in the process even per-
suading Mr. McCoy's publisher, Harper gr. Row, to
,.Jet it review his book manuscript before publication.
.But now � there comes an internal government re-
:port�done by the CIA and other . agencies�on
the difficulties of controlling the narcotics trade
in Southeast Asia. The report states:
"the most basic problem, and the one that
unfortunately appears least likely of any early
solution, s the corruption, collusion, and indif-
ference at sOme places in some governments,
particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that
preclUdes more effective suppression of traffic
by the governments on whose territory it takes
place."
-That is to say, a private report by agencies in-
eluding the CIA confirms the thrust of charges.
:which the CIA publicly denies. The White House
� contends the report, completed in February, is "out
of date."
Now, we are aware that the Nixon administration
_ has worked with great vigor and much effective-
, � pox,itwercer--
� 0. 4--
I Mkit
I 01111
-
ness to curb the international narcotics trade. Thel
fact remains that the largest supplies of .the filthiest
poison of them all apparently come from or through
Thailand and South Vietnam, if one is to take the
CIA's private word�as against its public word�
on the matter. Nor should it stretch any reasonable
man's credulity to understand that the United
States has had to accept certain limitations on its
efforts to get those governments to stop drug deal-
ing because it has wanted to ensure their coopera-
tion in the mar against North Vietnam. In the final
human analysis there is simply no place in the pur-
suit of honor and a just peace in Southeast Asia for
an all-out lionest effort to control traffic in heroin.
This is the infinitely tragic fact flowing from con-
tinued American involvement in the war.
Would heroin addiction among Americans have
swollen to its current dimensions and would the
amount of heroin reaching the United States from
South Vietnam and Thailand have reached its cur-
rent levels if the war�and power politics�had not
gotten in the way of effective American pressure
upon the governments in Saigon .and Bangkok? If
President Nixon needs any further reason to make
good his pledge to . end the war, this is almost
reason enough by itself for what it says about the
character of regimes this ,country has gotten into
the habit of supporting�lavishly and indiscrim-
inately�in the name of our "national .security"
and "world peace."
Rear Guard
�
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July 24, 1972
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD � SENAT
�
�
reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs shall
prepare and submit to the Congress a report,
In two parts, concerning, the illegal interna-
tional narcotic traffic.
"(c) The first part of such report shall in- '
elude a survey of (1) the cultivation and
processing of narcotic drugs (which are il-
legal in the United States) in each country
where these operations are known to, or be-
lieved by, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs to occur; (2) the routes of
transport of such drugs to the United States;
(3) tho means by which such drugs are
brought into the United States; (4) the fi-
nancial and banking arrangements which
support such illegal international narcotics
traffic; (5) changes in the international pat-
terns of cultivation, processing, and shipping
of such drugs for the United States markets
which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs, have occurred
since calendar year 1969, and an evaluation
of those changes.
"(d) The second part of such report shall
Include�
"(1.) a list of the countries which, in the
opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs, are currently major centers in
Illegal international narcotic traffic;
"(2) a summary of the programs rind other
actions undertaken by such countries for the
-suppression of such traffic; and
"(3) an evaluation by the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs of the effective-
ness of such programs and actions, including
reasons for their effectiveness or ineffective-
ness.
"(c) Each Federal department or agency
having the responsibility for the conduct of
the foreign affairs of the United States, or
for programs rind other actions related to
the suppression of the illegal international
narcotic traffic, shall, upon the request c,1
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, make available to the Bureau such
Information and other assistance RS may be
requested."
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President., will
the Senator Yield? -
Mr. MONDALE. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there be a 10-
minute time, limitation on the pending,
amendment, the time to' be equally di-
vided between the manager of the bill,
or whomever he may designate. and the
author of the amendment. I understand
it has to. do with: a report on interna-
tional drug traffic through the Narcotics
Bureau.
Mn GOLDWATER. I did not hear the
Senator.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand it has
to .do with a report on international drug
traffic through the Narcotics Bureau.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
.objection to the unanimous-consent re-
quest? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays.
.The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, this
amendment is, I think important, and
yet uncomplicated: It would require. the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs to submit to Congress within 6
months a comprehensive survey and
analysis of the illegal international nar.
co tics traffic.
I shall not go into details of all the
reasons why this amendment is needed.
I think the Senate is quite aware of the
growing seriousness of the inter-
national narcotics traffic. This amend-
ment would require the Bureau of Nar-
.
cotics and Dangerous Drugs to submit a
report to Congress which would contain
information, which would then be avail-
able to the Congress and to the public in'
two general categories; The first, it would
report a survey of the cultivation and
processing of narcotics drugs in' each
country where these operations are
known to, or believed by, the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to occur;
the routes of transport of such drugs to
the United States; the financial and
banking arrangements which support
such illegal international nareotie.s
traffic; changes in the international pat-
terns of cultivation, processing, and
shipping of such drugs for the United
,States markets which, in the opinion
of the Bureau of Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs, have occurred since 1060, and
other information in this general area,
The second part of the report would
include a list of the countries which, in
the opinion of the Bureau of. Narcotics
and Dangerous Drug's, are Currently
major centers in illegal international
narcotic traffic; a summary of the pro-
grams and other actions undertaken by
such countries for the suppression of such
traffic; and an evaluation by the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous�Drugs of the
effectiveness of such programs and
actions, including; reasons for their effec-
tiveness or ineffectiveness.
Last year we adopted an amendment
which I offered, which, among other
things, authorized this Government to
terminate foreign aid to any country
which 'vas known to be willfully in-
volved in the production of sale of illegal
drugs and which ultimately ended up in
the United States.
It is estimated that the amount of
illegal heroin entering this country will
be nearly 40 percent greater than that
brought into this .country .a year ago.
A front-page story in the New York
Times describes a secret Cabinet level
renort that concludes "There is no pros-
pect" of eliminating the smuggling of
narcotics in Southeast Asia "under any
conditions that can. realistically be
projected."
. I ask unanimous consent that the
article appearing in the New York Times
appear at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MONDALE. This amendment will
help the public and the Congress better
understand the essential elements of this
vicious problem so that we know better
what to do.
I am hopeful that the distinguished
floor manager will accept this amend-
ment.
EXHIBIT 1
MI:PORT TO UNITED. STATES SEES No Hoc's OF
- HALTING ASIAN DRUG TRAFFIC .
(By Seymour M. Hersh)
WASIIINCTON, July 23,�A Cabinet-level re-
port has concluded that., contrary to the
Nixon Administration's public optimism,
:'there is no prospect" of stemming the
smuggling of narcotics by air and sea hi
Southeast Asia "under any conditions that
can realistically be projected."
"This is so," the report, dated Feb. 21,
1972, said, 'because the governments In the
region are unable and, In some cases, un-
do those things that would have
done by them if a truly effective effort
twoill be it
were to be made."
The report, prepared by officials of the
- Central Intelligence Agency, the State De-
partment and the Defense Department,
noted that "the most basic problem, and
the one that unfortunately appears least
likely of any early solution, is the corrup-
tion, collusion and indifference at some
places in sonic governments, particularly
Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes
more effective suppression of traffic by the
governments on whose territory it takes
place." �
The report sharply contradicted the official
Administration position and qovernment in-
telligence sources say its conclusions are
still valid today. In May, Secretary of State
William P. Rogers told a Senate subcom-
mittee that "we think all the countries are
cooperating with us and we are quite satis-
fied with that cooperation."
Similarly, Nelson G. Gross, Senior Advisor
to the Secretary of State and Coordinatoie for
International Narcotics Matters, testified be-
fore Congress in june on the subject of nae-
coties smuggling that "the gOvernments of
Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have airesciy
joined us in the fight and, while we have
a long way to [o, we feel that during the
past year some real progress lies been
achieved." �
All officials concerned with the drug 'prob-
lem acknowledge that the United States
55elle13, under personal prodding from Pres-
ident Nixon, have begun an intensive effort
to stem the international narcotics traff,e.
But critics contend that the effort is far less
effective today than Administration officials
say it is.
C'RITICS. CHARGES BACIZ-ED
Two leading critics 'of what they allege to
be the Government's Is Xne3S In stoppingHie
flow of narcotics are Representative Robert
H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut. and
Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale gisidu-
ate student who has written a book on nar-
cotics in Seattheest Aetc.. The IcCW York
Times reported Saturday .that Mr. McCoy's
allegations concerning the C.I.A. and the
drug traffic had been the snblect of all in-
tense and unusually inne)lic rebuttal by the
r'ge`filacey.Cabinet-level report, made available
to The Times, buttressed many of the charges
made by tlae two critics, particularly about
the pivotal importance of Thailand to the
International drug smugglers. Thailand is
also a major Air Force staging area for the
United States..
III a report on the world heroin problem
last year, Mr. Steele wrote that "from the
American viewpoint, Thailand is as impor.
tant to the control of the illegal interna-
tional traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While
all of the opium produced in Southeast A5iia,
Is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smug--
gled through the country."
Mr. Steele's report, filed with the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted that
many American citizens had established res-
idence in Bangkok, and had Inured into the
narcotics trade. The report added that the
inability of the United States to have a few
notorious smugglers deported had led some
intelligence officials to conclude that the,
teen were paying Thai officials for protection.
Mr. McCoy said In testimony before Con-
gressional committees last month that hun-
dreds of tons of Burmese opium passed
through Thailand every year to International
markets in Europe and the TJnited Stales
and that 80 to CO per cent of the opium was
carried by Chinese Nationalist peramilitere
teams that were at one time paid by tbe
C.I.A.
There 'are a number of opium refineries
along the northern Thai horsier, he said, and
much or the processed high-quality heroin is
shipped by trawler to Hong Kong.
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V L. la I L.
(b)(3)
Report to U.S. Sees
No Hope of Halting
, Asian Drug Traffic
�
S By SEYMOUR M. IIERSH
Special to The 'New York Times
.s� WASHINGTON, July 23�A
Cabinet-level report has con-
cluded that, contrary to the
Nixon Administration's public
.Optimism, "there is no pros-
pect"- of stemming the smug-
gling of narcotics by air and
.Sea in Southeast Asia "under
any condition � that can realisti-
cally be projected."
"This is. so," the report,
dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, "be-
cause the governments in the
region are unable and, in some
Cases, unwilling to do those
things that wont(' haVe to be
done by them. if a truly ef-
fective- -effort � were to be,
made." -
The �report, prepared by of-
.e/ficials of the Central 'Mai-
� gence Agency, the. State De- .
partrnent :and the Defense De-
partment, noted that "the most
basic problem, and the one that
unfortunately appears least
-likely of any early solution, is
the' corrtiption, collusion and
indifference at some places in
some governments, particularly
Thailand and South Vietnam,
that precludes more effective
Supression -of traffic by the
is,9ssoisunerils on whose territory
Ye :vacv
The report sharply contra-
mu official Administra-
tion position and Government
intelligence sources ,say its
conclusions are still valid today.
In �May, Secretary of State Wil-
hiam P. Rogers told a Senate
subcommittee that "we think all
the countries are cooperating
with us and we are quite satsi-
lied with that cooperation."
Similarly, Nelson G. Gross,
Senior Adviser to the Secretary
of State and Coordinator for
International Narcotics Matters,
testified before Congress in
June on the subject of narcotics
smuggling that "the govern-
meats of Thailand, Laos and
Vietnam have already joined us
in the fight and, while we have
a long way to b go, we feel that
during the past year some real
progress has been achieved."
All officials concerned with
the drug problem acknowledge
that the United States agencies,
under personal prodding from
President Nixon, have begun an
intensive effort to stem the in-
ternational narcotics traffic.
Tut critics contend' that th-e ef-
fort is far less effective today
than Administration officials
.say it is.
Critics' Charges Backed
Two leading critics of what
they allege to be the Govern-
ment's laxness in stopping the
flow of narcotics are Represent-
ative Robert IL Steele, Repub-
lican of Connecticut, and Alfred
W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yalg
graduate student who has writ-
ten a book on narcotics in
Southeast Asia. The New York
Times reported Saturday that
Mr. McCoy's allegations con-
cerning the C.I.A.. and the drug
traffic had been the subject of
an intense and unusually pub-
lic rebuttal by the agency.
The Cabinet-level report,
made available to The Times,
buttressed many of the charges
made, by the two critics, par-
ticularly about the pivotal im-
portance of Thailand to the in-
ternational drug smugglers.
Thailand is also a major Air
'Force staging area for the Unit-
ed States.
In a report on the world
heroin problem last year, Mr.
Steele wrote that "from the
American viewpoint, Thailand
is , as important to the control
of the illegal international
traffic in narcotics as Turkey.
While all of the opium pro-
duced in Southeast Asia is not
grown in Thailand, most of it
is smuggled through that coun-
try."
Mr. Steele's report, filed with
the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs, noted that many
American 'citizens had estab-
lished residence in Bangkok,
and had moved into the nar-
cotics trade. The report added
that the inability of the United
States to have a few notorious
smugglers deported had led
some intelligence officials to
conclude that the men were pay-
ing Thai officials for protec-
tion.
Mr. McCoy said in testimony
before Congressional commit-
tees last month that hundreds
of tons of Burmese opium
passed through Thailand every
year to international markets
in Europe and the United States
and that SO to 90 per cent of
the opium was carried by Chi-
nese Nationalist paramilitary
teams that were at one time
paid by the C.I.A.
There are a number of opium
refineries along the northern
Thai border, he said, and much
of the processed high-quality
heroin is shipped by trawler to
Hong Kong.
"Even though they are heav-
ily involved in the narcotics
traffic," Mr. McCoy testified,
"these Nationalist Chinese ir-
regulars units are closely -allied
with the Thai Government." He
said that Thai Government po-
lice units patrol the northern traffm of heroin. Their measure
border are, and collect an "ilm!eleared the House Foreign Af-
port duts
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pound of raw Opium entering:
Thailand. All this activity, he
said, is monitored by United
States intelligence agencies.
Thai-U.S. Agreements Cited
Mr. Gross, the State Depart-
ment's adViser on international
narcotics, said in his Congres-
sional testimony that "during
the past year the Thais have
increased their efforts in the
drug field with United States
and United Nations assistance."
He cited two agreements,
signed in late 1971, calling for
more cooperation and more
long-range planning between
Thai and United States officials
.to stamp out the trade.
"Based on all intelligence in-
formation available," Mr. Gross
testified, "the leaders of the
Thai Government are not en-
gaged in the opium or heroin
traffic, nor are they extending
protection to traffickers." He
added that the top police of-1
ficial in Thailand had publicly
stated that he would punish
any corrupt official.
The cabinet-level report, sub-
mitted to the Cabinet Commit-
tee on International Narcotics
Control, asked "highest prior-
ity" for suppression of the traf-
fic by Thai trawlers, noting
that each trawler "would rep-
resent something like 6 per
cent of annual United States
consumption of heroin."
The report said that the
trawler�traffic should have pri-
ority because "it is possible to
attack the Thai trawler traffic.
without seeking the coopera-
tion of Thai authorities and
running the attendant risks of
leaks, tip-offs and betrayals."
After such a seizure, the re-
port said, the United States
Embassy in Bangkok could "re-
peat with still greater force
and insistence the representa-
tions it has already often made
to the Government of Thai-
land" for more effective efforts
"to interdict traffic from the
north of Thailand to Bangkok
and also the loading of nar-
cotics on ships in Thai har-
bors." L
At another point in the re-
port, a general complaint was Nailed Press International
voiced. "It should surely be Robert II. Steele charged
possible to convey to the right the Government is lax in
Thai or Vietnamese officials,
the mood of the Congress and - halting flow of drugs
he Administration on the sub- C t9
ject of drugs," the report said.
"No real progress can be made
On the problem of illicit traffic'
until and unless the local gov-
ernments concerned make it a
matter of highest priority."
Representatives Steele, Les-
ter L. Wolff, Democrat of Nas-
sau County, and Morgan F.
Murphy, Democrat of Illinois,
have sponsored legislation that
would cut off more than $100-
million in foreign aid to Thai-
and unless she took more ac-
ion to halt the production and
and is included in the Foreign
Assistance Act, now pend'ng.
During a Congressional hear-
ing into drug traffic last month,
Representative Wolff disputed
the Administration's contention
that it was making "real prog-
ress" in stemming the narcotics
flow and said, "we think the
trade has got so much protec-
tion in high places in Thailand
that the Administration is
afraid they'll tell us to take our
air basses out if .we put too
much pressure on them."
The New York Times
Nelson G. Gross asserted
that there has been prog-
ress against smuggling.
� CIA. AIDES ASSAIL
'ASIA D41 CHARGE
Agency, Fights Reports That
!gnored Heroin Traffic
- Among Allies of U.S..
� By SEY1ViOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 21 �
The Central Intelligence Agency
has begun a public battle
;against accusations that it
knew - of but failed to stern
the � heroin traffic of United
.Stdtes allies in Southeast Asia.
� In recent weeks, high-ranking
;officials of the C.I.A. have
Signed letters for publication
to a newspaper and magazine,
granted a rare � on-the-record
interview at the agency's head-
quarters in McLean, Va., and
-.� most significantly �. per-
suaded the publishers of a
forthcoming expose on the
C.I.A. . and the drug traffic
to permit it to review the
manuscript prior to publica-
tion. �
The target of all these meas-
ures has been the recent writ-
ings and Congressional testi-
mony of Alfred W. McCoy, a
26-year-old Yale graduate stu-
dent who spent 18 months in-
vestigating the narcotics opera-
tions in Southeast Asia. His
dbook, "The -Politics of Heroin
in Southeast Asia," is sched-
uled to be published by Harper
& Row in mid-September�bar-
ring delays caused by the in-
telligence agency's review.
In his �book, Mr. McCoy al-
leged that both C.I.A. and
State Department officials have
provided political and military
support for America's Indo-
chinese allies actively engaged
in the drug traffic, have con-
sciously covered up evidence
of such involvement, and have
been actively involved them-
selves in narcotic trade.
C.I.A. officials said they had
reason to believe that Mr. Mc-
Coy's book contained many un-
warranted, unproven and falla-
cious accusations. They ac-
knowledged that the public
stance in opposition to such
allegations was a departure
from the usual "low profile"
of the agency, but they in-
sisted that there was no evi-
dence linking the C.I.A. to the
drug traffic in Southeast Asia.
One well-informed Government
official directly responsible for
HEW 'LUX T I kES
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'4 4 JUL IW4.
monitoring the Illegal flow of
narcotics complained in an in-
terview that many of Mr. Mc-
Coy's charges "are out of date."
"Go back three or four years,"
he said, "and no one was con-
cerned about this. It wasn't
until our own troops started
to get addicted, unal 1968 or
'69, that anyone was aware" of
the narcotics problems in South-
east Asia.
This official said that In the
eyes of the C.I.A., the charges
were "unfair." He said of the
C.I.A., "they think they're tak-
ing the heat for being un-
aware and not doing anything
about so/net:MI.1g that was go-
ing on two or three years
ago."
Based on 250 Interviews
During two Congressional ap-
pearances last month, Mr. Mc-
Coy testified that his accusa-
tions were based on more than
250 interviews, some of them
with past and present officials
of the C.I.A. He said that top-
level South Vietnamese officials,
including _President Nguyen
Van Thieu and Premier Iran
Van Ithient, were specifically
involved.
In July, 1971, Representative
Robert H. Steele, Republican
of Connecticut, said during a
House Foreign Affairs subcom-
mittee hearing that the United
States Government possessed
"hard intelligence" linking a
number of high-ranking South-
east Asian officials. including�
Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu, then corn-!
mander of the South Viet-
namese II Corps, with involve-
ment in the narcotics trade.
Mr. Steele's accusations were
denied and mostly ignored.
Mr. McCoy also alleged that
Corsican and American syndi-
cate gangsters had become in-
volved in the narcotics trade.
He said that such information'
was known to the C.I.A. In a
chapter of his book published
in this month's Harper's Maga-
zine, Mr. McCoy further
charged that in 1967 the in-.
famous "Golden Triangle" �
an opium-producing area etn-
bracing parts of northeastern
,Burma, northern Thailand and
northern Laos�was producing
about 1,000 tons of raw opium
annually, then about 70 per
cent of the word's supply.
The bulk of Mr. McCoy's
accusations�both in the maga-
zine and during the Congres-
sional hearings--failed to gain
much national attention. None-
theless, the C.I.A. began its
unusual public defense after
a Washington Star reporter
cited some of Mr. McCoy's
allegations in a column.
Letter Sent to Paper
Two letters were sent to
the newspaper for publication.
One was signed by W. Er
Colby, the executive director
of the (ILA _ artrl
did not agree; he added, Harper
& Row would not publish the
book.
In a subsequent interview,
� Robert L. Bernstein, president
of Random House and president
of the Association of American
Publishers, Inc., said that his
concern had twice refused of-
ficial C.I.A. requests for per-
mission to revise manuscripts.
"In general," Mr. Bernstein
said, 'our opinion would be
that we would not ,publish a
book endangering the life of
anybody working for the C.I.A.
or an other Government agency.
Short of that, we would pub-
lish any valid criticism."
In a series of interviews with
The New York Times, a number
of present and former officials
of the C.I.A. acknowledged that
smuggling and "looking the oth-
er way" was common through-
for a copy of the manuscript out Southeast Asia during the
for review prior to publication. nineteen-sixties. But many noted
On July 5, a formal letter that the agency had since taken
making the request, signed by Atr.ong steps to curb such prac-
Lawrence R. Houston, general Vtices.
counsel of the C.I.A. was sent ! One official, who spent many
to Harper & Row. years in Southeast Asia, said,
Mr. Houston's request was "I don't believe that agency
not based on national security, staff personnel were dealing
but on the thesis that "allega- in opium. But if you're talking/
Vitals concerning involvement of
about Air America haulnig the
the U.S. Government [in drug
traffic) or the participation of
American citizens should be
'made only if based on hard
evidence."
The letter continued: "It -is,
our belief that ,no reputable
publishing house would wish
to publish such allegations with-
out being assured that the sup-
porting evidence was valid."
If the manuscript were handed
over, the letter said, "we be-
lieve we could demonstrate to
you that a considerable num-
ber of Mr. McCoy's claims
about this agency's alleged in-
volvement are totally false and
iithout foundation, a number
re distorted beyond recogni-
tion, and none is based on
convincing evidence." A copy
of the letter was made avail-
able to The New York Times.
Mr.McCoy, in an interview,
said that the book had been
commissioned by Harper &
Row and carefully and totally
reviewed by its attorneys with
no complaint until the C.I.A.
!request was made.
1 B. Brooks Thomas, vice presi-
dent and general counsel of
.the publishing house, said in
. an interview in No York,
1"We don't have nay doubts
!about the book at all. We've
,had it reviewed by others and
we're persuaded that the work
is amply documented and schol-
arly."
"We're not submitting to
censorship or anything like
that," Mr. Thomas said. "We're
aking a responsible middle po-
sition. I just believe that the
C.I.A. should have the chance
to review it.", If Mr., McCoy
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higton-based official wi ir
America, a charter airline that
flies missions for the C.I.A. in
Southeast Asia. Both categoric-
ally denied the allegations link-
ing C.I.A. personnel to any
knowledge of or activity in
the drug traffic.
. A similar letter of disavowal,
signed by Mr. Colby, was sent
for publication to the publisher
of Harper's Magazine within
the last week. Robert Schnayer-
son, the magazine's editor, said
that the letter would be pub-
lished as soon as possible.
The C.I.A. began its approach
to Harper & Row in early
June, apparently after learning
of Mr. McCoy's appearance be-
fore the Senate subcommittee.
Cord Meyer Jr., described as
a senior agency official, met
with Officials of the publishing
concern and informally asked
stuff around, then I'll bet my,
bottom dollar that they were
n
Another former C.I.A. agent
described Mr. McCoy's pub-
lished writings as "1 per cent
tendentious and 90 per cent of
the Most vain able contribution
I can think of." ,
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LEVITToWN, DA.
COURIER-TIMES
r 449842 1 13721
.
i/1-to's the ra,c,s?,, itutiear nig n zn:, all o
177 17
t "" � � . �
' � , ' 4+ ' '' ' ei ' '
The American
SAIGON (NEA) � There is a monument
in this city � appropriately next to a Chase
Manhattan Bank advertisement � which
reads: "The noble sacrifice of allied soldiers
will never be forgotten."
Ah, these Vietnamese. Already they tend
to forget.
Nearly three million soldiers from a half-
dozen nations have suffered 60,000 dead and
350,090 casualties in the last decade of the
Vietnamese war. But the man in the street, if
he acknowledges it at alp, may just shrug and
say, "Yes, butswhat have you done for us
lately?"
Some here who are aware that several
neighbors, such as Thailand and the Philip-
'pines, have contributed troops, dismiss it as
insignificant. The Australians, they say,
never, did much. And the Koreans, have just
strutted about feeling superior.
As for the Americans � who did the most,
who fought the most, who in effect pur-
chased, the 'entire allied commitment � as
� for them, well, "Americans No. 10," say
imany of the children of Saigon. -
Vietnamese officials deny it, U.S. diplo-
mats try desperately to explain it away, but
the icy fact is that after all this time and all
this blood the United States is unloved in this
country. Women fear us, merchants cheat us,
peasants ignore us, students deplore us. The
$10 billion a year ton average) Americans
have spent in this land has bought some co-
operation,.but neither respect nor apprecia-
tion.
"The only people who smile at me here
are the beggars," says an Air Force colonel.
"On the streets I feel like my forehead is
marked." -
The situation � call it anti-Americanism,
was perhaps inevitable. Two and a half mil-
lion GIs have been in and out of Vietnam
since 1961, plus thousands of sundry diplo-
mats, civilian workers, newsmen and seekers
of erotica. Few of them; with the occasional'
exception of diplomats, have strengthened
any international bonds. It's not that the
Yanks are so bad, just that they are different.
Vietnamese women have never gotten use to
being pinched on the boulevard and Viet-
19 Of COurse
namese men have never gotten use to seeing
it happen.
The troops, perhaps, because of sheer
numbers, have done the most to wrinkle the
Oriental brow. A drunk GI is hard to take in
Galveston, much less Gia Dinh. Not long ago
in Da Nang, a trooper from the 196th Light
Infantry Brigade, tipsy of course, ran down a
Vietnamese child with a truck. It was the last
straw for the nationals of the area. Hundreds
of angry locals stormed the truck, threatened
the driver and hinted of open war. Indeed, it
was war of a sort, and the. 196th had to seal
off the area, helicopter reinforcements in
and finally agree to pay retribution to the
victim's father.
The same sort of thing is happening from
the Delta to the DMZ. A newsman in Hue
was recently set upon by three Vietnamese
soldiers who stole his pack, his camera and
his sunglasses U.S. troops traveling through
the off-limits town of Bien Iloa do so with
guns loaded, cocked and pointing 'at anybody
who comes near. A military policeman with
the bIlilth recently lost a color, television
when he stopped his vehicle to avoid hitting a
boy, then could not get going before a swarm
of alerted nationals relieved him of his -cargo.
Fights. Shootings. Name it. The Nams are at
the Yankees' throats.
Even the North Vietnamese spring offen-
sive has not sobered the citizens sentiments.
Vernacular newspapers have hinted � good
grief! � that the invasion was a .ClA.splot to
"coldly test" South Vietnam's military met-
tle. And a young legislator, who knows bet-
ter, says privately: "It-wouldn't surprise me
if Nixon and Mao (Tse-tung) have plotted out
a coalition government for Saigon. The hth-
ajon could be the ploy to convince us that we
can't stand by ourselves. Therefore we
should hasten to aceept any generous Hanoi
offer of peace."
So it goes here. The walls of Hue Universi-
ty are covered with anti-American slogaris
("American GIs eat water buffalo drop-
.
By Torn Tiede
. . -
pings"). An airline clerk in Pleiku tells a
Yank traveler to "buy a ticket to My Lai."
There are several urban slums where U.S.
types walk at their own peril. "Not every-
body here hates us," says an executive of a
U.S. engineering firm "Some just don't care
one way or the otter.''
The situation is sad. And maddening. And
the forecast is the United. States may spend
the next decade here spending money trying
to buy the friendship it lost spending money
in the last. lint, say the cynics, there is at
least one hope to 'Vietnamese anti-Ameni,
canism: "Maybe it's a sign. Maybe these
people aren't passive after all. Maybe one
day they'll hate their enemies as much as
they hate their friends." . -
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646
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20 July 1972
r F.1
r4c4
kr4; I
Cti r4
SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who .-re-
butted the charges made by some American newspa-
permen that the CIA was involved in opium traf-
ficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither
do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium;
but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these
charges than mere "gossip, conjecture and old history."
I also know what I am talking about becausel was
inVolved in security matters for the South Vietnamese
government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect,
one day, the President told me to investigate into the
activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own
"CIA" and chief of military security, and to report di-
rectly to him, because, as he put it: "I cannot ask my
own chiefs of police, 'CIA,' and military security to
investigate into themselves."
I found out the corruption of two. chiefs, and the
President took very drastic measures against Them. I
have kept the contact with my security agents ever
since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in
Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above
all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the
rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the coun-
ter-insurgency warfare, the operations of the American
CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely im-
portant when they are compared. to operations of the
same agency in other countries, In Indochina, the CIA
is a real army with his own aerial Beet. A number of
CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or
Meo warlords or officials at the highest level, with
whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For
, good American citizens in the United States, it is very
difficult to imagine the influence and power of these
operatives in Indochina. Their power, in fact, is un-
limited�they are the true rulers of Indochina; their
desires are orders�no Vietnamese, Laotian or Cambo-
dian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption
growing from a de facto power. affects some of these
CIA operatives.
The traffic of opium involves a relatively large num-
ber of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are
Vietnamese, Laotians and Meo who are involved. Since
these persons have their clans, families and friends who
live from INS traffic, the total number of persons con-
cerned become so great that it is impossible to keep
secret the operations.
also do not question the good faith of CIA Director,/
Richard Helms when he said that "os an agency, in
fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign
roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a
solution;�we know we are not contributing to the prob-
lem . . However, as I said previously, a line must.
� be drawn and a distinction must be made; for circum-
stances are not the same�there is not the vaguest re-
semblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and
their colleagues operating in other countries.
� In conclusion CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss j.
Randal, and Mcdoy said the truth and did not contra- .
diet one another; they perhaps did not talk about' the
same country.
Chevy Chase, Md.
� Tran Van Mimi,
'Attorney, Former Deputy,
Vietnamese National Assembly,
. . I
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Alleg.ea
- �
PROVIDENCE, R.I.
JOURNAL
M � 66,673
S 209,501
� JUL 1_9_1972
IN p I .4. Pro/be. ...,peared in. the Providence-Sun. ,
i, oil to . ., day .Journal on June
porfed that cloud. seeding
operations were begun in the
mid-19130s to create rains to
wash'Yout portions- of the Ho
Chi Minh Trail.
In t tfectilter - The 'New "York Times ran .a
. story a,week later saying that
Sett Claiborne Pell' an- 'rainfall was .first begun over
nouriced yesterday that .a sub- Hue in 1963 to prevent Bud-
committee he heads will hold dhist demonstrations in that
hearings next week on allega- against the South Viet-
tons that the Defense Depart- namese government.' The
meat' has changed the :striry...quoted unnaMed agents /
Weather over Southeast. Asia of the �CentraLAtpiligPnea.
for Military reasons.
The senator said his Senate Senator Pell said witnesses
.! relations subcommittee on ..froM the State Department,
oceans and international envil. 'the Pentagon, the Arms am_
ronment will bold .hearings trol and.Disarmament
next 'Wednesday- and Thurs.,
day. .
� "There have appeared .in
the press recently very _dis-
turbing reports that the Unit-
ed States .has used weather
, modification extensively in
Southeast Asia," Senator Pell
said.
The hearings will focus on a
resolution introduced by Sena-.
tor Pell in March with 14 co-
sponsors which urges negotia-
tion of a treaty prohibiting the
" use of environmental or
weather changing techniques
Nas weapons of war. -
. A story which first ap-
Agency, the Council on Envi-
ronmental. Quality, end 'the
National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric' Administration have ,
been invited to testify. -
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1_5 JUL 1972.
^-,1 el1! � f 1/l
I'
I 11 11 I (T`. la'
1 � 9 Tc
II
cli 0);i l.j
C)
By Sanford J. Ungar pace of jury selection jeoprus ;chief prosecutor -Nissen who aml should let the. Pliblic
wk. intiiiiraoa Post MO( WI !ter diZeS the appearance of a I complained that. the judge
' }OS ANCE1 Fc.- July 14 ...... "necessary witness" for the was putting too lunch em- That is exactly the.pre'rition
The 6efense in the trial of ijiverhnieht who is avr'riltible plursis on the presumption of Oben by Ellsberg nind :Russo.
. Daniel El berg and Anthony all next. wee); but then must 'innocence in his jury exam- Mrs. Sirois, a 24-year-old
)-.0 cc todzry au:tell-ed. uisi pis., enter , a hospital for scriouslimitioni
. student beautician n.rid that
trio., Judge wi -.\i,itt Byrne Jr. surgery lie declined, how � "Tire presumption of innoe- she would not be afit'eted by
,
for t.dhiltettiv failinit to t ,, I: e eV CT, to name the witness. ('I1Ce Is lot a 1) 11' Of partial- the. fad ill:14,. hf:r 1'01i-it-IL was
necessary steps to assure the In a comment that ire has itv to he worn bY either side," a career miltintry o Meer and
'defendants an impartial jury. characteristically- employed Nissen. exclaimed. When the i that her brother served with
Leoliord B. Boudin, who rep- during the l'Ist� IiVeetl, BYrne defense pre S.SC:d for: an explan- the CIA.. iin Vietnam ,if she�
resents nisnergi complained reacted to the defense corn- ;tiler. dr that remark, Byrne in. should se..ve on the eventual:
that . piyrne,s totestioninei of 01111115 by saying, "I'll deem terjactial, "Never mind whaUjury. - I
prospective Jun ors \vas eharae..- that a motion and deny it." the pi osecutor says."
terized by a "lack of Itrohing." i The indnze sPeecailY re- )na is interhettatinn today,.
and was a .'pro forma exaint_ fuseel once again to permit the mniiiii 01. the .new pi osnectiye
nation" which met the techni- hiwYers " both -sides c'r the ',intro, s exipressed their views
cal requiremenls hut, did not case to (0 (lid u the dettiild 1 on ine American involvement
0.)ieit u se fob i n f orm a ti on f or ! exarni I ration of each potential i in viettiam.
ch" _
ioosit ig a inc. juror.
lie aiso turned down a re-. hic,:\viird IL Knapp, a retired 1
. iicrit\l\d'ii.4tihol.;1;t idziniii;nzio-alctinoitti,N1'iiiii Ile vi, ed de rense demand onto nicc:rameal inspector for Los
plea before the itni2,e. this all prospective jurors sib t-). An'."'ir. ti unit sliel, "line
morning, all Miner precn-intions luive sec-many clearances or l oll]it ' ',hunt I object to is the
zbmit keeping the trial fair ot hen connections with South. i t:triinin.ntirly;(,rospeytulhinutirglstotioie lici..)(t(n,cirlIn,
. 1 r .i , � ci . . 1 , , . " ern Calitornia defense imius- ii`
0111y." . . �
Ile ii.dso- comppdned tint tries be automatically ex�
Byrne, who Originally esti. chided from service,
mated that A jury mom be se. The defense contends that.
Iceted to try the espionage s,.uch jurors cannot be objec.
conSpitacy and theft etise or live . in judging, Ellsberg anCti
three days, is motivated more bliss�, who si
,uie
chargedwith
b.,: a desire for speed than hy criminal viorations n connec-:ressed and the- governmeni of
evenhandedness.
tion with disclosure. of the top; South Vietnam scented mist a-
With jury selection now in secret Pc"ta-i". papers, a ll'.s- 1 bie, I began to realize that it
its fifth clay, the judge has tory of U.S. involvement in ! \vas a mistake,"
i A nother potential juror,
lengthened daily court ses. Southeast Asia.
sions ini.d suggested 'that he Although openly annoyed Ilichard '\t tot whose step-
may hold .Saturday sessions as whh the Oscainileil detchsc at l brother was killed in Vietnam
well.
Boudin and Leonard L
Weinglass, qief counsel for
Buss�, contend that this is be-
cause of. "undue pressure"
from the ptosecutors handling
the case, who have repeatedly
asserted that some of their
witnesses � government offi-
cials in Washington � have
had to postpone their vaca-
tions because of delays here.
Late today, chief prosecutor
iDavid II. Nissen- said that the
Douglas W. Silver, who had
held a string of. civilian) jobs �
with the military, said that,
."Orlt.tinally I believed in tlicn
invoivement,' Lut as it prog-
Incl:s on Ins coronet of Juri Inst. year, told the judge, "1
selection, Byrne (lid expano ring we're Ping to give the
the scope of his questioning as vietnaniese people sernethinvi
the day went on. they don't want. IT think we
As he began interrogation.of stimild�rt be there."
" new P")111) of IG Prespect'v� Maseher also indicated his
jurors c; iled on Thursday, the skepticim s about the security
judge began asking., for exam: �
classification system, which
pie, what kinds of "briefings
:will be a major issue in the
they had had about security_
case, While in the Navy, he
matter n s in the defense-o-
said, he saw "a lot of things"
coiled jobs. stamped secret which he felt
But at the same time, I \
3-Tile 'should not have been.
began to incur the wrath of I
The day's biggest surprise
in court came when Jan Sirois,
\vho' is from an almost total.,
ly military family, proclaimed:
during examination hy lies
judge that, "a person \vim has
access (to secret documents),
if theY find something wrong,
has a moral oblii_nition and
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of opposing points of view on
the Vietnam war and one in
which the future of Vietnam
will Lc decided.
The asstuopt on by most Viet-
nainese seems to be that Presi
dent Nixon will pursue his pros
(Alt 0�01 se w , hich, in cyes,
Means � f the Commit.
nists, cot-no what may.
Senator McGovern is sect) as
1111 crierilv of Presicient hieu
kind. military ule, tmd, 10(1)0
importantly, as someone who
would hring peace to Vietnam
.by \Vii:1-!, the (01'00i515 10
p! t.:\ 1:der.
� Consequently, the. attitudes
Of any South Vietnamese to-
ward the two c;:redidates can
he predicted exactly if it is
Itnown how be feels abottt the
war, connumilsm and Presi-
dent Pignycn Van Thiel].
. Mistinst
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77,42,1 c 1 0 c)
2V" a iTy* SO titJ
� r,y MALCOLM WilOiVNE
n, `17
SAIGON, South Vietnain, July 1 Nixon Victory Etepetted
1.3---"Never has an American- 01..
C lection see:ned in1p01-1.ant: 1 -�r el prob-
to � politically int:rained South ti.hh, mtjortt.,,, of the yontl:,,tc�..
Vic tn3MCs.,?. than ilhe COmiog
ml.CJiccloa.0; V,'0111(1 111,0. 10 :�('C'
race betwc'en Savi"ter Gec'r!ter Senator McGovern in the White
MeGi"a111 and h'resdent Njxon.House.
Marry South Vietnamese sco
. Nhunn, an OppOsi-
thc ejection S a dear contest con Dopiny s3id:
Cooarn Nvirs in Not, einhcr then
I think he \-,111 be the one.
l_lniteci States l'icsident who
can bring 0hout nn honorable
atm most s:ttisirictory solution
,. .1
win re-election,
The 1.4Kly gossMing politi-
cians, joarnalitds, lav,�yers and
otlairs who make up the Sai-
flil COffe;�11C,11Se Set fdrea;iy
105 Senator MCGOVertl'S
"Nixon will have him inur-
ddied., yoU'll SO,'' a prominent
lav,tver said, "that's' how poli-
tics in America wioilz those
days. The microphones tia? Re-
ptinlictins tried to plant 01
Veinocralie heinicuarters show
what's going 00. Some mysteri-
ous killer, litte the one 5n0
almost. got 'Wallace, will gclt
, "There is another factor I
,\JCuOVC.1 r The C.I.A.'
I mention if ) Z.:111 10 lie navel' It a dove itito the
completely frank'," fpirly White 'arouse." �
high�raniting South Victmonese.
Most South Viathamese
civil servant said. "Theca has
H ove that. the Uniled
lao-
nesjer been ritime Vjliell trarii-
ike Vie'.nam, moves poiiticE:lly
nloso Of all political .1.1 iDes
m.Enly a context. of con-
they Americans more than 1,T.,iracies and counterconspira-
s
they do now. That is to say, tie . There is doubt that the
we dislike and mistrust both
ittiteetoral process in America is
Nixon and I,IcGovern, for the ,
more than sham that
irrational reason they are both num
Americans. cor.ceals a hchind-the-scencs
President-making proces, �
"But for me, and perhaps
Those few South Vietnamese
just for that reason, I prefer
McGovern. lie has pledged to v,,ho have visited or lived in
get America out of Vietnam, tnUnited Slates view the
and that's all I need to know coming election more lealisti-
about him." (tally, and some confess they
,Prespite the speaker's high .'.zr0 in a quandary about it.
!position hi the Government, his "If we Vietnamese could
views me clearly not typical vote in your election,' a weal-
of 'supporters of Piesidentl thy and well-educated Saigon
Thieu. doctor said, "this would he a
Over the years Mr. Nixon' difficult one for me."
has repeatedly visited south: 'A Time To Ife.Countu1'
Vietnam, and a succession of Ile added:
military governments has made
him feel welcomla. 13y compari- "The. issues are perfectly
son, � senator McGovern was Flear, a vote for McGovern �
greeted with. tear gas and offi- is, 0 vote agaihst my supposed
, class and. for the Communists.
et.13,1 der,isic,41,...�y1,1ah, ha visited the Communists lakc. over,
onigon September. it will mean the destruction of
Ngo Mule. Tinh, Minister of me. / will lose, everythint-f..
Education and a cousin of Pre.
"
But fin going to surprise
dent Thiell' st"id cn. the Me- VOU and tell you I would vote
Govern candidacy: "As Viet-
'or McGovern anyway. The
namese we all WiSll to See an time lias come for .nationalists
American President who can to stmd up and be counted,
deal strongly with the Commu-
and if Nixon stays in office,
nists. I think President Nit.:on ''1 -11,10) dodrnvo(1 prn.
lOIS bc'en' teugh- "-G05'01"Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
crIft N..,
(b)(3)
"One- of the reasons for the
great anti-American feeling
here now is Neon's� support
for a very unpopular president
in Vietnam," he continued.
"Nixon will win, of course,
but I would Ulna to 1.0e a Mc-
Govern victory followed by a
gradttal transition her T e. he
Communists viii run all of
vtetmtin., lint the
au tin thing is that ihay should
assume control not s.uddeitly,
but gradually, and let us ail
et used .to each other r little
to the Vietnam war."
at a time."
'1 he general ossin�rplion here ' Ahhot,gm Inc,st smith �,27,,dt
� �� � "
0(1)11)50 11)1(1 foreigners livinf

here !":13Y they how the,
people of this country think on
any given issue, nothim!, saerns
1.;:sccr to gauge than Scuth
Victriamese pulaie opinion.
