TAIPEI AND THE NIXON DOCTRINE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02909558
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01898
• Publication Date: April 17, 1970

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--Secret--
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Taipei and the Nixon Doctrine
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17 April 1970
No, 0502/70
73
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 April 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Taipei and the Nixon Doctrine
Summary
The Republic of China believes the 1970s will
be a crucial period in its history. Taipei views
its declining support abroad, together with recent
shifts in US Asian policy, as a growing threat to
Nationalist interests, especially its claim to
sovereignty over all of China. The Chinese lead-
ers do not necessarily fear that the US will negate
its defense commitments and "sacrifice" Taiwan for
an accommodation with Peking, but they interpret
any US action in Asia that appears to alter the
status quo as a betrayal of Nationalist interests.
Taipei is now particularly concerned that current
US moves are encouraginTmorldwide interest in end-
ing Peking's isolation--a development that could
result in both a substantial reduction of Taipei's
international standing and a weakening of its jus-
tification for continued "mainlander" monopoly
of political power on the island. The Nationalists
realize, however, that in the absence of a viable
alternative they have no choice but to continue
to rely on the US. Their public reaction to date
has been restrained because they are unwilling to-
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
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communicate a sense of impotency while the scope of
US intentions toward Peking is still ill-defined.
Thus, the coming visit to the US of Vice �Premier
Chiang Ching-kuo will probably be utilized to plumb
US intentions at the highest levels. Taipei will
probably continue to resign itself to US policies
and actions directed toward recognition of Commu-
nist control of the mainland, but only so long as
the Nationali.sts are not obliged explicitly to
concur.
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A Changing US Asian Policy
1. Taipei has always exhibited extreme sensi-
tivity and suspicion concerning the reliability of
US diplomatic and military support--a reflection of
a deep, but almost subconscious fear that Washington
will ultimately move to recognize the fact of Com-
munist control of the mainland and significantly
alter the US role in Asia. The beginning of US
disengagement in Vietnam, in conjunction with the
enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine last July, has in
Nationalist eyes given new immediacy to this gloomy
prospect, which Taipei quite understandably would
prefer never to face.
2. From mid-1969 on, the Nationalists were
confronted with a series of what they saw as the
first concrete manifestations of this new and, for
them, ominous turn in the power structure in Asia.
The reduction of 7th Fleet patrolling in the Tai-
wan Strait, the easing of restrictions on US trade
and travel to Communist China, and the US failure to
provide a squadron of F-4s shook Taipei and contri-
buted to its increasingly pessimistic interpretation
of the Nixon Doctrine.
3. These developments have also led to greater
Nationalist sensitivity in regard to Tokyo's future
role in Asia. Chiang Kai-shek has always attached
great importance to Taiwan's relationship to Japan,
believing that Nationalist claims would remain
viable so long as US and Japanese support held firm.
Taipei has been jolted by recent statements of
Japanese Prime Minister Sato expressing interest in
closer contacts with Peking. Nationalist fears
that Japan could not be relied on in the future
were by no means relieved by the recognition of
Tokyo's security interest in Taiwan that was con-
tained in last November's Nixon-Sato communicpi4 on
Okinawan reversion. On the contrary, agreement on
reversion, undertaken without advance consultation
with Taipei, was particularly unsettling to the Na-
tionalists because they saw it as an indication that
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Washington and Tokyo intend to exclude them from
consultations on important regional matters related
to Taiwan's security, Most immediately, however,
the Nationalists have been concerned over the fate
of the US bases on Okinawa; Taipei considers these
a primary facet of its own defenses. The agreement
on reversion, together with Washington's continued
reduction of grant military aid and its pressure on
Taipei to reduce the oversized Nationalist military
establishment, all serve to undermine the credibility
of Taipei's claimed intention to retake the mainland--
the raison d'etre of the Nationalist regime.
4. The most distressing development for Taipei,
however, has been the resumption of Sino-US talks
in Warsaw last January. Taipei has strongly opposed
the Sino-US ambassadorial-level talks since their
inception in 1955. By Nationalist lights, this form
of US consultation with Peking has been tantamount
to an open American "two China's" policy and has
done substantial damage to Taipei's international
credibility. It is apparent, moreover, that the
Nationalists regard the current series of meetings
as a much more serious matter than mere resumption
of past practice, when the contacts took place
against a background of predictable impasse and in-
creasing US involvement in Asia. Taipei is un-
doubtedly disturbed by the unprecedented secrecy
surrounding the sessions--a veil of silence that
underscores its fears that any devolopment at War-
saw will be presented to the Nationalists as a
fait accompli.