South Vie.tnain never had
a free elect"')), and the few
port efforts to 1: Ice polls have
been largely thwarted by the
war and the pievailing fear
that truthful rnswers can lead
to trouble Still the, police on
ohe side or the Communists on �
the other.
There seems little question
that `Multi Viet IlanleSe,
1:Olt continued armed Pe-
siStrnee to the Communists arc
hoping for a Nixon victr.�ty iii
;November; those who war.t.1111
and to the Way lozik to Senttlor.
l',".:ctGovern.
6:
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L5 JUL .IVZ
(b)(3)
'What McGovern Has Said on Some of the Issics
. �
Following are excerpts
.from statements by Senator
George McGovern on a num-
ber of issues:
- Vietnam
� �
� Let us not talk about
Nixon's war or Johnson's war
or the Pentagon's war or the
C.I.A.'s war. Let us take hold
' of this war as citizens and as
elected representatives, and
let us vote to end it.
, Many years ago, the an;��
cleat Biblical prophet wrote:
"I have set before you life
or death, blessing or cursing;
, therefore choose life that
' thou and thy seed may live."
� Let us choose not cursing
fait blessing, not death but
life. (Senate Speech, May. 7,
� 1970.)
Future Commitments
. In cases similar to what
.we�have *seen in Vietnam, we
should examine any request'
for American involvement in
the light of these points:
� cAre those asking our help
the appropriate elements for
us to be supporting, both in
terms of what they stand for
and in terms of our national
interest? ,
(]1.1 so, are they unable to
bear the responsibility them-
selves for the protection of
their position?
cilf they are not, we should.
try to determine if the inter-
national community, through
the United Nations, can pro--
vide there the aid they need.
If such a U.N. role is not
possible, then we should in-
vestigate the possibility of
multilateral action.
cif that approach is un-
workable, then we should be
prepared to consider a com-
mitment by the United
States..(Response to Congres-
sional Quarterly questions.)
Welfare .
There is a fundamental al-
ternative to the President's
Family Assistance proposal--
an alternative whose poten-
tial as an antipoverty strategy
far exceeds the poor people's
approach of the President �
a Human Security Plan which
looks toward insuring each
of our citizens against the
risk of poverty and doing so
simply because we believe
that this kind of minimal fi-
nancial_ security should be a
right of citizenship in our
country.
I will offer an amendment
[comprising] four major corn- -
ponents�components which
would protect each of us
against the four major
causes of poverty in Amer-
ica. First, it would include
a children's allowance to se-
cure the future of our. chil-
dren. Second, it would guar-
antee a job at a decent
wage for every able-bodied
working-age citizen. Third, it
would improve Social Securi-
ty for the elderly and disabled.
Finally, it would provide a
small, federally administered
special Public Assistance plan
to protect the few who would
remin in need for additional
incoMe maintenance.
(Speech to Citizen's Com-
mittee for Children, New
York City, Jun. 20, 1970.)
CrimQ and Justk'
All these apparently hard-
nosed proposals, winch would
actually result in making re-
duction of crime harder to
accomplish, are part of a
great illusion that has been
fostered ever since Richard
Nixon began to campaign for
the Presidency in I It is
the illusion that. crime is ray-
aging the nation because the.
police, the prosecutors and
the judges are too soft on
the criminals The Ad-
ministration hopes to blame-
Congress and the courts for
striking down an alleeTd at-
tempt to stop crime. This will
be the Administration's re-
sponse to the inevitable
demonstration that the Nixon
promise to end the crime
crisis is to he unfulfilled. The
promise- will be uniulfillcd
because the harder construc-
tive task has been largely
avoided. (Senate speech, July
21, 1970) � �
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(b)(3)
LOUISVILLE, KY.
TIMES
E - 173,180
rdUL 1 11972
ill it rain on your protest?
Every war, no matter how unpleas-
ant, produces benefits for some of
those who survive it. Outdoorsmen,
for instance, can thank World War
II for jeeps and lightweight sleeping
bags. Korea speeded up the develop-
ment of helicopters and jet airplanes.
And now Vietnam has given us a re-
markable new crowd. control tech-
nique known as "weather modifica-
tion."
On various occasions during the
war, according to the New York
Times, the CIA_ arranged for rain to
fall on civil lTdrders in Saigon and
Hue. Torrential downpours, the CIA
discovered, were useful in persuading
uppity Buddhist monks and other pro-
testers to go home and quit embar-
rassing South Vietnam's democratic
government. All it took to maintain
order in the streets was a little cloud
seeding on the day of a demon-
stration.
The question now is whether the
government will use similar methods
here in the United States. Miami
Beach, the scene of both national
political party conventions this sum-
mer, would be an ideal testing ground. is that the Miami Beach City Council
Instead of calling up the National and Police Chief Rocky Pomerance
Guard to quell a riot and risking a are trying something quite radical:
bloodbath, the President could simply ,they are being nice to the protest
send up a CIA cloud-seeding team,/ groups. Demonstrators have been
Even the most militant yippies, gay
libbers and poor people would be
forced to retreat when hit by Miami's
first monsoon.
Politics being what it is, we rather
doubt Mr. Nixon will modify the
weather to help the Democrats. Any-
thing that embarrasses them helps
him, so he will surely be content to
sit back and watch heads get bashed
on nationwide TV. Sudden cloudbursts
are much more likely if demonstrators
get out of hand when the GOP meets
in Miami late in August.
At the moment, however, it appears
that peace will prevail in the streets
of Miami this week. The authorities
have taken the security measures
needed to preserve order in an open
society. Concertina barbed wire has
been rolled out, troops are on alert,
and tear gas has been stockpiled.
What's really, significant, however,
allowed to camp in Flamingo Park,
and, policemen assigned to crowd con-
trol won't carry guns or clubs. When
a problem develops, negotiations will
be tried first, force second. In other
words, every effort is being made to
avoid the violence of 1968.
All bets are off, of course, if Sen.
George McGovern should somehow be
'denied the nomination. But it. now
appears that while the candidates
shed each other's blood inside Con.
vention Hall, cops and pot-heads will
smile at each other outside in the
Florida sunshine.
Law and order Republicans, on ,the
other hand, may not tolerate this per-
missive coddling of effete intellec-.
tuals. So if you are planning to demon-
strate at the Republican convention
for transvestite liberation or govern-
ment aid to middle-aged adults, better
take .along a ceuple of raincoats and
a water-repellent sign.
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GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
NE DAY
E jut,. 2,7 rfi)12
GOP Attractions: Vietnam, Beer,
By Bruce Lambert Jr.
Roslyn�When the several hundred youths at a Republi-
can conference here broke Ub into seminar groups, only half
a dozen or so showed up for the one on reelection of Pres-
ident Nixon.
Despite that disappointing turnout, the President got
virtually unanimous support at the day's most popular sem-
inar, on Vietnam. Thirty youngsters gathered for it, and,
unlike the other groups, their number grew.
In fact, the Vietnam seminar nearly tripled in size and
lasted close to two hours, long after the other seminars
ended their discussions on women, colleges, ecology, off-
shore oil, transportation, .busing, the courts, narcotics, and
the State Legislature.
The Vietnam seminar had not even been scheduled, but
the Nassau County Republican organization running the all-
day youth meeting accepted a speaking offer from a young
man who identified himself as Daniel Teodoru, a Romanian
refugee and former correspondent in Vietnam. He did, not
say what news organization he had represented.
Teodoru said the effectiveness of Nixon's war policies
had been confirmed by unpublicized Communist documents
captured by the. Central Intelligence Agency and the mili-
tary. "When you've got. ifie-PFAident and the enemy telling
you the same thing, you've got to believe it," he said.
Teodoru described Sen. GeOrge McGovern as "an out-
and-out liar" who "coordinates his political campaign with
Hanoi's military campaign." Referring to his own youth,
Teodoru also claimed that McGovern "bombed inc and other
innocent civilians" while serving as a pilot in World War II.
And he said that the media have been "vicious and vile" in
distorting news from Vietnam.
His remarks drew several rounds of applause from the
youths: One objected that the war was based in U.S. eco-
nomic interests and another spesifiled oil. Teodoru challenged
them for details and got none.
- "I ended up being a defense of Nixon," .one 19-year-old
girl said. "But he [Teodoru] was able to back himself up
with facts while they weren't. They had no facts. Generally,
I think the Republicans are making an effort for youth."
Another girl. said the seminars were "really excellent."
More popular than any of the seminars, however; were
the free attractions: several swimming pools, a- trampoline,
a pond, shady trees, fried chicken box lunches, Leer on, tap
and a dinner of hot dogs and hamburgers. One teenage girl
said to another, "Oh, let's stay. There's nothing else to do."
Nearly 1,000 of the 1846-25-year-olds registered during
Sakirday morning and afternoon, but a late afternoon rain
til6atened to end the program, and the crowd dwindled to 40.
With an ice cold can in his hand, one youth said, "Well,
we've still got the free. beer."
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vve (A) si k
5
(b)(3)
Pentagon:
Weather
Asa
Weapon
Of War
:.::. -WASHINGTON---Dr. Gordon J. F.
-MacDonald, a prominent geophysicist
,who had just completed a tour as 'vice
-president of the Defense Department's
-.Institute' of Defense Analysis, pub-
lished in 1968 a little-noted Init chilling
.study on the military potential of
.rneterological warfare. He listed a num-
ber of options available to those who
would choose to tamper with nature.
�Among them:
�,,, * Altering the world's temperature
,hy rocketing materials into the earth's
:upper atmosphere to either absorb light
(thereby cooling the surface below) or
�absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating'
i ..the surface below). This technique
'could be targeted at a specific area.
. o Triggering tidal waves by set-
-ting off a series of underground PX-
'plosions along the edge of the Conti-
nental Shelf, or by producing a natural
:earthquake. A guided tidal wave could
achieved by correctly shaping the
tfiergy-release source.
�....1 r .
; 0 Changing the physical makeup
.d the atmosphere by creating, with
. it rocket or similar weapon, a "hole"
in the important ozone layer between
.1C1' and 30 miles up that is responsible
'for absorbing much of the ultra-violet
light cast from the sun. Without the
e.� .
protective layer of ozone, a molecular
'form of oxygen, the radiation would
-be fatal to all human, plant and animal
life that could not take shelter in the
liffected area below.
.'''Dr. MacDonald (who is now a
member of the White House Council on
)nvironmental Quality) made it clear
71.11at" his essay was based only on spec-
-tilation. Last week, however, it became
Ithown that at least part of his maca-
bre weather arsenal had been secretly
4n use by the United States since the
1960's.
t:
7;�Air Force planes, supported by the
se
ntral Intelligence Agency, have beers
waging a systematic war of rain on
the infiltration trails of Laos, Cam-
bodia, North Vietnam and South Viet-
nam. The intent: suppress enemy anti-
missile fire, provide cover for South
Vietnamese commando teams pene-
trating the North and hinder the
movement of men and materiel from
North Vietnam into the South.
The first experimental rain-making
mission was flown by the C.I.A. in
South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not
until 1965 that a' group of Air Force
scientists officially was ordered to
start thinking of ways to turn nature
into a' military tool.
"We all sat down in a big brain-
storming session," said one of the
sciehtists who participated at the Air
Force Cambridge Research Labora-
tories at Hanscomb Field near Bedford,
Mass. "The idea was to increase the
rain and reduce the trafficability in all
of Southeast Asia."
Within a year, the Air Force and
C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-mak-
ing project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail
in Laos, known as "Operation' Pbp-
Eye." There were heated protests from
the State Department, and eventually
a directive from the Secretary of De-
fense Robert S. McNamara ordering a
halt to the project. Instead, well-
qualified sources � said last week, "it
went underground�into the dark."
From 1969, through at least early
this year, weather warfare was a
covert operation being directed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House
acquiescence.
The fact that the program existed
at all came to light only last week in,
The New York Times. But, despite an
extensive investigation, it could not be
learned how successful the program
had been, how many missions were
conducted or whether it was-still being
used in connection with the heavy
bombing of North Vietnam that fol-
lowed the enemy offensive last April.
Making rain has long been techni-
cally feasible. Scientists have learned
that rain fall can be increased
by as much as 40 per cent after seed-
ing clouds by aircraft with silver-io-
dide particles. Other chemicals, includ-
ing dry ice, also have been used with
success, both in the United States and
in Southeast Asia.
Military and Government specialists
acknowledge that there is little precise
scientific knowledge of the short-range
impact of cloud seeding and practi-
cally none of the long-range ecological
effect of changing the amount of
natural rainfall. Some scientists have
. � . � . �
.published data suggesting that weather
.modification, in combination with
,�
other ecological stresses such as air
pollution and pesticides, may have a
synergistic effect�that is, result in
collective changes far greater than
either abuse would have- caused by .
itself.
In Indochina, where heavy bombing
already has robbed much of the land-
snipe of its natural water-holding ca-
pability by destroying foliage and trees,
artifically induced rains may result in
far greater flooding than expected,
along with heavier soil erosion.
Technically, there are no interna-
tional agreements outlawing such war-
fare. But Government officials made
clear last week that the weather-mak-
ing activity of tile Air Foree was
shielded from public view because of
White House sensitivity to what could
be regarded as the impropriety of the
action. The issue, one well-informed
official said, was one in which Henry
A. Kissinger, the President's national-
security adviser, took.a personal hand,
"This kind of thing was a bomb," the
official said, "and Henry restricted
information about it to those who had.
to know."
�SEYMOUR M. HERSH'
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e JUL 1972
John P; Roche
War Command chaos
DEN. JOHN D. La-
velle' s private War with
North Vietnam has justifia-
bly touched off quite a stir.
Lavelle, it will be recalled,
was commanding general of
the 7th Mr Force and appar-
ently decided to use the am-
- biguity of "protective reac-
tion" as a justification for
some preemptive strikes
against North Vietnamese
military installations. He had
the records of these strikes
doctored up in such a fashion
that they indicated compli-
.� nee with the rules of en-
gagement. However, because
the President subsequently
Authorized wider bombing,
the chances are that many
-people will write off the La-
velle incident on the ground
that he was premature but
� sensible.
Actually the Lavelle initia-
tive is symptomatic of a far
more basic problem than sim-
ple battlefield improvisation..
Leaving aside the Strange-
love scenarios which have
� local commanders joyously
,firing off Minutemen, what
-occurred was a complete fail-
ure of, the command struc-
ture that should concern all
.of us. It was far more than a
'breakdown in civilian control
over the military; it was a
breakdown in military con-
trol over the military. Not
'since Abraham Lincoln put
.U.. S. Grant in command of
the Union armies have we
� seen such a shambles as the
command structure a the Vi-
etnamese war.
WHO IS theoretically the
top American official in
South Vietnam? The chief of
mission, Ambassador. Ells-
worth Bunker. What was the
official function of Gen. Wil-
liam Westmoreland and,
later, Gen.- Cr e ig ht on
Abrams? They were the am-
bassador's subordinates in
charge of the Military Assist-
ance Command (MACV).
That is, in theory, these four-
star generals had exactly the
same status as, say, the colo-
nel, who is in charge of an
American military assistance
group in some Latin Ameri-
can nation.
For openers, then, the.
commanding general, MACV,
worked for the ambassador,
just like the local director
of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development or the
local head of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Then
came the war and half a mil-
lion American troops�Army;
Air Force and Marines, plus
the assets of the Seventh
Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Now who was in charge?
Well, if you can believe it,
the ambassador.
' At this point General of
the Army George C. Marshall
must have been spinning in
his grave. Vietnam was never
made into a military theater
of command with the highly
structured lines of control
that existed in World War II
(and even then there were
problems; George Patton, for
Instance, had a do-it-yourself
view of strategy). Nor were
our ambassadors, either by
character or conviction, will-
ing to take on the job of pro-
consul.
Which brings us to Gen.
' Lavelle and the 7th Air
Force. Who was Lavelle's
boss? In one capacity, he
worked for Abrams; in an-
other, for the commander in
chief, U.S. Forces in the Pa-
cific (CINCPAC)---an admiral
In Hawaii; in still a third, for
the chief of staff of the Air
Force in Washington.
THE SAME sort of com-
mand chaos permeated all
the services. Indeed, if one
looked at the chart, he some-,
times wondered how any-
thing ever got accomplished.
But conversely, such a laby-
rinth is perfectly designed
for a general who wants to go
Into business for himself.
In political terms, it is a
'
classic case of hardening of
the categories. Even though
he character of the war rad'.
1t
he
changed between 1963-
66, the fiction was main-
tained that we were merely
providing "military assist-
ance." Thus we fell between
two stools: there was no thea-
ter commander to run the
show; there was no ambassa-
dor willing or able to exer-
cise his theoretical responsi-
bilities.
I have often thought in this
context that perhaps Presi-
dent Johnson's greatest error
was in not accepting Robert
F. Kennedy's offer to go to
Saigon as ambassador. With
Bobby at the head of the
table there would have been
no ambiguities in the com-
mand structure.
Sing Features Sync teat�
Joseph Kraft is in Hanoi.
His column will be resumed
this week.
�
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ANNALS OF \VAR_
VIETNAM
. II--SOVEREIGN OF DISCORD
,
NGO DINH DIEM�the
name
meant a great deal at one time,
in Washington as well as Sai-
gon. On a trip to Vietnam in 1961,
Lyndon Johnson called Diem "the
Winston Churchill of Asia." What-
ever the other points of resemblance
between him and that British states-
man, the man who undertook the
American project of barricading the
southern against the northern half of
Vietnam certainly provoked hyperbole
�from Americans. For a period in the
mid-nineteen-fifties, Diem was the
.hero of the American press. According
to an article in Life, he was a "tough
miracle man," who . had "saved his
'people from [the] agonizing prospect"
of a national plebiscite; and he was
widely given credit for halting "the
red tide. of Communism in Asia." The
word "miracle" affixed itself to Diem's
name with the adhesion of a Homeric.
�epithet. Diem had performed the "po-
litical miracle" of creating . a strong
government, the "economic miracle"
of rebuilding the economy of South
Vietnam from the ruins of war. In
1957, Diem travelled to the United
States on the American Presidential air-
plane. Welcomed by President Eisen-
hower at the airport, he addressed a
joint session of Congress and visited
New York, where Mayor Robert
Wagner called him "a man history
may yet adjudge as one of the great
figures of the twentieth century." Six
years later; Diem was to die in a dark
alley of Saigon, denounced as the petty
tyrant who had destroyed South Viet-
namese society and prejudiced the cause
of the free world in Asia.'
Any history of the Diem regime
would have to be written in vivid,
novelesqu.e colors. To start with, there
was Ngo Dinh Diem himself�a shy,
self-righteous Catholic mandarin who
had �taken a vow of chastity and re-
vealed an ambition to serve as a moral
example to his people. He wished, in ef-
fect, to be the emperor of an enlight-
ened Confucian state, in the classic pat-
tern of Vietnamese history. Four of
Diem's brothers played important roles,
especially the lean, fierce Ngo Dinh
'Nhu, wfloSe life. Was a succession of
plots, ruses, and metaphysical dogmas.
And there was Mine. Nhu, the beauti-
ful, outspoken, and wholly outrageous
woman whom the American journalists
called "the Dragon Lady." For nearly
a decade, the Ngos dominated all con-
versation in Saigon; Americans and
Vietnamese alike spent hours discussing
the latest court intrigue or scandal,
hours speculating on the intricacies of
the family philosophy. The 'Ngos never
disappointed them�not even in dying.
Played out under the gaze of the tele-
vision cameras, the fall of the Ngos
was, in its way, pure theatre, the de-
nouement of a baroque tragedy.
The private psychological drama of
Diem and his family was as nothing be-
side the grand strategies and global
concerns of the United States in Viet-
nam, but, as the French historian Phi-
lippe Devillers once wrote, "in our age
of mass society, where all liitory seems
to be determined by forces so powerful
as to negate the individual,, the Viet-
namese problem has the originality to
remain dominated by questions of indi-
viduals. Indeed, the problem becomes
almost incomprehensible if *one trans-
forms men into. abstractions." "f he no-
tion .may sound romantic, but it is not.
In the first place, Vietnam in the days.
of Diem possessed a very small edu-
cated society; most of the prominent
men knew each other as well as if they
had been the inhabitants of one village.
In the second place, the Vietnamese
traditionally understood politics not in
terms of programs or large social forces
but in terms of the individual. And
their perception was not unscientifically
based, for, given the size and .uniform-
ity of the old society, the life of one
man might stand as a model for the life
of the society as a whole. If that one
man was. Ngo Dinh Diem, then. the
personal drama of the Ngo family, with
its mysterious and violent ending, de-
scribed the difficulty of. the American
project in Vietnam better than would
a history of all the counter-insurgency
programs or an analysis of all the larg-
er social forces.
mencan decision to back
Ngo Dinh Diem was not of it-
self a major policy decision. The policy
of supporting a non-Communist Viet-
nam had been 'formulated sonic years
earlier, and Diem himself was but
one element of the fallback position
hastily devised following the French
debacle in 1954. By that time, the
United States was paying eighty per
,cent of the costs of the French war,
and it was not until June of 1954 that
Secretary of State Dulles told the
French definitely that the United States
would not commit its own troops and
planes to Indo-China. Even after the
fall of Dien Bien Phu, Administration,
officials did not accept the Vietminh
victory or the principle of a divided
Vietnam. During the Geneva Confer-
ence, their ambition was not only to
build up a government in Saigon but to
undermine Ho Chi Nlinh's govern-
ment in Hanoi as well. In June, 1954,
Colonel Edward G. Lansdale was sent
out as chief of a Saigon military mission
with orders to "beat tile Geneva time-
table of ComMunist takeover in the
.North." By August, during the period
of negotiated truce that had been
agreed upon to precede the �holding
of national elections, Lansdale's teams
were scattered about the country from
Hanoi to the Ca Mau peninsula con-
ducting agitprop work and sabotage
operations, in direct violation of the
United States government's promise at
Geneva to "refrain from the threat
or the use of force." These teams had
small success in the Vietminh-held.
areas. Their main' achievement in the
North was to lay the groundwork for
the 'subsequent "flight" of the Catholics
to the South. Their tactics were prom-
ises and "black propaganda," or the
falsification of enemy reports. Many
of the rest of their activities were little
more than terrorist acts. One team,
for instance, managed to contaminate
the oil supply in the bus depot of
Hanoi in order to wreck the engines
of all the city's public transport.
The fact is that high United States
officials could have had very little con-
fidence in the success of Lansdale's mis-
sion in either the South or the North.
In Saigon, the French-sponsored gov-
enunent was in a state of near-collapse.
Shortly after the. Emperor 13ao Dai ap-
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,v,JUL.1�.1
Rainmaking Is
As Weapon- by U.S.
Cloud Seeding in Indochina Confirmed�
Chemical Also Employed to Foil Radar
� By SEYMOUR M. IlEASH
St.'eelat to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 2�The "What's worse," one official
United States has been secretly asked, "dropping bombs or
seeding clouds over North Vi- rain?" ,
etham, Laos and South Viet- All of the officials inter-
nam to increase and control the viewed said that the United
rainfall for mititary purposes.
Government sources, both ci-
vilian and -military, said during
.an 'extensive series of inter-
views that the Air Force cloud-
seeding program has been
aimed most recently at hinder- -
Mg movement of. North Viet-
. .
namese troops .and equipment
and suppressing enemy antiair-
craft missile fire.
The disclosure confirmed
growing speculation in Con-
gressional and scientific circles
about the use .of weather mod-
ification in Southeast Asia. De-
spite years of experiments with
rainmaking in the United States
and elsewhere, scientists are
not sure they .understand its
long-term effect on the ecology
of a region.
Some Opposed rrogram
The weather manipulation in
Indochina, 'which was first
tried in South Vietnam in 1963,
two main rbonsoon
affect Laos and Vietnam. "it
was just trying to. add on to
smoothing that you already
got," one officer said. -
Military sources said that one
main goal was to increase the
.;seven inches Of rain- in two
'hours on one of our Special'
'Forces camps."
Despite the professed skepti-
cism on the part Of some nun-
duration of the southwest mon- her of the Johnson Administra-
soon, which spawns high-rising tion, military nun apparently
cumulus clouds � those most took the weather modification
susceptible to cloud seeding-- Program much more seriously.
�over the panhandle areas of According to a document
Laos and North Vietnam from contained in the Pentaadn
May to early October. The long- papers, the Defense Depai t-
er rainy season thus would give I merit's-secret history of the war,
the Air Force more opportun- weather modification was one
ity to trigger rainstorms, of seven basic options for stop.
"We wore trying to arrange ping up the war that were pre-
the weather pattern to suit our scented on request by the Joint
convenience," said one former Chiefs of Staff to the White
Government official who had House in late February, 196-7.
detailed knowledge of the �per- The document described the
atior. �
States did not have the capabil-t v,ather program over Laos�
ity to cause heavy flooding duri
;
According to interviews, the tidally known as Operation
ing the summer in the northern! Central Intelligence Agency in- Pop-Eye�as an attempt "to
parts of North Vietnam, where: itiated the use of cloud-seeding !reduce trafficability along infil
serious flooding occurred last over .Hue, in the
the northern part tration routes."
year. of South Vetnam. "We I irst Authorization Needed
used that stuff in about August
Officially, the White House of 1933," one former C.I.A.
it said that � Presidential
and State Department declined agent said,.. "when the Diem authorization was "required to
comment on the use of mete- regime was having all that implement operational phase of
i-
01-0-logical warfare. "This Is one trouble with the BuddhistsY -weather modification p ocesa
of those things where no one
previously successfully tested:
"They would just - stand
and evaluated in same arca."
around during demonstrations
is going to say anything," one The. brief stunmary concluded when the police threw tear gas
official said. by stating that "risk of coin-
Most officialt, s ,iaitervi at' them, but we noticed that ewed mise is minimal.'
when the, rains came they pro
agreed that the seeding had wouldn't stay on," the former .A similar option was cited
accomplished one of its main'"ge.litti
v got an A' n another 1:167 working docu-
tnent published in the Pentagon
objectives -- muddying roads ":ae
America Beechcraft and - had' Papers. Neither attracted nitY
and flooding lines of colnmulli- it rigaed up with silver iodide," immediate public attCtIltiOn,
cation. But there were also he said, "There was another The Laos cloud-seeding op-
many military and Government' demonstration and we seeded emotions Mt provoke, however,
P
officials who en-pressed the area. It rained." a lengthy and hitter, liKir
� ' A similar cloud-seeding was secatet, dispute inside the John-
that the prbject hzul caused any son Administration in 1967. A
carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in
dramatic results. Saigon at least once during the team of State Department at-
The sources, without provid- summer of 1964, the former torneys and officials protested
ing details, . also said that a agent said, that the use of cloud-seeding
was a dans
method had been developed for Expanded to Trail�the� Ur gerou
iited States precedent for
.
treating clouds with a chemical i.
is the first confirmed use of ; The Intelligence Agency exa "I felt that the military and
that eventually � produced an4,panded its cloud-seeding activi- agency hadn't analyzed it to
meteorological .1,varlar l- ,
e. A
acidic rainfall capable of foul-.
, ;ties to the Ho Chi Minh supply letermine if it was in our
though it is not prohibited by
ing the operation of North VIet-ltrail in I,aos sometime in th interest," one official who was
any international conventions namese radar ecatipment used' middle nineteen-sixties, a ntnn- involved in the dispute said:
for directing surface-to-air mis- her of Government sources he also . was concerned over
sues., said. By 1967,. the Air Force the rigid' secrecy of the project,
In addition to hampering 'had become involved although, he .said, "although. it might
-SAM missiles
. -and delaYing .as one former Government of- have been all right. to keep it
. . . .
secret:1f you did it once and
didn't want the precedent to
become known."
The general feeling was sum-
marized by one -former State
Department official- who said
he was concerned that the
� rainmaking "might violate what
we considered the general rule
of the . thumb for an illegal
weapon of war�something
- Il:Altering 'or tailoring the The state or the art had not that would 'calla'. unusual suf-
rain patterns over Noth Viet- advanced to the Point where fering or disproprlate damage.";
nam and Laos to ant United!
it was possible to predict the There also was concern. he( .
States bombing: missions. 'results of a seeding operation added, because of the unknown
ecological risks.
A Nixon Administration or-
roads and other lines of com-a"We used to go out flying flail! sal 1 tliat. he believed the
around and looking for a cer- fir' of weather modifi-
munication in opeiadion. . tarn cloud format.ion," the offi- cation over North Vietnam
Keyed To Monsoon � ,cial said. "And we made a lot of took place in late 1968 or early
The cloud-seeding operations 'mistakes. Once we dumped 1960 when rain was increased
necessarily were keyed to the 1
on warfare, artifical rainmak-
ing has been strenuously op-
posed-. by some State Depart-
ment officials.
ort Vietnamese infiltration, ficial said,
ag,ency was
lit could' not be determinall the �rainmaking program had calling- all the shots."
whether �the operations wereI the.follOwing pu.rposef: , "I 'always assumed the agen-
being conducted in connection (t:Provicling ram and ciono cy had a mandate from the
cover for infiltration of Sauth White HOMO to do it," he
with the current North Viet- Vietnamese commando and in-
=nese offensive or the telligance teams into North.added, . -
A number of former CIA, and
renewed American bombing of Vietnam. � lhigh,ranking Johnson Adminis-
the North. (:Serving as a "spoiler .'or!titation officials depicted . the
Ef fectiveness Doubted , North Vietnamese attacks aNcL operations along the In as
raids in South Vietnam. experimenta
Beginning in 1967, some
State Departnient officials pro-
tested that the United States,
by deliberately altering the nat-
ural rainfall in parts of Indo-
china, was taking environmen-
tal risks of unknown propor-
tions, But many advocates of
the operation have found little
wrong with using weather mod-
ification as a military weapon.
CDiverting North Vietnameir
men and material from military
operations to keep muddied
with any degree of confidence,
one Government official said.
cont iuuod
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_
PRuvivc.NCE, R.I 'Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
JOURNT0
L 3t972
m - 66,673
S 209,501
4.0ee-Qui ou CAS
.4s
� By BRUCE DeSIINA
, Quoting unnamed Central �
: Intelligorwe,AgeRay.,and State
.- Department sources, The New.
'. York Times News Service yes-
terday reported new evidence
that the Pentagon is changing
( the weather over Southeast
Asia for military reasons.
. In a �story by Seymour M.
, Hersh, the reporter who first
. .
broke the story of the My Lai '
Massacre, the Times said the
United , States first began
�seeding clouds to increase
rainfall over Hue in the north-
ern, part of South Vietnam in
1963. .
According to a former CIA ,
� official, the action was taken '
to prevent Buddhist demon-
ms
In addition to impeding infil-
tration, the Times reported
that the Pentagon rain-making
program has the following par.
poses:
O To provide rain and cloud
cover for. infiltration of
South Vietnamese comman-
dos and intelligence teams
into North Vietnam.
O To serve as a "spoiler" for
North Vietnamese attacks
and raids in South Viet-
nam.
O To divert North Vietnam-
ese men and material from
military operations to keep
muddied roads arid other
lines of communication
open.
strations in that city against The Times quotes a
� the South Vietnamese govern- "former high-ranking -of-
: ment, the Times reported. ficial" as saying that by the
"They would just Stand end of 1971, the Program was
� around during demonstrations under the direct control of the
when the police threw tear White House.
! gas at them, but we noticed
! that when the rains came
they wouldn't stay on," the
. former agent is quoted as gram was politically sensitive
.:saying. and ordered it kept a secret
The story repeats, as first from all but a handful of ad-
reported in the June 25.Provi-- ministration officials, the of-
. dence Sunday Journal, that ficial is quoted as saying.
seeding operations were me Times quoted a "well
: begun in the mid 1960's to informed source" as saying
create heavy rains which Navy scientists developed a
!: washed out portions of the Ho new chemical agent effective
Chi Minh Trail and impeded in warm stratus clouds that
, infiltration of supplies and produces an acidic rain capa-
,1 !- Men to the South. ble of fouling "mechanical
� Sen. Claiborne Pell said late equipment --- like radars,
� last Month he strongly be- trucks, and tanks.",
Heves the United States is The story implies,
Seeding clouds in Southeast not . say, that the
,�� Asia for�military reasons, was actually used
. Reached at his home last North.
:..night and informed of the The Times reports that of-
Times story, the Senator said: ficials interviewed said the "This provides additional United States did not have the
'-, foundation for my own belief, capability to cause heavy
. a belief that I have advanced 'flooding during the summer in
for several months, that these the Northern parts of North
activities have been conduct- Vietnam last year. The flood-
c1 by the United States." big. destroyed crops � and re-
The Senator is planning portedly killed' thousands. _
Senate hearings for later this
summer on his proposed
' treaty to ban the use of :
: weather modification as a
I: weapon of war.. � . �
�
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Henry Kissinger, the Pres-
ident's special adviser for na-
tional security, felt the pr
but does
chemical
over the
�� However,-, Sen. 'Pell and
David Heaney, a member of
the Senate foreign relations
committee's professional
staff, told the Journal they
believe the United States does
have that capability and was
responsible for the floods.
In a letter to Senator Pell
last year, Pady Johnson, the
assistant secretary of defense
for legislati've affairs, said the
Pentagon has the power to
increase rainfall by up to 50
per cent.
A 50 per cent increase in
the torrential monsoon rains -
'of the region could obviously
have a considerable effect.
1 "JUN
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By MIRIAM OTTENBEI RG
Star Staff Writer
U.S. narcotics agents are
making a sizable dent in the
Southeast Asian dope traffic
and�:despite reports to the
contrary � America's Asian
allies and the CIA are helping
them do it.
"We have seriously dam-
aged the program of the nar-
cotics traffickers," reported
c/ John Warner, chief of the Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs' strategic intel�
ligence office. "It's becoming
increasingly more difficult for
them to operate, even though
their profits are tremendous."
Warner countered testi-
mony given recently by Al-
fred W. McCoy, a Ph.D stu-
dent, before a Senate Appro-
priations subcommittee to .the
effect that the governments of
South Vietnam, Laos and
Thailand are actively en-
gaged in the heroin traffic -
and that the U.S. government� �
.; has not moved to stop it.
"Corruption," Warner
ac-
knowledged, "is a way of life
- in Southeast Asia. It reaches
to all levels. But the United
States government has made
it perfectly clear to all gov-
ernments in the area that we
Will not compromise on the
,narcotics issue."
He cited as an example of
increasing cooperation on in-
stance earlier this year when
1.26 tons of opium were turned
.over to the government of
Thailand by one of the in-
surgent forces along its bor-
der�presumably for reasons
of its own.
Until recently, the opium
'would have found its way
back into the traffic. But this
were taken and analyzed by
American chemists.
Even more significant are
recent successes of Laos and
� Thai narcotics investigative
units set up with U.S. aid.
Warner explained how they
came into being and, in doing
so, replied to the charges
made by McCoy in his Con-
gressional appearance. ..
McCoy had chaliged that
the U.S. ambassador to Laos,
G. Malurtrie Godley, "did
his best to prevent the as-
signment" of U.S. narcotics
agents to Laos.
Actually, Warner said, God--
ley has been one of the
staunchest supporters of the
anti-narcotics program in
Laos, and requested U.S. nar-
cotics agents as advisers long
before they could be sent
there. He was instrumental in
persuading Laos to outlaw the
opium traffic, Warner said.
Godley also persuaded the
Laotian government to ap-
point an honest and compe-
tent general to head the new
narcotics investigative unit
which the U.S. Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs
established and, 'trained, War-
ner added.
In the short time the unit
has been operational, Warner
reported, it has made tre-
mendous progress in arrest-
ing traffickers and seizing
laboratory equipment and the
chemicals used to make
heroin.
The unit's latest score came
on June 7 when it arrested a
Meo deputy of the Laotian
parliament and seized 10 kilos
of No. 4 heroin (the injectable
kind), 26 kilos of opium and
a number of U.S. Army car-
bines.
Another special investiga-
tive force tr a i ned and
equipped by BNDD agents,
has just gotten under way at
Chingmai in northern Thai-
land. Chingmai is a road junc-
tion in the network of roads
leading south to Bangkok.
. It's particularly important
Second of 2 Articles to U.S. narcotics agents be-
cause they hope there to halt
time, it was burned in the the movement of heroin out
presence of American nar- of the "Golden Triangle," the
cotics agents and samples opium growing area border-
ing Laos, Burma and Thai-
land.
The new Thai unit has just
scored its first success. On
June 10, a joint BNDD and
Thai task force raided a com-
pound and seized 1,600 kilos
of raw opium and processing
equipment, he said.
. Warner also reported that
.he Royal Hong Kong police
also have stepped up their
anti-narcotics program, 'flak-
ing large seizures of nar-
cotics, arresting traffickers
and seizing two laboratories
this year. At the time, both
labs had quantities of heroin,
opium and morphine base.
Burma, the other govern-
ment touched by the opium
traffic, has expressed its will-
ingness to cooperate, \Varner
reported, but Burmese offi-
cials frankly admit their con-
trol over the border areas are
very tenuous. It would require
an army to make any impact
on the border areas where
.insurgent forces protect the
opium traffickers. Warner
said.
In Laos an acknowledged
impartant trafficker has been
knocked out of business not by
an army but by American
diplomacy, Warner said.
Gen. Ouane Rattikone, for-
mer chief of staff of the
Royal Laotian Army, had con-
solidated several opium refin-
eries into one, and with his
army, controlled and protect-
ed the Laotian narcotics traf-
fic for years, Warner said.
"He was forced to retire in
July, 1971. We have political
clout in the area and Ambas-
sador Godley exerted it."
Warner said similar action
would be taken against Viet-
namese figures if charges of
narcotics trafficking were
proven.
"Politics means nothing to
us in BNDD," he said. If we
had the evidence . . . the
President would be informed
and I know something would
be done about it.
McCoy had said in is con-
gressional testimony that the.
political apparatus of Gen.
Nguyen Cao Ky (the former
president of South Vietnam)
"demonstrates the importance
of official corruption in South-
east Asia's drug traffic." Mc-
Coy also said Ky's sister is
tied in with heroin smuggling.
_ Warner, however, said there
is no evidence that Ky is in
volved.
McCoy, in his Senate testi
mony, said he had briefed
BNDD on his findings and they
corrobated much of his evi-
dence. Asked about that, War-
ner said he had seen nothing
of an evidentiary nature from
McCoy "other than gossip,
rumors, conjecture and old
history." -
McCoy had accused the CIA
of providing substantial mili-
tary support to mercenaries,
rebels and warlords actively
engaged in the narcotics traf-
fic and of letting aircraft it
chartered be used tO transport
opium harvested by the mer-
cenaries.
Of those charges, Warner
said the American-chartered
aircraft now have security
forces guarding against the
against the transport of any.
narcotics.
Since President Nixon asked
the CIA to assist in dealing
with the Southeast Asian nar-
cortics problem, Warner said,
the CIA has been one of the
most cooperative government
agencies working with BNDD
to' develop the information on
which BNDD and its foreign
counterparts can act to inter-
dict the traffic and make
cases.
The weeding out of Asian of-
ficials heavily involved in the
dope traffic, as well as the
strikes against the traffickers
themselves, are all fairly re-
cent. And so is the BNDD
in-
volvement in the Pacific. e
It's .only in the last twO
years that American narcotics
agents have come into the
Orient in force. Since BNDD
Director John E. Ingersoll
pushed for more agents to
fight the Pacific traffic in
drugs, regional offices .have.
been set up in Bangkok, Sia,
gon and Tokyo, and district
offices in Chingmai, Vientiane,
Kuala Lumpur, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Okinawa and
Manila,.
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3 JUN 1972
Charge CIA and Thieu
� push heroin to .U.S. GIs
Daily World Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON. June 2�Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale student.
working on his doctorate, told a Senate Appropriations subcom-
mittee today that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Sai-
gon Dictator Nguyen Van Thieu are directly involved in the ship;
meat of vast quantities of opium and heroin to the U.S.
McCoy, who has authored a book, "The Politics of Heroin in
Southeast Asia," debunked President Nixon's campaign against
heroin imported from Turkey."
. He told the Foreign Operations subcommittee. headed,by Sen. .
William Proxmire (D-Wisc), that the U.S. underworld has totally
�recouped the loss of the Turkish supply by turning to Southeast
Asia sources.
In South Vietnam, McCoy said, the opium and heroin traffic
Is divided among. the nation's three dominant military factions:
Pres. Thieu's political apparatus, Prime Minister Kim's political
organization, and Gen: Ky's political apparatus.
"Throughout the mountainous Golden: Triangle region, the
� CIA has provided substantial military support for mercenaries,:
- right-wing rebels, and tribal war lords who are actively engaged
in the narcotics traffic and 'in Thailand the CIA has worked
closely with nationalist Chinese paramilitary units which control
80 to 90 percent of northern Burma's vast opium export and man-
ufacture high-grade heroin for export to the American market,"
McCoy testified. �
"Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the
South Vietnamese army control the distribution and sale of he."
roin to Americans GI's fighting in Indochina." 1 �.�
' "Finally U.S. agencies have been actually involved in. certain
� aspects of the region's drug traffic. In Northern Laos, Air Ame-
rica aircraft and helicopters chartered by the CIA have been trans-
porting opium." 7� �
��
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1 JUN 1972 �
(b)(3)
Perspective
lectoral
olitics: The
Candidates
eply
IN THE ED1TORTAL ESSAY "Vietnam
and the Elections" which opened
the April issue of RAMPARTS WC
observed that the call for U.S. with-
drawal from Vietnam, once dismissed
as extremist or naive, had at last be-
come politically respectable. Withdraw-
al- had in fact become the dominant
' theme of Vietnam policy among this
.. year's..Presidential candidates. At the
same time, we noted, the clear prin-
ciple of this demand was being clouded
and distorted in the turgid mainstream
of American electoral debate. And we
. . .
called upon the anti-war movement
in the coming months "to sharpen the
demand for withdrawal and establish
the clearest possible mandate for it."
� In an attempt to' follow our own ad-
vice, RAMPARTS wrote, to each of the
Presidential candidates, presenting to
them a list of seven questions on their
plans for peace in Vietnam. We re-
ceived replies from Rep. Chisholm,
.Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Jackson, Sen. Mc-
Govern and Sen. Muskie. The letters
from Chisholm, Humphrey, McGovern
and Muskie essentially consisted of the
candidates' point-by-point responses to
our questions over their signatures. In
the following commentary we have
taken these questions one or two at a
time, and grouped together the answers
of these four candidates' for compari-
son and analysis. Sen. Jackson's letter
did not direct itself to the specific ques-
tions in a parallel way, so we are print-
ing it in its entirety in a box on page
10.0f the Democratic candidates who
remained in the aftermath of the Wis-
consin primary only Wallace and Mc-
Carthy did not respond to our questions.
Since Rep. McClosky had dropped out
of the race in March, and Richard
Nixon didn't answer, we drew a blank
on the Republican hopefuls.
. We posed seVen 'questions:. while the
original numbering is maintained, the
results are discussed here in a different
order. This alloWs us to set out first the
common thrust of the four candidates'
policies and in a sense proceed from the
easy questions to the hard, from the
shared assumptions to the problematic
implications. .
I. Shall the United States permanent-
ly withdraw all its armed forces (161-
,diers, sailors and airmen) from Viet-
nam on the sole condition of an agree-
ment for the repatriation of prisoners
of war, timed to coincide with our
�
withdrawal?
2. Shall the U.S. similarly withdraw
its armed forces front all of Indochina
on the same single. condition? What
about U.S. bases in Thailand? .
CHISHOLM: . . .
1. I firmly believe and stand for an
immediate total withdrawal of all U.S.
forces from Vietnam:. with the sole
londition being an agreement for the
repatriation of prisoners of. war. �
2. I also believe that it is imperative
� that we.. withdraw our armed forces
from all of Indochina. I must further
support a withdrawal of U.S. influence
on the lives of those who seek a .pres-
ervation of their culture.
HUMPHREY:
1. Yes..
2. Yes, although in regard to Thai-
land the critical point is that these bases
not be used for strikes in Indochina.
The question of leaving these bases al-
together is a longer term proposition,
involving issues that go beyond the
Vietnam war; this calls for further
study at the Presidential level.
McGOVERN:
1. Yes. It is important to note, how-
ever, that leaving U.S. forces in South
Vietnam to defend the Thieu regime is
a circuitous method of achieving re-
lease of our prisoners. I am convinced
that they will be returned within the
framework of Article 118 of the Gen-
eva Convention on prisoners of war,
which provides that prisoners will be
released without delay "after the cessa-
tion of hostilities." This requires a com-
plete American disengagement from
hostilities. against all parties in Indo-
I china. want to point out, too, that I
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�
do not regard this U.S. withdrawal as a
negotiating position�it is instead a
course of action which I. fully intend
to implement. The McGovern-Hatfield
Amendment did not urge the President
to 'negotiate our withdrawal; rather it
required withdrawal by cutting off
funds for the war.
2. Yes. The bases in Thailand have
no justification other than to attempt to
dert U.S. influence over the internal
politics of Southeast Asian countries.
The withdrawal must, of course, mean
an end to all military operations, in-
cluding bombing, anywhere in Indo-
china.
MUSKIE: .
I. Yes. I have consistently supported
this position in the last few years. On
February 2, I urged that "We muSt set
a date when we will withdraw every
soldier, sailor, and air-man, and ,stop
all bombing and other American mil-
itary .activity, dependent only on an
agreement for the return of our pis-
oners and the safety of our troops as
'they leave." I do not believe that an
agreement for the safety of our troops
as they leave would be in any way a
problem; the basic exchange would be
a complete end to American. military
participation in the Indochina war for
the return of our prisoners.
2. My proposal includes our military
aCtivity and personnel in Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia. would there-
fore not make use of our bases in Thai-
land and elsewhere in Southeast Asia
for activities related to the Indochina
war. I would otherwise approach the
issue .of bases in Thailand and else-
where in Southeast Asia in the context
of efforts not only to promote detente
between the U.S. and China but also
with regard to the effect that either
maintaining or removing our various
bases would have on the possibilities
for accommodation among Asian na-
tions' themselves. Clearly, we do not
need to maintain anything like the
number and size of bases we have now
in Southeast Asia.
6. Shall the U.S. set a date by which
it will carry out its withdrawal (as spe-
cified in the preceding answers) on the
same single condition of an agreement
on repatriation of POWs?
7.. What date?
"13
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� 211 MAY 1972
(b)(3)
� Exclusive
in terview
Jr-1i
By Wilfred Burehett
' Guardian Stall Correspondent
Paris
President Nixon's advisor Henry Kissinger has visited
Moscow, Peking and Paris in. search of�as Nixon always
puts itr-a peaceful settlement to the war in South Vietnam
and bearing "generous" offers of peace.
'He has had 13 private sessions with the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam's delegation in Paris, but he has
never deigned to talk with those primarily'concerned with
the struggle in the South�rePresented in Paris by Nguyen
Thi Binh: Foreign Minister of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and head of
its delegation in Paris.
There ar,e unclaubtedly elements of Male chauvinism in
this, but it is primarily the arrogance of the super-power.
psychology at the White House. An arrangement between
"equals" with the other super-power, the Soviet Union
could be tolerated. Next best would be a deal with People's
'China�at least a major power. But it was too humiliating
to talk even with. the DRV.
Each of Nixon's negotiators in Paris, from Henry Cabot
Lodge to William Porter, have exhausted the language of
contempt to make this clear. As for the PRO, it was seen
as far, beneath the contempt of the U.S.
It was with this in mind and due to the deliberate
distortions of the PRO's views by Nixon and Kissinger that
I put some questions to Nguyen Thi Binh: �
Are you prepared to meet with Kissinger or some other
competent U.S. 'negotiator and within the framework of
the PRG's 7-point peace plan discuss the following con-
crete points:
(1) The question of the safe withdrawal of the remaining
60,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam?
(2) The question of the release of U.S. POWs in South
Vietnam as well as the captured pilots held in the DRV?
(3) Questions relating to President Nixon's concern
about the "imposition of a Communist regime in Saigon?"
(4) Assure that there will not be a "long night of terror"
in South Vietnam as Nixon expressed it on May 8 or a
;bloodbath" as he expressed it in his April 28 speech?
Nguyen Thi Binh. answered with the following:
"In order to deceive American and Niior Id public
� opinion, Nixon persists in repeating his lies and slanders,
trying to justify his new extremely grave acts of war. We
have many. times declared and we repeat once again that
as evidence of cur good will and our sincere desire to
arrive at a peaceful solution to the problem of South
Vietnam, we are ready to engage in private conversation
with U.S. representatives so they may still better un-
derstand our peace proposals. We are ready to discuss alt
matters concerning a solution.
.The PRG proposals
"It, seems to me that the American government' is
presently well informed regarding ourApprove'd for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
continued. "However, I would like to clarify for American
public opinion some of the points you have raised:
"Regarding the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in
complete security. On Sept. 17, 1970, in .our 8-point peace
plan, as on July1,1971 in our 7-point peace plan, we clearly
rated that after the U.S.-fixes a definite date for the total
vithdrawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam,
he parties concerned could agree- on necessary. measures
.o guarantee the security of U.S. troops during their with-
Irawal.
"Thus, if the, list of soldiers and pilots captured, killed
Ind wounded gets continually longer this is precisely
because Nixon has refused to fix a concrete date for total
withdrawal, refuses to negotiate responsibility on the basis
of our reasonable proposal and continues to utilize U.S..
troops and pilots in acts of war against our people.
"Regarding the freeing of U.S. POWs. This problem has
also been dealt with exhaustively in our peace initiative. If
until this day captured U.S. military personnel have not
been able to return to their homes and their number in-
creases all the time, this is also because Nixon refuses to
fix a definite ..late for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops,
refuses to discontinue his support for dictator Nguyen Van
Thieu's clique and continues to wage -war against our,
people. These captured military personriel are in fact
prisoners of the policy of Wietnamization.' They are
prisoners of Nixon and Thieu. If the U.S. had replied
seriously to our, 7-point peace plan, the POWs would long
ago have returned to their families.
. "Regarding the political regime of South Vietnam.
There. never has been a question for us of imposing on.
South Vietnam any sort of regime whatsoever other than
one chosen by the South Vietnamese people. Still less do
we wish to impose a communist regime as the Nixon
administration continues to maintain.' On the contrary, it is
the U.S. that stubbornly continues to impose on the South
Vietnamese people the pro-American, anti-communist,
belligerant, dictatorial and fascist regime of Thieu.
. _
Elections�with Thieu machinery
Nixon's proposals about 'new presidential elections' in
South Vietnam, while Thieu's machinery of dictatorship
remains means nothing-other than a repetition of the one-
man electoral farce of October last year. The National
Liberation Front and the PRG have consistently ad-
vocated the formation of a truly representative govern-
ment in South Vietnam, which would be mandated to
organize really free general elections in South Vietnam to
commit a free choice of representatives of a political
regime. In the light of the present realities in South
Vietnam, such a government cannot be any other than one
of national concord, comprising three elements as we have
proposed." (That ..is, representatives. of the PRG; of the
present regime in Saigon as long as Thieu is no longer at
continued
(b)(3)
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f
10 MAY 1972
(b)(3)
grenam
ccascience
� 0
ri 0
N�1-.1.1 et
A delegation of American Communists arrived in Hanoi last month
as American bombers roared overhead with their weapons of death and
destruction.
The delegation consisting of Gus Hall, general secretary of the
Communist Party of the United "States and CP candidate for U.S. Pres-
ident; Jarvis Tyner, chairman of the Young Workers Liberation League
and CP Vice Presidential candidate; Rasheed Storey, chairman of the
- New York State CP; and Joseph North, author and editor of the Daily
World Magazine, was in Hanoi as invited guests of the Vietnam Workers
Party.
Hurried into air raid shelters by their North Vietnamese hosts,
the four Communists recorded their observations and issued, on April
19, "An appeal to the conscience of the U.S. people."
' "We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls and the bodies
of small boys ... the shattered hands of workers who will never again
be able to provide for their families... (and) some who were blinded by
� the flying debris," the appeal, printed in full in the April.20 Daily World
said.
Substantial portions of the appeal folloW:
, . . . .
We saw with our own eyes that the main targets of
the U.S. bombers were the heavily populated working
class centers of Hanoi and Haiphong.
We saw the newly constructed working class apart-
ment houses in Haiphong that were destroyed by the
criminal pilots sent by the arch criminals of the Nixon
Administration. �
We saw the hospital and spoke to the women and
children whose blood was smeared on the steps as we
entered.
We saw the workers' quarters where the planes re-
turned three times to complete their destruction.
< This is no accident. Civilian targets are the Main
objective of the government. We saw market places
bombed, restaurants bombed, factories bombed, water-
front warehouses bombed, vital water mains bombed.
�
We saw British, Soviet and German Democratic Re-
public ships attacked in the harbor. As we crossed a
bridge entering Haiphong, crowded with families of mo-
thers, fathers and their children, a U.S. plane streaked
above us and people scrambled for their lives.
We saw the same in the beautiful capital of Hanoi
where we experienced two waves of bombers. It was
the same in peaceful country villages by the rice pad-
dies where we met a. farmer whose friends, a family
of seven, had been killed in that morning's raid:
We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls
who only 'moments before played peacefully with their
dolls, and the bodies. of small boys whose friendly
games of marbles were disrupted forever by the mas-
3ive tonnage of U.S. bombs. We saw the shattered hands
)f workers who will never again be able to provide for
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ktep
Ues�
their families. We saw some who were blinded by the
flying debris.
In the name of our own children we appeal to all
Americdns to- save the children of Vietnam, Cambodia.
and Laos. We appeal to your humanity, common sense
and reason. '
. We know these murder. policies of aggression are
dictated not by the will of the people, or even of the
U.S. Congress, but by the giant monopoly corporations�
the Rockefeller, Morgan, I.T.T. interests, etc., who main-
tain and extend their riches through the destruction and
suffering of the Vietnamese and other peoples of the
world. ' �
We must see, though, that we bear a responsibility
as long as these acts of barbarism are perpetrated in
our name.
The bombings are the work of desperate tnen gone
insane, Nixon, Kissinger, Agnew, these Dr. Strange-
.loves of Washingtm.
0
The victories of the Vietnamese National Liberation
forces have created a totally new situation. They have
virtually destroyed the best of the puppet troops. They
have shattered once and for all Nixon's hoax of Vietnami-
zition. As the Pentagon-trained Thieu mercenaries turn
their guns and tanks on U.S. puppet troops, the arrogant
.predictions of General Creighton Abrams and Defense
Secretary Melvin Laird go un in smoke.
� But we in the United States have the main. respon-
sibility. In meeting this challenge we will be fulfilling
our responsibility to ourselves and to all the people of
the world.
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0
sontitihitiot
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� We appeal to all Americans: to every shop worker,
to all members of the trade union movement, to all
peace and dethocratic-minded Americans,. to all Black
Americans, .to all Chieano, Puerto Rican, Indian and
0 .
�
� ; -,;;, -
Asian Americang,' to, the youth, to the 'students, to the
women, to the veterans, to the unemployed, to the in-
tellectuals, to all who feel the impact of the war in a
thousand different ways�on our living standards, on our
taxes, on the decline of our cities, on the escalation of
;racism, and the destruction of democratic rights.
We appeal to all whose sheer humanity is violated
by this war.
This moment in history cries out for'unity in action!
This is a moment when we must unite and concentrate
our total efforts to end this criminal war, to end this
mass murder, to end this imperialist aggression.
. An absolute precondition for the right of the Vietna-
mese people to determine their destiny is the total
withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Indochina.
These actions must continue on every level and in all
localities. These actions must be intensified in depth
and scope, until the U.S. Government returns tci the
Paris negotiations in good faith, until it accepts the just
seven-point program of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam. -
These actions must continue until the U.S. govern-
ment sets the date for the withdrawal of all forces from
Southeast Asia�the ground troops, the U.S. Navy, the
U.S. Airforce, the C.I.A. and all supportive personnel!
� � There have been. many important actions in the U.S.
on behalf of peace since this .war began. The moment
cries out now for the greatest united actions of us all�
to achieve the end of this war on behalf of our people
and the peoples of Vietnam and all Indochina, on behalf
of human progress, on behalf of our children and all
children of the world. ' /
� . We make this appeal from the air-raid shelters of
� -
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DAILIr WORLD�
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1 MAY BM
Halt the assassins!.
The "language of naked power": that is the "kind of
language the President is now speaking."
The words are those of Agriculture Secretary Earl
- Butz, defending Nixon's latest violence in North Vietnam. �
The words describe the regime that Nixon would
impose on the world, the regime he would instal at home.
Those words'-- the "language of naked power" � de-
scribe also the attempt to assassinate Governor George
Wallace.
They express the violence of Nixon and Spiro Agnew
and the late J. Edgar Hoover. the violence which they
repeatedly incited against the advocates of peace and
democracy during the 1968 campaign.
That violence is of a piece with the scarcely-cloaked
charges of treason which the White House hoodlum bri-
gade has flung at those political leaders who do not support
Nixon's new violence against Vietnam.
It is the violence which the Pentagon and the mer-
chants of death have incorporated into the most profitable
business in America � at whatever cost to the nation and
_the world.
0
) � � �
The "language of naked power" is the language that.
U.S. imperialism introduced into Indochina a quarter cen-
tury ago. the language which it has spoken more and more
harshly since then. It is the language in which the death
sentence on Ngo Diem was spoken during the Kennedy
administration, by killer generals and their patron. the
CIA. �
It is the language of napalm and bombs and torture
and defoliant chemicals and bacteriological agents and
rigged elections and chain-store brothels and "tiger
cages." It is U.S. imperialism in Indochina.
The "irrational murderous" attack on Governor
Wallace occurs. as Gus Hall. Communist presidential
candidate said. "in an atmosphere produced by the es-
calated. genocidal war of aggression against the people of
Vietnam."
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111,12.0
114 MAY 1972
Nine years after a fateird assassina dyon
Eze i'vdan . Dfi'ami
,
SAIGON. deaths in 1970, between 1,000 and
/7MONG the ever-increasing scores 2,000 people, including the wife of A of graves in Mac Dinh Chi cem- President Nguyen Van Thieu �
etery, the oldest and most pres- Thieu's father is buried alongside�
tigious one in Saigon, now spread appeared at the graves in what an
be said across several blocks near the Amer- to� have marked the formal
jean Embassy in the downtown area, beginningsl of a revival of Diemism in
are two unmarked slabs of marble South Vietnam. Last Nov. 2, more
around which miscellaneous mourn- than 5,000 mourners visited the
ers occasionally place wreaths or graves and attended a requiem mass
scatter a few flowers. Each week at the Saigon cathedral that was pre-
fresh pots of blooming plants are set viously announced in the newspapers
on the tombstones by the gravekeep- by a conun'ltte e f Diem's admirers.
ers, who are paid by members of the Several thousands more who were
family of President Ngo Dinh Diem of simply curious passers-by, and a
South Vietnam and his Rasputinlike sprinkling of anti-Diemists as well,
helped cause a huge traffic jam.
ROBERT SHAPLEN is Far East cor- These reverential demonstrations in
. � respondent for The New Yorker. behalf of Diem are a manifestation
of the psychological and political
brother and closest advisor, Ngo
changes that have taken � place in
Dinh Nhu, both of .whom were .�mur-
dered in midmorning of Nov. 2, 1963, Vietnam in the decade since !his
approximately 20 hours after the death. But in seriously re-evaluating
Diem's historic role and analyzing
start of the military coup that over-
',his complicated personality, the cere-
.threw them.
monial and nostalgic tributes, in
. Following the assassination of the
themselves, can be easily miscon-
- two brothers, which'took place in an
strued. They are symbolic and symp-
� armored car after they were captured
tomatic performances, typically Viet-
in. a Catholic church where they had
namesc in their hidden meanings,
sought refuge, the 'two shot and bay-
flagellative and purgative, and their
� oneted bodies were originally buried
message is one a both longing and
in a corner of the military headquar-
admonishment. On the surface, they
.ters compound on the northern edge
represent the natural -and human in-
of the city close to Tan Son Nhut air-
chliation to look upon the past more
port. They were placed there as a
favorably than the present. Under the
precaution to avoid further mutila-
circumstances of the long and de-
tion by anti-Diemist fanatics. At 3
structive war the Vietnamese have
o'alock one morning two years later,
suffered since 1963, and especially
the remains were said to have been
since the large-scale American in-
secretly brought to the Mac Dinh Chi
volvement after 1965, the days of
cemetery. It was believed that the
Diem now seem peaceful and golden
generals who planned and executed
to many people who feel themselves
the coup did not want the embarrass-
/ worse off today than they were be-
ment of having the ghosts of their
fore. However, that is not true of all
two victims permanently haunting
Vietnamese, and if one stands back
them at headquarters; particularly
and regards the image of Diem in a
since Saigon at the time was full of
larger historical light, the picture is
rumors of new coups and counter-
� considerably more complicated.
coups.
Until two years ago, the two DISCUSSIONS about Diem nowa-
graves, originally just small mounds �
light
are particularly haunting in the
without any marble topping, were
aght of the new Communist offensive
scarcely. noticed.. A handful of rela-
in South Vietnam, which may well
tives and friends of the two men paid
be a climactic one. Many experienced
;homage to them each Nov. 2 and
observers believe that had Diem
sometimes on Sundays during the
lived the "big war" would never
year. But on the anniversary of their
have materialized and the South Viet-
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By ROBEIIT SEMPLE!
namese would not have suffered any-
where near 120,000 dead hnd 500,000
wounded-100,000 of them perma-
nently incapacitated�or that today
there would be 350,000 war orphans.
These figures date back to 1961,
when the American involvement that
has cost us 55,000 lives began on a
small but gradually increasing scale,
with advisers and funds. By the time
of the coup, there were 12,000 ad-
visers in Vietnam, but those who
knew Diem best feel that neither he
nor Nhu would ever have invited or
allowed 550,000 American soldiers to
fight in thefr country, and to permit
the devastation caused by air at-
tacks, including bombing and defolia-
tion. There is evidence that shortly
�before the coup took place�
and for several months after,
ward�the first tentative ef-
forts were initiated both by
the Saigon Government and
the National Liberation Front
to come to some sort of ac-
commodation. These- efforts
might well have led to noth-
ing, as so many subsequent
ones involving Hanoi and
Washington as, well as the
Front and Saigon have, and
the war might have continued
,anyway, although on a much
smaller scale than came to be
the case in the post-Diem era.
If there had been a smaller
war, or if a political- agree-
ment had been reached in the
days before Hanoi completely
dominated the N.L.F., South
Vietnam might well have
come under some form of
Communist domination one
way or another within two or
three years. This remains a
political possibility today, and
if that happens, despite Viet-
namization and despite con-
tinued American air and other
logistical support, it will be
due primarily to the inability
of the many governments that
succeeded Diem's to create a
�nation capable of withstand-
ing the more united, patient,
dedicated, and better-led Com-
munists. Still and all, looking
back in 1963 with all the
imponderables of the past and
present in . mind, almost all
''dontinue6,
RISH11.10I014 STAR .
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d. Han
nd of Pe
By RICHARD CRITCHFIELD
., .
. . Star Staff Writers
d"What fascinates me," former Viet-
Dam pacification. chief Robert W.
Korner observed last week, "is that
the war is ending with a conventional
bang." .
Komer'S feeling that the old Viet-
cong insurgency has been completely
overtaken by the overt North Viet-
namese inv asion and President.
Nixon's military moves against the
North seems to be generally shared
by a number of Americans who had
most to do with shaping U.S. counter-,
. insurgency doctrine and strategy in
Vietnam over the past 20 years. �
Among those interviewed . were
Henry Cabot Lodge, Gen. Maxwell D.
Taylor and Frederick E. Nailing, all
former ambassadors to Saigon; Walt
W. Restow, a chief foreign policy ad-
viser to Presidents John P. Kennedy
and Lyndon 13. -Johnson; Maj. Gen.
. Edward G. Lansdale, Ngo Dinh
Diem's first American adviser; and
Barry Zorthian, former U.S. infor-
mation chief in Saigon.
As most of them see it, the war
has now become a .straight old-fash-
ioned� military contest between two
geographically distinct states in which
the better army,, conventionally or-
ganized 'and equipped with tanks,
rocks and heavy artillery., Will defeat
the weaker one.. .
Solar American tactical air power
has failed to provide the necessary
margin of assistance to the South
Vietnamese, and the military effect�
iveness of the Northern sea blockade
remains to be proven. Nor have
those of the Southern Vietcong guer-
rillas.who survived the defeat of 1963
as yet shown they can play anything
but a supporting role.
THE IMPORTANCE of so complete
a transformation of the war, it is felt,
is that Hanoi has destroyed its own
propaganda. �
It can no longer claim 'a victory
will validate the doctrine of "people's
revolutionary war." The importance
to the North Vietnamese of still doing
so is evidenced by the title and con-
tent of General Vo Nguyen Giap's
recent essay setting down the ideol-
ogical basis for the current offensive,
"People's War, People's Victory."
In it, Giap predicts the war will end
In a climactic military victory. The
collapse of South Vetnam's 3rd di-
vision at Quang Tri, followed by
smashing blows against Hue, Kontum
and An Loc, may put that victory
In his grasp.. .. _
�1
But it will be done contrary to all
North Vietnam's declared strategic
doctrine, with its credos that the vic-
torious soldiers must be drawn
from the supporting masses of people
around them or native-born South
Vietnamese. �
Following the Chinese Communist
model, North Vietnamese doctrine as
declared by Giap and others has al-
ways held that the revolution must
pass through three phases: first, the
defensive, when the population is tak-
en in hand while leaving the enemy
to control the main centers; second,
offensive guerrilla warfare, which
obliges the enemy to split up his
forces while the organization of Com-
munist regular and local units is ac-
tively. continued on a battalion and
regimental scale; finally, the third
phase, Giap's climactic military vic-
tory, whose object is to crush the
enemy's main forces in preparation
for seizure of the cities.
North Vietnam's major departure
from this doctrine by sending its regu-
lar divisions into the South provided
the argument for the original U.S.
intervention in '1965. It also provoked
bitter Chinese disapproval, since the
more .conventional the .war became,
the more Hanoi became dependent
.on modern Russian arms and the less
its victory would vindicate Mao Tsp.-
twig's revolutionary idea.
Today, North Vietnam may be
close to winning, but it has had to
send almost its whole army into the
South and by sending its army it has
destroyed its own pretensions about
the nature of the war.�
IN THE VIEW of some of the
Americans most deeply involved in
Vietnam in the past, it is even pos-
sible this may have some effect on
what happens next, especially should
the North Vietnamese forces mount
an offensive directly against Saigon,
the provinces around it and the Me-
kong Delta.
More than 70 percent of the
country's population, mosiy native-
born Southerners with a distinctly
different dialect and culture from the
North, live in this rice-rich region.
Regionalism among these Southern
rice-growing peasants, it is felt, is as
strong as Austrian resentment against
the Prussians, or southerners against
Yankees in the American civil war,
and Hanoi cannot predict accurately
how much they might resist .wholly
Northern troops.
T.
s -
AMONG THE AMERICAN old
hands, Gen. Lansdale, who today
lives in retirement in Alexandria. said
he believed Hanoi could not collapse
the government of President Nguyen
Van Thieu without mounting an offen-
sive against the capital itself.
"Hue's falling would be tremen-
diously traumatic," Landsdale said,
"but that wouldn't be enough to topple
the government. I think we'll see
Saigon threatened. That will be the
real climactic moment."
Lansdale, who first went to Viet-
nam in 1953 and was Ngo Dinh Diem's
American adviser in 1954-56 after help.
ing Ramon Magsaysay defeat the
Huk guerrillas in the Philippines, has
ajways held the view that the growth
of Communist power in Vietnam fed
on peasant grievances. His recom- �
mended counter-insurgency strategy
was a mixture of charismatic leader-
' ship, land reform and agricultural
modernization, restraint on military
power � and restoration of traditional
Confucian ethics.
Today, Lansdale said, the overt
North Vi e lira mese invasion has
changed the nature of the ideological
struggle, since victory now will only
prove the Communists had a superior
army not necessarily that they had a.
superior political idea.
In the American search for a �
counterinsurgency doctrine to combat
"people's war" over the years, one
school of thought was to put primary
emphasis on civil government. This
was most closely associated with the
British and such authorities as Sir
Robert Thompson, who agreed that
top priority must be put on establish-
ing law and order through a central
government with a strong public pos-
ture of morality, decency and legality,
a large, competent police force and
an effective civil administration.
An American who shared This view
was former ambassador Notting, who
resigned his post in August 1963 to
protest the Kennedy administration's
withdrawal of its support for Diem.
Like all of those interviewed, Noll-
ing felt the lack of respected leader-
ship in Saigon was perhaps the most
potentially fatal weakness in the pre-
sent situation. Lansdale said, "I
think Thieu is trying but there's little
charisma or respect there. Corrup-
tion's been such and so commonly
known and his people have been in
on the take so obviously, I doubt if
he can rally the population as a war
leader."
ooniinued
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3
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NEW 6L-F.ANS, LA.
STATES ITEM
E - 134,707
'MAY 4 1972
�
ntiwar De
. About 100 anti-war demon-
.strators marched from Beattr-
�egard .Square to Lafayette
Square today where they
� gathered under an oak tree
and listened to speeches con-
demning President Nixon's re-
cent "re-escalation" of the air
war in Vietnam.
The procession bristled with
signs that said things like
"S mash Imperialism, Not
Women and Children," or
"WhoProfits.From This
War?"
The marchers chanted slo-
gans such as "Stop the War
' Now," and "Prices up, Wages
own, Why war?"
Willie Gunther, a Vietnam
.veteran, led the list of speak-
ers recounting that when he
onstrators March
worker as cryptographer in
:Vietnam he discovered some
"truths" about the war "that
the people of the United
States are not being told about
the war."
He said the government "is
telling a lie," when it says
North Vietnam is invading
South Vietnam. He said the
North Vietnamese troops com-
ing south are merely advisers
and support troops to the Viet
Cong.
Gunther said the President's
attempt to suppress the Pen-
tagon Papers indicates that
Nixon does not want the
American people to knew the
truth. "13ecause if the Ameri-
can people knew the truth,
Nixon would have the same
problent with them as with
his own troops."
� Ile said that since he. ar-
rived in Vietnam hard .drug
use has escalated and that the
C -ntral Intelligenee ALency,
working with poppy growers
in Cambodia who are friendly
to the U.S., is running "junk"
in Vietnam.
He said studies by the
Army have shown that troops
on hard dope don't resist the
army and that one general
has recommended that hard
drugs be allowed into dorrtes-
tic and foreign posts to keep
GI's from pretesting the war.
State R e p .-e lect Johnny
Jackson told the group the
continuing Vietnam war is
symptomatic of the U.S. con-
tinuing to hold the wrorig
priorities, particularly in, jc:
gards to the black and poor
c munities.
Steve Cohen, who said he is
with a group called "Air
War," spoke .of the anti-per-
sonnel \bombs he said are
being used in. Vietnam. . .
He said the U.S. has used a
progression of more and more.
destructive anti-personnel
bombs. He said that recently
the Flechettes, which are tiny
nails with fins on the back,'
which could be dispersed from
a bomb, strike' humans . and
cause gaping wounds, have
been replaced by plastic pel-
lets which Cohen said are
"even more nefarious."
0
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� . .
May. 3, .1972
(b)(3)
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.� HOUSE
. of our GIs around the world. I am hopeful .
that U.S.O. will continue to serve them in
the future. But I am afraid that from what
I have been told, that there has been a seri-
ous scandal within U.S.O. that may possibly
reach the very highest levels of administra-
tion officers in the organization.
If I can be of any further assistance to you
or to anyone else in U.S.O. in conducting
this investigation, please do not hesitate to
call upon me.
Sincerely,
LES Asmar,
Member of Congress.
CONGRESS OF TIIE UNITED STATES,
liOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., May 3,
The Honorable MaavIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS you may know, I
have been investigating the current scandal
in the United Services Organization.
I share your concern that some individuals
within 13.5.0. have been responsible for al-
legedly illegal acts. U.S.O. has been of great
service over the years to many of our GIs
around the world, but it is becoming increas-
ingly apparent If these allegations are true,
that a major scandal, possibly reaching the
highest administration levels of .U.S.O., has
occurred.
I am enclosing the testimony which I
have released recently, which I hope may be
of assistance to you in pursuing the investi-
gation.'
Thank you very much for your attention
to this matter. .
Sincerely,
LES ASPIN,
Member of .Congress.
MR. HARRINGTON IN VIETNAM
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
Irian from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL)
Is recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. O'NEILL, Mr. Speaker, our �col-
league (Mr. HARRINGTON) recently re-
turned from an official inspection trip to
South Vietnanrand Thailand. He was ac-
companied on his trip by William Was-
serman, his former administrative as-
sistant, who is a newspapernmn by pro-
fession. On their return, Mr. Wasserman
wrote an interesting and thoughtful re-
view of their activities which was printed
in the North Shore newspapers, which-
vfl publishes.
Because of their compelling interest on
a subject of critical importance to all of
us, I insert these articles by Mr. Wasser-
Man intoThe REcom) at this time:
AIR WAR SECRECY IS MOST FRIGHTENING
(By BM Wasserman) .
You can be frightened after a week in
Southeast Asia that U.S. policy is not suc-
cessful.
You can be even more frightened when you
see that we are rigidly pursuing that same
policy of failure, and perhaps widening it
to include Thailand.
But you can be most frightened by the ef-
fort of the U.S. government to conceal the
whole business from the U.S. public, and even
from a Congressman who votes the authori-
zation for all U.S. military programs.
After three days of intensive briefings and
tours of the five U.S. air bases in Thailand,
Congressman Harrington learned from a
newsman that several shifts in squadrons
and aircraft Were shortly anticipated which
would increase the fighter squadrons in the
area.
"That newsman's information is remark-
ably good," we were told by an Air Force
officer.
''Why wasn't I fold about itr asked Cong.
Harrington.
"You didn't ask," said the Air Force officer.
At Udorn Air Base in Thailand, a civilian
pilot staying in the civilian hotel where I
was billeted told me very openly that all Air
America helicopter 'flights oven Laos origi-
nated from Udorn Air Base. Air America is a
contract airline paid by the American gov-
ernment, and presumed to he a CIA oper-
ation.
When Congressman Harrington asked the
base commander at Uclorn, "What is that
squadron of helicopters over there?". pointing
to the lined up aircraft.
"I don't know, sir," said the base com-
mander. "Those are contract flights and I
don't know anything about them."
A press association reporter who has spent
five years in Thailand and has consistently
sought to report on American air bases there,
as reporters freely do in Vietnam, said that
he has been unable to obtain permission to
go on the bases. "The U.S. officials say 'Ask
the Thais.' The Thais say" 'Ask the U.S.' "
Craig Whitney, chief of the N.Y. Times
bureau; Peter Osnos, Washington Post; Kim
Wifienson, United Press International; Don
Sutherland, Christian Science Monitor�they
have all tried and so far been refused per-
mission to report first hand on the 'U.S. air
war being waged out of Thailand.
Yet the U.S. has about 26,000 airmen in
Thailand end its five bases account for about
5 million dollars a day. We have invested
billions of dollars in Thailand, and from
these bases we are 'boinbing Laos, Cambodia,
Vietnam, and now North Vietnam. We have
nearly twice as many airmen in Thailand tls
in Vietnam. It is a gigantic 'effort, but it is �
Concealed from the U.S. public.
One reason given for concealing the air-
war from the U.S. is "security'
But momasans, Thai women, come on the
U.S. bases in droves every day to do the house
chores of the U.S. airmen. They clean the
barracks. They wash airmen's clothes. With
their children, and their washtubs, and their
picnic lunches, they make a colorful sight
squatting between the GI barracks at lunch
hour. Along with Thai men who work on the
base, they can easily be the cover for any
hostile agent seeking general information
about the airbase. To suggest that what they
know as common knowledge cannot be avail-
able to the American public just doesn't
make sense.
SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHERE THE UNITED STATES j
PR ',J PRACTICES A POLICY OF AMB -ELIEVE
(By Bill Wisserman)
(North Shore 'Weeklies' publisher Bill
Wasserman traveled with Cong. Michael J.
Harrington to Vietnam and Thailand for 10
days from March 29 to April 8. In Vietnam
they visited Saigon and DaNang. In Thai-
land, they were in Bangkok and Udorn, and
Mr. Harrington visited four other air bases.
Harrington spent his days being briefed on
the military operations which he, as a mem-
ber of the Armed Services Committee, over-
seas. Wasserman interviewed airmen, civilians
and newsmen.)
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, tall, patri-
cian and gracious, leaned forward, his hands
folded, and said, "You must look at the
whole picture, not just the military. You
must see the economic side too. The military,
however, is now working." -
That was less than three weeks ago.
Ambassador Bunker had received me be-
fore Congressman Harrington's arrival in
Saigon because he was leaving for a week's
trip over Easter to visit his wife, the U.S.
Ambassador to Nepal.
It was a calm, sunny day in Saigon. We
sat in comfortable chairs at one end of the
Ambaslarge, air conoitloncci occ11/1,,
the embassy. The Ambassador's youngest sonku)k
x/3)
had been my roommate in school for two
years, and now, after catching up on family
histories, he told Me about Vietnam.
The. U.S. initially had failed, said Mr.
Bunker, to appreciate the need to provide
the wherewithal for the South Vietnamese.
"It was a new experience for the U.S. to he
involved in a civil war and a war from
without at the same time."
The Tet offensive In 1968, psychologically
a blow to the U.S., had been the source of
fresh determination by the Vietnamese, con-
tinued Bunker. They .saw the need to be bet-
ter armed, and, the A mbassadorobserved, the
U.S. supplied M-16's. The ARVN (Army of the
Itepublic of Vietnam) was modernized and
expanded and now 'numbered 1.1 million.
"fhe -Ambassador dwelt on the economic
development in the south. "I drove recently
with President Thieu through the country-
side. The farmers used to have bicycles. Now
they have Hondas and tractors, radios and
tv's, outboard motors for their sampans."
He urged me to arrange an air trip for
Cong. Harrington over the delta to see the
prosperity and to see, also, to the north to-
wards An Loc�now the scene of desperate
fighting�how air interdiction had not
meant total destruction but selected destruc-
tion.
What Bunker was clearly saying was that
Vietnamization was working, that we should
on this trip pay attention to the broad, civil-
ian achievements under President Thiem He
mentioned land reform, specifically.
As the interview drew to a close, tile erect
septogenarian who had completed a success-
ful business career before joining the govern-
ment, noted that he had served five Presi-
dents. "Of course, I expected to stay here a
much shorter time."
He smiled and described how President
Nixon had arranged for him to visit his wife
In Nepal regularly. "But that was impossible.
It was so busy here�seven days a week,
It used to be. It's better now," and he made
a little joke about how he had to make this
particular trip because his wife surely would
not permit him to be absent over Easter.
Forty-eight hours later, the North Viet-
namese offensive was underway. And within
those few hours, Quang 'Fri and Hue, major
bastions irf the north, were threatened. .
The American public at home was also calm
as our trip to Vietnam took shape. One local
newspaper even queried, "Why go?" Cong.
Harrington, their editorial suggested, would
do better to stay home and tend to his dis-
trict. Going to Vietnam now, they said, was
a junket.
In general it seemed the American public
felt that the war was almost over. Caeualties
lead almost disappeared�U.S. casualties, at
least. Our troops were leaving. The air war?
What was that? A distant war, Cong. Har-
rington said it needed seeing, it neediest ex-
posure. He suspected, but could not get firm
figures that it was costing $10 to $20 billion
dollars a year, and devastating three coun-
tries.
A gentle breeze swayed the palm trees over
the ornate Buddhist temple while saffron
robed young men, monks in training, strolled
by. This was Thailand, where the people,
commented the Air Force captain escorting
ine, were "very easy going and gentle," and
where the U.S. now maintains its major
Southeast Asian air bases.
Down the dirt road in front of the pagoda
walked a young couple hand in hand. He
was obviously American in his khaki trousers
and sport shirt. She was obviously Thai.
"Who would that be?" I asked.
"One of the guys from the base, and. his
girl," was the reply.
I was in Udorn, 30 miles from the Laotian
border and the location of our largest fighter
base in Thailand.
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0 Lc-Ilow V\7-e Scnk Ent.o
Jos,eph Buttinger
IDne of the most puzzling questions future
historians will have to deal with is why the
United States ever got involved in the con-
temporary struggle for Indochina that has
been going on since 1945. Did the consid-
erations that determined the course of
American foreign policy after World War II
' make this involvement inevitable or could
it have been avoided in spite of the tensions
that arose after 1945 between the West and
.the so-called Communist bloc? On this point,
opinions will probably always remain di-
vided, but those who believe that no other
course could have been chosen without dam-
age to the West or the United States would
do well, to consider the following:
(1) no Indochina war would have taken
:place if France had not insisted on reestab-
)l.ishing its control over Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos after these countries had gained in-
dependence following the Japanese surrender
in 1945;
(2) it is questionable that the United
� State S would ever have reached the point of
even considering intervention in Vietnamese
�� affairs. if it had refused from the beginning
to support the reestablishment of French rule
in Indochina.
� It is indeed one of the important conclu-
sions of the Pentagon Papers "that the Tru-
man Administration's decision to give mili-
tary aid to France in her colonial war against
the Communist-led Vietminh 'directly in-
� volved' the United States in Vietnam and
'set' the course of American policy."'
Yet this deci4on was made only in 1950,
after the victory of Communism in China
and the recognition of Ho Chi Mirth's regime
by the Soviet Union and Communist China.
It would never have come about had it not
been preceded by the decision made by the
� victorious Allies at the Potsdam Conference
of July 17 to August 2, 1945, which gave
0 the French not only a free hand but also
Allied support for the reconquest of � Indo-
china. This Potsdam decision, supported only
� by the British under both Churchill and At-
tlee, might not have been taken if President
Ca. Q.rq11,1
Roosevelt had still been alive. It was op-
posed by Nationalist China under Chiang
Kai-shek and certainly not favored by Stalin.
Vigorous American .opposition to it would
probably have led to the acceptance of
Roosevelt's concept of a United Nations
Trusteeship for French Indochina as a first
step toward full independence.
Surprisingly on this crucial point the con-
clusion of the Pentagon Papers is that Roose-
velt "never made up his mind whether to
support the French desire to reclaim their
� Indochinese colonies from the Japanese at
the end of the war." 2 In view of the forceful
statements Roosevelt made against the re-
turn of the French to Indochina to his Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull and to his 'son
Elliot, as reported in their memoirs,8 this .
conclusion must be regarded as erroneous.
There has been much speculation about
the question whether American massive mili-
tary intervention in Vietnam might not have
bean avoided if President Kennedy had been
alive. It is .unlikely that this question will �
ever be answered with any degree of cer-
tainty. But it is probable' that Vietnam after -
1945 would have experienced a period of
peaceful evolution toward independence, un-
der a regime not unlike that of Tito's Yugo-
slavia, if Roosevelt had lived and succeeded
in imposing his anticolonial solution for In- .
dochina. Nor is it far-fetched to assume that
Roosevelt would not have disregarded the
appeals of Ho Chi Minh, in at least eight
letters to Washington in 1945-46 for United
States and United Nations intervention
against French colonialism.4 "There is no
record . . . that any of these appeals were
answered." 5 Not until publication of the
Pentagon Papers did the American public
hear of the existence of these letters.
Yet the Truman administration's policy
toward Vietnam remained ambivalent for at
least the first three years of the Indochina
war. On the one hand, the -U.S. "fully rec-
ognized France's sovereign position," as Sec-
retary of State George Marshall said in a still
secret State Department cablegram sent to
the U.S. Embassy in Paris; on the other hand, ,
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BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE
M - 237,967
S -AW23671a72
We have no right or reason to
I had thought that there was no
longer any need to set forth the na-
ture and� causes of American failure
in Vietnam or the case for complete
� withdrawal, but the renewed bomb-
ing attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong
demonstrate that there are still those
� who have the delusion that it will be
possible to sustain a viable non-com-
munist government in the South.
The notions of "Vietnamization"
and an "honorable negotiated settle-
ment" in Paris implied the delusion,
but one could question how seriously
, they should be taken. When, how-
ever, we renew massive bombing
� . raids with their indiscriminate
� slaughter, it seems clear that Presi-
dent Nixon and his top advisers either�
think that the South can survive as
an independent entity, Or they are
� committed to postponing its collapse
until after the election. If it is the
former, they are fools: if the latter,
the most callous sort of political op-
portunists.
As a member of the infamous
Michigan State University project in
. Vietnam from 1955-1957, I partici-
� pated in that attempt to create an
� anti-communist regime in the South� .
By 1957 it was already clear that the
�Diem government was moving
towards , a police state to offset its
declining popularity, and that the
massive presence of the US was un-
� dermining Diem's legitimacy and en-
couraging his authoritarian tenden-
cies., That was 15 years, 5 govern-
ments and how many dead and
maimed Vietnamese ago? Everything
we have done over the past 15 years
has .contributed to destroying the in-
tegrity, the rationality and the will
of the people in South Vietnam while
building up the commitment to na-
..
tional. reunification in the North. We
have trained a few people at the top
of the South how to con us into great
concern over the consequences of
their defeat and therefore con-
tinuing support of their survival. Our
leaders for 15 years have operated
out of fear of being held responsible
for � a debacle (e.g. "who lo
China"), and the false hope that the
could create a regime that could stir�
. vive., �
.
continue'
The The con artists in South Vietnam
are not all venal. Some are; but.
many are just trying to exist in a
terribly confused setting. What
would happen to them if the North
:Vietnamese take over? The more
corrupt, who have already made their
fortunes, would probably flee, and
wisely so. The rest would stay and
try to make their peace with the new
regime. I am sure that some of them
would be killed and some impris-
oned, but probably not many. There
was no mass slaughter in the North
in 1955 and 1956. Most Vietnamese
with strong feelings about political
freedom have already left the coun-
try and those who remain have
learned how to compromise.
We have no right or reason to
continue, much less to expand a com-
pletely corrupt and corrupting war
either to save a few of our "friends"
or to postpone an inevitable failure.