A Muffled Response
5. For the most part, Taipei's public response
to these developments has been oblique and restrained.
The government-controlled press, depicting Taipei
as "the most faithful ally of the US and the most
put-upon victim of misplaced trust," has complained
of US "opportunism" but at the same time has ex-
pressed confidence that the current talks at Warsaw
will prove as futile as previous US "appeasement"
of the Communists. Taipei has also been pointedly
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reminding Washington of its commitment to Taiwan
by upgrading and publicizing requests for military
aid. The Nationalist press is missing few oppor-
tunities to score the point that China was "lost"
because of the denial of US military assistance
following World War II. Chiang's personal obses-
sion with the maintenance of the Nationalist mili-
tary establishment was recently illustrated when
he deliberately used inflated estimates of Commu-
nist capabilities in an attempt to persuade impor-
tant US visitors of Taipei's need for sophisticated
military hardware.
6. Nationalist diplomatic reaction has pri-
marily been an effort to coax the US to reiterate its
political and military commitments to Taiwan. In
late March, for example, Taipei centered its atten-
tion on the motion before the US Senate to repeal
the 1955 "Formosa Resolution." Foreign Minister Wei,
in a conversation with the US ambassador in Taipei,
expressed concern over the Nixon administration's
failure to oppose the motion, implying that Taipei
views the matter as a possible first step toward US
cancellation of its commitment to Taiwan. Wei then
requested written assurances that repeal of the
resolution would not affect US defense obligations
and asked Washington to do what it could to minimize
publicity of the Senate proceedings, out of defer-
ence to the Nationalist government's "internal prob-
lems." Other official comments also imply that--
with the exception of the Warsaw talks--the Nation-
alists are less concerned over the substance of the
US initiatives than over their possible psychological
effects on Taiwan and abroad. Nationalist legisla-
tors have recently criticized the regime's "laxness"
in responding to the current threat, and Chiang Kai-
shek probably believes that unrest can be undercut
by new, firm statements of US support for his gov-
ernment.
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the Central Standing Committee
in February adopted a series of foreign policy and
propaganda guidelines to deal with the current trend
in US Asian policy. Some of the proposals, such as
formation of a Northeast Asian security organization
and increased diplomatic activity abroad, were billed
as means to reinforce Taiwan's position as an inter-
nationally viable entity not overly dependent on the
US. Others called for pressure to obtain early US
reaffirmation of opposition to Peking's entry to the
UN, and strengthened liaison with US congressmen
sympathetic to Taiwan. The committee's program also
urged exploitation of the recently published Amerasia
papers to draw a parallel between the loss of China
in 1949 by "appeasers of Peiping" within the State
Department and the apparent direction of current US
Asian policy. The tactic of creating a face-saving
position paper as an end in itself is typical of the
posturing within the KMT government. But it also
indicates that Washington can expect a more energetic
Nationalist lobbying effort as Taipei's fears of US
policy changes begin to crystalize. Indeed just be-
fore his departure for the US Chiang Ching-kuo pub-
licly called for US support for the formation of an
East Asian security organization.
9. Taipei has responded to the threatened loss
of Japanese 6upport with similar tactics by urging
Tokyo to develop a more active and independent policy
in opposition to Peking.
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Holding the Diplomatic Line
10. The Nationalists view the recent US moves
with particular alarm because they know that other
nations will be greatly influenced by American actions
and, as Taipei says, when Washington "takes one step,
others want to take three." As a result, Taipei in
the past has always devoted considerable attention
to keeping its diplomatic lines with other countries
from unravelling. Following French recognition of
Peking in 1964--a jolting blow for the Nationalists--
Taipei has demonstrated increasing flexibility and
imagination in protecting its international position.
11. The most successful Nationalist effort has
been "Project Vanguard," a program providing economic
and technical aid primarily to Africa. By projecting
a "can do" image in Africa, Taipei has picked up
valuable diplomatic support, particularly in the
United Nations. Moreover, hoping to exploit Peking's
inept diplomatic stance during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, Taipei has been seeking contacts with states
recognizing the mainland--such as India, the Nether-
lands, and Indonesia--and is providing aid and tech-
nical assistance to African states, including Ethiopia,
Ghana, and Libya, whose UN positions do not favor
Taipei.