We should recognize that there is ab-
solutely-no hope for an independent,
anti-communist regime in the South.
Given that fact, the only way we can
help the Vietnamese people is to get
�out of the country completely � mil-
itary, aid, X,,J,406.,the whole works. �j
- � ._
and let the Vietnamese Work. out
their own accommodations and solu-
tions. ,
The US Government, by its recent
actions has demonstrated that it nei-
ther accepts these propositions nor is
it following a consistent policy of
withdrawal. So long as this is true
,and the government remains unre-
sponsive to the normal expressions of
public opinion, there must be mass
demonstrations as the only way of
showing the degree of dissatisfaction
with current policies. If such demon-
strations can be kept non-violent and
non-destruetive they can help to
build popular support for stopping
the war. It is unfortunate that uni-
versity buildings and research facili-
ties become the lightning rods for
absorbing the frustrations over tragic
government policies. A more fruitful
line of action is to assure that the
person elected President next No-
vember is unalterably committed to
stopping our involvement in the war.
� DAVID C. COLE
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge
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Washington Merry.Go-Round
Navy F
By Jack Anderson
� ,
The sewage that ships dump
into the open sea often washes
up on the shore.
� President Nixon, for one,
has had personal experience
'with this problem at his Flor-
ida beach house where mari-
time wastes have fouled his
swimming area.
s To fight beach and harbor
'pollution, he assigned the
Navy aa the "lead agency" to
set an example of maritime
sanitation to the world's ships.
; A .1978 deadline 'was set for
the Navy to stop the discharge
'of sewage; garbage, oil and
other debris into the sea.
Locked in the Navy's confiden-
tial files, however, is sad evi-
dence that this billion-dollar
program is failing.
' The Navy had counted heav-
ily upon a complicated sewage
'system manufactured by Fair-
banks-Morse. But Rear Admi-
ral Nathan Sonenshein, the
ships commander, has com-
plained in a "Point Paper" to
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the
Navy chief, that the new sew-
age equipment is "unreliable"
and "not operating" in the test
ship U.S. Conopus.
Indeed, the failure of the
sewage disposal units could
cause a smelly incident at
lioly Loch, Scotland, where
the Canopus has been berthed.
� Navy Odor
"In the interests of con-
genial relations with the tilt-
.
ule Up in Sew
ish," Sonenshein warned the
Navy's top admiral, "it is vital
that these units be put back
into operation as early as fea-
sible."
On top of the "unacceptable
reliability" of the new sewage
units, they also take up too
much room. This will have
"significant impact on military
performance . . . in the
smaller, high population dens-
ity ships," warn's the docu-
ments. Old sea dogs are also
sputtering over a plan to pull
out guns to make room for
sewage units on some destroy-
ers.
All the trouble with the
Fairbanks-Morse equipment
has forced the Navy to fall
back, at least temporarily,
upon a system of "holding
tanks." The tanks are sup-
posed to retain all sewage
while the ships are within 50
miles of the shore. Then, in
theory, the sewage is supposed
to be dumped at the pier when
the ships dock.
But-- unfortunately, most
piers aren't equipped to han-
dle the sewage or, for that
matter, the bigger naval ves-
sels. To get around this, the
Navy plans to spend millions
to build special ."lighter!
barges for each 'naval port."
The Navy's sea-sewage ex-
perts explain delicately that
the lighters will "collect and
transfer shipboard wastes"
to shore. But the shipboard
salts, less delicately, are al-
ready referring to the lighters
as "honey barges" and "dough-
nuts."
Summing up, the Navy docu-
ments concede that, on the
one hand, their sewage units
are a flop and, on the other,
there are persistent "political
pressures to demonstrate ac-
complishments."
Refugee Deaths
We reported on February 6
that U.S. officials in Vietnam
had covered up rampant mal-
nutrition, exposure, tuberculo-
sis and pneumonia in three
refugee camps.
As a� result, 350 displaced
Montagnard tribesmen, mostly
the old and the young, per-
ished while U.S. officials. shuf-
fled papers.
When word of the refugee
conditions reached the head-
quarters of U.S. pacification
chief William Colby. the fact
were swePt under the plush
rugs of the U.S. offices in Sai-
gon.
The number of deaths, ironi-
cally, were close to, casualty
totals in the infamous Mylai
massacre. Yet only Rep. Les
A spin (D-Wis.) showed any
concern.
In an outraged letter to AID
Adminsistrator John Hannah,
the congressman demanded to
know what had been done to
punish those "directly respon-
tsposal'
sible for the tragic deaths of
350 innocent people."
A few days ago, Hannah
sent back an evasive, self-serv-
ing memo prepared by ails
Vietnam specialist Robert II.
Nooter. The memo reports
that the Montagnards were
transferred from their homes
to the camps about January,
1971, by Vietnamese military.
commanders over the objec-
tions of American pacification
Officials.
"Montagnarcls exist at a
marginal subsistence level,
and with any loss in nutri-
tional level, the prevalent
diseases of diarrhea, malaria,
pneumonia, and tuberculosis
can prevail," explains the
memo.
The deaths began to occur
shortly after the relocation,
the memo adds. "Some 330 of
the very old and very young"
had died by the time higher
American officials discovered
the problem, it is contended.
Once discovered, "prompt
and remedial actions were
taken," the memo claims. The'
AID officials admit, however,
that it was April before "the
situation was in hand."
The officials tried to pass
the buck to military authori-
ties for hushing up the facts.
Any suppression of reports,
declares the memo, "would in-
volve reporting by militarY.
personnel in Pleiku Province
through military channels."
1972. 'United Feature Syndicate
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25 April 1972
nough If Covert Actio
�
While the Administration has obtained a tern the financing of Radio Free Europe which, whe
porary order against publication of a book on disclosed, stripped that station of every vestige
the CIA by a former officer of it, Victor L. of freedom or credibility. And there was the
Marchetti, the public has reason to be thankful Bay of Pigs.
to the author. He has already provided outside Then there was the CIA militafy operation to
of book covers some valuable insights and corn- save the Dominican Republic from a :rebellion
Inents on an agency that, deliberately hides to return a democratically-elected president.
from the public and Congress. � There was armed support for the overturn of
Without revealing any really hidden secrets, a government in The Congo. Of course, there
the author uses published repoits to note that " was the CIA's hand in the overthrow of the
the nation's intelligence budget is 6 billion dol. Diem dictatorship in South Vietnam, opening
lars a year, that the Central Intelligence Agency the way for another dictatorship more satisfac-.
has 18,000 employes, and that 6000 of these tory to Washington. And there is presently
'are working in clandestine services, as opposed war in Laos, which the CIA actively engendered
,to intelligence collection. without any visible success for the American
position in Southeast Asia, much less for peace
As it is, however, the CIA is the President's and order. '
baby. ,Congress has proposed various control Aside from the fact that so many of these
measures, such as a limit on the CIA budget, clandestine activities were inefficient and in-
or requirements for clearer information about � effective, even aside from the fact that they
It, or Senator Cooper's present legislation for were bound to be failures for America's long-
'the CIA to give intelligence briefings to Con- range pi�ospects and reputation even if they did
gross as well as the White House. Congress,
after all, foots the bill, but it does not know
for what.
CIA officials occasionally surface frOm se-
crecY to complain that critics concentrate on
CIA failures. If so, that is because the public
only hears �about the failures, and they have
to be, big ones at that. They always seem to
Involve those covert or "paramilitary" opera-
tions, which range from a most qualified suc-
cess in Guatemala to an unmitigated disaster
at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. Mr. Marchetti says, "I
don't think we've had a successful paramilitary
operation yet."
The clandestine operations are worth review:
There was the U-2 spy plane incident that tor-
pedoed President Eisenhower's efforts to im-
prove relations with the Soviet Union. There
was the CIA's proud armed intervention to
"save" Guatemala from. leftists, leaving the
country to, oppression apd terrorism. There was power to, make war.
succeed, the ability of the CIA to engage in
paramilitary functions represents a continuing
ability to start hostilities without the knowledge
of the people or Congress, and certainly with-
out< any declaration of war.
Author Marchetti is fair enough to say .that�
so far various presidents have kept a measure
of control over such activities. That is no guar-
antee for the future, however, and it is Con-
gress, not the President, that is supposed to
make decisions on war. Consequently, Mr. Mar-
chetti recommends confining intelligence ac-
tivities to a small and highly professional group,
and eliminating the covert actions entirely.
Intelligence simply cannot work well when
governed by an agency equally interested in
activities ranging from propaganda to military
action; that is a conflict of interest. The nation
does need successful intelligence. It does not
need a publicly-uncontrolled and unanswerable
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"17
etters
Controlling Foreign Policy
Senators 'Aiken and Fulbright have pro-
mulgated a long overdue and crucial proposal.
In the amendment to the bill authorizing
State and USIA funds, one which seeks in
effect to determine why or how everybody
and his half-brother is involved in foreign
policy decisions.
Nothing should punctuate this desperate
need more, forcefully than the latest pe-
remptory, policy-by-shock decision to mass.
bomb Haiphong for the first time in the war.
Even as two .other senators are en route to
Peking, as the President jogs between Red
China and Red Russia, as we demand our
prisoners returned unharmed, as we "Wind
down the war," and parrot the rubricated
claptrap 'that "it's Saigon's show now!",. we
Intensify our role as if it were D-Day minus
one.'Or is it?
� Worst of all is the continuous dropping of
'surprise policy bombs in the American
midst. as. if we are all imbeciles, unfit to be
Informed or 'warned of anything so trivial as
getting out or going back in. The Aiken-Ful-
bright- proposal to probe the myriad agen-
cies- ginning up policy blastoffs such as this
should be implemented fast, and with strong
support_ from millions of American citizens
in whose names, Vietnam is being bombed
into a senseless mass of cratered moon-
scapes and mangled bodies. Can we not at
least stop�our contributions to the continuing
massacre of peoPle year after year after
'year?
Anyone who has served responsibly in
Nietnam knows that State, AID, USIA, CIA, �
DOD, the White House, and a few others all
. have "their" own foreign nolicy, as the
Aiken proposition suggests. The chief of.
mission is . often the last person to know
what in hell is going on, and others who
have met with them in mid-Pacific confer-
ences have shown even less knowledge. Viet-
nam is horrendous enough. Another classic
' of 'hack policy handling is still stuck in our
:fthroats and that was the Bengali lunacy.
`',Our rush to destroy Bengladesh is only
:matched by our current passion to recognize
'the place and provide aid!
If ever a country needed someone at the
helm, the United States does today.
� . - ,LAWRENCE HARKNESS. ,
�. Washington....
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VC!.
("r
t liti
kc\i0 o 0
Special to the Daily World
HANOI, April 19�A delegation of four
U.S. Communists here who witnessed U.S.
air raids upon Hanoi and Haiphong today is-
sued an "appeal to the conscience of the peo-
ple of the United States" to force the Nixon
Administration to end the "mass murder"
bombing.
The appeal was signed by Gus Hall, gene-
ral secretary and Presidential candidate; Jar-
vis Tyner, Vice Presidential candidate; Ras-
heed Storey, N.Y. State Communist Party
chairman, and Joseph North, author and edi-
tor, World Magazine.
� The text of the appeal follows:
We who have now experienced the brutal
bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong make this ap-
peal to the conscience of the people of the
United States.
reirnr,
We saw with our own eyes that the main targets of
the U.S. bombers were the heavily populated working
class centers of Hanoi and Haiphong.
We saw the newly constructed working class apart-
ment houses in Haiphong that were destroyed by the
criminal pilots sent by the arch criminals of the Nixon
Administration.
We saw the hospital and spoke to ,the women and
children whose blood was smeared on the steps as we
entered.
We saw the workers' quarters where the planes re-
turned three times to complete their destruction.
- This is no accident. Civilian targets are the main
objective of the government. We saw market places
bombed, restaurants bombed, factories bombed, � water-
front warehouses bombed, vital water mains bombed.
We saw British, Soviet and German Democratic Re-
public ships attacked in the harbor. As we crossed a
bridge entering Haiphong, crowded with families of mo-
thers,- fathers and their children, a U.S. plane streaked
above us and people scrambled for their lives.
We saw the same in the beautiful capital of Hanoi
where we experienced two, waves of bombers. It was
the same in peaceful country villages by the rice pad-
dies where we met a farmer whose friends, a family
of seven, had been killed in that morning's raid.
We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls
who only moments before played peacefully with their
dolls, and the bodies of small boys whose friendly
games of marbles were disrupted forever by the mas-
sive tonnage of U.S. bombs. We saw the shattered hands
of workers who will never again be able to provide for
their families. We saw some who were blinded by the
flying debris.
In the name of our own children we appeal to all
Americans to save the children of Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos. We appeal to your humanity, common sense
and reason.
rr, et* �zi rn
Li i;a44.4 i=1 Li
. . .
We who have seen the iron will, the unprecedented
courage, the unbreakable determination, the united, un-
flinching commitment of the Vietnamese people in their
struggle for national salvation against U.S. imperialism
appeal to all Americans who value human life and dig-
nity.
We appeal to you to see the Vietnamese love of life
as your own, to see the Vietnamese people's struggle for
social progress as your own, to act now to save human-
ity from disaster.
Those who thought that the withdrawal of troops was
intended to end the aggression in Indochina now see
that it was Nixon's camouflaged way of escalating the
war via criminal air power�the new IVIylais of the B-
52's�that are designed to undertake an impossible task
to break the unshatterable will and determination of the
Vietnamese people.
This is why the targets are heavily populated cen-
ters and not the so-called military objectives. This we
saw with our own eyes�the genocidal policies of the
Nixon Administration. Now that we know this, we must
act now or accept the verdict of humanity of complicity
by complacency in mass murder, in genocide.
As long as the aggression continues we cannot, as
Americans, escape the stigma of what is a national
shame. As long as the bombing goes on. we can never
wash off the" blood of the millions of victims of U.S.
imperialist aggressors.
We know these murder policies of aggression are
dictated not by the will of the people, or even of the
U.S. Congress, but by the giant monopoly corporations�
the Rockefeller, Morgan, I.T.T. interests, etc., who main-
tain and extend their riches through the destruction and
suffering of the Vietnamese and- other peoples of the
world.
We must see, though, that we bear a responsibility
as long as these acts of barbarism are perpetrated in
our name.
The bombings are the work of desperate men gone
insane, Nixon, Kissinger, Agnew, these Dr. Strange-
loves of Washington.
The victories of the Vietnamese National Liberation
forces have created a totally new situation. They have
virtually destroyed the best of the puppet troops. They
have shattered once and for all Nixon's hoax of Vietnami-
zation. As the Pentagon-trained Thieu mercenaries turn
their guns and tanks on U.S. puppet troops, the artogant
predictions of General Creighton Abrams and Defense
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Secretary Melvin Laird go up in smoke.
The retaliation bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong has
smdshed to smithereens Nixon's phony �'peace for gene-
rations" fraud. This insane act destroyed the illusion
that Nixon's troop withdrawals were ever intended to
lead to the end of the aggression in Indochina.
This is a moment of great danger. NixOn's irrespon-
sible acts of desperation are those of a mad butcher and
can lead to a .world confrontation. But above all else.
the very acts of desperation have opened up momentous
possibilities of putting an end to the aggression now.
The escalation of the bombing has set into motion
an escalation of the world's struggle against U.S. im-
perialism. It has created a new stage in that struggle.
It will let loose the greatest waves of anti-imperialist
movements to date.
But we in the United States have the main respon-
sibility. In meeting this challenge we will be fulfilling
our responsibility to ourselves and to all the people of
the world.
We appeal to all Americans: to every shop worker,
to all members of the trade union movement, to all
peace and democratic-minded Americans. to all Black
Americans. .to all Chicano, Puerto Rican. Indian and
Asian Americans, to the youth, to the students, to the
women, to the veterans, to the unemployed, to the in-
tellectuals. to all who feel the impact of the war in a
thousand different ways�on our living standards, on our
.taxes; on the decline of our cities, on the escalation of
racism, and the destruction of democratic rights. �
We appeal to all whose sheer humanity is violated
by this war.
This moment in history cries out for unity in action!
This is a moment when we must unite and concentrate
our total efforts to end this criminal war, to end this
mass murder, to end this imperialist aggression. '
An absolute precondition for the right of the Vietna-
mese .people to determine their destiny is the total
withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Indochina.
These actions must continue on every level and in all
localities. These actions must be intensified in depth
and scope, until the U.S. Government returns to the
Paris negotiations in good faith, until it accepts the just
seven-point program of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam.
These actions must continue until the U.S. govern-
ment sets the date for the withdrawal of all forces from
Southeast Asia�the ground troops, the U.S. Navy, the
U.S. Airforce, the C.I.A. and all supportive personnel!
There have been many important actions in the U.S.
on behalf of peace since this war began. The moment
cries out now for the greatest united actions of us all�
to achieve the end of this war on behalf of our people
and the peoples of Vietnam and all Indochina, on behalf
of human progress, on behalf of our children and all
children of the world.
We make this appeal from the air-raid shelters of
Hanoi.
Signed, Gus-Hall, Jarvis Tyner, Rasheed Storey, Jo-
seph North.
Delegation, Communist Party, U.S.A.
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April 19, 1972
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD � SENAT
(b)(3)
0 041.)1
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a minute? I use
the time of the Senator from Arkansas
for this purpose.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to ,yield
to my friend from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the dis-
tinguished' Senator for a very forceful
and effective presentation. I think it is a
particularly significant contribution to
this discussion because of the Senator's
background in military matters in the
executive branch with high responsi-
bilities. His service now on all key com-
mittees in the Senate also provides him
with the opportunity to be better in-
formed than almost all Members of this
body on military and foreign relations
matters. �
I would like to make an observation
� and then to ask a question. I have noted
this morning that in some of the debate
we see what almost amounts to a "win
the war" attitude again rearing its head
in this Chamber. The distinguished
Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER),
whose forthrightness and frankness I
respect tremendously, stated he feels this
is perhaps the worst managed war in
history. He said that when you go into
a war you go in to win., not in 10 years,
but in 10 minutes. I wonder what that
means. The Senator from Colorado
spoke of the other side as a "losing
horse." .
The Senator from Missouri, and every
other Senator, and every citizen in the
country, know that we could�at least
In a tiarrow military sense�if we went
all out. The reason we have not done
that under a Democratic President, Lyn-
don Johnson, and under a Republican
President, Richard Nixon, is that we
know we do not just face small North
Vietriam with its limited population and
hmited resources; we face North Viet- �
.nam backed up by the Soviet Union and
China. If we choose to escalate our aid
to the South, they may very well feel
that they must escalate their aid to the
North.
I wish to ask the Senator this ques-
tion in light of the circumstances now
prevailing. Greater risks are being taken
now than at any time in this war in
terms of the escalation and possible re-
ciprocal moves by the other side: Where
can this end? What risks do we face if
we decide once again not to lose, not to
negotiate, but to break the backs of the
other side? What are the risks in that
policy?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I yield
myself 2 minutes under the same con-
ditions.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator is recognized.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say to the
able Senator that, regardless of what
the risks were, I would take them if I
felt they were in the interest of the se-
curity of the United States.
When I first went to Vietnam, back in
1961, with Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Mr.
Walt Rostow, I felt this war was neces-
sary. After further examination over the
years, however, I changed my mind, and
so told ray colleagues in the Senate in
the fall of 1967. _
It is interesting to note in General
Taylor's recent book, "Swords and Plow-
shares," that he makes a statement
which supports what I am told the dis-
tinguished Senator from Arizona said
this morning on this floor. General Tay-
lor's statement best illustrates how badly
this war has been managed from a mili-
tary standpoint by those who made the
decisions.
He said that no one, not even the
President, has the moral right to send
a man into combat without giving him
the best chance to do the job he is as-
signed, with least danger to his life. His
exact quote reads as follows:
Our pilots were required to return through
increasingly heavy enemy defenses to repeat
attacks on targets deliberately hit previous-
ly by aircraft insufficient in number to as-
sure their destruction in a single attack. This
was a misguided attempt to translate the
principle of gradualism and limited violence
from the strategic to the tactical realm�a
fallacy which ignored the fact that for the
soldier or pilot in the presence of an armed
enemy any war is total since his survival
is at stake. No one, not even the President,
has the moral right to put a man on the
battlefield or in hostile air space and re-
strict him from taking all the measures need-
ed for his survival and the execution of his
mission. So in a variety of Ways, gradualism
contributed to a prolongation of the war
and gave time not only for more men to lose
their lives but also for the national patience
to wear thin, the antiwar movement to gain
momentum, and hostile propaganda to make
inroads at home and abroad.
Military men constantly protested to
me that they were being forced to attack
useless targets. One who did was shortly
killed; another, even though a major
general, quietly resigned in protest. This
all helped me to change my view about
this war.
It is now clear said war is being
escalated as a result of the President's
decision to continue it even though in
his campaign�and I have now placed it
all .in the REcoaa�often he said,' "If
elected, I will stop it." He has had nearly
three and a half years, but instead of
stopping it, he has expanded it. There
is now fighting in Cambodia where there
was not fighting until he came to office.
He has maintained the struggle in Laos,
even though he switched it from being
run by the Defense Department, if they
ever ran it, to the Central Intelligence
Agency, and now he is further escalating
the war in Vietnam.
One. of the ironies of what is going on
brings us back to what I said in 1956,
namely, that our policies are to be weak
against the strong and strong against
the weak. The recent visit to China and
the planned visit to Moscow would ap-
pear incredible efforts to demonstrate
our peace loving intentions at the same
time we continue to destroy these little
countries in Southeast Asia.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, if the
Senator would remain on his feet, I wish
to say I regret that, under the time re-
straints, I was unable to yield to Senators
who have asked for time. We have had
difficulty when. they have asked us to
yield because of the time limitation. I
would like to ask if Senators who have
contrary views would like to address
questions to the Senator from Missouri.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, we have
Senators who would like to get the floor
In their own right. .
Mr. CRANSTON. As the Senator
knows, they will get the floor in their
own right.
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I will
begin by making reference to the Senator
from Missouri's statement about the dev-
astations which have been visited--
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
on whose time is the Senator speaking?
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, is there
time to Senators on this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
CHILES). Yes. -
Mr. GRIF.O'IN. Mr. President, I have
been authorized by the Senator from
Illinois (Mr. PERCY) to yield to the Sen-
ator from New York (Mr� BUCKLEY) such
time as he may need.
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I will
start by commenting on the statement by
the Senator from Missouri about the
devastation visited on Vietnam.
The history of the Vietnam war has
been one of complexities and confusion,
a history on which men of good will have
differed and shall continue to differ.
Yet with the redent massive invasion
by North Vietnam of South Vietnam, a
new phase of this war has been created.
The facts are unambiguous; one sov-
ereign nation has invaded another with
conventional forces for no other purpose
but the traditional one of all invading
forces: to conquer the people and the
territory of the invaded nation.
This savage and sudden end to cer-
tain fashionable myths which have
hitherto masked the role of North Viet-
nam in this war has had certain salu-
tary effects on world opinion. With the
exception of North Vietnam's ideological
allies; no nation has supported this at-
tempt at conquest. The idea that what we
are witnessing is a Civil war has become
a linguistic as well. as historical absurd-
ity.
While it would be worthwhile to ex-
amine in great detail those curious at-
tempts we have heard during the past
few weeks to switch the burden of blame
for these latest developments from the
North Vietnamese invaders to President
Nixon whose decisive action has helped
to halt the invasion, because of the brief
time allowed me I will limit myself to
an examination of some of the basic facts
of the matter.
First, the facts of the invasion along
the DMZ and of the bombing of the
military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong
area:
The northern sector of South Vietnam
has been invaded by a force of 45,000 to
50,000 seasoned NVA troops equipped
with modern Soviet and Chinese Com-
munist artillery and armor including
three varieties of conventional and am-
phibious tanks.
With the exception of minor Vietcong
units operating along the Cambodian
border north of Saigon, the entire Com-
munist effort within South Vietnam is
being conducted by the North Vietnam-
ese. Not less than nine NVA divisions
are now employed in South Vietnam, sus-
tamed by huge quantities of weapons and
trucks and fuel provided 85 percent by
the Soviet Union. . �
The fact that the NVA is now employ-
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18 APR- 1972
Stop the mad bomber!
President Nixon's order to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong
has opened the door to an international crisis, and involves
a challenge to our Constitutional structure. Democracy
and world peace are imperilled.
The message is� unmistakable. North Vietnam has
been under U.S. bomber attack for the first time since 1968,
now for the 12th day. Four Soviet merchant ships and one
from the German Democratic Republic have been hit in
Haiphong harbor. Another squadron of F-4 Phantom jets
has been deployed to Vietnam, this one from South Korea.
The Soviet Union has stated clearly that it will continue to
support, as it has, the liberation struggle of the people of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against imperialist
aggression. - -
These developments reflect an unprecedented aggra-
vation of U.S. aggression abroad. The implications for
democracy at home are inescapable, for imperialist ag-�
� gression abroad and fascistic steps at home complement
each other.
The situation demands a people's response of unpre-
cedented proportions, for'peace and democracy.
The demonstrations scheduled for New York, San
Francisco and other cities Saturday, April 22, should be ex-
panded far beyond their original scope in auspices and par-
ticipation. They should become outpourings of hundreds of
thousands united in the determination to turn Nixon from
his mad course. -
But the situation created by the bombing of Hanoi and
Haiphong demands even wider action. The hour demands
demonstrative action of all peace forces; in Seattle and At-
lanta, in Chicago and Houston, in Albuquerque and Boston,
in Cleveland and Minneapolis, in every city and town.
Nixon has put world peace in peril; he is prepared to
bomb U.S. democracy as he is bombing Hanoi. If confirma-
tion were needed of the world menace that Nixon's course
represents, it was provided by Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird's declaration that the Nixon Administration is plan-
ning to expand the U.S. s:-.ockpile of tactical nuclear wea-
pons in Europe, already in excess of 7,00.
The aggravated peril to peace, the desperate need to
mobilize the majority of the American people for action
against the war demands the maximum of unity for peace
and democracy. In the face of this peril, the provocation of
disunity � however "revolutionary" the gabble that may
aceempany it -- is the side of the bombers, not of the
people: The certain fact that the Central Intelligence Agen-
_ _ _
4ontinued
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cy is determined to provoke such disunity as part of Nix-
on's more-war program, should alert everyone to the need
for the utmost discipline.
The President's order to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong
represents another step toward Presidential dictatorship,
for further aggression abroad and at home.
The funds that should be used to sustain our public
schools and hospitals, for example, are being used to de-
stroy the women and children, the schools and hospitals of
North Vietnam.
Every public official, in executive or legislative post,
must be faced with the people's demand to speak out
against this incitement of a greater war, this ruthless mis-
use of the nation's wealth in devastating Vietnam, the new
steps toward dictatorial White House rule.
Eery public official should be required to answer:
What are you doing to block the road to a bigger war?
The resolution on which the Gary, Indiana, City Coun-
cil is scheduled to act tonight deserves emulation in every.
city. It calls upon Congress to "demand an immediate end
to the bombing of North Vietnam, and an immediate end
to American air anti other logistic support for carrying on
the war in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos," and it
demands that the White House set a "definite date for...
complete withdrawal" from Southeast Asia.
' Such demands should be introduced into every muni-
cipal and state legislative body, to save the peace and our
democracy. Mass demonstrations for peace this Saturday
will strengthen the prospects for people's victory -- here
and abroad'. '
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NORFOLK, VA.
PILOT
APR 1 6 1972
- 127,079
S � 174,257
�
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soa..ss.
grows Iun
By S. L. A. Marshall, !referring to them as "barbecues."
:Brig. Gen (ret.) :Thus, in the summer of -1963, several of-
� Times/Post News Service
IN HIS WELL-POI,ISH7r) MEMOIR,
"Swords. and Plowshares," Gen. Max-
:well a Taylor sees the murder of for-
mer South Vietnamese President Ngo
Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh �
Nhu, as a monstrous blunder in the
:Vietnam War, bringing about political
:c on f usi on that vastly prolonged the
Struggle.
Though one might answer such a theo-
ry in the words of the French diplomat
who said that it is an idle exercise in
history to spedulate on what might have
_ happened had that which happened not
happened, the Taylor opinion stays no
less weighty in the aftermath of the mil-
� itary coup and the killings. Taylor be-
came ambassador to Saigon and had to
'cope with the consequent chaos.
As he cOrrectly puts it, the inexcusa-
ble mistake of all who cons pi r e�ci to
� ;.0 v or throw Diem was that they had
� ;planned nothing better to replace him.
' The passions and attitudes of that
summer nine years ago almost inevita-
bly generated a violent climax. Diem
was under heavy fire. He was being vi-
ciously assailed by the American press
in Saigon, who waged their vendetta be-
:cause Diem scorned them and they
were. being starved of news: -
' Publici opinion in the United States,
;seeing Diem as a lesser evil, vented its
.rage against Nhu because of his oppresL.
sion of the Buddhists led by Tri Quang,
:who was just another Vietnamese rack-
eteer in a saffron robe. The self-immo-
. lation� of several Buddhist monks in pro-
test against Nhu's measures also served
to fire American emotion. Though Tay-
� lor indicates that Tri Quang had con-
'Arived these sacrifices to topple Diem,
'Madame Nhu, already an object of par-
ticular loathing to the American press,
:intensified the get-Diem movement by
ficial statements came out of Washing-
ton that seemed clearly to signal that
the U.S. government would welcome the
ruination of Diem.
Gen. Taylor's freshly minted memoir
lifts the lid on that subject more than a
little. On Aug. 24, when he was chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there
came to his desk a U.S. State Depart-
ment action paper already cleared and
cabled to the embassy in Saigon. What
he read alarmed Taylor as it did other
defense principals. -
The authors of the already cabled in-
struction were Undersecretary of State
W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secre-
tary of State Roger Hilsm an and a
White House staffer, Michael Forrestal.
They had cleared their paper with Un-
dersecretary of State George Ball while
he was playing golf and with the late
President Kennedy via telephone, which
signifies mainly that the clearers gave
only passing attention to a major and
convulsive change in American policy.
Significantly, the paper had not been
cleared with Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, who was not anti-Diem, or the
Central Intelliaence Agency or the De-
partment of Detenn5:
The sense of the paper sent to the new.
ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, was
that the United States would no longer
tolerate the presence of brother Nhu in
the Saigon government. Diem, however,
'must be given a chance to get rid of
Nhu. At the same time, Lodge was to in-
form key South Vietnamese generals
about this change in the U.S. position..
Not only that, but if at any point the
generals decided to get rid of President
Diem, they were told the United States
would directly support their action.
So what was in essence this instruc-
tion to the ambassador? Only a twisted
mind would see it other .than as a li-
cense for the South Vietnamese military
. I
(b)(3)
, . .
to form a cabal to gun down Diem and
Nhu with the approval of the United,
States.
� Inside official U.S. circles there *as :
no protest against the course so definite-
ly set forth. Some of those directly con-
cerned such as Taylor might in their
own minds question the wisdom of the
instruction or policy shift. But none said
clearly: "What we propose to do is im-
moral. It is beneath the dignity of the
United States that we as a government
would conspire to political assassina-
tion. My conscience won't take it. So I
will turn in my suit." One by one the
principals fell in line with what had be-
come, if by default, White House polity.
In the end, the deed was done.
Be it said in favor of the Vietnamese
in brass that they were more
loath to becom e the executioners of
Diem. and Nhu than were U.S. generals
and diplomats.
Taylor, however, in noting the inci-
dent, writes: "I know of no evidence of
dir ect American participation in the
coup and certainly of none in the assas-
sination."
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9 April 1972
(b)(3)
An old Asia hand doesn't tell it all
In the
Midst of
Wars
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia.
13y Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale.
Illustrated. 386 pp. New York:
� Harper & Row. $12.50.
ismosmiemexamsmcgaraar.....mramayemaseorzmar.....assommaxwasia
I3'y PETER ARNETT
Before the Vietnam war turned
sour and Americans could still be-
lieve in legends, there was an
idealized cold-war warrior whose
.bravery, boldness and common sense
were carrying the American Way to
victory over Communism in South-
east Asia.
His legendary exploits and style
became the model for the scores of
young American operatives dis-
patched by various departments -and
agencies to that arena of big-power
political intrigue. Like the idealized
cold warrior himself, those operatives
were armed with a moral certitude
about their mission. It sustained
them through the long hot nights in
backwaters like Luang Prabang and
Pakse cultivating minor princelings.
And it justified their support of the
shoddy political accommodations
that passed for democracy in Bang-
kok, Saigon and Vientiane.
- Then it all started to go bad. Deeds
'once thought bold and daring now
seem to have been blundering acts
of miscalculation that sucked the
United States into an unforgiveable
bloodletting in Vietnam.
Those who had a hand in shaping
the recent history of Southeast Asia,
however, feel differently from the
average._ American about that his-
tory. One such man is the model
cold-war warrior of them all, Ed-
ward Geary Lansdale. Novelists
.have tried to put him between. cov-
ers: Graham Greene made a kindred
idealist the antihero of "The Quiet
'American," and he was later featured
as the hero of "The Ugly American"
by William Lederer and Eugene Bur-
dick. -
Now, the 64-year-old Lansdale, for-
mer San Francisco advertising man,
oriental kingmaker, frustrated, coun-
terinsurgency expert, speaks for
himself with, "In the Midst of Wars:
An American's Mission to Southeast
Asia." But he remains as elusive as
the legends, even after 378 pages,
and the reason seems to be that his
memoirs are strangely abbreviated;
the narrative concluded with Presi-
dent Ngo Dinh Diem firmly in power
in Saigon in 1956, the second Asian
monarch helped .to the throne by
Lansdale. The first was Ramon Mag-
saysay of the Philippines. But with
all we know of the later dramatic
developments of the war, and with
all Lansdale knows; his memoirs are
like reading a history of the Ameri-
can Civil War that ends with the
first election of Abraham Lincoln to
the Presidency.
The record states plainly that in
1960 Lansdale wrote a bitterly nega-
tive report on the way the war was
going in Vietnam, and later dis-
cussed .his finding with President
Kennedy who wanted to send him
back to Saigon in a high position.
But -top Kennedy aides intervened
because of his bureaucratic crock-
ery breaking and. independence. This
same reputation apparently forced
his retirement from the United
States Air Force with the rank of
major general at the age of 55. But
none of this appears in his memoirs.
But if Lansdale is reluctant to eval-
uate his life's work or discuss his
personal reverses, he has plenty more
to say. His pages ring with the
evangelistic anti-Communist rhetoric
of the 1950's. Lansdale, an O.S.S.
officer in World War II, remains an
idealist who believes that the United
States can prevail in distant, un-
derdeveloped lands if she exports
"the American way," a composite
of "winning the hearts and the minds
of the. people" and expert leverage
of American economic aid.
The former operative made plenty
of enemies in his freewheeling days
as Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles's personal emissary in Indo-
china, but he names none in his
memoirs, preferring to rail against
the "back rooms of Washington pol-
icy makers," which are "too full of
articulate and persuasive practi-
tioners of the expedient solution to
daily problems, of the hoary art of
power politics, and of the brute
usages of our physical and material
means."
I ,ott Co A e c,
Lansdale's belief is probably sus-
-tamed because of his first and last-
ing counterinsurgency success, the
crushing of the Huh rebellion in the
Philippines. He teamed with the then
unknown Ramon Magsaysay, secre-
tary of national defense, and mount-
ed a drive against the Communist
Huks that demonstrated superb co-
ordination of political, military and
social-psychology strategy and tac-
tics. This dramatic campaign, which
he details .minutely in his memoirs,
destroyed the Huks and led Mag-
saysay to the Presidency in 1953,
with Lansdale's help.
By then Lansdale had become
America's Number One counter-
insurgency expert, and John Foster
Dulles sent him to Vietnam to do the
same there. In the Philippines Lans-
dale had a favorite maxim, "Dirty
tricks beget dirty tricks," and in Viet-
nam he was given every opportunity
to put his skills to use; his mission,
among other things, was to launch
paramilitary operations and poitticak
psychological
warfare against North Vietnam
a few days after the Geneva
accords gave that country to
Ho Chi Minh.
Lansdale's operatives were
the first American fighting ram
in Vietnam, a fact not hitherto
known until the Pentagon Pa-
pers last year revealed minute
details of sabotage in Hanoi by
Americans in 1954, including
the pouring of contaminants
into Hanoi buses to eventually
destroy them. Lansdale men-
tions the teams in his memoirs,
but he fails to include the con-
taminants, or his association
with the .Central Intelligence
Agency revealed by the Penta-
gon Papers.
Lansdale's main contribution
to the history of Vietnam was
his success in propping up Ngo
Dinh Diem, the obdurate Viet-
namese nationalist appointed
Prime Minister by the French
in a power play in 1954 and
saved from political extinction
by Lansdale who save in him
the makings of another magsay-
say. Dulles, in April, 195, had
already agreed to a demand by
his special envoy -in Saigon,
Gen. J. Lawton Collins, that
Diem be dumped in favor of a
coalition of Saigon politicians
and sect leaders, when a dra-
matic cable arrived from Lans-
dale stating that Diem was suc-
cessfully surviving a military
Peter Arnett is an Associated Press
C _A n\e. t n,"1 S
reporter who spent eight years In - �
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e1.i
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
WASHINGTON POST
-6 APR 1972,
Letters To
- A South "Vietnamese Soldier Writes
I have just received a letter from a South
Vietnamese soldier in Vietnam (a former
constituent) who retreated from the DMZ.
His language is very straightforward, but I
will not change anything because it will help
the American people who are saturated with
,cliches and hypocritical euphemisms to
know the other side of the story. Here are a
few excerpts (when my correspondent says
"we" he refers to himself and his South Vi-
.etnamese comrades in arms):
" "Enemy fire was not so terrible really, I
� have known much worse; we were not afraid
at all, we could have stayed, but we did not
want to fight the Reds . .. What for ? Why
� should we fight them? They have never
harmed us. But the corrupted Vietnamese
'leaders in Saigon and the Americans who
live in luxury and debauchery in Saigon
have harmed us. These Americans and these
Vietnamese traffic in heroin and opium;
they share the proceeds with one another;
the Vietnamese are the high officials; the
Americans are U.S. officials which include
military, civilian and CIA personnel; they
live lavishly with villas, cars, mistresses;
each of them spend in one night what we
soldiers, with one wife and three or four
children take one year to earn. That is why
'we all agree: (1) it is too stupid to die for
nothing; (2) it is even criminal to kill the
guys in front because they do not deserve to
die, they are unfortunate fellows like us; we
should kill instead the corrupted leaders in
Saigon and their dirty Saigon-American
friends .. . [note: he makes a distinction be-
tween the Americans who live in the U.S.
and who are not involved and the despised'
Saigon-Americans who are war profiteers]
who have made shambles of our country.
Since the Americans killed [sic] President
Ngo Dinh Diem and installed a new regime
of yes-yes men, corruption stinks to the sky.
We want to tear down the corrupted. Since
the Communists want to do the same job, we
leave it to them. What we want before all is
independence, then we shall freely choose
the leaders we respect. With the Americans
sitting right on our head we are anything
but free. That is why we are more and more
mad at President Nixon. His withdrawal is
interminable, hence we have no independ-
ence. His Vietnamization shall never work:
because he is fighting not only the Commu-
nists but also the whole Vietnamese popula-
tion which are mad at the corrupted Ameri-
cans.; and Vietnamese who rule them.
"There is a brave U.S. major, who acted as
adviser and who probably meant well, who
saw us packing and leaving and who asked
me�probably because I have many ribbons
for gallantry on my chest�why we did not
make the slightest effort to resist and save
our country from communism, etc., etc. . I
looked at him silently for a long moment,
shrugged my shoulders, and went away with-
out answering, because I cannot tell him
what I tell you in this letter. Some of us, in
other units, fight by sheer reflex, like ro-
bots, but they will quit too, because they
also feel the same way as we do. For the
time being we 'just quit the battlefield, but
in our next step we shall join the Commu-
nist forces.
"We hate the corrupted. Why don't you
come back to lead us?"
I concur, but I also advocate reunification
and neutrality for the entire Vietnam.
TRAN VAN KIIIEM,
Former Deputy. Vietnam National Assembly.
Chevy Chase.
bp)
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� -n-T
.evo,
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5 JAM It1/4
Hanoi improves
Its Air Defenses
.S. Pilots Sa
Washington Post Staif Writer
DANANG�The Soviet Union C-123 crew downed earlier in
has improved North Vietnam-
ese aircraft defenses, accord-
ing to U.S. pilots here.
the same area. �
Hanoi on Sunday claimed,
that a high altitude 13-52 was
They said the relatively safe shot down over Vinhlinh in
:layer between the low-altitude the eastern portion of the De-
i.57-mm. antiaircraft guns, militarized Zone. The U.S. Air
which are radar-directed, and Force denied the claim.
the high-altitude SAM-2 mis- If the- pilots are right in
sues is now harder to find.- crediting North Vietnam with
Pilots interviewed did not better air_ defenses, and there
know what technical improve- is no reason to doubt them,
ments were made in the So- this will -complicate their job
viet air defenses but listed the of assisting South Vietnamese
following as among the possi- troops under attack in the
bilities: an improved radar-, northern portion of the cOun-
. aiming system for the 57-mm, try.
antiaircraft guns, Soviet tech- Just suppressing the antiair-
nicians making adjustments craft fire to clear the way for
on the ground in North Viet- bombing runs could cost the
'Atm to improve both range United States and South Viet-
and accuracy. namese an unusually high
A further complication, the number of planes if the air de-
� pilots said, is that the North fenses indeed are more effec-
Vietnarriese have moved SAM- live.'
2 rockets and antiaircraft guns
southward to protect more
effectively their troops ad-
vancing in Military Region I.
One tragic bit of evidence of
the improved air defenses /
came several weeks ago when
the chief pilot of Air Ameri-
can had his leg shot off while
sitting in the rear of an air-
craft, flying at about 13,500
feet over northern Laos where
the Chinese have been build-
ing a road.
James Ryan, the chief pilot /
for the CIA-financed airline,
was , dropping pamphlets out
of a small plane when he was
hit by what fellow pilots be-
lieve was a 57-mm. shell., The
pamphlets Ryan was dropping
offered a reward for any infor-
mation about the whereabouts
of the -crew of an Air America
_ � "
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JAL. 1 .6 %I
APR 1972
(b)(3)
cz21: eirraTid monazazarr9E3
worort rvincnETTI
Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when
he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his
novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset &
.Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis
of the CIA.
The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign af-
fairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy
and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately
promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news
media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this
agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership,
one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources
and circumstances from which the agency draws its au-
thority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic
aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country
intend it to be�the clandestine mechanism whereby the
executive branch influences the internal affairs of other
nations.
In conducting such operations, particularly those that
are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with
the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the
field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its oper-
ational plans accord with the aims of the 'administration
and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional lead-
ers. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influen-
tial individuals and institutions outside government is also
sopght.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware
of the dangers they court, both personally and for the
agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their
covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more care-
ful than are administrators in other areas of the bureau-
cracy to inform the White Hous,e of their activities and to
: seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly
for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to
pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and
the men who control the Congress.
The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an
outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-
Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-
Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles
of the administration, however, the shoot-down was
shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the
chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny
responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly
defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although
for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had
authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against
the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system,
the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the
launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to
espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft.
The A-11 development program was completed, neverthe-
less, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be
useful elsewhere.
After the Bay of
feel the sting of Pre;
the agency had its
because it failed in
overthrow Castro. C
the top of the agenc
committee, which ti
tration, the agency .
tices. Throughout th
tine operations again
the same time, and
agency deeply involv
ing regimes in Laos
When the Natiom
the CIA in 1967, s
exposed the agency'
labor and cultural
funding conduits, ne
tried to restrict the
Senator Fulbright's a
trol over the CIA lit
was simply told by P
and get on with its lat
formed to look into
Secretary of State, th
of the CIA. Some
because they had be
longer thought worth
continued under improvea cover.
e arger
operations went ,on under almost open CIA sponsorship,
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being
examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a
$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/
assassination programs in Vietnam.
tew o
The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as
the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy.
Most of the few changes are intended to improve the finan-
cial management of the community, especially in the mili-
tary intelligence services where growth and the technical
costs of collecting information are almost out of control.
Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of
the community's product with national security planning
and to provide the White House with greater control
over operations policy. However, none of that implies a
reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action.
In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House
staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on
advice provided by the CIA and that given by former
agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential
Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Admin-
istration, the Council had responded to a similar request
by recommending that in the future the CIA should con-
centrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American,
African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as
agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and
other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-
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-5
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nawsa.a.al %JAN J. J. J...3%J.L). 11,1114.1J,
(b)(3)
y Lall9
four years
afterward
� 2 APRIL 1972
--� a-, �
'Cover-Up
By Seymour M. Hersh.
*Random House. 320 pp. $6.9
Reviewed by ROBERT SHERRILL
But that brings us to the even
the question of why officers of the highest rank failed t
investigate and prosecute the guilty immediately after th
offenses occurred, at which time even the creaking court
martial system might have been expected to produce
reasonable quantum of justice.
Cover-Up, another of Hersh's awesome reporting
achievements, is the best answer we are likely to get. It may
be futile to argue about whether the murders at My Lai
and My Khe prove that most young soldiers in moments
. of convulsive emotions can become war criminals; but cer-
/.; tainly little doubt can remain, after reading the evidence
here, that in moments of stress�as when they feel their
careers imperiled�high field officers in the United States
Army are quite willing to boil their code of honor down to
� the old practical barracks motto, "Cover Your Ass."-
-- : � By the evening of the day it happened, nasty jokes
about the My Lai "battle" were being made at division
headquarters. It was the chief topic at the cocktail hour.
in Colonel Oran fiend
Lest We forget, March 16 was the fourth anniversary of
the Most highly publicized and perhaps the worst war
,cOrne ever committed by U.S. troops, that being the day
.in 1968 when elenients of the Americal Division descended
.on cluster of hamlets in the Sorigmy area of South Viet-
�nain and, without provocation, butchered several hundred
.unarmed civilians. � -
IP'� The army still refuses to say how many Vietnamese were
killed that day by Company C, First Battalion, 20th in-
fantry, 1 lth Brigade when it destroyed the hamlet of My
-Lai :4. Seymour Hersh says the secret documents from
which. he developed this book show that at least 347
,women, children, and old men died there.
This is twice' as many as the highest previous estimate,
-and it is very .close to. the death count made at the time
:by the Viet Cong and circulated in propaganda leaflets,
which, of course, our officials. gave no credence to. Since
the Viet Cong have been more a4urate than the Pentagon
� about the whole matter, there is no reason not to take
their word also that "there-were twenty-six families killed
:completely�no survivors."
Their work done, the men of Charlie Company sat down
:among the bodies and ate lunch.
Meanwhile, in another hamlet nearby, this one known
as My Khe 4, Bravo Company was getting in some prac-
tice. "We were out there having a good time," one of the
participating GIs told Hersh. "It was sort of like being in
.a shooting gallery." Estimates of the dead at My Khe 4:
range up to 155. Hersh's account of this episode is the
first that has been made public, just as he was the first to
report the My Lai 4 murders in 1969.
�:For the slaughter at My Lai 4, the army (after intense
public pressures) eventually brought charges of murder or
� assault with intent to murder against 12 officers and men;
� but charges were dismissed against six, and of the others
only Lieutenant William Calley was convicted. i
For the murders at My -Kite 4, nobody has been court-
martialed, and apparently nobody ever will be.
So the evidence is, all in now, and already becoming
vintage history, that even where there are many witnesses,
the military's system of justice is incapable of coping with
war crimes.: , Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
erson s mess nail. lienclerson corn-
(b)(3)
manded the brigade. Many helicopter pilots in the 123rd
Aviation Battalion knew about the killings. South Viet-
namese district officials knew about the mass murder .
within three days. So did Lieutenant Colonel William D.
Guinn, the deputy province adviser, but he dismissed the
report passed on to him by the native officials as invalid
becaUse�now get this�because "it was so poorly trans-
lated and the handwriting was so poor I could hardly
read it."
Official reports of the assault stated that � 128 "Viet
"Their work done,
the men of Charlie Company
sat down among the bodies
and ate their lunch."
Cong" had been killed after a heavy fight. But only three
weapons were taken in the village and. no Americana were
injured by rifle fire. There were no requests .for gunship
support. For these reasons no alert officer would have let
the battle report go unchallenged.
Some of the gossip quickly reached the ears of Major
General Samuel W. Koster, commanding general of tia.:
America.' Division, and although he preferred that nothing
create 'shock waves that might disturb his style of life
(Koster's mess was noted for steak, lobster, engraved
china, the best of hard liquors and wines, GI waiters
dressed in white flunky coats, and the pleasant company of
Red Cross nurses), still, he did tell Colonel Henderson
that maybe he ought to investigate.
Henderson's idea of getting to the bottom of things was
to stop a group of the soldiers who had been at My Lai 4-
- _
Robert Sherrill's most recent book is Military Justice Is to
Justice as Military Music Is to Music.
�
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COMMUNICATIONS
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DVOiM4.01., mr.L.Lam
1 April 1972
_
ITT's public relations fiasco
Despite the welter of testimony and
newspaper stories implying question-
able relations between International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp. and the
Justice Dept., the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the White House, there
has been no concrete evidence yet pro-
duced of any illegal conduct. Still, the
publicity has damaged ITT's public im-
age. Even sophisticated businessmen
and investors are talking of the dam-
age done to the reputation of business
in general, describing ITT's recent con-
duct as arrogant and conscienceless. At
midweek, the common stock hit a low
for the year.
ITT is caught up in a full-fledged pub-
lic relations fiasco, with an unaccus-
tomed spotlight beaming on the office
of Edward J. Gerrity, Jr., senior vice-
president for public relations. Gerrity,
48, a onetime Scranton (Pa.) news-
paperman, oversees ITT's far-flung cor-
porate relations staff, including public
relations, advertising, and dealings
with government agencies. Dita Beard,
the lobbyist whose alleged memo about
the company's contributions to the San
Diego Convention Bureau started the
brouhaha, works for Gerrity.
The credibility. Gerrity's operation,
which has a staff of 51 worldwide, has
had a reputation for being effective but
heavy-handed.
In 1967, for instance, three Washing-
ton reporters .covering the Federal
Communications Commission hearings
into ITT's proposed acquisition of
American Broadcasting Co. testified
that ITT public relations staffers pres-
sured them for better treatment. Ei-
leen Shanahan, a New York Times re-
porter, said that Gerrity "badgered"
her, and she later claimed that ITT
asked a former employer about her
character. Now, shredded documents,
discrediting medical testimony, and ill-
advised memoranda have all combined
to make things look very bad for ITT.
When columnist Jack Anderson pub-
lished alleged ITT internal memos im-
plicating ITT in a scheme to block the
election of Chilean president Salvador
Allende, ITT public relations issued a
statement describing as "without foun-
dation in fact" Anderson's claim that
the conglomerate "had participated in
planning any plots or coup against him
[Allende]."
Yet former CIA director John A.
McCone, a member of the ITT board of
directors since 1966 and a member of
company told the U. S. government, "If
you have a plan, we'll help with it." Far
from disavowing the authenticity of
the memos published by Anderson,
McCone says "those were staff." And.
he adds that suggestions of "economic
repression" measures were "prudently,
properly, and firmly rejected by Gen-
een and his operating people." McCone
adds that ITT Chairman Harold S. Gen-
een and he are filled with "regret at
the way that the memos were written
and the way they have been read by
the press so that our true policy has
been distorted."
The Image. The .way they are 'being in-
terpreted by the press is, of course, a
problem for globally ambitious ITT, as
well as for 'Ned" Gerrity. What he and
ITT's statuette: A manneken pis for
members of The Brussels Boys Club.
his staff think of it all is unknown, for
Gerrity is refusing interviews "on the
advice of our lawyers."
ITT is not a corporation known for
hiding its light. Each year several hun-
dred journalists, ranging from finan-
cial writers to police-beat hacks, gather
at Manhattan's St. Regis Roof for a
bash that ITT's public relations depart-
ment calls "The Brussels Boys Club."
The tone of the evening is set by a
replica of Brussels' famed manneken
pis, which directs a potable stream into
the glasses of thirsty guests. "Members"
get statuettes of the manneken.
its executive committee, this week con- The emphasis on Brussels is crude
firmed that moves against Allende had but apt. The giant ITT always has one
indeed been discussed at ITT. McCon 1 _
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�
Of IT
counted for $3.1-billion of ITT's total.
corporate sales of $7.3-billion. Just last
week, the 11-man executive committee
of the ITT board flew to Brussels for a.
special presentation by ITT-Europe.
Notably absent were Chairman Geneen
and Gerrity, both preoccupied with the
hearings in Washington.
Hanging over the meeting was the
big question: Will the publicity tar the
company with the image of a string-
pulling, cloak-and-dagger operation?
Foreign affairs. If ITT's image is hurt in
Europe, it could not come at a worse
time. The now-famous deal it struck
with the Justice Dept., which allowed it
to retain Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
set a limit of $100-million on the size of
a company it could acquire domes-
tically. In effect, this means that ITT
will have to look abroad�especially to
Europe�for large acquisitions, and in
Europe a favorable government atti-
tude is a prerequisite.
A former ITT manager overseas con-
cedes that marketing and politics go
hand in hand in. Europe. There is in-
tense expense-account wooing of
postal, telephone, and telegraph offi-
cials. And the same tender, loving care
is devoted to selected French deputies
and Spanish ileputados as ITT lavishes
on U. S. congressmen.
ITT also recruits influential allies.
The board of Bell Telephone Mfg. Co.,
ITT's big Antwerp unit, includes former
NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri
Spaak, while the late UN Secretary
General Trygve Lie was a director of
ITT-Norway. Such tactics apparently
work: In the last 15 months, ITT has ac-
quired six companies in four countries.
Foreign troubles. In Latin American op-
erations, administered from New York,
the experience has not been so happy.
Foreign ownership of telecommuni-
cations systems there is out of style.
Peru and Ecuador nationalized ITT sub-
sidiaries in 1970, and even friendly
Brazil declined to renew the franchise
of ITT World Communications.
For all its overseas interests, ITT is
not averse to waving Old Glory. For ex-
ample, when Charles de Gaulle forbade
an ITT subsidiary to ship highly secret
radar installations to Vietnam, a for-
mer executive recalls, "We just slipped
the blueprints to the CIA."
Public relations is a management
problem, and the current image crisis
at ITT is a serious blow to Harold Gen-
een's reputation for tight controls. An
ITT public relations handout quotes a
magazine evaluation of Geneen as "the
greatest businessman," yet ITT's public
relations operations somehow slipped
from his grasp. Now, Geneen faces
hearings this fall by the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, looking into
4'6-2 influence of multinational corpora-
4
� ..... . .........
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k 'rummy�, uRvavA)
APRIL 1972
ti 0
SAN FRANCISCO-Earth Magazine
has announced the preparation of
a law suit against a CIA-controll-
ed airline it accused in its March
issue of flying heroin out of
'Southeast Asia with the knowledge
of that clandestine government
agency.
San F rancisco attorney Ron Lea-
chrnan says the suit.will charge
Air America, a corporation set
up by the Central Intelligence
Agency, with allowing its
facilities to be used for the traf-
ficing of opium from the "fertile
triangle" of poppy fields in Laos,
Burma and Thailand.
The current issue of Earth
documents in a feature article
by University of �Calfornia Prof.
Peter � Scott, the connection be-
tween� the CIA, Air America and
the heroin trade, Scott charges
that "the opium-based economy
of Laos is being protected by a
coalition of opium growing CIA
mercenaries, �Air America planes
and Thailand troops."
The article charged that much
of the heroin wound up being used
in Vietnam by U.S. troops or went
to the streets of America.
At a press conference announ-
cing the publication of the article,
Earth editor James Goode ang-
rily pointed out how corruption
abroad has brought disaster back
home:
"The CIA helped put our kids
in Vietnam and CIA heroin traffic
turned them on to smack." he said
at the press conference. "And
we're paying the CIA $6 billion
a year for these services."
The impact of this trafficking
on American youth cannot be
underestimated. In the article,
Scott quotes Eliot Marshall's
estimate in the New Republic .
that 25% of all berOin in the
U.S. comes from the fertile
triangle region of South-east Asia
A further amplification of the
problem came from research done
by Mike Benner of WR IF news in a
recent broadcast about the Earth
magazine exposures.
He said, "Studies on the heroin
problem in the United States have
indicated that up to five billion
dollars is spent annually on heroin
by an estimated five� hued red
thousand addicts. More than half of
the money spent each year on
the purchase of heroin two and
one-half billion dollars � is
U.S. Government studies have
indicated that as much as 50%
of the crime in metropolitan areas
is caused by addicts and medical
officials report that heroin pre-
sently causes more deaths to
people between the ages of 18 and
35 than war, cancer or car
accidents."
. Most observors feel that the
CIA involvement in the heroin
trade has not come about through
a desire of the U.S. government
to poison its troops and young
people. But rather through a trap
of political alliances with the
dealers and marketers of opium,
who were often the only forces in
Southeast Asia willing to support
the U.S. political and military
adventures in that region, an area
contro led by remnants of the
Chinese Nationalist Army.
Several recent calls for
attacks on the trade by the gov-
ernment are not being taken too
seriously and Hubert Humphrey
even suggested having the CIA
itself hunt down the smugglers.
Don Strachen writting in the
Staff newspaper in Los Angle
suggested that this was like askin
the Nazi S.S. force to investigat
atrocities at the Auschwitz con
centration camp.
Earth Magazine and atforne
Leachman want GI's vets or othe,
persons with personal knowlecigi
of the drug trade and who vvouli
be willing to help them in the sui
against Air America, to .contac
.Earth Magazine, The Agricultura
Bldg. The Embarcadero at Miss
ion, San Francisco CA 94115 o
phone [phone]. Copies o
the above mentioned article oft
also be gotten from that address
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0.11�1101NOMMOIMMIN�11,
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numamomaamm���=lawsmia
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Cl
Nixon's Peace Offer
IIE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE at stake
in the Indochina war has always
been a relatively simple one; is
the United States (or the French be-
fore it) to have a predominant voice
in determining the political and social
structure of Indochina, or will this
question be settled by the Indochinese
peoples themselves, relatively free from
outside intervention? It has been fairly
clear from the outset that, if external
force were withdrawn, Vietnam would
ultimately be unified under commun-
ist leadership, since the Viet Minh and
its successors had "captured" the na-
tionalist movement, as U.S. govern-
ment analysts express it. In Laos, the
Pathet Lao have been unmatched in
their ability to construct a popular na-
tionalist political movement, in this
case, too, with revolutionary social con-
tent. U.S. intervention from the late
1950s. has drawn North Vietnam in-
creasingly into Laotian affairs, much
as in South Vietnam and more recently
Cambodia, where the March 1970
coup, very likely with a CIA hand, and
the US-ARVN invasion that followed,
shattered a fragile though conceivably
stable neutralism and increased the
probability that Cambodia too will be
brought ultimately into a communist-
led federation of. some sort if outside
force is withdrawn.
For reasons that need not detain us
here, the United States has never been
willing to tolerate the "loss" of Indo-
china, and remains unwilling today.
The conditions of U.S. intervention
have changed over the years, but not
the essential goals. Furthermore, the
basic problem facing the Western in-
vaders has also changed little during
the past quarter century. Several years
ago, an American military spokesman
formulated the problem clearly: the
U.S. has enormous military force but
littlo. political power and must defeat
an adversary with enormous political
power but only modest military force.
To this problem the U.S. must find the
"proper response"�in Vietnam and
elsewhere in the third world as well.
(Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between
Two Truces, 1966).
This ,problem dictates American
strategy. The basic strategy has been,
necessarily, to demolish the social and
�
political structures in which the.. indig-
enous resistance is rooted, what is
called "nation-building" by some of the
more contemptible hypocrites spawned
�in the course of this endeavor, for ex-
ample, Robert Komer, chief Presiden-
tial advisor on "pacification" in the
Johnson Administration. Five years
ago, he held out the hope that "ero-
sion of southern VC strength" may be
feasible because, though none of the
American programs are very efficient,
"we are grinding the enemy down by
sheer weight and mass" (Pentagon
Papers, Beacon, volume IV). After the
Tet offensive of 1968, it became clear
that the American public would not
long tolerate the costs of a continuing
military occupation in South Vietnam,
coupled with a costly air war against
the North. Consequently, the direct
U.S. troop commitment was leveled off
and then gradually lowered through
"Vietnamization"�a policy suggested
by Pentagon systems analysts in 1967
�while a sharply expanded techno-
logical war reached its peak in the early
months of the Nixon Administration.
Nixon and Kissinger are gambling
that the massive destruction and forced
population concentration in the South,
with its devastating impact on the rural
society, may create conditions under
which the U.S.-imposed regime can
survive. To use Robert Komer's terms,
"thanks to massive U.S. military in-
tervention at horrendous cost," a "fa-
vorable military environment" has been
created "in which the largely political
competition for control and support of
the key rural population could begin
again" in this "revolutionary, largely
political conflict" of International
Affairs, 1971, no. 1). He fails to add
that contiol of the "key rural popu-
lation" may be facilitated by the fact,
that at least half the population, 85
percent rural in 1960, now lives in
urban ghettoes (J-C Pomonti, Foreign
Affairs, Jan. 1972), part of the "hor-
rendous cost" of "massive U.S. mil-
itary intervention." Much the same is
true in Laos and Cambodia. Nixon and
Kissinger appear to be moving towards
an effective partition of Indochina: the
heavily settled areas of Laos, South
Vietnam and Cambodia will, it is
hoped, be separated from the resist-
ance forces by a ring of fire and de-
struction, controlled by an elaborate
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
� military and police apparatus, an-C1
gradually absorbed within the U.S.-
Japan Pacific system. The vast areas
ceded to the resistance will be sub-
jected to intensive bombardment which
will continue to make an organized so-
cial life virtually impossible. Parts of
Laos may be effectively incorporated
within Thailand, as George Ball sug-
gested years ago. It may be that the
willingness of the Administration to
concede the 'presence of Thai mer-
cenaries in Laos (in conflict with ex-
plicit legislation designed to prevent
this) reflects the need to prepare the
public for this outcome.
As the very knowledgeable Austra-
lian analyst Peter King observes; such
"successes" as have been achieved in
this program are "no mystery": "It re-
quires more than ordinary courage for
civilians to maintain their political al-
legiances openly in the face of a semi-
genocidal counter-insurgent strategy"
(Pacific Affairs, Fall 1971), the pre-
requisite for Komer-stle "nation-
building." It is this counter-insurgent
strategy and its results that lead Gen-
eral Westmoreland to believe: "I think
particularly significant is that the en-
emy does not have the strong infra-
structure and the guerrilla forces in
large numbers, well equipped and high-
ly motivated, that he had in 1968"
(Peter Osnos, Washington Post-Bos-
ton Globe, Feb. 1, 1972). However, as
King and many others recognize, "the
durability of that success may be
doubted."
Given the insistence of the U.S. pub-
lic on scaling down the direct Amer-
ican involvement, it has been obvious
for several years that it would become
necessary for the U.S. to engage in
some sort of political manipulations
within the areas of South Vietnam that
'remain under U.S. control, or to "get
ready for political competition in South
Vietnam," as Harvard Professor Sam-
uel Huntington put it in a paper be-
fore the May 1969 meeting of the
Council on Vietnamese Studies of SEA-
DAG. This collection of scholars, who
claim to be concerned with support
for research on Vietnam, struggled
manfully with the problem of how tc
ensure control at the national level fen
"our side," given that the NLF re-
mains "the most powerful purely po-
litical national organization," "the
csontitued
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April 1972
Corpora ion
t: My Story
by Anthony Russo
f
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ocaAjuued
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1 .APRIL 1972
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IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia
by Edward Leary Lansdale
Harper & Row, 386 pp., $12.50
Reviewed by Jonathan MirskY
IN With the exception of the Pentagon
Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's
memoir could have been the most valu-
able eyewitness account of the inter-
nationalizing of the Indochinese war.
Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in
his own book, furnished the model for
the Ugly American who, from 1950
through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put
down the Iluk revolution in the Philip-
pines. He then proceeded to Vietnam
where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck
close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's
first shaky years when Washington
couldn't make pp its mind whom to
tap as the American alternative to Ho
Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured
Diem as the final choice for Our Man
In Saigon. While the book's time span
Is, therefore, relatively brief, the period
it covers in the Philippines and Viet-
nam is genuinely important.
There is only one difficulty with In
the Midst of Wars: from the cover to
the final page it is permeated with lies.
That Harper & Row finds it possible
to foist such a package of untruths on
the public�and for $12.50!�several
months after the emergence of the
Pentagon Papers, and years after the
publication of other authoritative
studies, exhibits contempt for a public
trying to understand the realities of
, our engagement in Vietnam.
The lie on the jacket describes Lans-
dale merely as an OSS veteran who
spent the years after World War II as a
"career officer in the U.S. Air Force."
In the text Lansdale never offers any
explicit evidence to the contrary. In-
deed, on page 378�the last of the text�
he states that at the very time Diem
was being murdered in Saigon, "I had
been retired from the Air Force."
For all I know Lansdale drew his pay
from the Air Force and, as the photo-
graphs in his book attest, he certainly
wore. its uniform. This is irrelevant.
Lansdale was for years a senior opera-
tive of the Central Intelligence Agency;
on page 244 of the Department of De-
fense edition of the Pentagon Papers,
Lansdale, two other men, and Allen
Dulles are identified as representing
the CIA at a meeting of the President's
Special Committee on Indochina held
on January 29, 1954.
Why is this important? Because if
there is one word Lansdale uses re-
peatedly it is "help"�and he uses it
personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-
like urge to offer spontaneous assist-
ance. Thus, the first day he ever saw
Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to
me that perhaps he needed help.... I
voiced this to Ambassador. Heath. .
Heath told me to go ahead." The in-
formal atmosphere continues when
Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem,
immortalizes him as "the alert and
eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding
what to do about Snow White."
Further desires to serve inform Lans-
dale's concern for the "masses of
people living in North Vietnam who
would want to ... move out before the
:ommunists took over." These unfortu-
nates, too, required "help." Splitting
his "small team" of Americans in two,
Lansdale saw to it that "One half,
Rider Major Conein, engaged in
-efugee work in the North."
"Major" Lucien Conein, who was to
play the major role the CIA had in the
murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in
the secret CIA report included by the,/
Times and Beacon editions of the
Pentagon Papers (sec SR, Jan. I, 1972)
as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Mili-
tary Assistance Advisory Gr9up1. for
cover purposes." The secret . report
refers to Conein's refugee "help" as
one of his "cover duties." His real job:
"responsibility for developing a 'para-
military organization in the North, to
be in position when the Vietminh took.
over . . . the group was to be trained
and supported by the U.S. as patriotic
Vietnamese." Conches "helpful" teams
also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's
largest printing establishment and
wreck the local bus company. At the
beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the
CIA's Conein infiltrated more agents
into the North. They "became normal
citizens, carrying out everyday civil
pursuits, On the surface." Aggression
from the North, anyone?
Lansdale expresses particular pleas-
ure with the refugee movement to
the Snuth. These people "ought to be
provided with a way of making a fresh
start in the free South.. .. [Vietnam]
was going to need the vigorous par-
ticipation of every citizen to make a
success of the noncommunist part of
the new nation before the proposed
plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale
modestly claims that he "passed along"
ideas on how to wage psychological
warfare to "some nationalists." The
Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that
the CIA "engineered a black psywar
strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the
Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on
how to behave for the Vietminh take-
%.1 x tit toe Hanoi region in early
October [1954] including items about
property, money reform, and a three-
day holiday of workers upon takeover.
The day following the distribution of
these leaflets, refugee registration
tripled."
The refugees�Catholics, many of
whom had collaborated with the
French�were settled in the South, in
communities that, according to Lans-
dale, were designed to "sandwich"
Northerners and Southerners "in a
cultural melting pot that hopefully
would give each equal opportunity."
Robert Scigliano, who at this time
was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michi-
gan State University team on how to
"help" Diem, saw more than a melting
pot:
Northerners, practically all of whom
refugees, [have] preempted many of
choice posts in the Diem government.
[The] Diem regime has assumed the
are
the
as-
pect of a carpet bag government in its.
disproportion of Northerners and Cen-
tralists ... and in its Catholicism.... The
(Southern people do not seem to share the
anticommunist vehemence of their North-
ern and Central compatriots, by whom
they are sometimes referred to as un-
reliable in the4communist struggle. . . .
[While] priests in the refugee villages hold
no formal government posts they al e gen-
erally the real rulers of their villages and
serve as contacts with district and pro-
vincial officials.
Graham Greene, a devout Catholic,
observed in 1955 after a visit to Viet-
nam, "It is Catholicism which has
helped to ruin the government of Mr.
Diem, for his genuine piety has been
exploited by his American advisers
until the Church is in danger of sharing
the unpopularity of the United States."
Wherever one turns. in Lansdale the
accounts are likely to be lies. He re-
ports how Filipinos, old comrades
from the anti-Huk wars, decided to
"help" the struggling Free South. The
spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture
warms the heart�until one learns from
Lansdale's own secret report to Presi-
dent Kennedy that here, too, the CIA
had stage-managed the whole business.
The Eastern Construction Company
turns out to be a CIA-controlled
"mechanism to permit the deployment
of Filipino personnel in other Asian
countries for unconventional opera-
tions.... Philippine Armed Forces and
other governmental personnel were
'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad."
Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of
Diem's success against the various
sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh
Xuyen. (At every step Diem was ad-
vised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic
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tettt
SATURDAY ni.,,TEw
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(b)(3)
SR: BOOKS
Book Review Editor: ROCHELLE CIRSONI
IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia
by Edward Geary Lansdale
Harper 8: Row, 386 pp., $12.50
Reviewed by Jonathan Afirsky
t:t With the exception of the Pentagon
Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's
memoir could have been the most.valu-
able eyewitness account of the inter-
nationalizing of the Indochinese war.
Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in
his own book, furnished the model for
the *Ugly American who, from 1950
through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put
down the link revolution in the Philip-
nines, He then proceeded to Vietnam
where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck
close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's
first shaky years when Washington
couldn't make up its mind whom to
tap as the American alternative to Ho
Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured
Diem as the final choice for Our Man
in Saigon. While the book's time span
is, therefore, relatively brief, the period
it covers in the Philippine S and Viet-
nam is genuinely important.
There is only one difficulty with In
the Midst of Wars: from the cover to
the final page it is permeated with lies.
That Harper &I Row finds it possible
to foist such a package of untruths on
the public�and for $12.50!�several
months after the emergence of the
Pentagon Papers, and years after the
publication of other authoritative
studies, exhibits contempt for a public
trying to understand the realities of
our engagement in Vietnam.
The lie on the jacket describes Lans-
dale merely as an OSS veteran who
spent the years after World War II as a
"career officer in the U.S. Air Force."
In the text Lansdale never offers any
explicit evidence to the contrary. In-
deed, on page 378�the last of the text�
he states that at the very time Diem
was being murdered in Saigon, "I had
been retired from the Air Force."
For all I know Lansdale drew his pay
from the Air Force and, as the photo-
graphs in his book attest, he certainly
wore its uniform. This is irrelevant.
Lansdale was for years a senior opera-
tive of the Central Intelligence Agency;
on page 244 of the Department of De-
fense edition of the Pentagon Papers,
Lansdale, two other men, and Allen
Dulles are identified as representing
the CIA at a ineeting of the President's
Special Committee on Indochina held
on January 29, 1954.
Why is this important? Because if
there is one word Lansdale uses re-
peatedly it is "help"�and he uses it
personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-
like urge to offer spontaneous assist-
ance. Thus, the first day he ever saw
Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to
me that perhaps he needed help. , I
voiced this to Ambassador Heath. .
Heath told me to go ahead." The in-
formal atmosphere continues when
Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem,
immortalizes him as "the alert and
eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding
what to do about Snow White,"
Further desires to serve inform Lans-
dale's Concern for the "masses of
people living in North Vietnam who
would want to ... move out before the
communists took over." These unfortu-
nates, too, required "help." Splitting
his "small team" of Americans in two,
Lansdale saw to it that "One half,
under Major Conein, engaged in
refugee work in the North."
"Major" Lucien Conein, who was to
play the major role the CIA had in the
murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in
the secret CIA report included by the
Times and Beacon editions of the
Pentagon Papers (see SR, Jan. 1, 1972)
.as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Mili-
tary Assistance Advisory Group] for
cover purposes." The secret report
refers to Conein's refugee "help" as
one of his "cover duties." His real job:
"responsibility for developing a para-
military organization in the North, to
be in position when the Vietminh took
over . . . the group was to be trained
and supported by the U.S. as patriotic
Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams
also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's
largest printing establishment and
wreck the local bus company. At the
beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the
CIA's Concin infiltrated more agents
into the North. They "became normal
citizens, carrying out everyday civil
pursuits, on the surface." Aggression
from the North, anyone?
Lansdale expresses particular pleas-
ure with the refugee movement to
the South. These people "ought to be
provided with a way of making a fresh
start in the free South. .. . [Vietnam]
was going to need the vigorous par-
ticipation of every citizen to make a
success of the noncommunist part of
the new nation before the proposed
plebiscite N'as held in 1956." Lansdale
modestly claims that he "passed along"
ideas on how to wage psychological
warfare to "some nationalists." The
Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that
the CIA "engineered a black psywar
strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the
Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on
how to behave for the Vietminh take-
over .o t e anoi. region in early
October [1954] including items about
property, money reform, and a three-
day holiday of workers upon takeover.
The day following the distribution of
these leaflets, refugee registration
tripled."
rr he refugees�Catholics, many of
whom had collaborated with the
French�were settled in the South, in
communities that, according to Lans-
dale, were designed to "sandwich"
Northerners and Southerners "in
cultural melting pot that hopefully
would give each equal opportunity."
Robert Scigliano, who at this time
was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michi-
gan State University team on how to
"help" Diem, saw more than a melting
pot:
Northerners, practically all of whom are
refugees, [have] preempted many of the
choice posts in the Diem government....
[The] Diem regime has assumed the as-
pect of a carnet bag government in its
disproportion .of Northerners and Cen-
tralists ... and in its Catholicism.... The
Southern people do not seem to share the
anticommunist vehemence of their North-
ern and Central compatriots, by whom
they are sometimes referred to as un.
reliable in the communist struggle,
[While] priests in the refugee villages hold
no formal government posts they are gen.
erally the real rulers of their villages and
serve as contacts with district and pro-
vincial officials.
Graham Greene, a devout Catholic,
observed in 1955 after a visit to Viet-
nam, "It is Catholicism which has
helped to ruin the government of Mr.
Diem, for his genuine piety has been
exploited by his American advisers
until the Church is in danger of sharing
the unpopularity of the United States."
Wherever one turns in Lansdale the
accounts are likely to be lies. He re-
ports how Filipinos, old comrades
from the anti-Huk wars, decided to
"help" the struggling Free South. The
spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture
warms the heart�until one learns from
Lansdale's own secret report to Presi-
dent Kennedy that here, too, the CIA
had stage-managed the whole business.
The Eastern Construction Company
turns out to be a CIA-controlled
"mechanism to permit the deployment
of Filipino personnel in other Asian
countries for unconventional opera-
tions.... Philippine Armed Forces and
other governmental personnel were
'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad."
Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of
Diem's success against the various
sects, Cao Dal, Iloa Hao, and Binh
Xuycn. (At every step Diem was ad-
vised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic
moment, even holds the weeping Chief
of State in his arms.) Everything de-
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WASHINGTON IDNTHLY
.APRIL 1972
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(6LyAmerican.
22`c232122
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a review by Taylor Branch
Two fa:theis of the Vietnam War
published- their memoirs in March.*
General Edward Lansdale's In the
Midst of tWars and General Maxwell
Taylor's Swords and Plowshares re-
cord the.,,' statements of defense for
men who!symbolize the two doctrines
that combined to produce American
counter-guerrilla strategy in Southeast
Asia. More importantly, Lansdale and
Taylor represent two distinct schools
of war. supporters�those who saw
Vietnain as a crusade and those who
saw it as a'burden.
Lansdale is America's first expert in
counter-guerrilla warfare�the legend-
ary figure who achieved fame in the
fifties by teaching our cold warriors
that the only way to defeat Asian
revolutionaries,. the guerrilla fish in a
sea of popular support, was to learn
how to paddle around a little
ourselves. Mixing modern "psywar"
(psychological warfare) techniques
with James Bond derring-do and the
kind of cultural savvy that later was
coveted by exponents of foreign wars
and foreign aid alike, Lansdale mana-
ged to position himself for exploits
and lever-pulling in palaces and rice
paddies, Asia's smoke-filled rooms.
Lansdale's knowledge of the players
and the bystanders�the French, the
Americans, the local warlords who
were beset with kaleidoscopic person-
al intrigue�helped him contour
Diem's strategy to fit both interna-
tional politics and contending Viet-
namese jealousies.. Lansdale became
mysterious and controversial�two
*In the Midst of Wars. Edward Geary
Lansdale. Harper & Row, $12.50. Swords
and Plowshares. Maxwell D. Taylor. Norton,
$10.
Taylor Branch is an editor of The Washing-
ton Monthly.
novels, The Quiet American and The
Ugly American, are modeled on his
doings. He helped move American
military strategy from the conven-
tional concerns of how you position
your armored divisions, tanks, artil-
lery, and nuclear weapons, to more
political questions like where you put
your psywar leaflets, why you need
pacification teams, and how to � win
the hearts and minds of the people. As
a counter-guerrilla man long before
the fashion, � Lansdale contributed
about half the ideas that led to
Vietnam.
General Taylor symbolizes another
idea, flexible response, which, floating
on a common sea of anticommunism
with Lansdale's doctrines, helped
direct troop ships across the Pacific.
At the apparent end of a long,
successful military career that began
at West Point under Superintendent
Douglas MacArthur,Taylor, found him-
self a very dissatisfied Army Chief of
Staff from 1955 until 1959. :He
dissented from the Eisenhower-Dulles
strategy of massive retaliation (which
essentially promised to nuke the
communists if they made a �move
anywhere) because he considered it
unlikely that the Russians would
believe our threat to blow up the
world if they seized the post office in
Nairobi. Of course, Taylor also had
bureaucratic reasons to oppose the
Eisenhower nuclear strategy: the Air
Force was getting missiles, the Navy
was in line for nuclear subs, while the
Army was getting little but budget
cuts. His development of the flexible
response posture paralleled a.series of
frustrated battles for more Army
funds, which Taylor implies were lost
because conservatives like Treasury
Secisetary George Humphrey wanted
balanced budget so badly that the
persuaded Ike to stick with a bargain
basement nuclear strategy.
Taylor retired from the Army ii
1959 to write The Uncertain Trumpe
and thereby take his case for flexibt
response to the public, where it wa
well-received because most peopt
were chilled by so much talk abou
the bomb during the Eisenhowe
Administration. A powerful fear tha
nuclear vertigo might draw our leader
toward the button was activated
especially among liberals, and its nem
endings .remained exposed until afte
the Goldwater-Johnson race in 1964
When President Kennedy and hi'
dandies came to Washington in 1961
they regarded Maxwell Taylor as
cultural and strategic ally. Alread)
alarmed at Khrushchev's speech pro
claiming an open season for wars o.
national liberation, the President per
suaded the general to become. hi!
military counselor (when Tayla
turned down the top post at the CIA,
to help the Administration enshrim
flexible response as official dogma am
to apply this wisdom in trouble spot:
like Southeast Asia. Lansdale wa:
already in Washington, working tit
Vietnam, and the Pentagon Paper
record that by July, 1961, Lansdah
presented Taylor with a long, classi
fled report "in response to your &sir(
for early in on unconven
tional warfare resources in Southeas
Asia." The two vials were beinl
poured together, and the Kenned
Administration bought both flexibh
response and counter-guerrilla warfan
in a logically compatible package
symbolized by the Green Berets.
Against the background, of flu
Eisenhower years, the thoughts of thi
two generals appear quite harmonious
rising to the top of the ne�
administration, but the memoirs shoN
that their personalities were sharpl:
different. While Taylor is a reserve
pragmatist, Lansdale is a true believe.
a gung-ho cold-war missionary, a ma
of action, whose writing calls fc
frequent crescendos of the nation;
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1 AFK 1V/4
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aiging
Reviewed by
Ron Riden hour
�In 1969 the reviewer wrote
,a' letter to the Secretary of
'Defense and other highly
placed persons that led to
.,the revelations of the My Lai
! massacre and al/ that fol-
lowed. He is now a student
i_at Arizona State � University
�and writes for New Times,
i an underground newspaper.
It came as a bitter shock
to most Americans when the
:nation's young began filling
'the streets in protest against
: the Vietnam war, leveling
�_ charges against our own
government and military
that had traditionally been
reserved for only our vilest
adversaries. They were
charges. few Americans
could accept.
But in November, 1969,
Seymour M. Hersh, an en-
terprising free-lance jour-
nalist who specializes in cov-
ering the military, rocked
the nation and the world
with a series of articles ex-
'posed what became known
as the My Lai massacre. The
series won Hersh the Pu-
litzer Prize and later be-
came a probingly thorough
book. Although most people
refused to believe it, it
,,began to look as if the worst
charges made by the anti-
war groups were true.
Now Hersh is back with a
-second book based on My
Lai. It is potentially more
. explosive than the story of
the massacre itself, raising
-serious questions that cut to
the core of the military as
an institution and laying
open to question the integ-
� rity of our top military and
.civilian leaders as well as the
American brand of justice.
"Cover-up" Is based on
.28,000 pages of testimony
and documents gathered by
the Army's investigation of
the My Lai affair by a much
ballyhooed blue-ribbon panel
named after its chief, Lt.
-Gen. William R. Peers, plus
Hersh's own extensive inves-
tigations. The purpose of
the Peers inquiry was to dis-
cover what happened at My
-Lai, why it happened, and
how it could have gone so
long undiscovered.
Army Was reacting, accord-
ing to Hersh, to charges of a
whitewash. The public was
promised full access to the
Peers discoveries after the
military trials, barring the
usual "national security"
catch-all provision. The
trials are now over except
for Calley's appeal, but the
Pentagon still refuses to re-
lease the report.
The reason, Hersh lays, is
that the investigation of the
whitewash, is itself a cover-
up.
�Hersh shows the Peers
group collecting detailed ev-
idence of a second massacre
on the same morning by an-
other company from Task
Force Baker, Charlie Com-
pany's parent unit, but Gen.
Peers denied any knowledge
of it at a press conference
announcing the investiga-
tion's results.
' 'He shows Lt. Calley sent-
enced to life imprisonment
(later reduced to 20 years)
while his two commanding.
generals are let off the hook
by a fellow general in a deal
that smacks of the "old boy"
syndrome�even though
each accuses the other of ul-
timate responsibility and
both their testimonies are
full of holes and hedging.
'He shows wholesale de-
struction and alteration of
records by privates through
generals.
'He shows the CIA's shad-
owy hand in operation and
the part a CIA agent played
in planning the My Lai op.
ration.
�He shows aloose, unoffi-
cial but fiercely loyal alli-
ance of field grade officers
willing to break all the rules
over-up o
hr, ewash of a
. Books �
COVER-UP. By Seymour M. Hersh.
(Random House, 305 IV., 55,95)
to protect their fellow offi-
cers�even those they've
never met.
Beyond these revelations,
however, lies the deeper
question of command re-
sponsibility, not only for My
Lai but for all the undiscov-
ered�publicly at least�
massacres and atrocities of
the war. Implicit in the han-
dling of the My Lai affair by
the administration and the
Pentagon is the assumption
that the massacre was an
atypical incident, a kind of
horrible aberration caused
by a freakish and compli-
cated combination of factors
that could never be re-
peated.
"Cover-up" indicates that
the atrocity syndrome was
widespread throughout the
Americal Ijivision, at least,
and that the military poll-
cies then in effect. policies
designed in the highest mili-
tary echelons made them
inevitable. In the chapters
Hersh devotes to the sub-
ject, one is struck by the
identical line that issues
from a variety of witnesses
from numerous echelons:
"Kill, kill, kill". If they are
to be believed, the official
emphasis was on body count
and little else. There is
hardly any conclusion left to
draw except 'that as far as
the brass Was concerned;
what really mattered was
not who was killed, but how
many.
In Hersh's final analysis it
becomes clear that not only
was My Lai inevitable, but
so was its cover-up and the
cover-up's cover-up. Perhaps
the most disturbing issue he
raises is that what made it
all so inevitable is integral
to the United States Army
today. And that raises some
questions.
Hersh threads the story of
My Lai and its sister massa-
cre at My Khe, their investi-
gation and the double cov-
er-up, into a broad tapestry
tightly stitched together with
the most damning evidence
of all�the testimony of the
men who participated at
every level and every stage
of the whole sordid affair.
Years from now, when schol-
ars attempt to understand
the Vietnam phenomenon,
"Cover-Up" is the one book to
which they will all turn.
And they will ask them-4
selves, I suppose, why the
vital questions raised by �
Hersh about an institution
as powerful in and impor-
tant to America as its army
were allowed to go unan-
swered�as they surely will
in a nation that has had the
war up to here. . �
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1 APR 1972
(b)(3)
1,e[iy5's Form .Grip
Cm . VEenfl
By HENRY S. BRADSIIER
Star Staff Writer
SAIGON � In the.half-year
since South Vietnam's presi-
dential .elections ended with a
whimper instead of a bang,
this country has been political-
ly more quiet than at any time
in recent years.
The quietness is a sign of
President Nguyen Van Thieu's
political mastery, of the de-
moralization of his opponents,
and of preparations for a pos-
sible eventual political contest
with the Communists.
And it might also be taken
as a sign of the narrow focus
of Vietnamese politics on a
small handful of people, with
the bulk of the population
knowing little abont them and
caring less�in the normal
way of underdeveloped coun-
tries with strongman tradi-
tions. .