12 Taipei's growing ties with Israel, whose
recognition of Peking in 1950 was never acknowledged
by the Communists, is one of the Nationa2ists' most
interesting initiatives. Contacts, which began in
1967, have since expanded and may be intended to
strengthen Taipei's independence of the US by pro-
viding the Nationalists with an alternate source cif
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military training and equipment. During the past
three years, Taipei has been receiving Israeli mili-
tary training, particularly in paramilitary Lpera-
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13. Even more dramatic, however, has been the
Nationalists' flirtation with the USSR. In 1967,
Chiang Kai-shek issued provisional authorization
for a cautious affirmative response to contacts
initiated by the Soviets and for formal meetings
between official representatives; since then, talks
have been held in several capitals around the world.
In 1968, he ordered the Nationalist propaganda ma-
chine to refrain from direct or extravagant attacks
on the USSR and allowed Soviet journalist Victor
Louis, who has been used by Moscow as an unofficial
envoy elsewhere, to visit Taiwan and meet with Chiang
Ching-kuo and other high-ranking officials. For the
first time since the Nationalists left the mainland,
Chinese specialists are now allowed to attend pro-
fessional conferences in Communist states, and un-
official representatives such as newsmen are en-
couraged to maintain an open attitude toward con-
tacts with their Soviet counterparts. Chiang's
interest in the USSR is primarily based on his hope
of exploiting Soviet hostility toward Peking in order
to dramatize the mainland's isolation and enhance
Taipei's international position. The Nationalists
probably realize the limited potential of their
contacts with the USSR, but they believe their
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cause has benefited from Soviet demarches to other
nations intended to discourage recognition of Peking
and weaken support for it in the UN.
But the Leverage is Limited
14. As suggested above, these efforts to rein-
force Taipei's international position have enjoyed
considerable success. A greater contribution, how-
ever, has been made by the intransigence and self-
imposed isolation of Peking. This situation is now
being altered as Communist China returns to a more
pragmatic and attractive foreign posture. Peking,
faced with mounting Soviet pressure, appears to be
clearly on the diplomatic 'make," 'intent on improv-
ing its international position. In view of recent
developments, the Nationalists may fear that it is
Peking rather than the US that will determine the
strength of the adverse current it sees developing.
� 15. Taipei's pessimism has been deepened by
the growing interest shown by a number of Western
states in cultivating relations with Communist China
at Nationalist expense. Canada and Italy took the
lead when they opened recognition talks with the
Chinese Communists last year. Until recently these
discussions have been snagged on the issue of Tai-
wan, with Peking demanding a formal acknowledgement
of its sovereignty over the island. In March, how-
ever, the Chinese backed away from this harsh demand
and may now be ready to reach an agreement with Ot-
tawa and Rome that will simply provide for Canadian
and Italian recognition of the People's Republic of
China as the sole government of China--the same basic
formula that led to French recognition in 1964.
When this breakthrough is reached, other states--
such as Belgium, Austria, and Luxembourg--will be
tempted to join the bandwagon and recognize the Com-
munist regime.
16. The Nationalists are no doubt concerned
over the impact of such a diplomatic setback to their
position in the United Nations. For 21 years, re-
affirmation of Taipei's status in that international
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forum and its associated organizations has been a
mainstay for Taiwan's claims. The Nationalists were
particularly 'concerned over the effect on the vote
last November of the prevailing interest in estab-
lishing contacts cci.th Peking. At that time, Italy,
Belgium, and Chile shifted from opposition to absten-
tion on the admission of Peking, and Ghana, Libya,
Mauritius, and Nigeria moved from abstention to sup-
port. The votes of Ghana and Mauritius gave Taipei
an unpleasant surprise which, added to the independent
stance of Chile, fed the Nationalists' apprehension
over the dependability of their blocs of support in
Africa and Latin America. Taipei's narrow margin
of eight votes with 21 abstentions on the resolution
calling for the admission of Peking, and the vague- .
ness of several nations' commitments to support the
Nationalists in the future is another reason why
Taipei must view the timing of recent US initiatives
with alarm.
The Problem of the Thirtieth Province
17. Challenges to the government's international
status not only affect its relations with other
states but also its position on Taiwan. For 21 years
the Kuomintang has rationalized its legitimacy in
terms of an eventual return to the mainland, and
morale within the bureaucracy and the military
depends on that aim. Furthermore, the National-
ists have justified their consistent denial to the
Taiwanese of greater participation in national poli-
tical affairs by arguing that as the government of
all China they cannot allot Taiwan province greater
representation than its relatively small population
merits. This argument is only valid, however, as
long as the KMT's claims to wider sovereignty are
viable. In this regard, the Kuomintang has utilized
US support--and the prestige such support offers--to
maintain its control over the Taiwanese. Consequently,
fluctuation in Taipei's intJrnational fortunes and its
reading of the firmness of the US commitment have
always had a direct effect on the Kuomintang's view
of the threat the Taiwanese majority may eventually
pose to continued "mainlander" rule on the island.