In the offices and villas of
,those persons who consider
themselves Saigon politicians,
there is some desultory discus-
sion these days of new politi-
cal alliances. Thieu might
once again be interested in
gathering the support of some
politicians, instead of spurning
them all.
i The An Quang pagoda group
� of Buddhists is busy cleaning
house, the student movement
is hardly visible, and war vet-
erans are being taken care of
fairly well. These are the
groups that have caused the
most political turmoil in re-
cent years, but not now.
Few Pay Attention
Retired Gen. Duong Van
Minh, the self-appointed savior
of Vietnam from both Thieu
and communism, has issued a
few statements since deciding
in August not to fight a losing
presidential election cain-
paign.
Not many people pay atten-
tion. Vietnamese politicians,
Journalists and other observ-
ers find it hard to imagine any
future developments which
could bring to Minh the call to
national leadership that he �
wants.
The other man whom Thieu
maneuvered out of the presi-
dential race, former Vice
President Nguyen Cao Ky,
plays tennis and talks with his
military cronies.
Now outranked by a former
subordinate, he cannot return
to command of the air force
which he held before becoming
premier seven years ago. Be-
sides, Thieu seems disinclined'
to give Ky any position of au-
thority�not surprisingly, since
Ky threatened in September to
"destroy him and all his
clique."
Ky is not so easily written
off as Minh, however. He has
more determination and, at 43,�
he is younger. He can wait for
the next presidential elections
in 1975, when Thieu will be
constitutionally unable to seek
another term.
Way Charter Reads
Or at least that is the way
the Constitution reads at the
moment. But that American-
inspired limitation may prove
no more realistic for Vietnam
than other ideas copied from
the U.S. Constitution and later
abandoned, like an independ-
ent judiciary.
Few observers would want
to predict as far ahead as 1975.
But if Thieu is still running
the same kind of government
then, it seems likely that he
might decide to emulate Presi-
dent Chung Hee Park of South
Korea. A few years ago Park
found himself so indispensable
that he had to force through
his parliament a change in the
American-inspired two-term
limitation.
Thieu works from behind a
screen of Oriental aloofness.
He tours the country exten-
sively to meet with local offi-
cials, who form the basis of
his political power, but he does
not try to establish a popular
image with the masses.
He has made little effort to
explain his policies. The presi-
dential palace provides almost
no information to the Vietnam-
ese press about what it is
doing. More than just a retic-
ence, there seems to be an
absolute hostility toward the
American press.
Parties Too Fractious
� Thieu dickered in 1969 with
the idea of uniting seven politi-
cal parties behind his pro-
grams. But they proved too
fractious. By early 1970 he was
denouncing all politicians as
would-be leaders without any
followers.-
Now, however, there are
signs that the president might
be coming back to the idea
that organized political sup-
port can have a value beyond
his use of local officials and
army officers to rally popular
backing and turn out voters.
The three parties that show
signs of coalescing behind
Thieu are the Workers' and
Peasants' party, the Progres-
sive party, and the Revolution-
ary Greater Vietnam party.
The first is primarily com-
posed of union members led
by Tran Quoc Buil. He has had ,
strong American support since
the days when the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency financed
"No one has the right,
through ill-considered acts, to
go counter" to the constitu- .
tion, Huyen said. Thieu's pro-
posal to let the Communists
contest elections Would violate
the anti-Communist provisions
of the Constitution.
Cautiously Quiet
the creation of anti-
Commtthist unions abroad.
The second party unites pro-
fessional tnen and civil serv-
ants. Its highly respected lead-
er, Prof. Nguyan Van Bong,
was assassinated in Novem-
ber, weakening the party.
The third, part of the old Dal
Viet semi-secret political
movement, is led by a former
minister of the interior, Ha
Thuc Ky.
Position Strengthened
Thieu gave these parties
some help of dubious legality
in August's elections to the
lower house of parliament,
and they strengthened their
position. Now, he might be
looking toward next year's
lower house elections.
If a constitutional amend-
ment is to be passed allowing
a third term, . Thieu would
need more parliamentary sup-
port than he now has.
The president is still pre-
senting a stoutly anti-
Communist determination to
the world. But he has gained
politically � and weakened his
critics � by offering in Janu-
ary to resign and fight presi-
dential elections against the
Communists.
This helped Thieu to capture
much of the credit for favor-
ing peace which had been held
by various opposition groups.
It has at the same time
caused concern. After a six-
week silence, the president of
the upper house of parliament,
Sen. Nguyen Van Iluyen, who
would run the country tempo-
rarily under Thieu's plan to
resign for new elections, ex-
pressed guarded disagre e-
ment.
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The opposition groups which
had voiced desires for peace
have been cautiously quiet.
The most interesting devel-
opment among the opposition
is an attempt by the An Quang
Buddhists to purge Communist
sympathizers from their own
n r ks, especially their student
io
ovements. After denying
bvernment accusations that
they often served communist
purposes, the church leaders
now seemed concerned about
this.
Their supreme patriarch re-
cently accused both the Saigon
and Hanoi governments as
"merely acting as puppets for
foreign powers." This even-
handed condemnation was a
change from attacking Thieu
while being polite to the Com-
munists. . ,_
\
LOS 111,;GF.Y1l:s Tins;
CIA Agent .
Blath�for
My Lai:.Error
'
Author Seyrnour Af, Hersh
said an agent for thq.Cen-
tral Intelligence Ageney
misled the planners f the
1968 attack on My Lai by
telling � them they would:
find a Viet Cong battalion.
: there. The agent denied it.
The assault units met
only old men, women and
children in the South Viet-
namese vill a g e. Many
were killed by the Ameri-
can troops.
Hersh, who won a Pul-
itiei�Prize� for breaking
the My Lai story, identi-
fied the agent in A new
book, as Robert B. Rams7
dell, nOw a private inves-
tigator in Qrlarido, :-..
"Ramsdell refused to
speak; specifically about
the information he provid-
ed Task Force Barker be-
fore the My Lai 4 opera-
tion, but acknowledged
that his intelligence un-
doubtedly was a factor in
the planning for the mis-
s i o n," Hersh wrote in
"C ov er- Up," published
Sunday by Random
1-louse.
. Denies Charges
In a telephone interview,
Ramsdell denied Hersh's
allegations and said that
although he was working
for the CIA in the My Lai
area at the time of the kill-
ings, he had nothing to do
with intelligence reports
to the Americans.
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2 7 MR 1972
Of his role in the 'CIA,
Ranisdell said, "My func-
tion 'was with the Viet-
namese. I had very little to
do with the Americans."
He said that informatiOxi.
gathered by the South
Vietnamese was at 'times
relayed to U.S. troops, but
added that he doubted
those: reports could have
become the basis for the
m i s 1 eading information
fed to planners of the My
Lai assault.
Viet Colig Sought ,�-�
In the ,,My Lai courts-
martial of Lt. William L.
Calley Jr. and o hers,
there was testimony that
the attack was made in the
belief the village was the'
home 'of the 48th Viet
'Com,7.Battalion, -which pre-
viously had inflicted hea-
vy ,damage to American
- The source of that belief.
was alluded to only as "in-
telligence reports."
-Hersh said: The link
between Ramsdell and the
poor intelligence for the
March 16 operation was
never explored by the
Peers panel (the exhaus-
tive Army investigation
headed by Lt. Gen. Wil-
liam :R.Peers). For one
thing, none of the high-
ranking officers on it had
any reason to suspect that
Ramsdell was poorly in-
formed about Vietnarb."
Rarrisdell was sent into
QUang Ngai 'Province, on,
Feb. 4--�-40, days before MY
Lai�to run -the...clandes-
tine Operation Phoenix,
h wrote
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27 MAR 1972
(b)(3)
iAroutul the Nation
4'
CIA hi Mylai
�
vaxotaIglaila
� Author Seymour M. Hersh
says an agent for the Cen-
'1.1'4 Intelligence Agency mis-
led the planners of the ill-
starred 1963 attack on My-
� lai by telling them they
. would find a Vietcong bat-
talion there. 'The agent de-
nies it.
" The assault units met only
old men, women and chil-
dren in the South Vietnam-
ese village. Many were
killed by the American
troops.
�Hersh identifies the agent
In a new book as Robert B.
. Ramsdell, now a private in-
vestigator in Orlando, Fla.
Ramsdell denied Hersh's al-
legations and said that al-
though he was working for
the CIA in the Mylai area
at the time of the killings,
he had nothing to do with in-
telligence reports to the
- Amereans.. ,
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By RICHARD CRITCHFIELD
Star Staff Writer
IN THE MIDST OF WARS. By Maj. Gen. Edward Geary
Lansdale. Harper & Row. 386 pages. $12.50.
When Edward Lansdale returned to an almost-defeated
Vietnam in the fall of 1965, he was already a fabled figure, the
legendary Asian hand who had been the mentor of the Philip.
pines' great anti-guerrilla fighter, Roman Magsaysay, as well
as Ngo Dinh Diem's first American political-military adviser
in the mid4950s,
Although he was. then 58, he still had an air of youthful
Idealism; with his haggard good looks and brown hair only
tinged with gray, he might have stepped out of the pages of
Eric Ambler or Ian Flaming. One saw at once why he had
inspired major characters in both "The Ugly American," by
William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, and Graham
Greene's classic on the Indochina war, "The Quiet American."
BOOKS
� a
In "The Ugly American," Lansdale was barely disguised
as Colonel Edwin D. Hillandale, a haromonica-playing good
guy who "loves to be with people, any kind of people." In a
frankly admiring sketch, the authors wrote, "In 1952 Colonel
Hillandale was sent to Manila as liaison officer to something
,or other. In a short time the Philippines fascinated him. He
ate his meals in little Filipino restaurants . . . he even.
'attended the University in his spare hours to study Tagalog*
The counsellor up at the American Embassy always
spoke of him as 'that crazy bastard.' But within six months
the crazy bastard was eating breakfast with Magsaysay and
he soon became Maksaysay's unofficial adviser."
� BUT THERE was another way of interpreting Lansdale
and Greene turned it into literature in his bitterly brilliant
:"The Quiet American." The novel is a despairing portrayal of
.a young idealistic CIA operative who blunders tragically
.through the intrigue, treachery and confusion of Vietnamese
'politics. Innocent and well-meaning, but naive, the American
leaves a trail of blood and suffering in his wake.
Greene's young American was sent to Indochina in the
early 1950s to help create an indigenous political force that
could resist a Communist takeover when the French pulled
out. In May, 1954, John Foster Dulles dispatched Lansdale to
Saigon with secret orders to see if anything could be salvaged
from the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Lansdale became Diem's
adviser at the time the Vietnamese leader was defying the
Geneva agreements, which both he and the United States
refused to sign, resettling almost a million refugees from the
Communist north- and beginning to make South Vietnam a
nation.
In the novel, the Lansdale figure, after becoming involved
in a terrorist explosion in Saigon � an incident that actually
took place before Lansdale went to Vietnam � is murdered by
the Communists. Thus when Lansdale came haek to Saigon in
1965, It was rather like Greene's quiet American coming back
to Saigon in 1935, it was rather like Greene's quiet American
coming to life again. Oddly, the Vietnamese started calling
Lansdale "the phoenix" after one of their household gods.
What would he do?.
"What does a man do," Lansdale told us at the time,
"when he returns to a country, 10 years later, with great
stress on its social and political structure, great suffering,'
great pain. I have no great plan. One's got to move in with
tremendous gentleness; these people have been divided and
hurt and a lot of clumsiness could divide and hurt them more.
But there isn't much time. They need rule of law, consent of
the governed in how they are governed and a life in which kids
have some hope of tomorrow. I feel the Vietnamese are in
their last quarter. This is the ninth inning and we either do it
now or not at all."
' He was brimming with plans for sweeping land reform,
rural electrification, bringing back all the able administrators
purged for serving Diem, restoring Confucian ethics, putting
strict restraints on American artillery and air strikes.
But he was quickly stripped or any real authority. On Jan.
21, 1966; Philip Habib, now ambassador to South Korea who
ran the embassy's political aection, sent Lansdale a memoran-
dum, reportedly signed by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge,
forbidding him further contact with the Vietnamese leaders.
Lansdale the phoenix. Perhaps the Vietnamese should have
remembered a line of Greene's in "The Quiet American:"
if� � � but nothing nowadays is fabulous and nothing rises
from its ashes."
"IN THE MIDST of Wars" is his own discreet account of
the years in Asia from 1950 to 1956, the brilliantly successful
four he spent helping to defeat the Huks and elect Magsaysay
president in the Philippines, the less successful two in Viet-
nam assisting Diem to unite the feudal religious sects, defeat
the.gangster army which ruled Saigon and begin a pacification
effort against the budding Vietcong insurgency.
It is an invaluable historical document and an exciting
adventure story, and like the author himself, rugged, humor-
ous, compassionate, baffling, naive and a little infuriating. In
tho book's anti-climactical final paragraph, Lansdale briefly
notes he returned to Vietnam again from 1965 to 1968, closing
his book with the cryptic sentence, "But that's another story,
quiet different from the experiences f,lescribed in this book?"
Why another story? From his personal viewpoint, of
course, he went back as a civilian in an enormous, disarrayed
American mission torn by interagency rivalry in a war
already going badly, and he was never allowed to come up to
bat. But would his approach have worked if he had?
The book's final chapter is devoted to Lansdale's belief
that irregular war is not just another aspect in the art of
fighting but is a complex primarily political struggle for
political ends.
"Fundamentally," he writes, "the people of a country are
the main feature on a' battleground of Communist choosing,
since the ensuing struggle becomes one between the Commu-
nists and the government over which side will have the
allegiance of the people. Whichever side wins that allegiance
will win the country. . . In other words, a country's strength
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rc
war
con �Mere
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19 MARCH 1972
2ele.cted:piesident deSpite*..the
4 , Filipino political establishment. In South Vietnam, he did
r � his best to perform the same role in a more difficult situa-
tion with Ngo Dinh Diem. . .
Throughout, Lansdale promoted his belief that democ-
racy on the American model was exportable, desirable,.
and an effective method of countering Communist "peo-
ple's wars." In his view, the theories of Washington, Jeffer-
son, and Lincoln were both morally and tactically superior
to those of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, and his evangelism
was unabashed:
- sharing our - ideology while Making others strong
; enough to embrace and hold it for their own, the Amer'.
can people strive toward a millennium when the world
will be free and wars will be past. -
In the Midst of Wars
� An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia.
By Edward Geary Lansdale.
Harper &Row. Illustrated. 386.pp. $12.50
'Reviewed by SHERWOOD DlCKERMAN
To.. Graham Greene's jaundiced British eye, he was a
� inodel for Pyle, the na�ly dangerous "Quiet American." .
Burdick and Lederer took an approving, American view
. a him as Colonel Hillandale of The Ugly American. In
-Jean Larteguy's Yellow Fever, he was Colonel Teryman,.�
astute, somewhat sinister and, of course, anti-French.
Now Major General Edward Geary Lansdale has finally
'written his own book about himself. In the Midst of Wars
-covers the six years from 1950 through 1956 when Lans-
dale, in the Philippines first and then in South Vietnam,
ivaS Washington's leading agitprop agent for American-
style democracy and against communism. An Air. For�ce
Antelligence officer well connected with the Central In-
�V telligence Agency, Lansdale was a cold war cendottiere.�
Sherwood Dickerman spent five years in Southeast Asia
as a foreign correspondent.
Madame Nhu, Dm, Lansdale, 1956
who became possibly the most influential single American
in Southeast Asia and certainly the most controversial. As
. the close friend and adviser of Ramon Magsaysay, Lans-
dale helped to defeat the Communist Hukbalahap rebellion
The Washington officials to whom Lansdale addressed this
message were, he notes, "not toe happy" over it. In the
sadder and wiser America of tie 1970s, perhaps most
Americans would not be happy ,,sith Lansdale's sense ,of
global commitment to democratic panaceas. (Yet the
Lansdale spirit is not so dated as it may sound; it survives,
perhaps in more sophisticated forais, among able and in-
telligent men at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and else-
where.) .
In trying. to realize his ideal, Lansdale was ingenious
and ruthless. He was an early student of Maoist military
theory and psychological warfare. "Dirty tricks beget dirty
tricks," he writes, and the premise is that the other side
played dirty first. Thus he writes approvingly of a Filipino
psywar squad that drained the blood of an ambushed Huk
through punctures in his neck to terrify the man's corn.
rades of d vampire. Lansdale also recalls his success in
causing a mass work .stoppage in Hanoi at the time of the
Communist takeover� there-through distribution of phony
leaflets proclaiming a' one-week victory holiday.
- He does not tell all, however, which is probably one
'reason why the book by Lansdale reads less melodramat-
ically than the ones about him. Through the Pentagon
Papers, it is known that Lansdale's American agents in
Hanoi also sabotaged the city's bus fleet at that time to
embarrass the Vietminh and .that American-trained Viet-
namese guerrillas, the "Hao" -and "Binh" teams, were in-
filtrated into :Haiphong under his direction for anti-Com-
niunist underground activity. It may not be surprising for
a retired career officer to omit such secret and sensitive
material, but in Lansdale's ease there are grounds for sus-
pecting that he may have omitted more than he put in. His
protests about exaggerated news reports of his activity in -
.Vietnam sometimes have a hollow tone.
Certainly Lansdale's 386-page book is no comprehensive
record of the U.S. involvement in either the Philippines or
Vietnam during this period. Neither are there any major
historical revelations. What does emerge strongly is the
personal philosophy and style of America's best-known
".`nation-builder" in Southeast Asia at a time when the
nation-building concept was generally accepted and ap-
plauded. Anecdotes, alternate with moralizations. Out of
these, Lansdale app7.ors as idealistic and courageous (he
notes offhandedly at' at lie was marked for assassination in
both Manila and Saigon), a warmly sentimental man to-
in the Philippines and to' get the idesli,iie Magsaysav ward Asian friendg nnd 51 quick-study improviser and
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2 MAR 1972
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['Jou ac�
ta
Daily World Combined Services
� American B-52 heavy bombers yesterday made their heaviest attacks in two weeks
against the northern provinces of South Vietnam. In Saigon, more evidence of political
skulduggery emerged, in the case of a Saigon puppet general fired by puppet President
Nguyen Van Thieu at the beginning of the week on the "recommendation" of U.S.
adviser John Paul Vann.
Gen. Le Ngoc Trien, eommand-
er of the Saigon. puppet 22nd In-
fantry Division, was relieved of
his command on Monday by Thieu
at what was described as a "high-
level" military conference at
Nha Trang, 190 miles northeast
of Saigon.
Nha Trang was formerly U.S.
Special Forces headquarters in
South Vietnam and is also a center
of U.S. Central Intelligence Agen-
cy operations. Vann, the U.S.
adviser � not otherwise described
� recommended that Gen. Trien
be fired because he was suffering
from "a case of nerves and can't
hack:it." Trien's forces are stat-
ioned in the Kontum-Pleiku region
of the Central Highlands and the
coastal province of Binh Dinh.
Tied to U.S. elections
What made thp U.S.-inspired
move by Thieu significant was
that Thieu on Monday tied in the
defense of the vital Central High-
lands region to Nixon's reelection
goal. Thieu asserted that "the
Communists" would try to defeat
Nixon by gaining military victor-
ies in the Central Highlands and
thus disproving Nixon's "Viet-
namization" scheme. The firing
of Gen. Trien therefore is a move
within the context of U.S. domes-
tic politics.
Thieu's remarks appeared on
Tuesday in two Saigon news-
papers: Tin Song, which is financ-
ed by his own private secretary,
bang Duc Nha, and the news-
paper Chinh Luan, which was de-
scribed by United Press Inter-
national as having a "special
relationship" with the (Saigon
puppet) presidential palace. Chinh
Luan is also known to be in the
good graces of the Saigon National
�Police.
Thieu declared, according to .
these papers, "1972 is the last
year for the Communists to
achieve final success. To help
bring about Nixon's defeat, North
Vietnamese must try to demon-
strate the failure of Vietnamiza-
tion by inflicting a crushing mili-
tary defeat."
He asserted that the "Commu-
nist thrust" would be aimed at
Gen. Trien's area, and thus Trien
was being fired.
It was not until yesterday that
U.S. newsmen dug up the fact
that Thieu's action and the reas-
ons behind it all originated with
the U.S.
. �
The Central Highlands region
of South Vietnam has been a cen-
ter of fierce struggle against the
Japanese, the French colonial-
ists, the Saigon puppets and their
U.S. masters.
In the 1946-54 war against the
French, the Central Highlands
were regarded by the French com-
mand as a center of Viet Minh
strength; among the French lower
ranks, being posted to the Central
Highlands was regarded as the
equivalent of a death sentence:
In the 1954 Geneva discussions,
the Vietnamese patriots argued
that the Central Highlands should
be included in the area under
their control but agreed to the
region temporarily being assigned
to the French zone until scheduled
elections were held in 1956. The
elections were never held.
Heavy fighting was reported
raging yesterday in the Central
Highlands and the adjoining
Binh inh coastal province. Seven
separate B-52 air strikes were
called in a single, 450-square-mile
area in the region, while in other
areas, U.S. fighter-bombers
were called in to drop napalm and
bombs around encircled Saigon
puppet army units.
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7-
Forrnii: U.S. Sen. Wayne I
Morse Of Oregon told a Western I
Washington State College au-
dience Tuesday, numbering noj
more"than 100, that the nation is I
Well on its way to "government'
by executive supremacy and se-
crecy."
More, one of the Senate's
earliest doves, used the series'
of "presidential wars" as an ex-
ample of presidents exceeding
then...constitutional authority.
, "The President has no power
'to make war�that power , is
solely invested in the Con-
gress:" he said. He blamed the
present situatien on political
cowards in Congress. lie is
currently a candidate for the
Senate seat of Sen. Mark
Hatfield.)
Back to Wilson
BELLINGHAM, WASH.
HERALD
MAR 1 1972
E - 21,494
8 -22,543
r-
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Morse warns students
of executtve supremacy
. .
_ � �
By HUNTLY GORDON Morse,.. considering himself E
Of The Bellingham Herald strict constitutionalist. said o�
constitutional law: "I didn'�
teach it ,all my life to walk ow
on it."
Morse retraced the years ot
his obstruction on the Senatei
Foreign Relations Committee,
during which he called the Eis-
enhower administration's top.
men "liars." .
He accused then Secretary of
State John. Foster Dulles of sit-
ting at the conference table in
Geneva working out a peace far:
Indochina while secretly seek-
ing alliances from Britain and
France to perpetuate � the war,
and Eisenhower of "honey-I
combing" Vietnam with CeLit.W.1 /
Intelligence Acrencv agenrS7 if �
He criticize the U.S. action
following the 1954 treaty, which
created only one Vietnam.
Product of U.S.
"South Vietnam was the prod-
racing his premise of grow- net of the U.S., set up in Saigon
ing executive supremacy. he with a puppet ruler, he said.
took it back to the tune of Pres- He also � criticized the con-
ident 'Woodrow Wilson. lie said version of the 17th parallel from
that if Wilson had used the con-- a military demarcation into a
stitutional provision of the ad- :political demarcation.
vise and consent clause in ad- He moved on to criticize the
vance of his peace measures. Formosa resolution of 1955,
the world could have been dif- 'which, he said is now causing
ferent today. ,the nation embarrassment in its
He rapped Presidents John new relationship with China.
.Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and He rapped Kennedy's escala-
Richard Nixon for not sending:.tion of the Vietnam war, but
up a war mesSage seeking clec-' added that shortly' before his
laration Of wdr in Vietnam. He i death, he had seen "his errors,"
said they didn't dare to seek a and would have pulled out mili-
declaration , of war because the tarily had he lived. Morse said.i
action is ,"untenable and The Gulf of _Tonkin resolution
gal."
He said "the mess we're in
Asia" began in 1953 With te
Eisenhower military
.taimment policy in Asia.
policy � to stop communism
was not constitutional, Morse,
said:
"Eisenhower didn't get his
power from the Constitution, if
he got it from God. he 'never re- �
leased the text of the conversa-
tion," the still - peppery Orego-_
Wan said, �
he criticized because the entire
incident had been falsified, he,
said. He said the ship which
had been attacked wasn't 65'
miles at sea and�its mission had
been spying.
He said because of the nature'
of the ship, the international
doctorine of hot pursuit pre-
vailed. 4
And secrecy, too
He criticized government se-
crecy which made the resolu-
tion possible and said: "If 5 per
cent of the truth had been
known, it would never have got-
ten out of committee."
Although he criticized Con-
gress for failing to halt presi-
dential power encroachment, he
was just as tough on the courts.
He said the Supreme Court
has failed to take cases which
examine' presidential ursurpa-
tion of constitutional power.
� He said a free and open press
is necessary to the proper con-
duct of government. He praised
Daniel Ellsberg for exposing the
Pentagon Papers and Jack An-
derson for releasing classified
documents so the people could
really know what was going on.
"This afternoon. we're in-.
volved in a major war -in -Laos,'
There are American officers
and mercenaries fighting an il-,
legal war, which we continue to
fight," he said.
Only with the secrecy
stripped away from government
can the Congress, let along the4
people, know what is going on,:erl,
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3)
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(b)
GREENSBORO, N.C.
RECORD
MAR
E 33,470.
1 1972
Editor, The Record:
Because Americans so much
ant to believe their president
and want to believe that what is
happening in Indochina is all
right and that our position is
improving, if slowly, it is hard
to keep the basic facts of the
situation in f u 11 perspective.
What are these facts?
1. In Cambodia most of the
countryside is in the hands of
. revolutionaries of many types,
; including hard core communists
and also followers of Prince
Sihanouk. They are consolidat-
ing their positions and setting
up an infrastructure so- that
when they take over the capital
that they can set up an effective
government and resist attacks.
The Lon Nol regime is maintain-
ing its precarious position on the
basis of support from the U.S.,
by using mercenaries and for-
eign, troops, and by training
Cambodian soldi e rs in South
Viet Nm under the
2. clients in Laos are alSo
in �a stea '131 worsening position.
The Royal Laotian Army is es-
sentially moribund. The forces
holding the communist Pathet
Lao at bay are: a, Thai troops
and the threat of further Thai
commitments backed by the
U.S., b. Mao tribesmen (an eth-
nic minority) under the pay,
support and direction of the
C.I.A., and c. U.S. air power.
The Mao tribesmen have been
worn down to using even nine
year olds as soldiers. The com-
munists now have sophisticated
anti-aircraft defenses and, de-
spite heavy air a ttack st are
making increasing use of artil-
lery and tanks and thus over-
running government positions
previously considered se cu r e.
Our bombing has depopulated
much of nort hern Laos and
caused intense hatred of remain-
ing and displaced tribesmen.
3. In South Viet Nam the
"new" army of Thieu and oth-
ers has given up to sorties into
Cambodia and other contested
areas and has basically with-
drawn behind a ring of Ameri-
can air power to take up def en-
sive positions around population
area s. Thieu has still not
established any significant pop-
ular support other than the land-
lords, and has had to use ex-
treme measures to repress stu-
dents, workers, Buddhists a n d
Catholics some of whom still
dream of setting up a genuinely
neutral "third force" govern-
ment and thus stopping the kill-fl
In sum, the military, political
and economic situation in all
three of our client nations is not
good, is deteriorating, and is
being sustained by massive
American aid, This situation is
not deteriorating so fast that it
will embarrass Nixon be f or e
November. His reelection game
plan just might work. But let's
be clear just what is happening.
We are prolonging the agony of
millions of local peoples in Indo-
china, killing and maiming un-
told numbers in our "unin-
volved" air war. We are still
draining our treasury and killing
our youth. We are continuing to
damage our military morale. We �
are still dividing our own nation
in deep and long lasting ways.
We are delaying return of Amer-
ican prisoners of war. We are
deflecting national attention and
energy from many severe do-
mestic needs. We are prolonging
the draft . and all its attendant
problems.
Is it worth all this 'just to get
Nixon reelected? Can people
really support a politician like
Nikon who would place his own
political future ahead of so
many crucial national needs.
The coming primaries in North
Carolina will be a good indica-
tion of just how badly America
wants to forget, to put out of
mind, our national agony.
PATRICK W. CONOVER.
Greensboro.
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mina T TETTITUD ThIrr ATACPT trrerrrtr. sirr iroRNIA
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"JattAJ ALI
1 ',larch 1972
RICK GLIDSTADT
r 9
rAN
[jVi)
aftcl clop
.V.r[itmEy.
Not long ago the counter-culture's own superstar; Allen Ginsberg, appeared on
the Dick Cavett Show. After first chanting a Hindu psalm for some two minutes
(watch out, Dick, your ratings are slipping), Ginsberg began weaving an enchanting
web of mystery, high intrigue and crash exploitation�a tale of the CIA's involvement.
.in the heroin trade of Sbutheast Asia.
in a straight forward manner Ginsberg told of a coektail party, a la radical chic,
which he attended with the CIA's chief, Richard Helms. It seems the two made
a friendly v, T...er. Ginsberg accused the CIA of maintaining an open market for opium
(from which heroin is derived) at Long Cheng, a CIA-built stronghold in Laos. Helms
denied this, and so they made the bet. If Ginsberg lost, he was to turn over his
Hindu scepter. If, however, Ginsberg's accusations were correct, Helms was to
meditate every day for a year�a thought as frivolous as watching Richard Nixon
turn on for a national television audience.
As Ginsberg was rapping this bit of people's folklore, he was all the time waving
that very same Hindu scepter, as if he was exorcising the evil powers-that-be with
-a magic wand.
The rest of Ginsberg's story is history�past and future�as set out boldly in
the May, 1971 issue of Ramparts.
� Such an open market for opium, in the true capitalistic sense, does in fact exist
�at Long Cheng�with the open blessings of the powerful, clandestine CIA. This much
has been told by as many as eight journalists who have managed to slip past the
ultra-high security structure of Long Cheng, as the Far Eastern Economic Review
reported last year.
, Carl Strock, one of the reporters, gave an eye-witness account tells of "American /
-crews loading T-28 bombers while armed CIA agents chatted with uniformed Thai
soldiers and piles of raw opium stood for sale in the market (a kilo for $52) ..."
Where much, if not most, of this money earned from opium goes is towards
the support of "friendly" capitalistic governments in Southeast Asia. For example,
Newsweek has said that General Duane, former chief of the Laotian general staff,
was forced into a premature retirement due to excessive exposure of his role in
thd opium trade. General Duane, who, the New York Tomes said, "has never denied
allegations that he is in charge of the opium traffic in Laos," even confided to news-
men that supporting opium traffic is a "good thing." Not only does this occupation
provide the Meo tribesmen with a livelihood, Newsweek reported Ovane as saying,
but it keeps them from the control of the Communist Pathet Lao. It is by now common
parlor talk that these same Meo tribesmen are equipped and instructed for warfare,
In a most thorouah manner, by the "freedom-loving" CIA.
Although not as clearly documented, there is a preponderance of evidence of
dealings in opium traffic at the highest level of South Vietnam's government. In .
a broadcast reported by the N.Y. Times, NBC charged President Thieu and Vice
President Ky with profiting from the drug traffic, and the Vietnamese police were
accused of pushing illegal drugs (note the parallel with New York City). In that �
same broadcast NBC reported that the biggest pusher was said to be Thieu's closest
'adviser and special assistant for military and intelligence affairs, Lieut-Gen. Dang
Van Quang. All NBC's charges were attributed to "extremely reliable sources."
Su much for a mere spattering of the suspected truth. What all this suggests,
incredible as it might seem, is that the United States government, directly or
indirectly, is supporting a procedure which results in the heroin addiction of hun-
dreds of thousands of American citizens.
We should all know that Nixon has proudly proclaimed a "most significant"
deal with. Turkey, a country which, according to Nixon, exports two-thirds of the
world's heroin. This fact is somewhat contradicted, however, by a -report by the
UN Commission on Drugs and Narcotics. Referred to by both Ramparts and Ginsberg,
this report stated that since 1966, 80% of the world's 1,200 tons of illicit opium comes
�not from Turkey, but from Southeast Asia. ,
evnfintl&I
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23 FEB 1972
Viet Prisoner-Rescue
Unit to Be Disbanded
Fate of Secret Squad Parallels That of
Other Clandestine Operations in S.E. Asia
BY GEORGE McARTHUR
� '
� � � Times Staff Writer
. �
SAIGON�A secret corn-.
mand of American sol-
diers specially trained for
prisoner rescue raids in
hostile ,territory is sched-
uled to be disbanded some
time this month.
According to an officer
long involved in clandes-
tine operations, the move
will take from the U.S.
command in South Viet-
nam its last cloak-and-dag-
ger outfit specifically
honed to fight its way in
and oht of prisoner camps.
(The secret unit being
disbanded was trained for
use in the jungles of South
Vietnam, Laos and Cam-
bodia and not for such
spectaculars as the unsuc-
cessful raid on Son Tay in
North Vietnam in Novem-
ber, 1970.)
Scattered ArOund
Though there are. plenty'
of toughly skilled Ameri-
cans in Sbuth Vietnam to
mount such. raids if the
chance arises, they are
'scattered among many
Units. There are also small
outfits � like Navy seal
eteams�available for such
things, but they are not
specifically trained and
kept in readiness for pris-
oner rescue grabs.
Consequently the stand-
down of the secret prison-
er rescue group has stirred
heated words within the
headquarters of U.S. Gen.
Creighton W. Abrams.
Abrams, who has an ill-
concealed suspicion Of the
value of elite units super-
imposed on the Army's reg-
ular structure, has repor-
tedly resisted arguments
to go lightly on the with-
drawal of such outfits.
Since the prisoner
rescue unit was formed af-
ter the big influx of Amer-
ican .troops in 1965-66 it
has not succeeded in res-
cuing a single American'
prisoner held by the Viet'
Cong, though it has helped
5.earch a� small number of.
S .o u t h Vietnamese cap-
tives from jungle camps.
The unit had a parallel
mission of saving downed
pilots in cases where
ground commandos might
be required in addition to
the crews of Air Force
rescue helicopters known
as Jolly Green Giants. If
any such operation was
ever mounted it has not
been_ revealed. Some offi-
cers hint, however, that
some operations of this
type took place.
Not Many Captives
One reason the unit has
few successes ,to its credit
is that it was used sparing-
ly and under the strictest
limitations. To avoid en-
dangering the lives of any
captives with "fishing ex-
peditions," special raids
were ordered only when
intelligence turned up
hard and immediatennfor-
mation on the location of
Viet Cong POW camps.
Thus, while the unit had
few successes . it could
equally boast few failures
in the sense of botched or.
sloppy efforts. -
The number of Ameri-
can captives in Viet Cong
.camps is also very small.
Casualty figures list 463
Americans missing in
South Vietnam. The Unit-
ed States claims 78 of
these were known from
various sources to have
been alive at the time of
their capture and were
consequently listed as
war prisoners. Of these,
however, only 20, have
been acknowledged by
Viet Cong propaganda
_broadcasts as prisoners.
The justification for the
Approved for Relea
S p e cial prisoner -rescu
commando of a relative sidiary unit known as th
handful of men it there-- 11-57 De6chment precipi
fore small in the face of tated what became know
as the Green Berett, case
the overall troop with-
That case � which in
drawal demands�the U.S. volved the execution of
force level is now 127,000 suspected double agent
men and the current goal blew the cover on how ex-
is 69,000 by May 1. tensive clandestine opera-
The withdrawa I, tions had grown in South
however, underscores the Vietnam. It also caused a
unpublicised decline hi all number of heads to roll
eland estine operations within the U.S. establish,
which has paralleled the meat and resulted in a
pullout of regular troops. general hunkering down
.CIA Cutback of cloak-and-dagger types.
This actually be ga n Military spokesmen say
/
about 1960 when the Cen- that a number of SOG per-
tral Intelligence Agency sonnel have been drib-
began to sharply trim bling out for several
its involvement in
many programs. Part of
this was caused. by
Abrams, who disliked hav-
ing Army types under CIA
command as was the case
in several areas. At any
rate, the CIA began to
withdraw provincial
agents from the Phoenix
program�aimed at root-
ing out and killing Viet
Cong, "Phantom govern-
ment" officials�and quit
funding (and controlling)
such programs as the
training school at Vung
Tau which turned out
government Revolutiona-
ry Development cadre.
Though the CIA's tenta-
cles still reach all the sen-
sitive areas of control in
South Vietnam, the em-
phasis now is less on
"operational" areas and
more on pure intelligence
gathering.
Paralleling the CIA's .ap-
preciably lower silhouette,
the, Green Beret troopers
of the 5th Special Forces
Group were pulled out a
year ago�their clandes-
tine operations being ab-
sorbed by an outfit known
as SOG�the Studies and
Observations Group. SOG
is a cloak.- and - dagger
grabbag at Abrams' head-
quarters, incorporating a
dozen or so outfits which
inontns. Its tuture will
probably be sharply di-
minished within the next
several months when the
troop withdrawal program
enters its final phase.
Paralleling these de-
clines in the "secret war'
is the increased use of sen-
sors and computers re-
quiring fewer men in the
field and more brainpower
at headquarters.
Long-range patrols into
Cambodia, Laos and even
NorthVietnam have been
virtually eliminated by
the seeding of the Ho hi
Minh Trail with electronic
sensors. Much of the cern-
.puterized analysis on the
readouts from these sen-
sors is now done from a se-
cret Air Force establish-
ment in Thailand and not
in South Vietnam (though
the results are still chan-
neled into 7th Air Force
headquarters at Tan Son
Nhut where the air. war
-egr tinues to be run).
While clandestine oper-
ations on the ground have
lessened, the Air Force
has also cut the number of
planes that were part of
the "secret war." These
planes were in conglomer-
do everything from super-. ate outfits .known as spe-
cial operations squadrons.
They included everything
from helicopters for drop-
ping penetration agents to
r a die -.packed executive
jets equipped to pick up
The operations of SOG radio in from
are noticeably less visible agents deep in enemy
today �than their. were a land. The squadrons also
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secret long-range patrols
to analyzing documents
a n d interrogating top-
rank prisoners.
Less Visible
... a
(b)(3)
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THE NEW REPUBLIC
19 FEB 19/2
The CIA put your brother in Vietnam.
CIA heroin traffic turned him on to smack.
You are paying
the CIA $ 6 billion
a year for these
social services.
EA magazine
EARTH Magazine -
The Agriculture Building
The Embarcadero at Mission
San Francisco, California 94105
Please send me a one-year subscription to EARTH.
I enclose cash, check or money order for $8.00.
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY & STATE ZIP
Mcn rt-th To 175. Approved for Release:.2918/01/30 CO2792462-nv cohccrintion to EAR-PH.
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DA LY Vi CID
18 'FEB 1972
Activities of Nixon's aides
_ President Nixon's promise of a "generation of peace"
should be considered in the context of the latest war moves
from Washington. They include:
VIETNAM: The indefinite postponement of the Paris
peace talks by Ambassador William Porter.
This follows on the jingoistic declamations by the
forme it -CIA agent at the meetings in the past couple of
months, and his filthy slander of the Versailles confer-
ence last weekend.
. VIETNAM: The prolonged and massive bombing of
South Vietnam.
A new dimension has been added to the barbarous
destruction of the land, its people; dwellings, means of
livelihood. Hitherto, the air assaults have been carried
out from Thailand and the three U.S. carriers in the Gulf
of Tonkin. Beginning Monday, B-52s recently flown to
Guam and based there have been assigned to the so-called
"Limited duration" devastation program.
GREECE: Establishment of a U.S. naval base at Pir-
aeus. .
In return for U.S. support, the dictatorial junta has
agreed that the U.S. establish a home port for the U.S.
Sixth Fleet and for 10,000 Naval personnel and dependents,
at the port for Athens.
SOVIET UNION: In preparation for the Defense
Department's campaign to extract new billions from the
Federal Treasury, Secretary Melvin Laird has pitched
higher the Administration's hysterical warnings of Soviet
peril and has demanded billions for new weapons, includ-
ing a one-billion-dollar appropriation for a new advanced
missile submarine:
These and other manifestations of the glaring contra-
diction between Nixon's words and his government's deeds
,have moved the Senate to enact �
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�
VIS1V) 104
.346 JO�
Spockal
. By SHERLEY UHL
, Press Politics Editor
There may be more activity
- on the outside than on the
inside at the Republican Na-
tional Convention in August,
but any demonstrations will be
peaceful, Dr. Benjamin Spock
predicted here today.
The widely recognized pe-
diatrician, running for the
; -presidency on . the People's
Party ticket, said anticipated
protests in San Diego are
"well ajong, in plannings."
Permits Sought
He said youth groups eve'l
now are negotiating with offi-.
dials there for permits am
other arrangements necessary
to conduct "nonviolent" dem-
onstrations at the convention.
"It won't be a civil disobedi-
ence type of thing," he ex-
plained. Instead, he insisted, it
will be an orderly attempt to
"keep the pressure on" in
demands for troop withdraw-
als and peace.
Spock said he Is not aware of
what might occur at the Dem-
ocratic convention in Miami
Beach, but he described the
1968 demonstrations in Chica-
;, go as "infinitely worthwhile."
. "They radicalized tens of.
� millions of young people," said
Spock. "It was brutal . . .
� America will never be the
tame."
� Spock, one of the godfathers
of the youth protest move-
ment, was in Pittsburgh to
rustle up not only interest in
his candidacy, but also signa-
tures on petitions, yequired to
put his name on the ballot.
March 8.Deadline
� The peoples Party needs
$6,000 signatures by March 8,
and, said Spock, it probably
will be necessary to.� c011ect
65,000 to overcome all chat-
. - lenges.
At a. news conference, he
Outlined his platform, includ-
;in i m late halt in
edc'efld;
VS
DR. BENJAMIN SPOCK
Won't be "intimidated."
withdrawal of "troops, merce-
nary and paramilitary (Cen-
tral Intelligence A g eller
fuses." .
1
He also would withhold eco-
nomic support from the Thieu
government.
Spock contended it was "out- .
rageous" for presidential as-
sistant H. R. Haldeman and �
others to impute treasonous
motives to war critics.
"The American people voted
for his (Haldeman'S) boss be-
cause Nixon promised a quick
end to the war in Vietnam,"
said Speck. "I hope American
people won't be intimidated by
that kind of rubbish."
In response to questions,
Spock said he is dedicated to _
the U. S. and, "It's our govern-
ment that is lousing up our
relations with other nations."
He speaks at 8 p. m. today
st Lawrence Hall, Point Park
College, downtown, and lateii?.
will attend a beer lest at Peg/
pies Party headquarters
Oakland. �el . �
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BE L. flP CO
Available
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FEBRUARY 1972
Ctql;7,1:{0 I A VID 10
�
1
ri9incraiibile, ma' chi e uscita be-
tie dalla rivelazione del farnoso
Rapport� McNamara � sul Vietnam,
e stata proprlo la C.I.A.
Questo ente misterioso e colossale,
sfuggente e onnipresente, temuto, ca-
lunniato, dalle leggende false e pro
palate ad arte quale schermo per ye-
rita che battono le invenzioni roman-
zesche, danito ii delinquente min�-
. rile della politica estera americana �,
dalle recenti pubblicazioni di documen-
ti segreti sal conflitto chc hanno divi-
so e sconvolto gli Stati Uniti, risulta
schierato la maggior parte &lie_ vol-
te eon le � colombe � anzicliC con
falchi �, sprezzante le illusioni di go-
vernanti e di militari sulle possibilita
di vittoria. E anche contrario ai born-
"
lc, determinante quella conversio-
ne del niiiiitro della Difesa Robert
McNamara clic turbo graveinente ii
Presidente Johnson c costituisce uno
dei drammi .psicologici della nostra e-
poca, coerente insomnia con quella ri-
volta popolare, giovanile, dci beatnik,
dgli hippy, clegli intellettuali e degli
irregolari che indusse Lyndon Johnson
a non ripresentarsi candiclato e che e
ancora attualmente c potenzialmente
al cuore della crisi americana.
.Si direbbc che la C.I.A., organ� di
spionaggio c azione scgreta, abbia pre-
ferito combattere in Asia sudorientale
da.sola, una guerra personale � co-
me l'aveva concepita c voluta John
Kennedy, (pale si era iniziata fra
bar c le abitazioni galleggianti di Sai-
bardamenti del Vietnam tt t !

be hate a mano, pugnalate, voltafac-
cia e tregue, con ragazzini portaordi-
ni e belle figliole che distraevano gli
avversari, anziche ridurre la rivalita
con i comunisti a quell� che ii poeta
Auden chiarna revento stypido e-
grossolano delle battaglie
Non ci Si meravigli Sc i misted, le
operazioni e le delusioni della C.I.A.
evocano citazioni letterarie: l'immagi-
nazione 6 inclispensabile per penctrar-
la, per indovinare da quell� che ine-
sorabilmente trapela quanto ci sia di
vero c tremendo nel groviglio an fin-
ziamenti, nomine, impiegati, agenti pa-
lcsi e segrcti, cadaveri. II defunto se-
natore democratic� Richard B. Rus-
sell, che era presidente della Commis-
sione per le forze armate e sostenito-
orm r dr fiumo Arlekano con born-
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO279246
r dei massirno riserbo sulk attivita 2e
70ntintiod
)
yrvitr went, 'Tonere
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
80 DEC 1971
(b)(
3)`
�
U.S.DiplomatsinWetnam'
Said to Face Moral issue
I.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 29�As-
signments to Vietnam�par-
ticularly to the pacification
programs there�have caused
By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times
�wnen we're given the
facts," a Pentagon spokesman
said, "we always look into
atrocity charges."
The magazine article is mane
many young career diplomats with the name "John Cray-
to face a serious "moral dilem- more," a pseudonym, the jour-
ma," according to an article in nal explains, for a former dip-
the December issue of the For- lomat who served in Vietnam
and whose primary reason for
eign Service Journal, subsequently resigning from the
The critical question, the ar- Foreign Service was "disagree-
tide says, is how far they men with United States policy
should go in exposing incidents on ECutheast Asia."
"which they knew to be CLigressional and diplomatic
wrong."
. One Foreign Service officer,
now back from Vietnam and
on his way to another overseas
assignment, is reported by the
article to possess a file of
"documented atrocities, includ-
ing Photographs."
"He has written extensive
reports on these apparent wan
crimes he investigated in Viet-
nam," the article states. "As
far as he knows, no action has
ever been taken to punish the ,
guilty, it says. �
The article, which is entitled
"Vietnamization of the Foreign
Service," goes on to say that
the owner of the file will not
make his information public
because he is a "supporter of
the President's Vietnam policy
and fears the effect on that
policy of additional war crime
controversy."
He is also "aware of the
negative result disclosure would
have on his career prospects,"
the earticle states. .
Press Reports Cited
State Department sources!
said that the alleged atrocities'
were investigated by the de-
partment and were also re-
ported in the United States
press on Jan. 12, 1970. They
are said to have concerned the
South Korean "Tiger" Division,
one of two South Korean infan-
try divisions serving in Viet-
nam, and not United States
forces.
A State Department spokes-
man said that "implications in
the article that United States
forces were involved or that
there was a cover-up by the
State Department are just plain
Inaccurate and misleading."
A Pentagon spokesman said
that officers in its Southeast
Asian section had not been
able to obtain the current issue
of the Foreign Service Journal
and thus could not comment.
"The artiele Says that the
Vietnam experience has "sharp-
ened the generation gap" be-
tween young and older diplo-
mats. The younger officers, it
says, often returned disillu-
sioned with what they regard
as deliberate suppression by
senior officers of criticism eith-
er of the Vietnamese authori-
ties or of the United States
military.
The political section of the
huge United States Embassy in
Saigon is especially subject to
riticism on these grounds, the
article asserts.
"Almost all foreign service
officers who served in the paci-
fication programs and most jun-
ior members of the embassy
staff itself give examples of
how their reporting was distort-
ed and suppressed in Saigon
in order that the embassy
might be consistent with the
"to
'line' in dispatches
vto Washington," the writer de.
gram in Vietnam from 1966 to dares. �
1968 and later resigned to be-, Combat Experience
come a foreign policy consult-
ant to Congress. Mr. Marks has "Statistics they knew to be
confirmed his authorship.
I merely worthless were con-
Thestantly being quoted by the
Foreign Service Journal ! ''d f the United St
,
has a circulation of approxi- !as an indication that progress
mately 10,000 copies through- was being made in Vietnam,"
out the executive branch and in !it says-
Other points made in the
, article included these:
CWhile there was no clear
'State Department policy, most
!Foreign Service officers in the
field were expected to bear
arms. Many participated in
icombat operations and even
e ry firalledie n m
n on
enemy
sit
es pooraiorntisl-;
CThe State Department de-
sources have identified the au-
thor as John. D. Marks, who
served in the pacification pro-
Congress. It is published month-
ly by the American Foreign
Service Association, a voluntary
group comprising approximate-
ly 8,000 active and retired
Foreign Service personnel.
The article notes that nearly
3 million Americans have now
served in Vietnam, including
career diplomats, or approxi-
mately 20 per cent of the For-
eign Service.
Approximately 350 � the
great majority of them junior
officers�have been assigned to
the pacification program,
known as Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development
Support, or CORDS. They have
functioned as advisers to the
South Vietnamese civilian and
military administration � try-
ing, the article says, to make
the Government of South Viet-
nam "a viable force in the
countryside."
Generation Gap 'Sharpened'
Service in Vietnam, the ar-
ticle says, is a unique experi-
trice. In no other country have
perhaps 20 per cent of the
foreign service officers experi-
mented with soft drugs, but of disagreement with the Viet--
"that is the case in Vietnam," nam war, but "they are deli-
it asserts. :nitely the exception and in
"And in no other country," it each known case they have
adds, "do foreign service offi-
cers have their own personal been very junior officers."
automatic weapons and receive The article maintains that,
training in how to fire a gee_ despite the difficulties in re-
nade-launcher before they go,,, cruiting _ Foreign Service per-
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cided during President Lyndon
B. Johnson's second term that
it must contribute 150 diplo-
mats to the approximately
1,000 United States personnel
military as well as aid, in-
ytelligence and other civilians�
in the CORDS program. Its pol-
icy of making duty in the pac-
ification program mandatory
f of�
junior officers split the
Foreign Service until it was
scrapped last August. Now as
the United States presence in
Vietnam is reduced, only vol-
unteers who have previously
served in at least one other
diplomatic post are being sent.
'CA few Foreign Service offi-
cers have resigned as a result
sonnel for Vietnam, "the ma\
jority enjoy the experience
once they go."
Living conditions often are
pleasant and, the article says,
they find "the country and
especially the women fascinat-
ing."
When these officers are as-
signed elsewhere, it states, "the
return to a more traditional
Foreign Service assignment is
often a letdown,"
(b)(3)
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26 DEC. 1971
(b)(3)
e5 okra S. Knight's NedeDoolz
WITH THE PASSING of an-
other Christmas, joyous for
some and not so happy for oth-
ers, my thoughts turn to our
prisoners of war in Vietnam and
the cumulative casualty lists
since the beginning of our folly
in that tragic land.
Since 1961, 45,626 of our
youth have died and another
302,367 are listed as wounded in
a jungle war fought for unattain-
able and mistaken objectives.
The cruel drama of this re-
pulsive war, together with the
fateful decisions taken during
the Kennedy administration, has
never been more vividly por-
trayed than in NBC's "Vietnam
Hindsight," a remarkable two-
part documentary which strip-,
away all of the noble self-
serving rhetoric and bared the
bones of an unspeakable trage-
dy. ,
First With Diem
� IN THE Eisenhower adminis-
tration, several hundred U.S. ad-
visers were in South Vietnam to
assist Ngo Dinh Diem, the first
provisional president who was
afterward reelected in 1961.
President Diem was an ex-
traordinarily strong ruler and a
despot in deed and fact. Eisen-
hower promised Diem financial
aid and military training for
Diem's Army, provided South
Vietnam's ruler made a number
of indicated land and other re-
forms. Sadly, no reforms were
ever made. �
In the United States, Diem
had the strong support of Joseph
P. Kennedy, patriarch of the
family, the late Cardinal Francis
Spellman together with organi-
zations of Americans determined
to "stop communism" in South-
east Asia.
Later, Vice President Lyndon
Johnson was to � call Diem "the
Winston Churchill of Southeast
Asia."
Pressures Greiv
FOLLOWING John F. Kenne-
dy's election in 1960, the pres-
sures for U.S. intervention be-
came greater. By 1963, we had
16,000 troops in South Vietnam
and were facing some very diffi-
cult decisions indeed
Jack Kennedy was a sorely.
troubled man as he contemplat-
ed his earlier statements that the
struggle in Asia was net worth
the life of a single American, and
the growing awareness that the
United States had become pre-
cariously involved.
His chief concerns arose
from Diem's absolutism, rumors
of a planned Coup against Diem
and the chilling news that Sai-
gon was losing the war.
Within the White House.
Kennedy advisers were divided
on how to proceed.. After many
fact finding missions to South
Vietnam and long consultations
with Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge, a reluctant and torment-
ed Kennedy -decided that Diem
must go.
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letnarn
Bloody Plot
�THE CIA'S principal agent in
Saigon had been in close contact
with Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh,
leader of the plot against Diem.
He informed "Big Minh" that the
signals were green and on the
first days of November, 1963,
the Diem regime was over-
thrown.
Although President Diem and
his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had
been offered safe conduct by
Ambassador Lodge, Gen. Minh,
by a vote of the conspirators, or-
dered their assassination. A
third brother, Ngo Dinh Can,
was also executecion May 9.
Their blood was on our
hands. In effect and by not op-
posing the coup, the White
House had decreed their fate.
Within three weeks of Presi-
dent Diem's murder; John F.
Kennedy � 35th President of
the United States � was shot.
and fatally wounded by an as-
sassin as he rode in a motorcade
in downtown Dallas.
Bad Judgments
THE NBC documentary fur-
ther reveals In stark detail the
appalling degree . of confusion
and mistaken judgments which
led tp Lyndon Johnson's escala-
tion of the war in 1965. �
Cabot Lodge is shown to
have been a man rigidly inclined
to imperious dictums. Defense
Secretary McNamara was fight-
ing a war with computers and
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25 DEC � 1971
(1D)(3)
A Canadian Perspective
Amnesty When?
Toronto
At his November 12 press conference, Mr. Nixon was
asked if, once the war was ended, he would grant am-
nesty to young American men who went abroad to
avoid the military draft. He was .obviously unpre-
pared for the question. He had no circumlocutions or
rhetoric at hand. He replied, "No."
There are approximately 50,000 American war re-
sisters in Canada, most of them "guilty" of breach of
Selective Service or military law. They have been flow-
ing across the border in a steady stream since the mid-
sixties. Canada has granted those who qualify by edu-
cation, skills, job offers, etc., "landed immigrant
status" leading to citizenship. No question may be
asked concerning their draft or military status in the
process of "landing." Once landed, they are not ex-
traditable by Canadian-US treaty. They have not com-
mitted an offence punishable within Canada.
They are a mixed lot. Some are educated, reflective
young men who after attending Vietnam war sit-ins,
rapping with their political science professors, and
hassling the Selective Service system as long as pos-
sible, have come to Canada prepared and have as-
similated quickly. Others, less privileged, poorly edu-
cated, who got caught up in military service and who
split for Canada impulsively when on order to Viet-
nani, have naturally had greater difficulty in adapting.
What the articulate among them are saying goes
something like this: "Amnesty is not ouF problem; it
is the problem of guilt-ridden American liberals. We
have done nothing for which we need to accept for-
giveness. In a choice between being criminals in South-
east Asia, being treated as criminals in American pris-
ons and stockades, and a new life in Canada-. we
chose Canada. The land of the free and the home of
the 'brave has killed, crippled, jailed and exiled thou-
sands of its young. Those Americans who find this
fact hard to live with will try to make partial amends
by amnesty or 'second chance' legislation. The likeli-
hood of their succeeding in time to benefit any appreci-
able number is negligible. If and when amnesty comes,
we shall be launched on Canadian careers; have Cana-
dian Wives, and Canadian children. Amnesty will mean
being able to take the kids to visit their grandmother,
instead of her having to visit them here. Americans in
Canada with their heads screwed on right are not
making any decisions concerning their future based on
talk of amnesty."
Rather than amnesty, war resisters in Canada prefer
to focus upon what they call "repatriation." Repatria-
tion is the right to return to the United States without
any recrimination for breach of Selective Service or
military law. It is amnesty with the Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
cepting forgiveness removed. Discussion of repatria-
tion among expatriates is usually in the context of the
realities of the ongoing war. All they see happening is
a change in the color of skin among some of the
ground troops. American boys are being returned in
time and in sufficient numbers to affect the '72 elec-
tion, while the horror continues unabated. Those who
took a stand against the war and chose exile are saying
that when the war ends completely � all troops, planes,
advisors and CIA agents withdrawn � then and ohly
then, the right of exiles to return may be considered
along with other matters � US war guilt, release of
political prisoners, reparation to the peoples of Indo-
China. Repatriation is not thought of exclusively in
terms of the return of exiles. The word is used to in-
clude the release of prisoners and the surfacing of
those who have gone underground.
If the reaction of exiles is negative to amnesty pro-
posals implying their guilt, imagine their, feelings
about proposals which link them with war 'planners
and criminals. There are suggestions abroad which call
for amnesty for all war-related offences � for the Lt.
Calleys as well as draft and military offenders. As a
Women's Strike for Peace newsletter recently ex-
pressed it, "This would solve the problem of war guilt
by sweeping everyone under the rug together � those
who refused to kill along with those who killed indis-
criminately. Then we could forget the past and march
on united to even greater national glory."
The ideal of repatriation which the exiles hold up as
just will never be realized. The US is not going to con-
fess criminality, stage its own Nuremberg trial, and
acknowledge the right of unqualified restitution to
those who broke its laws resisting this war. The US
may grant amnesty when it is politically expedient to
do so, and when it can pass it off as a gesture of mag-
nanimity and strength. That is what Senator Robert
Taft, Jr. seems to have in mind, when he proposes
amnesty for these "however misguided" young men
who "are entitled to a second chance."
When will this be? Perhaps when the political fight
to renew Selective Service legislation the next time
around does not seem worth the effort. 1974? A ges-
ture of largeness of heart in the bicentennial year of
1976? In the meantime, young Americans in Canada
are not holding their breath. Nor are they, in the nice
phrase of one Vietnam veteran and deserter, "standing
here at the border crying."
Robert Gardner
MR. GARDNER has been travelling across Canada this
year, visiting, helping, interpreting young American
exiles. He is the coordinator of the ministry to US
draft age immigrants, sponsored by the Canadian
Council of Churches.
no-. � Joky� ,�`.
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DEO 1971
(b)(3)
� By JUDY BACHRACH
.9t is in the interest of the
U.S..government that the coup
1.shall succeed."
Cable from John F. Kennedy
to Henry Cabot Lodge.
Well, last night gave us part
II of the illustrated Pentagon
Papers, otherwise known as
Hindsight. And if anything,
NBC's second episode was
More fascinating than the
" first.
Yesterday's segment dealt
with the events, the decisions,
and the non-decisions that led
up to the death of Diem. It
focused less heavily on early
Sixties footage than did the
previous segment, preferring
..to concentrate almost exclu�
sively on testimony from men
who were then involved in our
- complicity to overthrow a
� government that had turned
against us. And according to
the show, our complicity was
well nigh wholehearted by the
time the coup of the generals
took place.
� Chief among the subjeris
.1( was Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, a
key CIA agent in Vietnam who
'now claims that as early as
.August, 1963, he was given or-
ders not to thwart a possible
Coup of the Diem regime. It's
hard to remember when there
has been a more avid testifier
. than Colonel Conein, or one
more anxious to relay contem-
porary history as he knew it
and lived it.
It was embarrassing
In 1963, the United States
�was growing increasingly dis-
satisfied with Diem. He was
getting repressive, he insti-
tuted martial law, Buddhist
monks were immolating them-
selves, . it was embarrassing.
Also, Diem was starting to
make deals with North Viet-
nam, and this was more than
a little distressing to our gov-
�ernment. "His brother told
me" said Colonel Conein, "that
IfDieml was dealing with the
A documentary that really4
turns pack time
HANS CONREID
people of North Vietnam. So
the generals knew this too.
And they considered this a
danger, because what were
they fighting for if he negotiat-
ed behind their back?"
What indeed? Diem wanted
above everything else to reuni-
fy his country. Mr. Kennedy
and his advisors were appalled
at the idea of supporting a
man who would sell them
down the river. But the first
coup was never pulled off.
Robert Kennedy wanted ta get
out of Vietnam totally arid
some advisers concurred that
withdrawal would be prefera-
ble to supporting Diem. Only
Robert S. McNamara wanted
to delve a little deeper into the
situation, and tripped off on a
visit to Vietnam. According to
Roger Hilsman, President
Kennedy let him because he
wanted to avoid divisiveness
among his cabinet.
From that time on, however,
it became too late to remove
ourselves entirely from a situ-
ation that even the President.
�
� �
was having second tnougnts
about. We had 16,000 men in
Vietnam; we had Henry Cabot
Lodge, who seemed anxious to
stay. And, as the program im-
plied, by that time there were
only two alternatives: to re-
form Diem or to overthrow
Diem. We withdrew our aid to
Diem: As George Ball said,
this was a hint to the rebel-
lions generals "to go ahead
and try another government
. This was inevitable." -
It became too late
Watching last night's show,
one was almost completely un-,
aware that it was a documen-
tary. And that's probably the
highest compliment you can
pay any documentary. If this
year's economy has resulted
in a. paucity of news specials,
and the political pressures in
an even greater paucity of
good news specials, Hindsight'
more than made up for the
deficiency.
�o--
it's exceedingly difficult to
speak about the unspeakable.
WBAL-TV aired a children's
special (translate "cartoon")
last night. Very likely the
crudest animation I have seen
in a long time; clumsy draw-
ings, insipid story line, and a
few sad voices, the most nota-
ble of which belonged to Hans
Conreid. There's nothing like
hearing those prophetic words
"Wait till the Messiah comes.
11 fix those guys," to make.
ou doubt your sanity. And if I
see one more dog who woofs
on command, I'm notifying the
city pound.
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VEASHL.C4i
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1%ti �
M C Claims
lem Death
Inside Story
Seventeen - generals and -
colonels of the South Viet-
namese army voted unani-
mously to kill President Ngo
Dinh Diem in 1963, and were
not particularly discouraged
by a high - ranking U.S.
CIA official, an NBC report
scheduled to be telecast to-
night discloses.
, The report is Part 2 of "An
NBC News White Paper: Viet-
nam Hindsight,'" and deals
.with the origins of America's
involvement in that Southeast
Asia, country.
The report presents the first
supposed inside � account of .
Diem's assassination, disguised
as a political coup, and in-
cludes statements by Alvin
Davis, associate producer of
the program, and Lt. Col. Lu-
cien Conch), the key CIA man
in South Vietnam during the
time of the coup.
It is "quite inconceivable"
:to Conein that Gen. Maxwell
;Taylor and others were not
!aware of the timing of the
coup, Conein says on the pro-
gram, which depicts Diem's
death as a Diem maneuver
that backfired.
� The decision to kill Diem
Is reported to have developed
over a series of eight meet-
ings and arguments, and, fi-
nally, a vote. Three who would
have voted to save Diem were
'assassinated before the vote
was .taken. Four others, in-
cluding the present ' Prime
Minister, Khiem, were deliber-
ately excluded from the vote.
Many among the 17, how-
ever, wanted him killed from
the start, and the only over-
heard phrase spoken in French
rather than in Vietnamese was
by Big Minh, might-have-been
presidential contender in the.
October, 1971, election, woh
said, "The pig must be killed."
After that, the vote went
like this: Big Minh: kill; Gen..
Don: kill; Gen. Xuan, kill. Col. �
Nghia, kill. At the end there
was total unanimity, and a vow
of silence was taken, The si-
lence is to be broken tonight,
Davis says.
Diem had asked for full
honors, and a "graceful" exit
from �Vienam to exile in an-
other country, but refused to
-
ask Big Minh�who in turn
was furious at the 'slight.
Between 6 and 9 p.m. Nov. 2,
the day of Diem's death, he
refused again to speak to
Minh, then finally spoke to
him on the telephone, but
Minh, outraged, hung up. On
the third try, Diem gave in,.
asking only for safe conduct.
At this point Col. Conein
said he was told by Amtas-
sador Henry Cabot Lodge not
to instigate, encourage or dis-
courage a coup, which was in
the planning stages through-
out October, 1963. But Diem,
Conein said, had his own plans
for a phony coup, after which
he and his family would be
brought in honors, by popular
acclaim, back to Saigon from
their place of exile, Pleiku.
What happened, apparently,
is that both the phony coup
and the real one came off at
the same time, fooling Diem
and his brother, Ngo Dinh
Nhu.
Conein, in an attempt to get
Diem out of the country, says
he asked his embassy for a
plane, but was told that he
would have to wait 24 hours
for it.
"I spoke for the U.S. gov-
ernment and I was authorized,
and I informed the junta'
(Diem's organization) that I
had an aircraft, but it would
take me 24 hours to have that
aircraft on the ground."
"Instead?" Davis asked.
"Instead, he was shot by a
major in the Vietnamese
army," Conein says on the
telecast. .-
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. rATIONAL MUT-MT /X
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
5 DF(.: 1P71
17 '17 C) . 17.
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AgiTA
f. \-7
VIETNAM-CAMBODIA
President Nixon was busy stepping up the we:::
lest week, sending Asian client troops into battle'.. the CIA's infamous 'Phoenix" program, A sign !
on three fronts. hiside Cambodia about 20,000 posted by the "Seals" at one of their bases on the :
Phnom Penh troops were thoroughly defeated; Mekong Delta said: "People who kill for money
on the Cambodia-Vietnam border 25,000
are. professionals. People who kill for fun are
' some
are
Saigon soldiers couldn't find the "enemy" alleged sadists. People who kill for money and fun
to a meeting of the China-Cambodia
to- be operating there; and in South Vietnam .
some 15,000 Saigon troops ware sent into the
Friendship Association in Peking Nov.. 9, 18th
- .
anniversery of the independence of the Kingdom
Central Highlands on Nov. 27. Reports of the
drive were not published until several days after of Cambodia, a report on the excellent battle
� situation end filch morale of the liberation forces
it occurred and a week afterward there was still
.r.g Sery, special envoy of the
no word on its results. (Under new press tules put was made by long
into effect Nov. 30 in Saigon, no news of the war .� Celmbc-)d'an government in exile. He said, "Under
may he published unless it is released by high the leadership of the National United Front of
Cambodia...our people are determined to unite
U.S.-Saigon officials or their spokesmen.).
� on a wide scale, wage resolute struggle, overcome
all difficufties � and hardships, win more. and
greater victories, make no compromise or retreat,
wipe out the enemy, smash the enemy's espion-
age activities and psychological warfare and-
. defend the liberated areas. Imbued with firm�-
' revolutionary optimism, the Cambodian people
and the people's armed forces of national libera-
tion are confident of the inevitable defeat of U.S.
imperialist!) and its running dogs, the Lon
Nol-
Sink Matak-Son Neoc The.nh tyaitorous clique."
American 'pilots reported last week that for the
-first time since 1935, North Vietnamese MK;
fighter planes fired air-to-air missiles at U.S. B-52
bombers. The pilots' report---not confirmed by
��
� � GI TOLL: 350,437
� . .The following casualty figures for
� china are based on .U.S. government statis-
tics. They are lower than U.S. casoaltie.s
� reported by the liberation forces. Figures
- are from Jan. 1, 1961 to Nov. 27, 1971.
Figuies in fmrenthoses are for the week
- 20 to Nov. 27. Killed: 45,613 (9); 'on- -
� combat" deaths: 9054 (7); Wounded:
. 302,283 (78); Missing, captured: 1617.
'
the U.S. command�said North Vietname.39 Rus� �
sian- and Chinese-built MICs had made about 10
passes in the last two weeks at U.S. bomlears
flying over Leos. Said a senior pilot in Saigon in
en interview with the New York Times, 'I'crsay
the Ml Cs represent a seriOus new threat, not a
; potential threat but a real one. "....With Indb-
chime doing all the. fighting, U.S. troop with:
drawels are continuing. By Nov. 30 there were
1827,400 GIs in Southeest Asia. The' lest of the
Navy's "Seals" are also leaving Vietnam. The
operations of this special unit were stopped,
according to the Times, "because some members
. of the coinnlando teems in the field have become
afraid their activities might bring down on them
the kind' of prosecution that convicted U.
William .Calley in the it-lessee:fa of civilians at
Mylai." The "Seals' " work included support of !
z
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_ GC. 0 � talit E1 L
1,13
� By Peter Osnos But - �considering the p. These reports, along with province and police officials.
Washington lost Foreign Service portance. attached to Phoe- the cloak and dagger aura of misuse their authority to
.: � SAIGON, Dec. 13 � The .nix as recently as a year ago . CIA involvement and spe- settle
grievances and inno-
Phoenix program, devised :and the fact that only a few .eiallY trained and paid Viet-
four years ago by the CIA hundred Americans were in cent people are jailed or,
namese agents. known as , .
as the way to wipe out the volved even at the peak, the PRU (provincial reconnaiss- vorse. .
Vietcong's political infra- -.pullout at this stage is seen ance . units), gave the pro-. In Angiang, the country's
structure, remains today one ' by many observers as an ad- gram a sinister reputation .most pacified province, a
that overshadowed 1 man was recently trun-
of the most notable failures mission that there is shnply . its con-
of the war. . very little more that can be tinning inability to accom- cheoned to death before it
was
� This is the view expressed 'done. plish the job it had been as- - ' dis -'�
oovered that he had
'
by many senior members of "The military didn't know signed, been picked up by mistake. . The killer was an enlisted
-the U.S. establishment here, how to advise the program "The most impo.rlant .
thing about Phoenix,' a man in the militia assigned
sometimes in the boldest and the Vietnamese didn't
official. commented early in to the local intelligence.
possible terms. "It's a lousy - want to learn," said an Amer-
.failure," one top-echelon � lean . civilian who has 1970, unit.-.
"is that it is not work-�
a The case . was reported in
American said loudly at a watched Phoenix closely. ing."
reception the other night. Official Vietnamization Reason Foi� Trouble .. the Vietnamese press and
informed U.S. sources said a .
. -Despite the recognized im- figures Show that about One reason frequently of- sergeant had .acted on his.
portance to the Saigon gov- 20,000 agents -are "neutral- fered for Phoenix's troubles own without authority and
.ernment's future of climi- ized" (killed, captured or is that it involves an ex- would ,be tried later.
mating the Vietcong's clan- rallied to the government traordinarily complex mesh- HoW many of these incl.
. destine Poltical apparatus, it side) each year. But, Ameri- ing of information and per- dents go undiscovered is
Is apparently no longer con- cans acknowledge that prac- sonnel from any number Of anybody's guess. "This is an
sidered an achievable goal. tinily all of this probably Vietnamese military, para- undisciplined country at
� The Vietcong infrastruc- inflated figure were low- military and civilian groups. War," said a high-ranking
Lure consists . of enemy level village and hamlet op- Leadership is nominally U.S. pacification official,
agents responsible for re- eratives and P-le basic lead- vested in the national polic, "and Plioeni> is about what
� cruiting, collecting taxes, ership still remains, and its elite special branch: you'd have to expect."
spreading propaganda, infil- A very small percentage In fact, the military often"
trating legitimate groups of even these are killed or predominates. The interest
and generally undermining captured because Phoenix and personality of the prov-
government influence, The - intelligence ferreted them ince chiefs and their princi-
cache of about 70,000 called out. What usually happens i3 pal aides are also instrumen- .
VCIs are homegrown and that persons rounded up in taL
deeply rooted. : routine military operations Information is gleaned
� This summer the U.S. and are subsequently listed as from a variety of sources.
-
South Vietnamese officials ' VC's* including armed sources
"Statistics show that for ganda teams, revolutionary
decided to offer bounties as every one neutralization of development, cadre and
high as $11,000 for high- a previously identified VCI
plain villagers. The data is
'ranking VCIs. The plan was . we are neutralizing fear collected and Maintained at
never carried out, sources that were not previously district and province intelli-
Identified," the senior Amer- gence and interrogation cen-
said, because it was realized
. lean adviser. in Binhduong
that it wouldn't work. ters.
. . Province wrote recently. Plaids are entrusted to the
"The , Vietnamese are Phoenix (known Properly PRU, . the CIA-sponsored
never going to turn their by its Vietnamese name squads who are the action
.own people in," . said an Phuong Hoang � all-seeing arm of Phoenix, sometimes
'American with many years bird) has been in trouble militia units and the police
of experience in Vietnam, from the start. It was drawn, harei also f involved. American
e icop ers are used fre-
"and they certainly won't. up by the CIA as a "system- quently to ferry the PRU.
take sides politically until .
the outcome of the war is atic effort at intelligence cc-
Country' -
abSolutely clear." ordination and exploitation" .
In cases where wanted
"Survival (in South Viet- � a way to prevent clumsy
VCIs a r e apprehended,'
nam) has often meant and_ overlap. It was turned over trials arc conducted by prov:
largely still means sitting on to the Vietnamese in 1968, incial security councils,
- the fence," explained one � made up of the province
young official. ,' Agents were to be identi-
various police and
lied, apprehended and pun- chief,ie.f,
military officials and whom-
Advisers Withdrawn ished by local authorities.
� For sonic months now, - War critics in the United ever the province chief. se-
American military advisers states promptly attacked lects. .
to the program have been Phoenix as a counterterror In practice, all this turns
gradually withdrawn, effia organization, utilizing assas- out to be a haphazard busi-
cially as part of the overall sination and torture as itsaca ''_., Among other things,
Phase.out. A small comple- principal tools. Periodically,"
i merit of men from the Ccn- there were reports on such officials said, suspects fro-
sq tral Intelligence Agency will abuses. , - .� � _ quently bribe their way out,
remain.
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MIAMI, FLA.
HERALD ii3Ec 1 3 1971
� M � 380,828
� 479,02
Jack Kofo6d Says
eqs�,fe.
�
�
Is the Secretive C
orth the Ex
The Central Intelligence
Agency has laid off 5,000
spies, and only 134,000 em-
ployes are left on the payroll.
Nobody knows how much the
CIA costs us, because it
doesn't have to account pub-
licly for its spending. The ex- �
penditures run into billions.
� The spies, who manned to
keep their methods secret for
years, haven't been success-
ful at that recently. It has
been disclosed in Vietnam
that torture is one of their
gimmicks for obtaining infor-
Mation from close-mouthed
people. They've ordered mur-
der, as in the case of a dou-,
ble-crosSing agent in Viet- ,
nam. The CIA apparently is V
answerable to no one, which
makes it the most dangerous
government agency the Unit-
ed States has ever known.
The intelligence beagles
'haven't been as successful as
they'd have us believe. Pearl
Harbor should have been an-
ticipated. Douglas MacAr-
thur scoffed at Chinese inter-
vention in Korea two days
before the Reds moved in.
His G2 should not he saddled
With all the blame, for the
142.111412... Haris of the CIA
were supposed to know. '
And, what about the Bay
of Pigs? There was a perfect-
ly fouled up job, based on
completely unreliable Intelli-
gence. We don't seem to be
getting adequate information
for the billions we're spend-
ing.
ense?
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12 DEC. 1971
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1..) teal
'Pr It.
k ral teL
It'n��Y, -
\.;.`..) L. Id
!iir,7500tenTo Pea' 2?
tiNLiT ORMAN MAILER and Rip Torr
\el flounder together in the island
grass, Mailer bleeding from
his hammered head, Torn's ear half
'bitten off. They- rise and exchange
maledictions:
Mailer: Kiss off!
Torn: Walk on!
Mailer: Kiss off!
� Torn: I'll leave the hissing to you!
- The lights come up. The preview
audience at the Whitney Museum
moves xlisbelievingly toward the out-
er gallery 'where cocktails and cana-
pes await them among Edward Flop-
per's melancholy seascapes. I spot
, Jose Torres,. Buzz Farber, Mailer
himself and then, suddenly, Daniel
Ellsberg and his wife, Patricia. We
wave and shrug our shoulders. Only
a few days before, the Ellsbergs had
agreed to let me trail them about for
p�few weeks; but I'M not scheduled
.to start until the following day. �
"L ask Ellsberg what he thought of
the film, Mailer's "Maidstone." He
:says he was struck most by the two-
page mimeog,raphed prospectus
� handed out at the door which said
"Maidstone" was created out of "a
.deep and revolutionary conviction"
that a film must probe "the mystery
of life, in all of its fathomless com-
plexity." Ellsberg �says it read like
"all those prospectuses, the Govern-
ment prepared for the pacification
program in Vietnam�how they were
going to win the minds and hearts of
the Vietnamese people. This time it's
the minds and hearts of the audience.
.The guys in Vietnam never realized
J. ANTHONY LUICAS, a staff writer
for The Times Magazine, is the -author of
"Don't Shoot�We Are Your Children!"
:how badly they:failed. Do you think
Mailer realizes how he failed?"
Abruptly, he's off on a different
tack, his blue-gray eyes snapping
eleetrically. An enthusiastic amateur
photographer, he's intrigued � by the
cinema verite technique in the film.
"All through. It I kept jabbing Pat
and saying, �'If Mailer can do it, any-
body can do it.' Maybe I should
I
Marx, the millionaire toy manufac-
turer).. The Ellsbergs; who now live
in Cambridge; have kept it as a New
York pied a. terra and refuge
for Patricia in case Dan goes to
jail after his trial next spring
for unlawful possession and
use of the Pentagon Papers.
Meanwhile, it's quite a pied a
term. Three large windows . �
present a spectacular view of .�
the East River. The decor is
expensively Modern. Two deep
brown leather couches con-,
front each other across 'a
square glass coffee table un-
der a silver lamp arched half-
t.1
L. IL __I,-
_
I ��� n "Th.
1%./ �
�
�"N\ r�el
wif 1 I:11,
S prearranged I reach the Ells-
/I
bergs' 14th-floor apartment on
Sutton Place South at 1:15 P.M., in
time for us to dash to the airport and
.catch the .2 P.M. shuttle to Washing-
ton where Dan is scheduled to re-
ceive the "Federal Employe of the
Year" award that- night from the
Federal Employes for Peace.
But I find him far from ready to
leave. He has mislaid a spiral note-
book containing his notes for that
evening's speech. For 15 minutes, he
ransacks briefcases, bookshelves and
a desk piled high with notes and
documents for the book he is doing
(ono:anon and Schuster. "This is ter-
.rible. I know I had it with me when
went to see the lawyer yesterday."
But no luck. We're going to miss our
plane, so I phone for reservations on
a 2:30 flight. (I'm reminded of the
afternoonl phoned to broach the pro-
posal for a magazine piece. Ellsberg
said he had to catch a train and.
couldn't talk long, but he talked near-
ly 10 'minutes. Then . he called an
hour later to say, "We missed the
train. You might as Nvell come over
now.")
We are to be joined on the trip
by Peter Schrag of the Saturday Re-
view who has been interviewing Dan
that morning. While Ellsberg contin-
Lies his hunt, Schrag, and I admire the
apartment, actually PatriCia's bache-
dining.. table. near the win-
dows, a French 'maid has now
set � .Melon, chicken,
.tomatoes, ginger ale. But we
barely have time to munch
some chicken before rushing
to the. airpeat.
JeN the taxi, Ellsberg betrays
'some disappointment, about
this evening's event. Leaders
of the Federal -Employes for
Peace report difficulties in
rounding up an ..audience.
Most Government agencies
have. refused to let them post
notices on their bulletin
boards. "We, too. bad," he
says. "I'd hoped they could
use ray appearance, .to _do
some real recruiting-o-particu-
lady at State, Defense and
the...C.I.A. I wanted to see
posteta with my picture on
theta all over the Pentagon:
'Come hear Dan Ellsberg
speak for peace.'"
� About half an hour before.
the .banquet is due to begin,
we� enter the ballroom of La
Cemma, a catering hotel four
blocks from the Whiteliouse.
Eilsberg learns to his delight
that the evening is a sellout,
more .than a thousand people
are expected. Now, he's a lit-
tle worried because he never
found his notebook and still
hasn't written his speech.
"Couldn't I just find a little
room here W:lefe I could eat
alone and write?" he asks.
lor digs. (she is the daughter of Louis .� ach no,n says Susan
Strauss, one of the evening's
organizers. "All these people
want to watch you eat."
At 8, the ballroom is packed
with lawyers from the Justice
Department, 'desk officers
from _State, tax men from In-
ternal Revenue and squads of
fluttery secretaries. When
Ellsberg milts onto the ros-
.trum they give him a stannial3
-ovation.
� I find rayaelf sitting next to
Richard Strout of" The Chris-
tian SCiCriCe 1.1011107.- is
the New Reouhlic's
way. nrrn e Slrout tells me that back in
_
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2, DEC 1971
� A p�-�.7 . ,
� e 12. Tr Eh' � lf v...} "g
15 6
� �
�, 4 k ritr-,--)
Lit ti-ft,-L/Ci t!kti � kJ 4.,.cif.1)0
� �71 , -717 -9 0 _II
- .
. .. . . ... .
: "To emphasize the point that we are not seeking to find
. � l villains and assess blame, as there is blame enough for every-
-!one,:the.ti.tie was changed td "An NBC News White Paper: Viet .
;Nam..Hirrdsight." -.- -. �� : . , , .
- 1
. � Thus did Reuven Frank, president of NBC News, announce !
that a..doeumentary originally entitled '"The Death of Diem; :An ;
�� !NBC News White Paper on John F. Kennedy and the Viet Nam :
! War" -'would be expanded and the. emphasis changed.
In an earlier announcement, the network. described the doe- 1
umentary as "television's first attempt to document the deci- ;
,
sion-making process. that 'led
to the nation's deepening in-
volvement in the Viet Nam ;
war during the Kennedy ad.: i
.- -1
�: ministration." ,
I
The broad5ast, which was .
� ,,.
to be an hour long and cover
the period 1961 to 1933, has
now ' been expanded . to two
hours. The first hour, entitled
"How It Began," will be seen
at 7:30 p. m. Dec. 21, and the
second, "The Death of Diem;"-
will be seen at 9 p. In. Dec. 22.
'Transcripts of the two pro-
grams will not be released un-
til just prior to 'broadcast, but
, it is said that key ifeures. in
-' the decision-making process
veill appear with their recollec-
tions.
..,,,,g .. u,.
Producer Fred .1'1-ad is
. - No Dinh DiQm - said to have obtained new in-
formation on the assassinations of President Ngo Dinh Diem .
� iand his. brother., Nhu, and the role played by United States
intelligence officers. . . _. ' . .
- "As the material developed not only in volume but in '
. scope,' said Prank, '[hose. 'a! u5 who watched it come in were '
struck by its importance and powerful narrative thrust. New :
material was corning out .about a time of unique significance in '
� recent American history and new in�ighis about information]
- , eight, nine, and 10 years .old that .was ig,nored .or . at, least ,
. .
underestimated at the time. � ,
. "Perhaps the most interesting insight," Prank continued,'
,.."was that after President Diem and his brother *died, in the
coup, Viet Nam and all related problems were in the forefront
.of American attention. Until then such problems. as Berlin, the
Cuban-' missile crisis, and even Laos were Considered more ,
' important." . . �- I
Some- 20 officials' involved 'in Viet Nam- war strategy have i
been. interviewed by NBC News. Among the participants are.
.Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the President's military adviser and dater
chairmen .of the Joint 'Chiefs of Staff; Gcn...Ten That Dinh, who
commanded troops in the Saigon area 'at the time of the coup; �
. Rufus Phillips, who directed the. strategic hamlets program in�
� the-Delta area of Viet Nam and ran U. S. aid missions; Freder-
ick Nolting, ambassador td the Saigon government until August,
. 1903, when he was replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge; George.
Ball, acting secretary of stale; John Kanto:Ur Galbraith, who
. "told President Kennedy the U. S. could not win in Viet Nam
'N vith Diem, that we should not ..sc.n-A in U. S. troops"; and
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2 DEC 1971
�
t
Li
I "
L
I ."-Nt7
C\
f
(7,1,71 r"7,-Tj
In 30 months of power, with Ins "vietnaraization of
the. war" aimed at implementing the "Nixon doctrine"
in this part of the world, President Nixon not only obstin-
ately continued and-prolonged the' war of aggression in
South Vietnam, but. also embarked on new military ad-i
Veeturea...teeainst the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam, overtly extended the U.S. war of aggression into
Cambodia and Laos, whose undertakings were accompan-
ied by innumerable crimes against the peoples of the three
Indochinese countries, and seriously jeopardized peace in
Southeast Asia. �
, I. In carrying out "Vietuarnization," the Nixon ad-
ministration prolongs the U.S. war of aggression with
countless concomitant fresh crimes against the South
Vietnamese people.
1)- The Saigon array feverishly beefed up and an im-
portant contingent of U.S.. troops maintained in South
Vietnam.
Under the U.S. plan, the Saigon junta feverishly draft-
ed. troops from 15-year-old adolescents to fifty-year-olds-
to raise the strength of their army from half a rnillioni
to a million-odd men. Besides, it reorganized the police
into an armed force with 20 men per village, 300 per. dis-
trict, 3,003 per province, and tens of thousands at the
central echelon to lay an iron grip upon the population
and repress. them. Over a million people, mostly aged,
Women and children were forced into "civil defense"
units.
. With a great sense of urgency, the U.S. equipped the
Saigon army with all types of weapons and war means.
Since the beginning of the "Vietnamization" program
alone, it has supplied 610,000 M.16 rifles, 20,00 machine-
guns, 34,000 grbriade-throwers, 870 guns, 10,000 81mm mor-
tars, 210 M41. tanks, Lem armored vehicles, 44,000 military
lorries and 40,000 transceivers....
� As regards the Saigon air force, the U.S. provided it
with some 850 planes of various types and has intended to
bring this figure to 1,200 by 1972. To the Saigon navy, the
U.S. turned over an estimated 1600 shipe� and craft of
different kinds. The annual credit allocated by the Nixon
administration to the Saigon junta for general expenses
was brought to 2 billion dollars.