18. The government now appears increasingly
concerned that internal pressure from the Taiwanese.
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will become much greater if US Asian policy continues
in its present direction. The most dramatic devel-
vment in this context was the escape from Taiwan of
P'eng Ming-min, a leader of the handful of politi-
cally articulate Taiwanese who oppose mainlander
political domination. P'eng, who had been under sur-
veillance since his release from prison in 1964
after serving 13 months for circulating subversive
literature, fled to Sweden last January under mys-
terious circumstances--a development which has caused
heads to roll in the Nationalist security services.
Given their concern over recent US policy moves, not
to mention their need to find a scapegoat, some Nation-
alist officials have claimed to see a US hand in
P'eng's escape. Their suspicion may have been en-
couraged by P'eng's subsequent application for a US
entry visa; Taipei immediately made known to Wash-
ington its strong objection to P'eng's possible
entry into the US.
19. P'eng's views are, of course, extremely
embarrassing to the Kuomintang, which considers this
an especially inopportune time for him to speak out
freely. Whether P'eng actually can add impetus to the
adverse' international trend the Nationalists see
developing, however, 3.s questionable. In the past,
the small and fragmenterl Taiwanese independence
groups have been litt1 more than a nuisance to
Taipei. Regardless oif the future effectiveness of
Taiwanese dissidence, however, the problem of main-
taining "mainlander" legitimacy on the island is sure
to loom larger and larger in Kuomintang eyes as
pressure mounts on Taipai's international position.
The Uncertain Future
20. The Nationalists realize that, in the ab-
sence of any practical alternative, they have little
choice but to continue to rely on Washington and to
accommodate to US policy, no matter how distasteful.
The uncertainty of the present situation has led the
Nationalists to stop short of a full-scale display
of pique toward Washington. The US attitude is the
keystone of its future, and Taipei is unclear as to
how far Washington is willing to go in developing
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a rapprochement with the Chinese Communists. As
a result, the leadership probably sees little to gain
by communicating to the bureaucracy and public a
sense of impotency in the present situation,,espe-
cially while there is a chance that an intransigent
stance by Peking will again save the day. The coming
visit to the US of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo will
probably provide the Nationalists with a vehicle both
to plumb US intentions and to restate publicly and
privately Taipei's determination to defend its claims.
President Chiang has requested US officials to speak
with complete candor to his son. He said, "It is
better for us to know the limits of US thinking, even
if it should be somewhat distasteful to us."
21. Despite its concern over developing trends,
however, Taipei has by no means reached the panic
stage. The Nationalist leadership does not appear
to believe that the US will abrogate its defense
commitment to Taiwan in return for an agreement with
Peking. Furthermore, thee have been no indications
that the present prospects for diminished US politi-
cal support and diplomatic setbacks elsewhere will
lead Taipei to alter significantly its own interna-
tional tactics. On 18 March, for example, Chiang
Kai-shek told the KMT Central Standing Committee
that the Nationalist position can best be preserved
by a hard-line approach to the current erosion of
its status. Comparing the situation to that in
1949, Chiang said that no external pressure of any
kind should be allowed to weaken the determination
of the Nationalists to defend their claims. The
Nationalists will almost certainly react to Canadian
and Italian recognition of Peking, as they did with
France in 1964, by applying Taipei's longstanding
policy of withdrawing from any capital that estab-
lishes formal ties with the mainland.
22. Taipei's reaction over the longer term is
difficult to assess, in part because it is unclear
at what point the Nationalists will conclude that
a developing Washington-Peking rapprochement re-
quires decisive action to avoid an imposed solution.
The response would depend partially upon whether
Chiang Kai-shek or a successor, perhaps less deeply
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committed to Nationalist claims, were in power.
Grudging acceptance of a lesser status for the
"Republic of Taiwan" or a bilateral political
agreement between Peking and Taipei are develop-
ments that cannot be ruled out as long-run possi-
bilities. At present, however, the outlook is
for little alteration in Taipei's policy of fighting
for preserving the status quo in spite of US initia-
tives and other international developments.
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