Up to June 30, 1971, the Nixon administration still
kept in South Vietnam about 240,000 U.S. troops, not in--
eluding nearly 20,000 men in the 7th Fleet and Coast-guard
units and 32,000 others in the USAF stationed at American'
airbases in 'rhetoric!.
2) Relentless furtherance of "pacification" work
backbone of the Nixon administration's "Vietuarnination"
along with intensified bombardments and sweeps
against civilians. � �
The U.S. government has just earmarked an additional
$1 billion and entrusted the U.S. Defense Department and
ly in South Vietnam. .
. The French newspaper Le Monde. on 'July 29, 1970
stated: in 1970, on an average, the U.S. discharged on the
Indochina theatre a quantity ef explosive equivalent to 11
20-kiloton A-bombs, the sort released by the U.S. on Hiro-
-shima in 1915. -
The U.S. command in Saigon 'unilaterally delineated
"free fire zones," making of entire large populated-areas
its targets.. ..B-52 strategic bombers, in particular,
redoubled their carpet-bombings - without distinction of
targets. In March 1039,� right after taking office, U.S.
Defense Secretary Me Laird decided to ask for an addi-
tional credit of 52 million dollars in 1959-70 to increase
B-52 activites from 1,503 to 1,853 missions a month. . . .
Over 2,500 artillery pieces of all calibers., positioned
everywhere on the mainland and based on warships.
Everyday, tens of thousands of shells of different calibers
were pumped into villages and hamlets. Quang Tri alone,
in a single day, received over 20,003 shells...
Sweeps against civilians, villages and hamlets
' In the period under review (January, 1939-June, 1971)
U.S.-Saigon and satellite troops mounted over 50,033
mopping-up operations of battalion size upwards through-
out South Vietnam, blotted out more than one-fourth of
the total of hamlets in the South, and perpetrated hundreds
of new Son My-type massacres, many of which had been
disclosed by GI's themselves.
..In the two provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien,
our of 870 hernlets, nearly 500 were levelled.,...
� . In Quang Da province, till late 1970, out of 441 hamlets,
351 were .erased. Bien Ban district- had 20 of its 27 vil-
lages flattened: Go Noi area, composed of 6 villages with
40,000 inhabitants. was razed to the ground. The sur-
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I.
the CIA with the direct conduct of' a new "pacification"
effort called "rural defense and local development" pro-
gram, beginning May 1, 1971. According to an assigned
quote, within a year, the Saigon agents have to liqUidate
14,003 patriots and force four million more people into the
"civil defense" organization.�
Following were the principal measures taken to imple-
ment the Nixon administration's "pacification" program':
In 20 months under Nixon, the U.S. used in South Viet-
nam an amount of explosive equal to the total of U.S.
bombs expended in both 4 years' World .War II and two
years' Korean War (Bomb tonnage used in the Europe. and
Pacific theatres: 2,682,244 tons; that used. in .Korea:
635,003 tons).
- Under Johnson, the yearly average of U.S. bombs used
in both South and North Vietnam ran to 800,000 tons. Under
Nixon, the qtiantity of bombs dropped on South, Vietnam
alone yearly average 1,377,000 tons. According to. the U.S.
Defense Department's data from the beginning of 1959 to
August 1970, the U.S.. rained 2,131,334- tons of bombs and
fired 2,292,125 tons of shells in the Indochina theatre, most-
, �
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
were turned into no-man's land. In Ben Tre provincenm
1969-1970 alone, the U.S.-Saigon troops launched 6,003
sweeps, slaying 4,300 people, -maiming 3,590, imprisoning
aver 4,990, burning nearly 4,003 houses and levelling bun-
lreds of hamlets.
The periphery of Saigon, stretching CO miles from Sai-
�;on to Tay Ninh, was cleared off. Twenty villages along
the Vain Co Dung river, Long An province, were changed
into deserts.
Many an operation lasted for months on end, such as
the raid beginning December, 1958, and ending late in
April, 1959, on numerous areas in My Tho arid Ben The
provinces, during which the soldiery killed and wounded
almost 3,039 people, burnt 1,000 dwellings, blotted out
(lozens of hamlets and herded tens of thousands_of villag-
ers into concentration camps....
...The "II Minh campaign" from Des:sernhner let, 1.0i73
to late April 1971 in Ca Mau and Rach Gin, supported by
hundreds of U.S. aircraft and artillery pieces, during
which the troops, according to their own profession;�
murdered 2,411 civilians, injured hundreds .of others, ab-
ducted hundreds of people, impounded tens of thousands
in concentration camps and set on fire tens of square
miles of forests.... In Ca Mau 'alone, from pril 1970 to
pril 1971; the raiders raped or killed 575 people- of female
Sex, including children and wounded 334 others.. .
Data from the U.S. Senate, stated (though still below
the reality) that the 'U.S.-Saigon forces in 1970 killed or.
i.njured 125,000 people, one-third being children under 13
;years of age.
� I Colby, the man in charge of the US. � "pacification"
program in South Vietnam, admitted on April 21, 1971,
that from the beginning of the war to April, 1971, 5,900,090
civilians (one-third of the South Vietnamese population)
were killed, injured or made homeless.
3) Stepping up population concentration to control and
exploit them and to squeeze manpower and material
sources for the U.S. war of tiggressien. '
The U.S.-Saigon forces carried out indiscriminate
bombings and strafings, chemical sprays and sweeps
against the civilians, used , series of huge bulldozers
of over 20 tons with special "Rome plow blades" against
houses, gardens and hamlets, thereby levelling whole vil-
lages into no-man's lands. . .
With inch atrocities, millions of inhabitants were
made homeless end forced to leave their villages, and
mine away in disguised concentration camps. . .
Once the people were cooped up there, "purification'.'
programs started and "Vietcong" or "Vietcong" suspects
were exectited:
A network of spies, scouts, civil guards, policemen and
"pacification" men was set up in such car:erre,tocenteol
and supervise the detainees and spot, arrest and assass-
inate those who did not submit to the enemy during the
so-called 'Phoenix" Or "Swan" campaigns.
About the "Phoenix" campaign, the Baltimore Sun
wrote on May 26, 1971: the campaign dragged on for 3 or 5
years and an average of Loo people 'were killed or jailed
in a month, surpassing the plan by 1,223. In Ka, a monthly
average of 1,850 _people were disposed of. . . .
Early in 1971, some. 10,090 minority peonle in CO ham-
lets on the High Plateaux were forced into concentration
camps in the lowland... �
_ Those who demanded to return to their villages and
refused to suffer such harsh conditions were persecuted.
A case in point was the airbornbing of 359 detainees in
Kong-Ho-Rirh concentrating-1 cerrsa in nreseeturret ply/I:errs
on Feb. 22, 1939.
Repression and persecution in urban c-enters.
The U.S.-Saigon rulers also carried out the "pacifica-
tion" plan in urban areas... .
In operation "Thach Loc" "fa) in Hue-1 Q.ZanZ.7, Ti
provincial capital and Dong 114 township, the enemy
arrested, tortured or threw in jail oven 30,C90 COiC arid
forcibly enlisted 1,599 young people.; . .
All repressive measures were taken against students
movements, such as closing down schools and forcing
them to take military training..or go into the army, en-
circling or brutalizing their meetings, demonstrations or
sit-ins.
The crackdown of the press was still more blatant. In
1959, the Saigon papers were confiscated 40 times...
In 1970, 230 times, and in the first six months of 1971,
250 times. The Ting Sang (Morning News) has been barnted
127 times since March 13, 1970. '
Higher taxes were imposed on townspeople.
Living, costs rose in proportion. According to official
statistics, in 1959 the living costs shot up 09 percent as
compared with 1958. In 1970 they again soared by 70 per-
cent. 100 kg, (220 lbs.) of rice of the best quality in 1969
cost 590 piastres but this year 10,090 piastres, the price of
an egg grew from one piastre to 22 piasters.
The U.S. magazine Look VTOtC on June 11, 1970�since
,1965 (when the U.S. expeditionary corps was directly in-
volved in the war of aggression) the living cOsts in South
Vietnam had gone 900 percent higher. .
4) Continued chemical warfare cotsplenel with at-
tempts to deceive public oniniore
Alongside bombings and strafings, the Nixon atins,in-
istration Continued chemical warfare...Toxics laid
waste over 1,880,000 hectares (one hectare equals 2.47
acre) of rice and 'other crops, orchards and jungles:
poisoned nearly 900,000 people, mostly women, chAren
hundreds of them lethally. . .
...The .U.S. wantonly lobbed gas or chemicals, bon-lbs �
and shells on villages. Gas and toltic chemicals v,Tre -
also sprayed by U.S, and Saigon troops into ur:dergro::r,d
trenches, shelters, houses, wells and other drinkirn
water sources during their actions. In the 1970-1071 liskell
year, the Nixon administration spent 8 billion dollars on
chemical warfare and has planned to drop 1,300,000 more
gallons of "Blue" and "White" agents on South' Viet-
namese soil.
Since the beginning of this year, U.S. aircraft have
been flying more chemical sprays over numerous areas in
the provinces of Quang ,Tri (March, 1971), Thna Thien
(May, 1971) Phu Yen (March and April, 1971), Tra Vinh
(February, 1571), Rach Gia (February, 1971), Ca Mau
. .
(January, March and April, 1971), etc.
...The Nixon administration is training the Saigon
army and equipping it with chemical warfare facilities
to continue such atrocities in South Vietnam.
The continued and intensified use of chemical products
in high concentration and on vast areas for many years by
the U.S: in South Vietnam has had serious effects on the
population and the environment there, effects unforesee-
able for the immediate or distant future.
The U.S. chemical war crimes in South Vietnam were
exposed nnd strongly condemned by the Paris Inter-
national Conference of Scientists (December 1970) and
the second session of the International Commission for
Inquiry into U.S. war crimes held in Oslo (June, 1970).
� Harsher prison regime and medieval torture
Beside a sum of 86,761,900 for paying U.S. advisors on�
prison and covering the cost of the maintaining of prisons
in South Vietnam, the Nixon administration has spent 103
more million dollars for the enlargement of the prison
system.
After the denunciation of the 150 "tiger cages" in Con
Son island (July, 1970) the Nixon administration, on the
one 'hand; ordered the abolition of the "tiger cage" re-
gime, but on the other; has secretly built 334 new "tiger
cages.".. .
AFP estimated on April 29, 1971, at 400,000 the South
Vietnamese prison Phpulation. Current were such horrors
as applying electricity to the breasts of women detainees
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� and to the genitals- bf men prisoners, driving nails into
their fingers and toes, immersing them in water, strap-
pado, tearing out their teeth with pincers, driving skew-
ers into the privy parts of female inmates includiez teen-
aged girls, repeatedly for many days.
Phain The True, a member of the Saigon "parliament"
testified that in. the first six months of 1971, in inh Thuan
province alone, nearly 6,000 civilians were unwarrantedly
imprisoned and savagely tortured. According to Kieu
iTiong Thu, a woman member of "parliament," the ward-
*ers at Tan Hiep jail used quick lime and acid against.
women -prisoners, inflicting grave injuries on many of
them.
. . . ... � .. . .
II.Contintitti and serious encroachments on the soir--
: ereigaty and security of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam.
In blatant violation, of the U.S. Government's commit-
ment to end definitively an; unconditionally all bombard-
ments and other acts of war against the DfaVN, in the thir-
ty months of its rule, the Nixon administration (ordered
the following):.:. .aircraft of various kinds, including
B-52 stategic bombers, and its artillery based south of the
demarcation river and on the Seventh .Fleet in repeated.
reconnaissance flights and murderous bombing and shell-
ing missions against many heavily populated areas in
-"North Vietnam. . .
U.S. planes flew 31,215 reconnaissance sorties over 25
provinces and Cities in North Vietnam, and the tempo
of such flights had not ceased growing: From a monthly
average of 650 in 1959, it went up to 1,150 in 1970 and 1,000
in the first half of 1971:
U.S, tactical aircraft made 2,714 and B-52 strategic
planes 601 strikes releasing a total of 184,167 demolition
and blast bombs, 2,853 cluster-bomb units (CBU) many
-missiles, rockets and 20:nm shells on many populated
areas from Vinh Liah (17th parallel) to Vinh Phu province
(21st 'parallel) and even letting off missiles" and rockets
on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong. :
On March 21, 1971,40 waves of jet planes includ-
ing F4, F-105 and other types in 15 air actions in succes-.
sion dropped 150 demolition and blast bombs and 22 CBUs,
�fired many missiles, rockets and 207am Shelia on popu-
lation centers in Ky Anh and Hnoug Nile districts; Ha Thin
province, killing or wounding over 30 civilians, destroying
27 houses and a primary school.
--... The rate of U.S. air strikes increased day after day. In
1059: the monthly average of tactical aircraft missions
was 50, that of B-52's was four.
,In 1970: the figures rose respectively by 150 and 45.
. times. In the first half of 1071 the monthly rate*was 137
times for tactical planes and 46 for B-52s. -
'� - III. Direct inVasions of ,Cranbesilia and Laos extend
the Nixon administration's war of aggression to the
whole Irealechina.
. To salvage its "Vietnamization" program in South
Vietnam,. the Nixon administration not only continued to
-violate the sovereignty and threaten the security of the
:Democratic Republic of Vietnam but also eapaucled the
aggressive war to Cambodia and Laos, thereby adding to
its records fresh war crimes against the Indochinese. .
On March 13, 1570,- following the U.S.-masterminded
ceup d'ettat against Head oinStato Norodom Siixnouc Can
Nixon administration set up a lackey administration in
Phnom Penh. At the end of April 1970, it hurled tens of
thousands of U.S. and Saigon troops into an invasion
of Cambodia....
Thea Nixon administration continued to introduce
military personnel, weapons and strategic goods into
Vietniane to step up its special war in Laos. The
Central Intelligence Agency-speot hundreds of millions of
dollars on the organizing, training and officering of the
mercenary army of the Moo nationality headed by Wing
Pao for inroads into the liberated mile of Laos. The U.S.
also brought 17 battalions and continued to being more
battalions of Thai mercentaries to Laos to join the rightist
array....
The U.S. kept a high level of bombing in Laos. U.S.
senator Paul McCloskey recently disclosed that the ton-
nage of bombs dropped on Laos had doubled since Nixon
assumed office. Since September 1970, it has been flying
a daily average of 500-000 tactical aircraft and 50-60 B-52
missions against Laos.,
Early in February, 1971, the Nixon administration
mobilized. nearly 2,000 planes, more than 40,000 U.S. and
Saigon troops in aggression against Southern Laos. How-
ever, the disorderly rout of this aggressive army after
losing an important part of its manpower vividly demon-
strated the bankruptcy of "Vietnamization," whose pur-
pose is to shift on to the Saigon army the war responsibil-
ity of U.S. troops. �
Along with these � criminal -operations, the *Nixon ad-
ministration has' endeavoured to instigate the *rightist
party in Vientiane to torpedo every effort of the Lao Pa.-:
triotic Front to solve the Laos issue peacefully. .
IV. Universal indignation of the heinous crimes of U.S.
imperialism and tie Vietnamese people's resolve to
carry on their resistance till final victor/.
The past 30 months of the Nixon administration have
been thirty months of progress along the path of the neo-*
col,onialist War of aggression against Viet Nam and the
-whole Indochinese peninsula.... .
According to the estimates of William Wallace Ford,
retired. U.S.' Army Brigadier (New York Times July 2,
1970) in South Viet Nam alone, the U.S. war of aggression
has had the following. consequences: 300,00 civilians
killed, over 1,000,050 others injured, 105,050 incapacitated,
253,000 orphans and 6,050,000 D.P.s and homeless:. ..
Wherever and whenever the crimes or U.S. imperial-
ism were brought to light, they triggered off outbursts of
anger against the Nixon administration's flouting of all
:norms of morality and international practice and .untold
crimes against the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cam-
bodia. These have played havoc among .the present gen-
erations of these countries and will have incalculable ef-
fects -on the future generations. They have leached the
level of genocide and of systematic destruction' of life and
the living environments. .
Together with the progressives in the United States
who have been courageously and persistently pushing up
their actions against the policy of aggression and the
crimes of war of the U.S. ruling circles in Indochina, a
front�of the world people has practically taken shape to
back the just fight of the Indochinese peoples under the
comMon slogan urging the Nixon administration to stop
immediately its aggression in Viet Nam and Indochina,
bring home speedily all the U.S. troops and let th Viet-
namese and. the other .peOples of Indochina settle their
own affairs without U.S. interference. . � �
Recently, the disclosure- Of the Pentagon's "secret
study" on Viet Nam by the American press has further
substantiated the denunciations : made by the Govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam- over many
years past concerning the root cause of the Vietnam war,
and the aggressive nature of the United States.
For their part, the Vietnamese people from South to
North; while being deeply grateful for the allround sup-
port of the fraternal socialist countries, the nationalist
countries and the forces of-peace and democracy through-
out the world and eagerly longing for peace which, how-.
ever, must be a peace in real independence and freedom,
are determined with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia at
their 'side to keep up their war of resistance to U.S. ag-
gression for national salvation; till complete victory., -
Over the past two and half years, defying all: diffi-
culties and hardships, the Vietnamese people in conjunc-
tion with the successful fight of the Lao and Cambodian
00UtinUela
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peo71es, have inflicted heavy reverses on the U.S. ag-
gressors and their henchmen more than 1,150,030 enemy
troops including 365,000. GIs and tens of thousands of tons
of weapons and a considerable amount of. war materiaN of
the U.S. have been put out of action.
The bellicose and corrupt lackeys of the U.S. In Saigon
�are more isolated than ever. Over the same period, 138
U.S. aircraft have beeh shot down in the Democratic Re-
'public of Vietnam, bringing to 3,335 the totai of U.S.
planes grounded between August 5, 1934, and June 30, 1971.
- raThe accanzran_nan:: 2Nixcu Adralnri,c,=t-icn crimes in inanlcelf-ma, circolnt-
ell as an official document by the. United Natons, will be an eye-vaener for many Arnerico.ns
who believe Ntaen is "winrf3ag down" the Vicanin war. The Derneera2ic Republic el Vietnam
in this mennesiowsthnt, un 22 cover c2 "V the U.S..' hns steopedC7 tEn:a
war in every way..
The DRV study covers the 30 months from January, 139,. to June, 1971. In that period,
the U.S. has had its puppet Saigon regime more than double the size of the Saigon army, from
500,000 to more than a million men, and furnished it with hundreds of new warplanes and'
ships, hundreds of thousands of new weapons.
A new. U.S.2sacnsored "pacification" pnognran has been started, hacked by $1 billion
in U.S. funds; bombing and shelling of South Vietnath has sharply escalated, involving hun-
dreds More air raids and tens of thousands more bomb-tonnage dropped. On the ground,
hundreds of hamlets have been destroyed and their inhabitants massacred.
- During the Nixon years, millions of South Vietnamese have been herded into concentra-
tion camps and prisons, while the entire countnyside has been sprayed with poisons, destroy-
ing several, million acres of crops and affectir.g t'00,C3D-people. New invasions of Cambodia
arid Laos' were carried out under Nixon orders, broadening the war. The air war against
Cambodia and Laos�hs.'s risen in intensity every month, and there have been renewed air
attacks against the.DRV.
D2SDitO the Ninnon acFn'ression, "Vietnnnaizadon" his failed and the peoples of Indochina
have continued to inflict severe reverses On the U.S. and its puppets. The Vietnamesealao
and Cambodian peoples are determined to fight on- until complete victory, and have the sup-
port of all the world's peace-loving forces. s.
Tine De-Tanen:tic Republic of Vint-,..TlitYS memorandum on Nizca war crimes' in Indochina.
was circulated to all United 1\ZOinns mamber-states on Oct. RI, by UN Secretary-General U
Thant at the. request .of Dr. Zdenek.Cerniln UN Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic.
�D.W. Foreinn Dennrtrnent
�
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DECEMBER 1971
(b)(3)
"CORDS comes home to Washington,
Pacification has just begun, �
Still so many hearts and minds to be won."
�from "Songs to Alienate Hearts and Minds By"
EARLY three million Americans
have now served in Vietnam. Of
these, about 600 have been Foreign
Service officers.
Thus, roughly .20 percent of the
Foreign Service has been exposed to
many of the stimuli which have
turned "nice" kids from Middle
America into peace freaks, hawks,
junkies, and even assassins.
For the FSOs, however, the ex-
perience generally has not had the
radicalizing effect that it has had on
many of the military men. The
FSOs tended to be older and less
malleable than the American sol-
diers in Vietnam, and their personal
thought processes were more subtle
and less striking than those of the
GIs. Some FSOs were essentially
untouched by the whole experience,
reacting no differently than if they
had been in Paris or Rome. But for
most, and especially the young, Viet-
nam meant change. It meant a
violent breaking away from the tra-
ditional diplomatic life and an ex-
posure to the realities of war.
About 350 FSOs have been as-
signed to the Pacification program
(CORDS). They functioned as ad-
visors to the Vietnamese civilian
and military administration in an
effort to make the Government of
Vietnam a viable force in the coun-
tryside. Few, if any, had any back-
the
ftreign S3rvce
JOHN CLAYMORE
John Claymore is the pseudonym
of a former FSO who served in
Vietnam. The primary reason for
his resignation from the State De-
partment was disagreement with
US policy on Southeast Asia. He
is not using his real. name because
of a limitation on publishing in his
current job, but he would be glad
to correspond or meet with any-
one interested in discussing his
article.
photographs. He has written exten-
sive reports on these apparent war
crimes he investigated in Vietnam.
As far as he knows, no action has
ever been taken to punish the
guilty. Because he is a supporter of
the President's Vietnam policy, and
because he fears the effect on that
policy of additional war crime con-
troversy, he has not chosen to make
his information public. He also is
undoubtedly aware of the negative
result disclosure would have on his
career prospects.
His example is extreme, but it
points up the fundamental proposi-
tion that serving in Vietnam is not
like serving elsewhere.
With respect to no other country
could it be said that perhaps 20
percent of the FSOs had experi-
mented with soft drugs, but that is
the case in Vietnam. And in no
other country do FSOs have their
own personal automatic weapons
and receive training in how to fire a
grenade launcher before they go.
Vietnam is different.
undoubtedly sharp-
the generation gap between
young and old FSOs. In some of the
junior grades, a disproportionately
large number have been to Viet-
Int-11/Ainanm. Almost all return with a
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ground for this assignment; yet most
have acquitted themselves well,
within the context of the programs
they were working in.
Nevertheless, FSOs have been
affected by .the same pressures that
have been widely reported in rela-
tion to the military.
Many served in proto-combat
roles with command responsibility.
While not participants, they re-
ceived reports of war crimes and
what often seemed like the unneces-
sary loss of human life. Some were
faced with the moral dilemma of
how far they should go in exposing
incidents which they knew to be
wrong.
One HO currently serving in
Washington possesses a file of
VIETNAM has
ened
A
ripw r,T,DirtiT'Vrt:
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( I\ U !V I
� .. r791 o.
11i:11;TC.r?' kci
1-17-)�
11.%.ichard Nixon does not intend "to see this nation accept the first
defeat in its proud 190-year history," and the corollary of that is that
he does not intend to preside over the collapse of our client regimes in
Indochina. But in the modern world not even the most super super-
power can indefinitely maintain 'satellite governments 8000 miles
from its shores (6000 miles, if we are thinking of Hawaii). And.
even assuming the viability and the reliability of the governments Of
our choosing and our financing in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambo-
dia, the .PLneiican people �are bound to become increasingly skeptical
about whether the huge invcstinents required are worth it. Other
great powers have played this game --,the French, the Italians, the -
British, the Germans. Japan tried .to make it work as late as .1940;
Portugal is 'still at it: But remote control by money and technology has
a limited life. The Nixon Doctrine will soon seem aS antiquated as.
. Empire or. the co-prosperity sphere. Meanwhile, the President thinks
he can pull it off: winning a civil war in Southeast Asia by repeated,
'heavy doses of US air and naval power, and aid, and disarming his
domestic critics by keeping the casualty rate low and bringing most of .
the combat troops home. In the short run- he might succeed -7 getting
Thieu through '72 and Nixon too. In the longer run he won't. The
Asians will take charge.. -
"Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form," the President
told the press on November 12. It took form initially with the in-
vasion of Cambodia by US forces in April 1970, Staged, the Presi-
dent reported, "to protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guar-
antee the cOntinued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization .
program." A week later, he remarked that if he .were to follow the
advice of the doves and simply withdraw from Indochina, the. enemy
would "come into Vietnam and massacre. the civilians there. by the
millions.": Four days later he judged the Cambodian expedition an
"enormous success," so much so that he thereupon requested an ad-
ditional. $250 million in aid for Cambodia (about $240 million more
than was authorized the preceding year), and. invited "third doun7
tries ..*. to furnish Cambodia with troops or material." The $250:
million,. the' President said, was "probably the best investment in
foreign assiStance that the US has made in my political lifetime." In.
the following year and a half, he withdrew a substantial number of
t riu
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combat soldiers from Vietnam. He also requested $341
million for Cambodia for fiscal '72, which suggests
that the, fewer the number of men whose withdrawal
must be protected, the more it will cost. The $341 mil-
/ lion is not all that will be spent, of course. It does not
si include CIA operations, or the surplus arms and
equipment the" US will turn over to the Cambodians.
Nobody knows how much in' the way of surplus arms
has already been dumped into Southeast Asia. Sena-
'tor Symington has been trying for months to find out,
without much success. Senator Fulbright has asked for
a monthly report from the Pentagon on exactly what
we are doing, what we' are putting into Laos and Cam-
bodia; he is not told. Bureaucracy is expert at passing
the buck. "A slarge part of the data requested bY you,"
the Pentagon informed Fulbright earlier this month,
"is not known to the Dept, of Defense because it con-
cerns the operations of other government departments
or agencies."
What we do know is that the amount is enormous
. and the end is not in sight. 'Whatever the Nixon Doc-
trine promises, it doesn't promise total withdrawal.
"This idea that somehow. or other the Nixon Doctrine
means that we will not have air or sea power in Asia,-
Mr. Laird says, "is a great mistake because that isn't
part of the partnership theory under which we � are
operating." The President adds tivt in the absence of a
� negotiated settlement, we must keep "a residual force"
over. there, "in order to continue our role of leaving
South Vietnam in a position where it would be able to
defend itself from a Communist. takeover." However,
that is not Mr. Nixon's only reason., 'A very ,primary
reason" for keeping a residual force in Vietnam; is that
we must have "something. to negotiate with, with re-
.gard to our prisoners." Five hundred thous-and Ameri-
can troops could not pry the prisoners loose, but 50,-
000 might help de) it! At no, time has the President
bothered to acknowledge or treat seriously Hanoi's
repeated statement that once he sets a withdrawal date,
it will'provide for the safety of our forces as they pull
out, guarantee the release of all POWs and prevent
.reprisals. The President would not like to have it put
this way, but in effect Hanoi has given him a choice
between abandoning Thieu or abandoning the pris-
oners. He thinks he dare not give up either; that is
his dilemma. And not his only dilemma. For his doc-
trthe requires constant transfusions of dollars and arms
to anti-Communist military regimes in Southeast Asia,
while he simultaneously seeks a detente with those bil-
lion Chinese, in fear of whom 'the US intervened in
Indochina a decade ago.
Some idea of the costs can be glimpsed by suryeying
past and planned military assistance to the three Indo-
chinese states. The figures the public has access . to
,understate the reality, for they do not include a variety
of hidden expenditures. Even so, whereas aid to Cam-
bodia in fiscal 1970 was $8.9 million, two years later
the requested authorization was over 37 times higher.
e �
For Laos, the 1970 aid bill Was $118.4 million; for the
'coining fiscal year it will be at least $189 million. Mili-
tary aid 'for .South Vietnam in 1970 was $2,049,100,-
000; in fiscal 1972 it is expected to be about tWo and a
half billion dollars.
The cost to the Indochinese is incalculable by any
'dollar measurement; they pay in the currency of refu-
gees, orphans, cripples, corpses. From 1966 until June
of this year, our fliers had flown 25,546 sorties over
Cambodia; 280,000 over North Vietnam; 505,000 over
Laos; 762,650 over South Vietnam. The air war goes
ahead full speed. We are dropping about 70,000 tons
of bombs each month over Indochina, and by the end
of this year twice the weight of bombs will have fallen
on this area the size of Texas � as were dropped in
World War II and the Korean war.
Congress could set the country on a different, less
.destructive course, but not by such ambiguous and
open-ended declarations on withdrawal as the one it
attached to a $21.4 billion bill for weapons and Penta-
gon research, and which the President simply dismissed
last week as "without binding force or effect."
. � In 1968, Mr. Nixon said he had a plan to end the
.war. He 'did; be is following it; it is to. get peace by
winning the war but without losing the next election �
a refinement of an early and abandoned Lyndon John-
son plan to let Asians fight Asians. In its "purest
form," the doctrine is bull.
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2, 5 WI
I
/ .1, � r), _ .
�st.
V I I I Ukii 1
33.17 STEWART EELLERMAN
�
VP1 51,-1ff Wrilor
� SAICON----It was a rainy
evening and the villagers
- huddled in their wet straw
huts warming themselves
:by smoky fires. Outside,
two. young Vietnamese'
, crawled through knif e--
sharp elephant grass to
the outskirts. of the vil-
lage.
- one of the youths buried
.
an olive-painted claymore
mine in the red-brown
- mud of the only trail lead-
ing into the village. The
other strung a wire to a
plunger hidden behind, a
clump of bushes.
. - The two youit-m.en----on
the payroll of the U.S.
.1 Central intelligence ..kgen-
� cy (CIA)----could soon hear'
the splash of footsteps as
the local Communist polit-
:Ical leader returned home
'to spend the night, with his �
family. � .
. They waited patiently,
. rubber sandals sunk in the
tmud.- The, moment the
Comma niat leader reached
the mine, they pushed
down on the plunger, shat-
tering the evening calm
with a deafening roar.
The killing was the work
of the Phoeni. Program,
tin allied project aimed at
wiping .out the political
leadership. of the National
Libeeation. Front (NUN)
with some of the same ter-
rorist tactics the Commit-
. nista have used against
Saigon goyern.m.ent offi-
� cials. ..
' U.S. Involvement,
�� A U.S. Army intelligence
officer described the in-
cident to newsmen but de-
manded the names, Idea-
tion and date he kept se-
cret. Ilis caution was typi-
cal of American officials
with 'knowledge of one of.
. the most controversial and
least -understood allied
programs in Vietnam.
, Reliable American
.sources said the United
States, which. thought up
Phoenix almoat four years
ago, is still deeply in-
volved in it.
Aside from CIA partici-
pation, the U.S, Army (has
helped set up a massive in-
telligence apparatus
which Critics claim has
given the Saigon govern-
ment "big brother" power
over much of the popula-
tion. The sources said U.S.
Army intelligence officers
also sit unofficially on
hoards determining the
fate of suspected Commu-
nists.
Officially, the object of
the Phoenix Program is
the "neutralization" of the
'Viet Cong In f-aastructure
(V.C1), bureaucratic jargon
Son the Communist sha-
dow government in South
Vietnam. .
1?.eason for 'Killings
The program, started by
South Vietnam in lf,`68
with the encouragement
of U.S. intelligence ex
-
pelts, claims to have neu-
tralized .8309 Commu-
nists . since thent-20,036
40,580 jailed and
22,083 talked into switch-
ing sides.
Allied officials working
in the Phoenix Program
usually say the killings
have been the result of
suspects resisting arrest.
"We don't want to 'kill
any of them," one U.S. ad-
visor sTid. "We want live
ones. A dead man is just a
statistic. He can't give us
any information. And we
have to bury him."
U.S. officials working in
related programs and
some former Phoenix ad-
visers, however, occasion-
ally tell a different story
.when speaking anon y-
mOUSly.
"r)f re- we'ee --ng
lot cif VC and torturing a
lot of them." one Ameri-
can said. "What else can
we do .it We're just doing
the same thing to the ene-
my as tl�vt-- to us."
C 0 iu munist teiT01:151.
ha v'e 111i1(10, life just as dan-
gerous for government of-
ficials. The Saigon. govern-
ment lists I 1,680 Commu-
nist terrorist incitients last
-st
'year a 1 0 n e, principally
against local officials and
- their relatives: �
It was suppertinic in a
t mall, rice-farming village
in the central highlands of
_ South Vietnam. .
The kitchen sounds�
' scraping of pots clinking
� or glasses and clacking of
iplatea--drowned out the
noise f two young Com-
munists walking :toward
the village: .� .
'Family Gunned Down
The two youths, dressed
in black. pajamas and car-
rying Soviet-reade
walked down the only
path leading. into town,
their ru'bber tire sandals
slapping against the earth.
WithouChesitation, they
pushed open the doof: of
the biggest building--an
unpainted wooden shack
where the Saigon govern-
mere. village chtef had. just
sat down for supper with
his wife and two. children.
The men then
mechanically e rn p tied
their rifles into the 'room
and casually walked out of
the. village, leaineobehind
four bodieS Slumped
across the. table. between
pieces of broken dishes
and glaases:
It was one more Com-
munist te.:-.:arist attack
against local -government
offieials, village council-
men and dedinary civilians
In South Vietnam, Dozens
of � tertorist. attacks take
place every day across the
country, �
"It's easy tor somebody to
stand tip. in Congress back
In the States'. and eorn plain
about .hotv immoral - the
Phoealix Program is, one
U.S. official said. . "But
Once' you've seen the VC
gain' down:- -chiefs,
kilt innoc.ent women- and
children, you don't feel
that � way anymore:
They're just animals and
they've got to be -destroy:,
ed.
'The only- way to fight
thee ..7ellinals is to kill
thern," a U.S.. police 'advt.'
set� =said. 'it's too bad but
we haven't clont.'; _enough
killince around here lately:
ll,re only got loan of them
in my district last month."
Controversial Grojtp
Withont a doubt; ti
most controversial: men on
the Phoenix team are the
PRUs, members � of pro-
vince reconnaissance units
organized and financed by
the CIA, according to Al-
lied intelligence sources.
Thie sources said the
PRU% Mainly former ell-
minals and Communists
recruited from jails, are
tho triggermen for. the
program's political assas-
sinations. They said the
PRUs are also used to ar-
rest especial!yt. dangerous
suspects and to administer
the rougher tortures.
At the 'start of the pro-
gram, the typical assassin-
ation squad would be
made Up of four ,PRUs and
two Americans, the
sources ..said. .Nowadays,
however, the PRUs 'usual-
ly work alone.
They said the PRUs used
to get paid piece rates--;
that is, by the head. But
the CIA ..switched them
ovct? to straight salaries�
substantially higher than
pay _scales fol.. South Viet--
nair430, soldiers and po-
lice.
lIrogrann -
Unit is a' poor . farmed.
Ile grows rice on an acre
of land. near the, South
China 'Sea. He lives with
his wife and -three chil-
dren � in a cramped hut
made of stray.' and nufd.
millions of
others---has been :forced.
by tho South 'Vietnamese
government- to spy On his
own family for -the Phd--an-
ix Prograth, � .!
"I don't- want to get into
trouble," LinIcsaid
fit vo ugh- -a Iran slat er.
'That's why I Jell the
government what h y
want. I don't tell. them ev-
erything, of couese. Just as
ranch as I have-to." �
This Phoenix Program
has tried to get ea gin
int ong (fainily head) like
Linh to report in � every
hut, house and shanty in
South Vietnam. They're
.the lowest rungs on a thaa-
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'WASHINGTON POST
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11W+
(b)(3)
By Mark Frankland
London Observer
SAIGON�The It oman
Catholic community in
South Vietnam, once consid-
ered to be the nation's anti-
Communist hard-core, is
now providing some of the
most vigorous opponents of
President Thieu's regime.
e� There are young Catholics
.among the student militants
who - have been burning
American. ears on the streets
of Saigon these past few
:weeks. Tin Sang, the major
opposition newspaper, is
run by. a group of .young
Catholic deputies.
Even the more moderate
Catholic politicians in the
Senate, led by the Senate's
'Chairman, protested against
President Thieu's one man
re-election. A group of
-young Catholic priests pro-
Aided the opposition with an
Intellectual backing more
;radical than that of the.
Blidelhist monks associated
with the militant An..Quant
pagoda.
It never was true that the
Catholics, who make up
one-tenth. . of South Viet-
nam's population of 17 mil-
lion, were all aggresSive
anti-Communists. This repu-
tation was really won by the
.Catholic Communities who
emigrated � to the Smith
when Vietnam was divided
into two zones at the Ge-
neva Conference in 1954.
. Inevitably these groups,
which resettled as communi-
ties still under the leader-
Ship of their- old parish
priests, were eager allies of
the Saigon government; all
the more so becalise. that
government was headed
from 1954 to 1963 by the
.pious �Catholic Ngo Dinh
Diem. -
The Diem gOvernment set-
tled a good many of the ref-
ugees from the North
around Saigon, and the
nearness of these .militants,.
Who were always ready to
take part in demonstrations
in the capital, gave the im-
pression of an entirely
miii-
uon. Why do they think so
differently from their par-
ents? One very important.
'reason is that they have
come to look very critically
at the whole history of Viet-
namese Cathlicism.
Catholicism. was, � .of
course, brought to Vietnam
by European missionaries. It
was the most eminent of
these who gave the Vietnam-
ese language its Roman
script. A French bishop be-
came the first great Western
interferer in Vietnamese af-
fairs by helping put the Em-
peror. Gia Long on the
throne of a united Vietnam
�
In 1806.
Gia Long's successors
were less friendly towards
the Catholics and the cries
of help from 'French mis-
sionaries encouraged France
to take the country over.
- The young Catholics today
know that the fate of Chris-
tians in South Vietnam has
been often used to justify
the present war against the
Communist. They know,
too, that many Catholic&
have collaborated closely
with the Americans in Viet-
nam. This alliance with for-
eigners against the Vietnam-
' ese is, of course, a serious
crime in the eyes of many
people. (One of the easiest
Ways to destroy someone's
reputation in Saigon today
is to call him a CIA agent.)
Like many young and in-
tellectual people the radical
� Catholics feel a strong sense
of guilt about their church's
association first with the
French and now with the
-
(It) I1(11 en fir:6
\LI le.) \LI
�
St' 1'r-it'
.
-
_
But in fact the southern-
born Catholics were often
different.
eThose that lived in the
countryside often had to co-
exist with the National Lib-
eration Front. Sometimes .
the Communists' attitude to-�
wards these Catholics was
tough; it was accommodat-
ing. In either case the Cath-
olics. and their priests had to
1
PI L i ii r:-
)..,
. _..
Americans. It explains why
they, more than any other
opposition group .(excepting
of course the ,Vietcong) are
prepared to accept the Con-
sequences of a total Ameri-
can withdrawal however un-
pleasant they may be.
The militant Buddhists
are far less certain on this
point. Perhalps this is partly
because they do not feel
they have any guilt to ex-
learn to live with the Corn- plate. But it is also because
munists as best they could, many educated Catholics,
Today children of the, and mit Only the radicals
Northern ' emigres , are among. them, believe that
among the most active of the churen will survive in
the clerical and lay opposi- some form or other what-
ever happens. The Buddh-
ists, with no world-wide. or-
ganization to give moral
support from outside, are.
considerably more gloomy
about their future in a Corn- .
numist South Vietnam.
. But the -young opposition-
minded �Catholic! priests are
also left wing They . wel-
come the egalitarian ideas
of the Communists and feel
the true church has nothing
to lose by them. "If you
have nothing to lose you
have nothing to be. afraid
of," said one of them. �
What counts most for Vi-
etnamese Catholics is the'at-
titude of their bishops, and
the bishops are usually con-
servative. But even among
them there are signs of
change.
The Pope's conference at
Manila last year, when he
proclaimed a "Church of the
Poor" authorizes a move to
the left. The bishops clearly
do not want to be identified
with the present Saigon re-
gime just because President.
Thieu is a Catholic. They
have given, and will give,
no endorsement to Thieu'a.
� uncontested re-election.
The Archibishop is not
going to back the radicals in
the church openly: He is too
cautious a man for that. But
ori-te of -the young priests
elieve .� he accepts that
theirs may be the way of the.
future. Whether that is true
or not the church' has, po-
tentially, a far more ,open
mind about the future than
many have -suppoed in the
past.
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
2 1 EH 1971
(b)(3)
�!
TT? �..1_ r, By hOn 11.20r0t7U����� � .
.
kt,fifal-D- l'he- writer does interpreting and
p12,otOgraphy for ne WaShington Post's
-
iT ,Saigon lF
b:ttrieEaNn.D 'an /3o always
-.
-
.' � �
'111 tY-
� � 0 ' ,
�.
11110113 � knew when .1 'entered Ins house
--..even though he wasblind. It .Niias a,
�,
!thatched house with a mud floor; typi-
% GT .13
07) (En of Buddhist dwellings in the Me-
-J,-)CELL .ii (tkong Delta. The walls .were made of
V. cardboard and -decorated with U.S.-
- niagazi.ne ads.. The. focal point of the,
3 front .roora. was '11:ie ,family altar, on,
which were placed artificial flowers
. .
and fruits, pictures, of deceased fore;
'fathers and. a bright., sawed-off artil-
, lery shell for incense:
.
I- had come to Vietnam as :a -volun-
- teer:lor International Voluntary Serv-
.ices (IVS) in mid-1969 from the Univer-
� sity of California at Berkeley, where'
.-Vietnam had been the main :topic of
cOnversation. Everyone had pet theo-
ries on the war, but no one had been
By 1ton Moreau
A lion Hao vitlager
-51110 4-CS 111(1711Uttila frour
-a ware/ pipe mode out
of an American beer Call...
there. 1 wanted .to be there.
had opposed U.S. intervention in
.Vietnam and had been peripherally in-
.:Volved, in, the antiWar Movement. My
.draft board granted me conscientiouS
--objector status, -accepting INTS service
in Vietnam as a satisfactory alterna-
tive to military;duty.-
lIoa Hao (pronounced web-how)
,village where I Stayed for 11/2 years, in �
Vietnam's fiat delta region near the
Cambodian border, most foreigners
were viewed as intruders, tolerated
� Only for their money.. Naked and rag-
ged children would shout, 'Americalf,
American" in: Vietnamese, pointing
and occasionally throwing objects as
rode past. The older ,people generally
would ignore me. lint after I learned
.,Vietnamese and --local customs, I
gained a -.degree of acceptance, and I
V.made 'a few Close friends. Eao,' a 60-
-year-old farmer, farmer, was my best friend.
- .
I lived in a marketplace some five
� 'miles from him, and I kept ray motor-
bike .at his house on a bumpy dirt road
that followed the river. The rural delta
� people do not live in clusters as In
most other regions of Vietnam. Rather,,
the delta houses extend along the int*
bate canal network that rims tendril-
like through the region,
' When -I Would arrive 'at Bao's house,
he would invite me to sit down for tea.:
Some of the furniture ,was ' fashioned
out of empty rocket crates. Local cook-
des L1.3ado of rice flow and a pet of tea
were placed on the table by his daugh-
ter, who greeted me with downcast
. . � . � � .
0-0:atinue4
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462
(b)(3)
COLUMBUS, OHIO
IS P AT CR
2267
s 33.8,040
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